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VILMOS PESCHKA 
(1929-2006) 
Professor Vilmos Peschka, editor-in-chief of this review, member of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences passed away on 25 July 2006 at the age of 77. 
He departed this life as a prominent scholar on legal philosophy during the 
period following the Second World War in Hungary. 
Vilmos Peschka was born at Budapest on 17 December 1929. He graduated 
from the Law Faculty of Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), where he obtained 
a diploma summa cum laude in 1954. Between 1954 and 1957 he pursued 
postgraduate studies in legal philosophy. From 1 September 1957 he was a 
research fellow at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences up to his retirement in 1999. 
Through little short of three decades from 1960 he was teaching civil law at 
the University of Budapest. 
In January 1958 he defended his candidate's thesis (PhD) entitled "Basic 
Questions of the Theory of Legal Relations" (A jogviszonyelmélet alapvető 
kérdései) and published by Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó in 1960. His 
second thesis in "Sources of Law and Legislation" (Jogforrás és jogalkotás) he 
submitted in 1968. He had not yet completed his 50th year when in 1976 he 
vas elected an associate member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in 
1982 he became a full member of the Academy. 
Professor Peschka was the most outstanding Hungarian scholar of legal 
philosophy in the last third of the 20th century, one whose work was a worthy 
continuation of the activities of three Hungarian Neo-Kantian philosophers of 
law-Felix Somló, Gyula Moór and Barna Horváth-, who had deserved recogni-
tion even abroad in the first part of the last century. Professor Peschka's first 
greater works, his thesis in the theory of legal relations, had shown his greatest 
assets, primarily his ability to treat fundamental questions of legal philosophy 
in such a way as to enable both practicing lawyers and scholars to read his 
writings with pleasure and benefit. As far back as his early works he had 
broken with an even levelled criticism at socialist normativism. The fact that 
he had argued for recognizing the law-making function of the judiciary was 
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seen as a novel contribution particularly in the Hungarian literature of that 
period. He maintained that the Supreme Court, by its authoritative rulings 
handed down while interpreting laws and regulations, was actually making law, 
postulating, however, that the place in the sources of law and the material 
boundaries of such judicial legislation were exactly established. 
The most productive period of his creative work was marked by the 1970s 
and the 1980s. He focused his scientific activity on dealing with problems of 
legal philosophy, while publishing several studies on civil law. His book 
entitled "Fundamental Problems of the Modern Philosophy of Law" (A mo-
dern jogfilozófia alapproblémáij-Gondolat Kiadó, 1972-, which presented the 
contemporary legal philosophy in Western Europe, can be said to have been a 
pioneering work under conditions of socialism. It continues to be the best 
overview in Hungarian of the fundamental issues of legal philosophy and will 
remain so for long, inasmuch as it has even been published in Japanese 
(Horicu Bunka Sa Co., Kyoto, 1981) on the basis of the German translation, 
which was edited under the auspices of Akadémiai Kiadó. It was at that time 
that his monograph on "The Theory of Legal Rules" (A jogszabályok elmélete) 
appeared, discussing the theory of legal norms as the most basic notion of law 
and jurisprudence, and this in a way that it is at least as exciting reading for 
somebody who is familiar with the philosophy of law as it is valuable and 
useful to the legal practitioner. This cannot be said except of the truly great 
works on legal philosophy. Similarly, his writing on "Max Weber's Sociology 
of Law" (Max Weber jogszociológiája; Akadémiai Kiadó, 1975), which was a 
pioneering work when published and is a classical one today, is still an exciting 
read. To Vilmos Peschka the relationship between morality and law was more 
than a question of legal philosophy, for he, in his writings as well as in his life, 
was a great moralist, as were many among the philosophers of law negating the 
inevitable relationship between law and morals. He rejected the views on 
immanent moral value and justice of law, his experience gave him good reason 
to do so, but the moral issues, perhaps for that very reason, remained fundamental, 
to him. This is witnessed by his volume on "The Appeal of Ethics" (Az etika 
vonzásában; 1980), which is a summary of his writings on ethics. His selected 
studies were published under the title "Law and the Philosophy of Law" (Jog és 
filozófia; Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1980); they contain his fundamental 
study "Expediency in the Working Process and in the Legal Norm" (Célsze-
rűség a munkafolyamatban és a jogi normában), which is a basic exposition of 
his concept of law. 
The monograph on "The Special Character of Law" (A jog sajátossága; 
1988) is Professor Peschka's comprehensive work on the philosophy of law, 
one that constitutes a system on the subject. The title is connected in the 
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reader's mind with György Lukáes's great work on "The Special Character of 
the Aesthetic Quality" (Az esztétikum sajátossága), the reference being no 
accident as Professor Peschka was also an admirer and follower of György 
Lukács, but he did not share all of the latter's views. Features common to their 
mentality were an anti-Stalinist Marxism free from Leninism, which was then 
called Western Marxism, and the determinate role played by the tradition of 
the classical German philosophy and of German erudition in general. Professor 
Peschka was a Marxist but (contrary to Lukács) no Communist. This he spelled 
out clearly in his writing on the "Marxist and Socialist Theory of Law" 
(Marxista és szocialista jogelmélet), which was published in 1966. It is a fact 
that Professor Peschka's lifework is the only worthy equal of György Lukáes's, 
the best-known Hungarian philosopher, in the legal philosophy. 
His book of the 1990s entitled "Appendix to, 'The Special Character of L a w ' " 
(Appendix, A jog sajátosságához; Közgazdasági és Jogi Könvvkiadő, 1992) 
was concerned with the achievements of legal hermeneutics. 
To Vilmos Peschka the aesthetic quality was a fundamental value. He was 
passionately fond of literature, and a man of amazingly wide reading. When in 
company of others, he liked quoting Shakespeare, Goethe, Thomas Mann or, 
of Hungarian authors, Gáspár Heltai or the poet Endre Ady. The shelves in his 
Budapest home were overloaded with books in examplary order, including 
legal and philosophical works as well as classics, Hungarian and foreign, and 
the latest literary works, being as he was a regular reader of contemporary 
literature as well. Moreover, he was a lover and connoisseur of music, fine arts 
and theatre. A friend of his ironically called him an aesthete of law, a 
"hallmark" he accepted, and rightly so, as he was indeed one. 
This was perhaps an added reason that in the 1980s he was chosen to be a 
co-editor-in-chief of the Academy's Pocket Lexicon (Akadémiai Kislexikon; I-
II. Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990), but it was likewise natural that he should have 
become co-editor-in-chief of the Lexicon of Law (Jogi Lexikon; Közgazdasági 
és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1999). 
Vilmos Peschka was an active figure of the scientific community both in 
Hungary and abroad. In former times was a member of several committees of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. From 1992 he served as editor-in-chief of 
Acta Juridica Hungarica. Until his death he was President of the Hungarian 
Section of the International Society of Legal Philosophy (IVR), between 1983 
and 1987 he sat on the Board of Directors of that Society, and from 1978 he 
was a member of the Editorial Board of the Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie. 
In 2001 he received the Széchenyi Prize, the highest award for scientific 
life achievement in Hungary. 
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He was keenly concerned with young people, carefully examining works of 
his students and promoting their careers with sound pieces of advice. He 
willingly read manuscripts of any authors seeking his views. Although one of 
the greatest living Hungarian philosophers of law, he was never allowed to teach 
philosophy of law at university. 
A genuine sociable person, he had many friends, liked friendly gatherings 
and passionate conversations. Receiving someone into his friendship was 
considered to be a privilege. 
He adored Lake Balaton. Fate was gracious to him, death overtaking him in 
his sleep while on summer holidays by a beautiful lake-shore. 
In duty to his wish, his last repose is in Óbuda Cemetery of Budapest. His 
burial was attended only by his closest relatives, as he had willed. His friends, 
students, sometime colleagues, and admirers could not pay the last honours to 
him except in thoughts. 
Vanda Lamm 
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I M R E V Ö R Ö S * 
The EU's Constitutional Treaty-Its Development, 
Structure and Containt 
Abstract. The study analyses two questions: the necessity of a European Constitution, and the 
basic content of the European Constitutional Treaty (with the aim to analyse in a separate study 
the potential effects of the Treaty on the Hungarian Constitution and its application by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court). 
Keywords: European constitution. TEU, TEC 
Introduction 
Though the rejection of the Treaty on the European Constitution in two member 
states' referenda serves as a serious warning sign to all political decision-
makers, this issue must be separated from the scientific value that the Treaty 
generated and represents. This marks the politically attainable compromise at 
the level of the European Union today, and it could make the EU's operation 
more transparent and democratic, and would end the confusion surrounding 
competencies. At the same time it could lay the constitutional, "public administra-
tive-institutional" and substantive law foundations for a new EU that progresses 
in a clearly staked out direction and also carries the possibility of a new quality 
of integration. 
The French and Dutch referenda rejecting the Treaty were not about the 
above considerations: the European Constitutional Treaty has to be regarded as 
the communis opinio that will be unavoidable in the future, as it is considered 
a significant achievement both in political and scientific terms. Exploring the 
Constitutional Treaty-as the most recent "swallow" of European law-and its 
effect on the Hungarian constitutional order is therefore both practical and 
useful, even if this swallow has "not made a summer" (yet). 
1. The European Constitutional Treaty appears to be the result of a fairly 
recent process-but here the appearance is deceiptive. It is true that the 29lh 
Scientif ic adviser . Institute for Lega l Studies of the Hungarian A c a d e m y of Sc iences , 
H - 1 0 1 4 , Budapest , Or szágház u. 30. 
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October 2004 signing of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) 
was preceded by the establishment of a European Convention based on the 
European Council's December 2001 Laeken Declaration, and that the TCE's 
draft took on its final form on 10lh July 2003, thanks to the Convention's rather 
intensive work. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the president of the Convention, 
presented the final product to the Italian Presidency-in-office. The Intergovern-
mental Conference beginning on 4lh October 2003 debated the draft and then 
adopted it, and finally the TCE was signed on 9,h October 2004 in Rome. 
Were only a mere 22 months necessary for working out and passing the 
TCE? Obviously not. European law, especially European constitutional law, 
the science of public administration and political sciences have all worked over 
a decade in preparation of the signing, creation and designing of the TCE. 
2. Already since the early 1990s a whole series of scholarly as well as 
practice-oriented conferences have focused on the necessity of creating a 
European constitution. Nothing illustrates the urgency of the problem better than 
the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights was designed before the TCE, 
so its text simply had to be inserted into the TCE. This process was also 
reinforced by the fact that member states' constitutional courts (especially the 
German and Italian courts), encountered the problem of securing fundamental 
rights with increasing urgency, which-as I will analyse in more detail below-in 
turn brought up with growing urgency the issue of the relation between member 
states' constitutions and European law, in other words the question of primacy. 
3. It is impossible to make even a passing reference to each of the innu-
merable conferences and scientific as well as non-scientific communiqués issued 
on this subject. Let me just allude to the fact that in addition to the scientific 
analyses the European Parliament adopted a decision on 10lh February 1994 
(„Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union")} In this decision-
which interestingly (even surprisingly), the 518 member Parliament adopted 
with an unconvincing majority (155 in favour, 87 opposed, 46 abstentions)-
the Parliament refers to its „repeated" request: the European Union needs a 
democratic constitution. In this context the decision noted with satisfaction 
that the Committee on Institutional Affairs had come up with a Draft Consti-
tution for the European Union. 
From the scientific side a body called the European Constitutional Group 
presented its own draft constitution,2 but other groups, too, prepared expertises 
and drafts.3 
1
 Document A3-0064/94. OJ С 61, 10. 02. 1994. 155-170. February 10. O. J. 1994. 
A Proposed for a European Constitution. Report by the European Constitutional 
Group . L o n d o n . 1993. 
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In 2001 the reputed T.M.C. Asser Institute in the Hague organised a conference 
which, looking into the future, focused on the impending enlargement, the 
accession of the 10 new Central Eastern European states and in this context 
also the issue of the European Constitution.1 
In 2002 a broad analysis entitled „Europäisches Verfassungsrecht" was 
published5-to mention an arbitrarily selected example-which in part presents 
the theoretical dogmatic foundations of European constitutional law, and in 
part offers a perspective on future developments. The theoretical-dogmatic 
foundations touch upon complex issues of the constitutional legislator, feder-
alism, the institutions, sovereignty and the primacy of Union law, European 
constitutional jurisdiction, the EU's and the EC ' s constitutional relations, 
Union citizenship, basic rights, the economic constitution and the unusual term 
"competition-constitution" (Wettbewerbsverfassung). The future outlook analyses 
such basic issues as the problem of an EU situated at the intersection of the 
community's and the member states' legal systems, the legal structure of the 
EU as an association of states (Staatenverbund), and finally the prospective 
advantages of a European Constitution. 
I. On the need for a European constitution 
1. It has been communis opinio for quite a while now that the current Treaty 
establishing the European Community (will be referred to as TEC below) and 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU), are no longer sufficient as the constitu-
tional foundations of Union co-operation; instead of a "treaty-based constitution" 
there is a need for a real European constitution. 
The notion of a "treaty-based constitution" refers to the fact that the EU 
does have a constitution already: the two Treaties, the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). 
Based on the these two treaties the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has drawn out 
of the Community law those constitutional safeguards and constitutional 
principles based on which Community law began to function as constitutional 
3
 The Shaping of a European Constitution. Report of the Working Group on the 
European Constitution. 1990: Kind, P.-Bosco, A. (eds.): A Constitution for Europe. London. 
1991. 
4
 Kellerman, A.-Jaap W. de Zwaan, Czuczai, J. (eds.): EU Enlargement. The Consti-
tutional impact at EU and National Level. The Hague, 2001. 
5
 von Bogdandy, A. (ed.): Europäisches Verfassungsrecht |European Constitutional 
Law], Heidelberg, 2003. 
8 IMRE VÖRÖS 
law. In the ECJ's application of law the TEC veritably began to fulfil the role of a 
constitutional charter. In the Court's practice Community law began taking on the 
functions of a de facto constitution in terms of determining the relationship 
between member states and their citizens, as the Court interpreted (and on this 
basis applied) constitutional safeguards "into" their relationship with the EC. 
2. The basis for providing safeguards to citizens/individuals was especially 
the direct effect of Community law which opened up the possibility of enforcing 
individual rights in the courts. We refer to safeguards such as rule of law 
(„Etat de droit", „Rechtsstaat"): in its prominent and often-cited Les Verts 
decision' the Court proclaimed that the requirement for rule of law was a 
foundation of the EC. Rule of law means that community or member state 
measures adopted in the EC must be in harmony with the EC's „basic constitu-
tional charter, the Treaty" (i.e. the TEC). Deriving them from the member states' 
constitutions, the ECJ recognised such principles as the fundamental components 
of the rule of law, as for instance due process the prohibition of discrimination, 
the defence of legitimate expectations the prohibition of retroactive effect, the 
requirement of proportional limitations and good faith in procedures 
In addition to demanding the rule of law the ECJ also explicated the 
separation of powers, democratic governance, the right to judicial and the 
defence of fundamental rights, as well as defence of the four freedoms of the 
market as constitutional values.7 The specialised literature refers to this process 
as the „constitutionalisation" of Community law, at the same time pointing out 
that this is something different from the emergence of a nation state's 
burgeoning constitution. Wechsler, for instance, refers to the TEC's gradual, 
step-by-step, verdict-by-verdict transformation into a sui generis constitution 
by virtue of the ECJ's application of it.x 
3. Naturally this has its own story-as do the books, too („habent sua fata 
libelli"). The crystallisation of European constitutional principles in no small 
measure emerges amidst the concerned „ frowning " of member states ' consti-
tutional courts. 
3.1. The question arose in the context of how to interpret the primacy 
of European law in relation to the member states' legal systems, especially 
6
 Case 294/83, Les Verts, 11986] European Court Review, 1339, 1365. 
7
 See for example. Petersmann, E.-U.: Proposals for a New Constitution for the 
European Union: Building-Blocks for a Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Law of 
the EU. Common Market Law Review, 1995, 1124. 
s
 Wechsler, В.: Der Europäische Gerichtshof in der EG-Verfassungswerdung [The 
European Court of Justice in the Genesis of the EC Constitution]. 1995. Cited in: 
Petersmann: op. cit. 1142. 
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constitutions and the constitutional rights and principles safeguarded by 
those. 
The Italian4 and German10 constitutional courts both voiced their objections to 
the absolutist interpretation of the primacy of Community law which held that 
the latter is above the whole of the national member states constitutions, not 
only above a significant portion of the constitutional rules and the other 
internal legal regulations. 
3.2. The Italian Constitutional Court pointed to the limits of the priority of 
Community law-as laid down and expounded by the European Court of 
Justice-set by the Italian constitution. In its Frontini verdict the court emphasised 
that even though overall Community law might be above the Italian consti-
tution, it certainly does not enjoy primacy over the constitution's provisions 
regarding the inalienable rights of individuals and the constitution's funda-
mental principles. Though Art. 11 of the Italian constitution does regulate the 
possibilities of transferring or limiting competencies, but at the same time the 
abovementioned fundamental rights and principles serve as „counterweights" and 
„counterlimits" (controlimiti) to this constitutional option. 
In the Fragd decision (2Г1 April 1989) the constitutional court reserved its 
right to review some regulations of Community law with regards to their 
compatibility with certain human rights articles of the Italian constitution." 
3.3. The German Federal Constitutional Court similarly asserted that Com-
munity law does not have absolute primacy with respect to certain fundamental 
rights protections enshrined in the German Basic Law-as long as Community 
law does not offer a similar measure of protections; the constitutionality of 
Community law will be reviewed with respect to the standards laid down by 
the Grundgesetz (the German constitution). In its famous Solange I verdict the 
Federal Constitutional Court stated that the Grundgesetz's fundamental law 
guarantees enjoy priority as "as long as (solange) the competent organs of the 
Community have not removed the conflict of norms".. . between Community 
4
 On the primacy of community law see: Várnay, E . - Papp. M.: Az Európai Unió joga 
[The Law of the European Union). Budapest, 2005. 82. For the decisions of Italian 
constitutional court see: de Witte, В.: Constitutional Aspects of European Union Member-
ship in the Original Six Member States: Model Solution for the Applicant Countries? In: 
EU-Enlargement, op. cit.74. 
10
 For the "Solange" decisions see for example BverfGE 73, 339. The most recent 
relevant decision is: BverfG. 2 BvL 1/97. Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht. 
2000. 702. For the Maastricht decision see. BVerfGE 89, 155. Also see: Várnay-Papp: op. 
cit. 307-312. 
" Gaja, G.: New Developements in a Continuing Story: The Relationship between 
EEC Law and Italian Law. Common Market Law Review, 1990, 83. 
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law and the basic law safeguards contained within the Grundgesetz "in 
accordance with the Treaty mechanism". This means that the Community 
law's primacy is not unconditional, absolute primacy, but merely conditional. 
In the 1986 Solange II decision the Federal Constitutional Court observed with 
relief: given the European Commission's practice regarding human rights and 
general level of the protection of fundamental rights, the introduction of direct 
elections to the European Parliament, as well as the fact that all member states 
joined the European Convention on Human Rights, it finds the situation 
satisfactory "...as long as (solange) the European Communities, and in particular 
the case law of the European Court, generally ensure, an effective protection of 
fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the communities which 
is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of human rights 
required unconditionally by the Grundgesetz..." The Federal Constitutional 
Court will not make use of its powers in the sense of deciding upon the 
applicability of secondary community legislation by member states' courts 
with reference to the German Grundgesetz. In other words the Federal Consti-
tutional Court found that the situation that had emerged (unlike the situation at 
the time of the Solange I decision) bore no probability of a conflict of norms 
Community law and the constitutional, especially fundamental right safeguards 
of the Grundgesetz. 
3.4. In de Witte's interpretation these statements denote the thesis of 
relative primacy of Community law over member states' constitutions and thus 
they deny the notion of absolute primacy. 
4. En route towards the „constitutionalisation" of Community law a crucial 
stepping stone was marked by the assertion of the TEU Art. 6 (2) that the EU 
respects fundamental rights. In the instance the TEU refers to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the general principles of Community law, as 
well as to member states' common constitutional traditions. 
4.1. In view of the above it cannot be regarded as a coincidence, but rather 
as a significant step in the coherent process of development that the EU 
decided on drafting its own Charter of Fundamental Rights. Nonetheless, this 
was not always an obvious choice: the drafting of the Charter was accom-
panied by doubts. 
4.2. The question that arose was whether drafting a European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights would in fact increase citizens' fundamental rights as 
compared to the current situation? The answer was not unequivocal. In Weiler's 
poignant analysis1" the Europeans are becoming nauseated by the protection of 
12
 Weiler, J.: Europe 2000-The Constitutional Agenda. An Outline. In: EU Enlarge-
ment. op. cit. 10. 
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fundamental rights: they are protected by the member states' constitutional 
and regular courts, by the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and by the European Com-
mission. The Commission stated already in 1969 that it finds all community 
measures that infringe upon the member states' common constitutional 
tradition unacceptable. Thus primarily one would have to clarify the legal 
policy goals of such a charter; its undeniable advantage would be that it would 
make comprehensible and tangible even for the „man of the streets" what so 
far only jurists-and even among those only a select group-sense and under-
stand. For this very reason Weiler thinks that the creation of the charter might 
backfire. It could offer a loophole to avoid undertaking anything in this area, in 
other words it would merely offer an excuse to evade taking necessary steps. 
In reality the European Community does not have a human rights and funda-
mental rights policy and that is the real problem. What is needed is not the 
formalisation of rights, but the formulation of a policy for the enforcement and 
institutionalisation of fundamental rights. 
The best counterexample to this is community competition policy. Arts 81-
82 of the TEC provide the basis of community competition law and therein 
the guarantee of the internal market's unity. Obviously these articles would be 
hardly more than rhetoric if the Directorate General No. 4 were not engaged in 
enforcing these rules. In fact since the introduction of EC Regulation 1/2003-as is 
well-known-with the decentralisation of the enforcement of competition law 
the member states' competition authorities (European Competition Network-
ECN) and courts have also become involved in implementing the provisions of 
the two articles. 
The situation regarding fundamental rights is similar: it is hardly possible 
to rely on the courts in this area, as the continuous monitoring of violations, 
the gathering of information, conducting inquiries or potential „investigations" 
cannot be a task for the courts, but has to be within the purview of an organi-
sation established for this purpose. 
4.3. Similarly, we must also face up to the fact that from a functional 
perspective the ECJ ' s current institutional/organisational system is not 
completely capable of enforcing fundamental rights. Though the ECJ's justices 
are excellent jurists, few are constitutional lawyers per se. The real problem 
stems from the fact-and this is where the shadow of new „Maastricht 
decisions" looms-that it may be within the context of an ECJ decision that the 
primacy enjoyed by European law over even the most important fundamental 
rights, and the associated principles and rules guaranteed by member states, 
are enforced. This, the total subordination of member states' basic law 
regulation to European law, is problematic and may substantially violate member 
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states' constitutional „sensibilities". In the final analysis, Weiler" points ou t -
the ECJ's relation to the member states' courts is rather a lot more complex and 
of a different nature than the legal standing of the House of Lords or the US 
Supreme Court in the respective countries' constitutional order.14 Weiler thus 
concludes that a separate European constitutional court would be necessary, 
which could exclusively address issues of constitutional law and thus concentrate 
on those without dividing its attention among complex internal market, economic, 
competition law, etc., problems, among which constitutional jurisdiction would 
be only one of several issues. 
4.4. As is commonly known the body charged with drafting the Charter 
worked out its proposal under the chairmanship of Roman Herzog, formerly 
president of the German Constitutional Court and then German head of state, 
and presented its Charter of Fundamental Rights which the intergovernmental 
conference at Nice accepted on 7th December 2000. In the process of drafting 
the TCE the Charter of Fundamental Rights was then integrated into the 
document as its Part II. 
5. The „constitutionalisation" of Community law could therefore be regarded 
as a process taking place under a kind of member state compulsion. 
The primacy of Community law cannot be enforced absolutely, if for 
instance basic law safeguards are insufficient; its relativity on the other hand 
opens the door to those objections-as formulated in the abovementioned Italian 
and German constitutional court statements-that primacy exists only in so far 
as Community law provides the same level of protection as member states' 
constitutions do. If this is not the case, then constitutional courts reserve the right 
to potentially declare-according to their own constitutional standards-certain 
provisions of Community law unconstitutional, thus effectively ordering lower 
courts in the given member state not to apply it. It is obvious that this line of 
reasoning implies a judicial review of Community law by the constitutional 
courts of member states: in effect these bodies can „destroy" Community law 
depending on whether it is consistent with their own constitution; in this case 
Community law will not enjoy primacy in the given member state. 
The EU was thus under pressure to act: drafting a European constitution 
including safeguards of fundamental rights became inevitable.17 
13
 Ibid. 8. 
14
 Ibid. 8. 
15
 Gordos, Á.-Ódor, В.: Their book entitled Az Európai Alkotmányos Szerződés szüle-
tése I (The Birth of the European Constitutional Treaty). Budapest, 2004.] offers useful 
information on the circumstances of the European Constitution's creation without the 
difficult dogmatic background above, and also provides a wealth of information on the 
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6. Still, the debate on the necessity of a constitution continued to rage in 
2001. On the one hand the phenomenon referred to as „democratic deficit", the 
lacking legitimacy, was indisputable, as was apparent that the Treaties could not 
function as real constitutions. The Treaties were too detailed, frequently 
overlapping, while at the same time from a constitutional legal standpoint they 
were not differentiated enough. Ultimately, the Union's competencies can only 
be limited-that is obstacles to the indefinite expansion of these competencies 
can only be erected-by the way of a constitution. 
6.1. Even in light of the above, there was still controversy surrounding the 
question of whether it was really necessary to formally create a separate, newly 
worded constitution to address these issues. (An ironic reference comes from 
Weiler, who titles one of the sections in his study „Does Europe Need a 
Constitution?", while casting doubt on the idea in the next section s title; 
„Does Europe really need a Constitution?"16). Weiler believes that a formal 
constitution would also introduce a formal legislative hierarchy that would 
deprive European constitutional development of the very advantage that stems 
from its essence, its peculiar feature deriving from singular historical circum-
stances: flexibility. The democratic deficit and other problems ought not to 
be necessarily addressed by drafting a constitution. It would be sufficient to 
separate the TEU's and TEC's constitutional parts par excellence, while 
preserving the non-constitutional parts as „normal" Community law. 
6.2. The fundamental challenge that nonetheless needs to be addressed 
constitutionally is the question of proportion between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. In reality this is the basic issue underlying the institutional 
reform proposals of successive intergovernmental conferences. Developing 
the EU is a rather paradox process. Wonters, for instance, sees a shift 
towards the intergovernmental feature at the expense of supranationalism. In 
his opinion the Council of Ministers continues to gain ground at the expense of 
the Commission, a case in point is the memorable participation of an 
extremist party in the Austrian conservative-led government, when the 
diplomatic measures taken by the Union were not handled by the Commission, 
but outside the institutional structure of the EU.17 
6.3. Even though it is possible to argue with the observation above, the 
issue of intergovernmentalism/snpranationalism was always-and presumably 
Hungarian government's position on the relevant issues, as well as the work of the 
Hungarian representatives at the convention. 
16
 Weiler: op. cit. 5. 
17
 Wouters, J.: Institutional and Constitutional Challenges for the European Union-
Some Reflections in the Light of the Treaty of Nice. In: EU Enlargement... op. cit. 45. 
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will be in the foreseeable future-one of the basic questions of the EU's develop-
ment strategy. The magic word can probably be found in the dichotomy of 
increasing democratic legitimacy versus efficient functioning. In this context 
Wouters points to possibilities such as the appointment of ECJ justices. This is 
a sensitive issue that no matter how far it strays from the abovementioned 
"magic word" is still inseparably tied to it: it is an indication of lacking 
democratic legitimacy that there is no democratic control over the appointment 
process and thus it is impossible to guarantee that a judge inducted into the 
body will fulfil all the conditions laid down in TEC Art. 223, in terms of his 
independence or expertise. 
6.4. There is also a lot to be done in terms of the transparency of EU 
institutions to European citizens. Though the modifications introduced by 
the Amsterdam Treaty-for instance TEC Art. 255's new text-called for 
guaranteeing citizens' right of access to documents and other data, in reality 
the exercise of this right is conditional on general principles, so in practice the 
right of access is rarely enforced.11* In other words the exceptions need to be 
narrowed and the exercise of this right needs to be expanded. The ECJ played 
an important role in this area (as well)-especially in the Netherlands v. Com-
mission case19-in the "constitutionalisation" of European law. This case and 
the ECJ's practice are good examples illustrating how the ECJ fits the member 
states' common constitutional traditions into the EU's constantly evolving 
"constitutional law." 
6.5. The abovementioned democratic legitimacy/democratic deficit and the 
associated problems of rule of law, the more precise demarcation of competencies 
and the issue of re-evaluating the role of member states' parliaments all 
contributed a great deal to the TCE's drafting. 
6.5.1. Democratic legitimacy fares best in the co-decision procedure. Still, this 
is the area where the most demands for progress came in. Wouters specifically 
called attention to the possibility that the European Parliament's role ought to 
be increased: the Nice Treaty, for its part, did not ensure parallel to the 
introduction of the qualified majority voting in the Council that it would also 
be tied to a co-decision procedure, or at least that there would be the possibility 
of obligatory consultation for the European Parliaments" There is no such 
requirement for the fiscal policy or monetary rules concerning the euro zone, 
nor for trade in intellectual property. The situation is even worse as far as the 
second pillar is concerned, though somewhat better in the third. 
18
 Wouters: ibid. 45. 
" C a s e C-58/94 Netherlands v. Council [1996] European Court Review. 1-2169. 
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 Wouters: op. cit. 48. 
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6.5.2. The question of rule of law also raises concerns that provided 
important arguments in favour of drafting and adopting the TCE. The ECJ in 
its previously mentioned Les Verts decision and in subsequent decisions 
emphasised that if we consider the EC or the EU to have rule of law, then 
this implies-in fact assumes-that there is a system of legal remedies and 
procedures at the Union level, which neither the EU nor the member states can 
circumvent, in as far as the review of the legality of the Union's own ac t s -
compared to Community law-is concerned."1 Given that such a requirement 
implies the comparison of community's and member states' process of 
legislation with European law, this practically means the formulation of a 
requirement for constitutional jurisdiction of sorts. Even though-as we have seen-
the ECJ has fulfilled this role almost since its inception and has developed 
European constitutional principles in the process, including especially the 
enforcement of basic rights, the obligation for implementing the rule of law 
will evidently necessitate a set of requirements that extend beyond what has 
been established hitherto. One such question was in how far individuals can 
turn directly to the ECJ for the purpose of enforcing their rights-the ECJ 's 
stance on the TEC Art. 230's standing rules is arguably too strict in comparison. 
Obviously this is about fundamental questions the answers to which-given the 
deeply constitutional and basic rights nature of the issue-cannot be left (even 
in part) to the ECJ's practice.22 
6.5.3. Similarly the TCE drafting was also instigated by the need for a more 
precise demarcation of competencies between the EU and the member states. 
The multi level governance system appeared worthy of consideration. It implies 
that responsibility be distributed by domains and tasks, divided between different 
actors who are connected-while sufficiently preserving and securing their 
autonomy-by efficient institutional links.23 
6.5.4. The unsolved issue of the relationship between member states' 
parliaments and the European Parliament was also raised, of course. This 
delicate matter naturally did not come up in the context of modifying or 
reducing the European Parliament's prerogatives in any way. Parliament (TEC 
Art. 189) consists of representatives of the Community's member states and is 
thus one of the most efficient repositories of political democracy. 
21
 Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament [1986] European Court Review, 1339; also see 
Case C-2/88 1MM Zwartveld 11990] European Court Review, 1-3365. 
22
 See for example Wouters: op. cit. 49. 
23
 Ibid. 52. 
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Suggestions to make Parliament bicameral,"1 however (it was not hard to 
detect that the model for this idea stemmed from the German and Austrian 
federal parliaments), illustrate the problem well in spite of their stunning 
nature. A second chamber would-in Wouters' opinion-not reduce Parliament's 
authority, of course, but rather turn the Council of Ministers into some sort of 
second chamber, the membership of which would consist of representatives 
from the member states' governments. The practices used in the co-decision 
procedure demonstrate, however, that the Council of Ministers-at least f rom 
a constitutional/theoretical perspective-already works as a kind of second 
chamber. In such a system the first chamber would be home to directly elected 
popular representatives, while the second chamber-and here the example of 
the German/Austrian, even the American federal system is apparent-would 
represent territorial/regional governmental interests, as a second chamber 
constituted on a territorial principle. 
6.6. It is indisputable that the problems and ideas above, raised merely by the 
way of example-regardless of how much or in which form they found their way 
into the TCE-significantly influenced and in some cases and contexts even 
forced the inclusion of certain ideas into the document. 
II. The TCE's content and its main features 
The TCE consists of a preamble and four parts. These are complemented by 36 
protocols and two annexes. 
The Preamble and the first two parts are really the TCE's constitutional content. 
1.1. Part I-unlike the others-does not have its own title, even though it 
contains the rules concerning the Union's nature, its self-specification, 
organisation and operation. 
Part I is divided into nine titles: Title I addresses the Union's definition and 
objectives, Title II recognises fundamental rights and deals with Union 
citizenship, IV details the institutional framework and bodies of the EU, the 
fifth title concerns the exercise of the Union's competencies (including the 
Union's legislative system, the common foreign, security and defence policy, 
the rule of law, the solidarity of member states and enhanced co-operation), 
Title VI bears the name „Democratic Life of the Union", while Title VII 
addresses finances, VIII good neighbourhood relations, and the final title, 
number IX dwells on Union membership. 
24
 Ibid. 53; See also: Horváth, Z.-Ódor, В.: Ac Európai Unió Alkotmánya. [The 
Constitution of the European Union]. Budapest, 2005. 28. 
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1.2. Part II incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted earlier. 
1.3. Part III deals with Union policies and their operation. 
1.4. Part IV contains general and closing dispositions. 
The protocols and annexes following the four parts occasionally touch 
upon very important basic issues, such as the role of national parliaments in 
the EU, the ECJ's statutes, or the protocol laying down the procedure to be 
followed in the case of excessive deficits. 
2. With respect to its structure the TCE has thus fulfilled expectations: it 
puts into a well-arranged, clear system... 
- the EU's fundamental objectives and values-including the fundamental 
rights-, its organisational and operational order, as well as 
- the EU's policies.7 
There are two essential areas in which the TCE's content can be grouped. 
3. In terms of content the TCE bring changes of great importance: even if its 
only role had been to formulate-for the first time in the history of European 
integration-in a generally comprehensive manner the rules in all those areas that 
the TEU and the TEC address, than it still would have been worth drafting. The 
overly complex, inscrutable mass of statutes burdened by numerous instances of 
overlapping primary law is now being replaced by clear regulations that-at least 
to a certain degree-enable the average citizen to find out what the EU is, if he so 
wishes. 
Selecting any of the many important changes in the TCE is inevitably bound 
to be arbitrary. Accepting this risk we would like to call attention to the following: 
- the EU's basic goals reflect the transition from initial economic integration-
the creation and maintenance of a unified internal market, that is the establish-
ment of a certain level of economic union-to political integration (Art. 1-3); 
- the TCE proclaims the EU's legal personality (Art. 1-7), which 
simultaneously abolishes the-undeniably complicated, but given the continu-
ously ongoing development inevitable-three pillar structure. 
- In this context the TCE also lays down the rules for withdrawing from 
the Union (Art. 1-60) 
- it clearly (with the high standards one expects from a real constitution) 
settles the relations between the EU and member states declaring the equality 
of member states before the TCE (Art. 1-5); 
- finally establishes in a written legal statute the primacy of Union law 
over member state law (Art. 1-6) . 
- the clear tabulation of the EU's competencies (Title III, Arts 1-11-18); 
- in a structural/institutional context the TCE establishes the permanent 
position of an European Council President (1-22), as well as that of a Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (1-28); 
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- the TCE achieves a veritable breakthrough with its reform of decision-
making procedures: it limits the number of those areas in which unanimity is 
required (in effect curtailing the scope of member state vetoes) and creates the 
institution of qualified majority, the so-called dual majority, in the decision-
making process (Art. 1-25); 
- the TCE gives greater weight to the European Parliament by expanding 
its competencies (Art. 1-46 provides the basis); 
- it introduces the institution of popular initiative [Art. 1-47 (4)], as a 
manifestation of participatory democracy; 
- the TCE's Part II includes among its constitutional provisions the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights with its enumerated basic rights-which is absolutely 
essential for any document aspiring to the rank of a constitution-, thus pre-
empting the abovementioned potential source of friction between the EU and 
member states' constitutional courts. 
4. Though in terms of its legal classification the TCE is a treaty between 
subjects of international law, and can only be modified with their consent and 
through consensus, it was nonetheless undoubtedly created with the intention 
of setting up a constitution. 
When we are asked to take a position on the question whether this could be 
considered a constitution in the traditional constitutional law sense of the 
word, then it certainly appears to be a waste of words-one might say hair-
splitting-to look for the attributes of a nation-states' constitution in this document. 
This is a unique process in European history whose legal, constitutional 
representation cannot be undertaken with traditional legal or constitutional 
categories. Undoubtedly, a traditionally understood constitution would have to 
talk of a traditionally understood sovereign state and, correspondingly, of the 
people constituting it, who are the source of said sovereignty. In this context 
we cannot talk of a state-constituting people-the European people. But this 
does not imply that the TCE, in its own specific range of tasks, in the very 
specific, historically determined set of problems it needs to address, could not 
fulfil the function of a basic law, or to put it better: a „Basic Law". 
The TCE determines the constitutional framework for those fundamental 
questions that are not handled by primary legislation: the TEU and the TEC, 
which would be repealed once the TCE takes effect (the Euratom Treaty is the 
only one that would not be affected by the TCE's potential adoption). The EU is 
not a „state" in the traditional sense and thus the debate whether it can be made 
to fit the "confederation of states" or "federal state" mould seems nonsensical. 
The EU is genuinely a sui generis formation, with the intermediate characterisa-
tion ..invented" by the German Federal Constitutional Court (a kind of neither 
this nor that): the „Staatenverbund". Correspondingly this non-traditional forma-
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tion of states cannot have a traditionally understood constitution, but it can have a 
„constitutional treaty" based on an international treaty between the member states. 
This peculiarity is well expressed in the compromise name that the 
document finally received: „Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe". 
The category and institution of the „treaty-based constitution"-introduced 
and analysed above (see I . l ) -as a living, already practically existing "consti-
tution" (within the conceptual framework outlined above), cannot be immediately 
replaced by a "real" constitution as it is traditionally understood, with all the 
regular features of a constitution, for that would require a federal state that is 
compatible with traditional constitutional law categories. At the current stage 
of development there is no sign of such a state, however. The TCE's undoubtedly 
small, but at the same time determined and significant steps in this direction 
cannot change the fact of lacking sui generis state formation. The "Constitu-
tional Treaty" replacing the "treaty-based constitution" captures the complexity 
of the integration process, its historically unique nature, even at the level of a 
wordplay, and it also expresses the notion that in the given situation this 
"product" best represents the reality of the attainable level of integration-now 
and in the foreseeable future as well. 
In our opinion the TCE therefore-with all its compromises-adequately 
reflects the current state of economic and political development: the state in 
which the EU-consisting of economic and political union-is right now and 
will be in the foreseeable future and medium term. 
This is not only no small achievement, but also the attainable maximum-if 
it is attainable at all in light of the integration process. But not even the TCE 
itself sees this as the end of the road. 
5. The Preamble clearly expresses the nature of the European unification 
process: Paragraphs (2)-(3)-(4) („wishes to deepen"; „united ever more closely"; 
„...continue the work accomplished within the framework of the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and the Treaty on European Union, by 
ensuring the continuity of the Community acquis,") all indicate that integration 
is on the path of preservation through cancellation.1" The TCE's goal is thus 
not to finally conclude for the long-term a continuously evolving process-and 
it could not do that even if it wished to do so-but to further develop the results 
See the TCE's critical analysis in: Czuczai, J.: Some Points Concerning the EU Consti-
tution from a Hungarian Perspective. In: Curtin, D.-Kellermann, A. E.-Blockmans. S. (eds.): 
The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? T. M. C. Asser Institut. The Hague, 2005. 
4 3 3 ^ 4 5 ; on the preservation through cancellation: Szigeti, P.: Az Európai Alkotmányszer-
ződés hatása a Köztársaság Alkotmányára (The European Constitutional Treaty's Impact 
on the Constitution of the Republic]. Special edition. 225. 
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accomplished so that a Union of 25 will be capable of flexibly serving the goal 
of integration at least in the medium-term. 
5.1. Though the TCE was criticised immediately following its adoption for 
being "overly centralised", the truth is that it preserves the intergovernmental 
nature of the development process-the TCE is an international treaty that can 
only be amended unanimously, based on a consensus of all member states. The 
Preamble [Paragraph 4] talks of a Europe "United in diversity", making clear 
that unified Europe is based on the preservation of the member states' national 
identity [Preamble Paragraph 3]. 
These are not just the typical generalities common in preambles: Part I, 
Title I, Art. I- L—that is the TCE's first rule on establishing the Union-clearly 
states the EU's competencies are derived from the member states who confer 
on the Union their own competencies, which in turn practices it on a 
"Community basis". 
5.2. The second notion in the Preamble is the strengthening of democracy 
and transparency in the EU's public life-and the TCE does indeed live up to 
these expectations. 
5.3. The Preamble finally refers to the values that the EU subscribes to and 
then later details in Part I Title I Art. 1-2: the TCE begins with a commitment 
to the values of human rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law. These 
values are complemented in Art. 1-2 by the individual rights of persons 
belonging to minority communities, pluralism, a general prohibition of 
discrimination, tolerance, social justice, solidarity, as well as the declaration of 
gender equality. 
6. The TCE's "individual" boundaries are set by the fact that the European 
Union established by this Treaty (Art. 1-1) is successor to the current EU and 
the EC (Art. IV-438). Correspondingly, with the taking effect of the TCE, the 
TEU and the TEC are repealed, as are the Accession Treaties. Separate 
detailed rules regulate the issue of territorial scope. 
7.1. In addition to the EU's aforementioned values we also find the 
summary rules concerning the EU objectives here - many of which we have 
already encountered in the context of the TEC introductory regulations. One 
such goal is, for instance, the well-being of its peoples. Aside from such 
general statements we also find a statement on the "two unions": Art. 1-3 (2) 
includes among the Union's objectives the notion that the EU is an area with 
both, political union (without internal frontiers, with freedom, security and 
justice), and economic union (an internal market where competition is free and 
undistorted). These two constitute the real EU, the summary term for which is 
the "European Union". 
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The common feature of the two partial unions is that they seek to realise a 
social market economy, promoting social solidarity, economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity between the member states. 
7.2. It is important to point out that the TCE puts a great deal of emphasis 
on the rule of law, as one of the fundamental attributes of the EU: up to Art. I-
3 this category is mentioned thrice, in the Preamble, in Art. 1-2, and in Art. 1-3, 
(2) listing the EU objectives. It is obvious here that this is not merely the TEU, 
the TEC or the acquis which "show up again", but the member states' common 
constitutional traditions as well. The text 's emphasis, however, is to set 
fundamental conditions concerning potential future enlargements, which-due 
to their safeguard character-(rightly) raise the bar very high for potential new 
member states and candidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, but 
especially Turkey). Though as an aside one could point out that there are 
sources of law that not only fail to satisfy these requirements but-we shall 
return to this below-straight-out contradict them. 
7.3. The clear, comprehensible repetition of the four freedoms is—final ly !— 
mentioned together with the prohibition of discrimination. 
7.4. Art. 1-5 of the TCE states another well-known proposition: the principle 
of member state's obligation to co-operate [Art. 1-5, (2)], but this is preceded 
by the statement on the equality of member states before the "Constitution"-
this is how the TCE refers to itself at this point!-, as well as the respect for 
their national identities [Paragraph 1]. 
7.5. Art. 1-6 finally declares the primacy of Union law: what this means is 
the primacy of the law "adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising 
competences conferred on it" over the legal order of the member states. The 
TCE does not mention the relationship between its own provisions and the 
member states' constitutions-leaving this "thorny delicacy" to the member 
states' constitutional legislators. As is known, the Republic of Hungary has 
significant outstanding debts in this area-the primacy of European law over 
the Hungarian Constitution ought to finally laid down in the Constitution. 
Unless this happens the issue cannot be regarded as concluded. We will return 
to this issue further below, as with the TCE's potentially entry into force 
settling this long-delayed question may become completely inevitable for the 
Hungarian constitutional legislator.2'' 
2i
'For further information see: Vörös, I.: Az EU-esatlakozás alkotmányjogi: jogdog-
matikai és jogpolitikai aspektusai [The constitutional, legal dogmatic and legal policy 
aspects of EU accession]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 57 (2002) 397; Kecskés, L.: Magyar-
ország EU-csatlakozásának alkotmányossági problémái és a szükségessé vált alkotmány-
módosítás folyamata. |The constitutional problems of Hungary's EU accession and the 
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7.6. Art. 1-7 declares the EU's legal personality, thus the Union become a 
subject of international law. 
7.7. Title II of Part I, referring to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
contained in Part II, recognizes basic rights-with two clarifications. On the one 
hand the TCE additionally also refers to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, as well as the common constitutional tradition of member states. This 
means that in applying and interpreting the Charter of Fundamental Rights-the 
TCE's Part II-these two legal texts have to be considered. 
The fundamental rights, if properly applied and interpreted, are therefore 
part of the Union's legal order. 
What this means is that in applying Union law one always has to pay 
attention to fundamental rights, as those constitute the fundament of the whole 
European legal order as its core principles. In our opinion their classification as 
core principle means that Part II, containing the fundamental rights, on the one 
hand also incorporates concrete applicable measures, and on the other hand-as 
supplementary feature in the case of loopholes, for instance-is also a repository 
of general principles that ought to be considered when applying European law. 
The basic rights are therefore the lex generalis of European legal order, which 
influence the application and interpretation of any lex speciali. 
7.8. The TCE's beneficial effect is inestimable in the sense that it subsumes 
the first two of the three effective treaties (TEU, TEC, Euratom Treaty), in a 
single "treaty", thus repealing them (the Euratom Treaty is not affected by the 
TCE). The Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) 
lapsed on 23rd July 2002 as the fifty years its validity had been envisioned for 
had expired, but the majority of its provisions live on in the TEC.27 
This means that the EU ' s primary law becomes codified in a single 
document, which marks a fundamental change in terms of its effects. The 
European legal order, the EU's structure, institutions and operations have 
become transparent, clearer and more easily comprehensible. This is reinforced 
by Art. IV-438 which pronounces succession: the successor of the EU and the 
EC established by the TEU is the EU established by the TCE: 
The situation of secondary law is different: those remain in force. The same 
applies for other elements of the acquis, as well as the ECJ 's and the Court of 
First Instance's decisions, which continue to preserve their source of law 
character. 
process of the constitutional amendments necessitated thereby]. Európai Jog. 2003/ Nos. 1 
and 3., 21-30. and 22-23. 
See Horváth-Ódor: Az Európai Unió Alkotmánya, op. cit. 58. 
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8. The TCE brings significant changes: simplification and increased trans-
parency in the system of sources of law. Title I Chapter I talks of the Union's 
legal acts within the framework of "Common Provisions", and significantly 
simplifies the extremely complex, nigh inscrutable system. The TCE's articles 
1-33—1-39 introduce four legally binding and two legally non-binding so-called 
legal acts. Dogmatically it is odd that the TCE does not refer to the legislative 
system but to "acts", and it is odder still that it distinguishes between legally 
binding and non-binding acts. It would be a substantial error if the text were to 
talk about legally non-binding sources of law, but the designations of "acts" 
benevolently conceals the dogmatic slip-up. We return to the problem later to 
analyse its effect on the Hungarian constitution. 
A legally binding act is the European law (which corresponds to the current 
first pillar regulation), the European framework law ("successor" to the 
directive)-these so-called legislative acts [Art. 1-33 (1)1 have general applicability. 
A European regulation differs from legislative acts in that it serves their 
implementation and thus, depending on which law's implementation it was 
issued to serve, it could have 'European law' content, that is immediately binding 
content, or it could have "framework law" content, meaning in essence that it 
only obliges member states to pursue certain goals but leaves the choice of 
adequate tools up to them. 
The European decision is not necessarily generally, but a binding executive 
act. A decision can designate specific addressees, and in such a case it is 
only binding for them. 
The TCE preserves the institutions of legally binding recommendations and 
opinions, but through enshrining them in the constitution it inaugurates them 
as constitutional institutions. According to the position delineated by the 
Hungarian Constitution and the Hungarian Constitutional Court this is a very 
worrisome practice; we will return to our concern about the integration of 
these institutions into the constitution further below. 
9. We will not delve further into the TCE's detailed contents, as the 
objective of the present study is not to provide a full commentary on the TCE 
but to assess its likely effects. Beyond the abovementioned effects we will 
therefore in a separate study concentrate on some specific problems, with 
special attention to their impact and mutual feedback effects on the Hungarian 
Constitution and the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. 
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Abstract. Linguistic arguments were in some of the new Member States invoked to justify 
national variations in the spelling of the name of 'euro' while, in others, a 'sovereign right' 
was claimed to spell that name in accordance with national language rules and usage traditions. 
Examining these claims against the background of the current Community language rules 
and of the exceptions and limitations to the 'principle of linguistic equality' inherent in these 
rules, this article will argue that, while the issue of the spelling of 'euro' is not one of 
language, even if it were to be conceived as such, the Treaty objectives served by a 'single 
name for the single currency' should prevail over arguments in favour of national variations 
of its name. 
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I. Introduction and legal framework 
The European Union (EU) is founded on 'unity in diversity': diversity of cultures, 
national identities and local customs. As language is a fundamental component 
of national identity, the concern of the EU with the preservation of linguistic 
diversity represents both a political necessity and a question of principle for 
the Community Institutions.1 The EU's interest in the promotion of linguistic 
diversity is also intimately linked to the distinct nature of primary and secondary 
Community legislation and, in particular, to its supremacy over national law2 
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The views expressed in this article are purely personal and do not represent those of the 
European Central Bank. 
E-mail: phoebus.athanassiou@ecb.int 
1
 According to Art. 6 Treaty on European Union, the EU shall 'respect the national 
identities of its Member States' . 
2
 In Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] European Court Review 585, the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the signature of the Treaty operated a transfer of 
Member State powers to the Community that entailed a permanent limitation of their 
sovereign rights and signalled their commitment to observe Community even against 
conflicting national laws. 
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and to its direct effect. ' core features of Community law that cannot assert 
themselves otherwise than against the background of a fully multilingual EU.4  
The EU's commitment to linguistic diversity can also be explained in terms of 
the latter's instrumentality as a legal certainty guarantee: the obligation to draft 
and present Community legislation in a language that the citizens of Europe 
can comprehend is so fundamental that the EU's respect for the Member State 
languages not only serves legal certainty purposes but, ultimately, also 
contributes to the protection of the rule of law.5 Finally, linguistic diversity 
is rightly deemed to enhance democratic representation,6 transparency and 
accountability by facilitating interaction between the Community Institutions 
and EU citizens and enabling public access to Community documents.7 As a 
result, linguistic diversity represents one of the most prominent characteristics 
of the EU as a sui generis 'supranational' organization, distinct from traditional 
international entities and ordinary federal structures.5 
Notwithstanding the fact that linguistic diversity is most intimately associated, 
whether historically, politically or legally with the European integration project, 
that its importance was already inherent in the text of the Treaties establishing 
the European Community (the 'Treaty ') and the European Atomic Energy 
The principle entails that, not only Treaty provisions (subject to the conditions 
stipulated by the European Court of Justice in van Gend & Loos, ibid), regulations and 
decisions (pursuant to Art. 249 Treaty on European Community) but also directives can 
conditionally be invoked by Member State nationals, in their own language, before national 
courts, as a direct source of rights and obligations that can be enforced against Member 
States or other individuals. 
4
 See Vedaschi, A.: Istituzioni europee e tecnica legislativa. Milano, 2001. 90. 
The first recital to the preamble to the European Constitution bears an express 
reference to the rule of law as one of the universal values of Europe's heritage. 
6
 See the preamble to the European Constitution thereto, read in conjunction with Art. 
I-10 (Citizenship of the Union). 
7
 Under Art. 255 Treaty on European Community, 'Any citizen of the Union ... shall 
have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents ' . In 
the same vein. Art. 21 Treaty on European Community provides that 'Every citizen of the 
Union may write to [any of the Community Institutions or bodies] in one of the [official 
languages! und have an answer in the same language. 
3
 After the 2004 enlargement, the number of the official languages of the Union has 
reached 20. From 1 January 2007, Irish will also be an official Community language. The 
planned accession to the EU of Bulgaria and Rumania will bring this figure to 23. By 
contrast, the UN uses 6 official languages for its intergovernmental meetings and documents 
while both the Council of Europe, with a current membership of 45, and NATO, with a 
membership of 26, use English and French only as their official languages. 
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Community,9 and that the core value attaching to its protection has since been 
emphasized in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the 
Charter),10 in the text of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (the 
'European Constitution')11 and, more recently, in a Commission Communication 
on multilingualism,12 even a cursory examination of the Community language 
rules suffices to reveal the absence of a comprehensive set of provisions dealing 
with all the different aspects of the interplay between the tasks of the EU, on 
the one hand, and the role of languages in their performance, on the other, as well 
as a consistent EU-wide language policy setting out specific standards against 
which to measure the EU's performance with regard to the use, preservation 
and promotion of languages.1 ' As a result, the ascertainment of the existence 
or otherwise of a Community 'principle of linguistic equality' and its precise 
demarcation are largely questions of interpretation for the Community Institu-
tions, for the Member States and, ultimately, for the European Court of Justice 
( 'ECJ'). 
Arts 21, 314 and 290 of the Treaty and Regulation No 1/58, as amended by 
successive Acts of Accession (the Regulation),14 set out the legal basis for 
multilingualism in the EU.'2 Art. 290 of the Treaty instructs the Council to 
4
 The reference is to the notion of the 'equal authenticity' of the texts of the Treaties in 
the official languages of the Member States, enshrined in Arts 314 Treaty on European 
Community and 225 Euratom, as affirmed by all subsequent Accession Treaties. 
10
 According to Art. 22 of the Charter, an important reference document for the 
interpretation of Community law, '[T|he Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity' and in Art. 1-3 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: '[The Union) 
shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural 
heritage is safeguarded and enhanced'. 
11
 O. J. С 310, 16. 12. 2004, 1. 
12
 'A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism', Commission Communication of 
22 November 2005, [COM(2005)596, available at http://europa.eu.int/languages/en/ 
document/74| . The document reaffirms the Commission's commitment to multilingualism, 
explores the various aspects of its language related policies and sets out a new framework 
strategy for multilingualism with proposals for specific actions. 
13
 See Shuibhne, N. N.: Does the Draft EU Constitution Contain a Language Policy?, 
http://www.cicmen.org/mercator/pdf/simp-shuibhne.pdf. 
14
 O. J. В 17, 6. 10. 1958. 385, as last amended to award to Irish and to three regional 
languages in Spain a reduced language status 
15
 Art. 314 Treaty on European Community provides that 'This Treaty, drawn up in a 
single original in the Dutch, French, German, and Italian languages, all four texts being 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian 
Republic, which shall transmit a certified copy to each of the Governments of the other 
signatory States. Pursuant to the Accession Treaties, the Danish, English, Finnish, Greek, 
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unanimously take decisions on the rules governing the languages of the 
Community Institutions 'without prejudice to the provisions contained in the 
Statute of the Court of Justice'. It was on the basis of this Art. that the Regulation 
was adopted. Besides enumerating, in Art. 1, the official and the working 
languages of the Community Institutions, the Regulation inter alia provides 
that a) documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction 
of a Member State sends to the Community Institutions may be drafted in any of 
the official languages selected by the sender, the reply being drafted in the 
same language, whereas documents which an institution sends to a Member 
State or to a person subject to its jurisdiction must be drafted in the language 
of that Member State (Arts 2 and 3); b) regulations and other documents of 
general application must be drafted in the 20 official languages (Ait. 4); c) the 
Official Journal of the European Union (the 'Official Journal') must be published 
in the 20 official languages (Art. 5); d) the Community Institutions may 
stipulate in their Rules of Procedure (RoP) which of the languages are to be 
used in specific cases (Art. 6); e) the languages used in the proceedings of 
ECJ must be laid down in its RoP (Art. 7); f) if a Member State has more than 
one official language, the language to be used must, at that Member State's 
request, be governed by the general rules of its law (Art. 8). 
The Regulation allows the Community Institutions a fair degree of latitude 
in the selection of their particular language regime, provided that this is set out 
in their respective RoP."' Because of this, but also because of the different 
needs and objectives of the different Community Institutions, the Regulation 
has been interpreted differently by each of its addressees, as will become 
apparent later in this paper. Further sources of limitations to the application of 
the principles of the Regulation, developed later in this paper, are the ECJ 
Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish versions of this Treaty shall also be authentic'. 
Similarly. Art. 3 of the Treaty of Accession 2003 provides that 'This Treaty, drawn up in a 
single original in the Czech, Danish. Dutch. English. Estonian, Finnish, French, German, 
Greek, Hungarian, Irish. Italian. Latvian. Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, 
Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these languages being 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian 
Republic, which will remit a certified copy to each of the Governments of the other 
Signatory States'. 
16
 It is important to note that the Community Institutions' freedom of choice (a) relates 
to their working language(s) only; and that (b)it is in all cases subject to the political 
constraints inherent in selecting one or more languages as their working languages. In the 
case of the European Central Bank, for instance, its RoP do not expressly identify English 
as the European Central Bank's working language, in view of the reaction that an explicit 
reference to that language might perhaps have generated. 
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case-law on the Community Institutions' and bodies' language regime and the 
national choices of Member States with more than one official language. 
II. The spelling of 'euro': A Community competence or a language 
question? 
A) Background to the debate 
The name of the single currency and of its decimal subdivision17 were 
determined by the Heads of State or Government at the 1995 Madrid European 
Council meeting. The importance of choosing, before the start of Stage Three 
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a name for the new currency that 
would be simple, symbolic and uniform across Member States was acknowledged 
early on as an essential requirement for a smooth currency changeover and, 
ultimately, as a determinant of the EMU's public acceptability.Is 
The significance of the name of the single currency was reiterated in 
Recital 2 of the Council Regulations establishing the legal framework for the 
introduction of the euro.1'1 The consistent reference in their texts to 'differences 
in alphabet' suggests that the original intention was not merely to prevent 
Member States from unilaterally adopting divergent 'national' names for the 
single currency but, also, to oblige them to uniformly spell 'euro', subject 
17
 Although Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of 
the euro (O. J. L 139, 11.5. 1998, 1) requires the same name of the subdivision of the euro to 
be used in all official languages, written or oral deviations exist in several Member States, 
including in the case of Greek small denomination coins which, instead of 'EURO CENT' , 
read leptó or leptá (the old 100th part of a drachma) on their national side. Oral deviations 
can be explained by reference to recital 2 to Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98, inter alia 
stating that 'the definition of the name "cent" does not prevent the use of variants of this 
term in common usage in the Member States'. 
18
 'The name of the single currency must be the same in all the official languages of the 
European Union, taking into account the existence of different alphabets; as of the start of 
Stage 3, the name given to the European currency shall be euro. This name is meant as a 
full name, not as a prefix to be attached to the national currency names' (Conclusions of 
the European Council Meeting in Madrid, at 'I. Economic revitalization of Europe in a 
Socially Integrated Framework, A. Economic and Monetary Union, I. The scenario for the 
changeover to the single currency', available at http://europa.eu.int/european_council/ 
conclusions/index_en.htm). 
19
 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating 
to the introduction of the euro (O. J. L 162, 19. 6. 1997, 1) and Council Regulation (EC) 
No 974/98. 
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nevertheless to the use of a different alphabet in one of the Member States.2" 
Although it is plausible to presume that the legislator's concern was first and 
foremost with references to the single currency's name in legal texts, there is 
little to suggest that any formal spelling distinction was ever envisaged between 
legal documents, on the one hand, and documents intended for the general 
public, on the other, not least because such a distinction might subvert legal 
certainty. At the same time, issues relating to the pronunciation of the words 
'euro' and 'cent' were presumably not intended to be addressed, if only because 
to impose specific rules in this respect would lie beyond the remit of the 
Community. The conclusion that the emphasis was on spelling rather than on 
pronunciation is also consistent with the Regulation. 
Although there is no indication that anything short of the uniform spelling 
of the name of the single currency was ever intended, at least in official usage, 
a number of linguistic concerns, initially with regard to the spelling of 'euro' 
on banknotes and coins, but also in connection with the grammar and formation 
of plurals of 'euro' as used in other official texts, have been voiced by Member 
State representations in EU fora21 and expressly highlighted in an annex to 
the European Constitution.22 In one Member State23 a legal act establishing a 
'national' spelling of the name of the single currency was adopted while, in 
"The reference is to Greece where the name of the single currency is spelt 'EYPQ'. 
The planned accession to the EU of Bulgaria will signal the inclusion of the Cyrillic 
alphabet into the 'alphabets officially used in the European Union' , as per the Declaration 
by the Republic of Bulgaria on the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in the European Union to 
the Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
European Union (O. J. L 157, 21. 06. 2005, 392). 
See, for instance, the ECOF1N meeting of 6 November 2004, held after Member 
State and EU officials discovered that there had been translation disparities in the spelling 
of the name of the single currency in several official language versions of the two Council 
Regulations establishing the framework for the euro and in the text of the 2003 Accession 
Treaty and of the European Constitution ( 'euras' in Lithuanian, 'eiro' in Latvian, 'evro' in 
Slovenian and 'euró' in Hungarian). 
" The reference is to a declaration by Latvia and Hungary on the spelling of the name 
of the single currency appended to the European Constitution whereby: 'Without prejudice 
to the unified spelling of the single currency of the European Union referred to in the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as displayed on the banknotes and on the 
coins. Latvia and Hungary declare that the spelling of the name of the single currency, 
including its derivatives as applied throughout the Latvian and Hungarian text of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, has no effect on the existing rules of the Latvian 
and the Hungarian languages'. 
The reference is to Latvia. 
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another three Member States," either a 'national spelling' only is being used in 
national legal acts or the 'national' and the official spelling are being used 
interchangeably. Objections to the uniform spelling of the name of the single 
currency have been expressed in yet another Member State.2" 
Three questions inevitably arise. The first is whether the spelling of 'euro' 
is a language issue, in which case linguistic and non-discrimination arguments 
might be of relevance. A second question is whether Member States can 
legitimately claim a right to spell the name of the single currency in line with 
their distinct linguistic traditions. A third, and perhaps more fundamental 
question, is whether convincing arguments can be canvassed against the 
permissibility of national variations in the spelling of 'euro ' , on account of the 
utility of the uniform spelling of the name of the single currency and of the 
actual existence of several other limitations to the 'principle of linguistic 
equality', similar in logic to those which this article argues should prevail in 
connection with the issue of the spelling of 'euro'. The following sections will 
examine each of these questions in turn. 
B) The spelling of 'euro' as a question of language and its link to non-
discrimination 
To determine whether or not the issue of the spelling of 'euro' is one of language, 
in connection with which non-discrimination arguments can legitimately be 
invoked, we propose to briefly examine the link between the EU's remarkable 
linguistic diversity and the rationale underlying the EU ' s concern with non-
discrimination. 
An enquiry into the rationale of the regulatory action of the EU in the field 
of languages suggests that the common thread that runs through all of the 
relevant Community legal rules, including, in particular, Art. 21 TEC and the 
provisions of the Regulation, and which informs the policy of the Community 
Institutions on this question, is the Community's concern to avoid language-
based discriminations against Member State nationals, likely to have an impact 
"
4
 The reference is to Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
' T h e reference is to Malta, where the National Council for the Maltese Language 
(NCML) recently proposed that the name to be locally used for the single currency should 
be 'ewro' (report available at: http://www.kunsilltalmalti.gov.mt/filebank/documents/ 
reportonthenamesoftheeuropeancurrency.pdf). Under Art. 5(2) of the Maltese Language 
Law, the NCML is the supreme language authority in Malta, with a duty to 'update the 
orthography of the Maltese language as necessary and, from time to time, establish the 
correct manner of writing words and phrases which enter the Maltese language from other 
tongues.' 
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on their everyday lives, whether by rendering their access to Community legis-
lation, procedures and information more difficult, or by discouraging language 
learning and societal linguistic diversity or by subverting the promotion of a 
thriving, multilingual economy. It follows that, perhaps, the only type of 
'discrimination' that one can meaningfully invoke when discussing issues of 
relevance to the linguistic diversity debate, relates to discrimination which is 
the result of restrictions likely to adversely affect the ability of the public to 
interact with the Community Institutions in their mother tongue or to invoke 
Community legislation or to exercise their citizenship rights and Treaty 
freedoms.2'1 In this respect, the Community's concern with avoiding language 
discrimination is no different from its concern with avoiding discrimination on 
any other grounds. 
Turning to the issue of the content of the principle of non-discrimination, it 
is noted that, while secondary Community law has prohibited both direct and 
indirect discrimination since the early days of European integration, what it did 
not expressly do was to provide an actual definition of the underlying concept.'7 
The principle was subsequently elaborated on and applied by the ECJ, notably 
in the fields of the free movement of labour and occupational gender equality. 
The gradual expansion of the scope of the Community law prohibition on 
discrimination continued with the Treaty of Amsterdam,28 which considerably 
broadened the range of prohibited types of discrimination, without, neverthe-
less, risking a definition of their 'common features'.29 Building on the case law 
of the ECJ and on the progress achieved through the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
new discrimination-targeted secondary Community legislation has been enacted 
J
' Particularly as regards the importance of the protection of linguistic rights for the 
preservation of the free movement of persons, the European Court of Justice has stated 
that, in the context of a Community based on the principle of the free movement of 
persons, 'the protection of the linguistic rights and privileges of individuals is of particular 
importance' (Case 137/84, Mutsch [1985] European Court Review, 2681, at paragraph 1 1 
and Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] European Court Review, 1-7637, at paragraph 
13). ^ 
In particular, Council Regulation No. 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on the free move-
ment of labour within the Community and Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 
1976 on the implementation of the principle of gender equality in relation to access to 
employment, training, promotion and work conditions. 
28
 O. J. С 340, 10. 11. 1997, 1. 
24
 Art. 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam empowers the Community to take action to deal 
with discrimination based on a whole new range of grounds, including racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. 
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in recent years.3" However, while the list of non-discrimination grounds is not 
definitive and notwithstanding that the principle of non-discrimination is likely 
to be applied, in the future, more broadly,31 the fundamental requirements for 
its ascertainment, namely, the existence of an unlawful differential treatment and 
the establishment of a prejudice to the legitimate interests of one or more 
individuals, have, throughout, remained unchanged. 
An examination of the 'language issues' that the question of the spelling of 
the name of the single currency raises and of the alleged discrimination in-
herent in the Member State obligation to spell its name uniformly, reveals the 
lack of any relation, direct or indirect, between these and the rationale that 
underlies the EU's concern with the protection of languages, as a particular 
aspect of its general non-discrimination policy. This is because the element of 
'discrimination' is absent from the equation. It should be remembered that the 
name of the single currency is an artificial word, selected as a matter of 
convention in view of its symbolic resonance, which is no more closer to 
Greek than it is to Hungarian or to any other official language of the Union, in 
a way such as to suggest a bias in favour of one or more and to the detriment 
of one or more other official languages and of the Member State nationals that 
speak them as their native tongues. It was precisely in order to avoid this 
eventuality that an artificial name, rather than, for instance, one reminiscent of 
the name of an actual currency, past or present, was eventually retained. 
It follows that, because it does not, stricto sensu, raise equal treatment 
questions, the issue of the spelling of the name of the single currency is not, 
properly speaking, a language issue in connection with which arguments 
inspired from the concern with avoiding discrimination against Member State 
nationals and, more particularly, from the respect of the EU for Member State 
languages, can legitimately be invoked. 
30
 These include Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on the implementation 
of the principle of equality without reference to racial or ethnic origin. Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 on the creation of a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, and Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 
September 2002 amending Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of 
gender equality in relation to access to employment, training, promotion and work 
conditions. 
31
 The EU's commitment to the principle of non-discrimination was recently reaffirmed 
in the Charter which, in Art. 21, prohibits discrimination on the 6 grounds listed in Art. 13 
Treaty on European Community, as well as on 7 additional grounds namely, social origin, 
genetic features, language, political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property and birth. In common with Art. 12 Treaty on European Community, Art. 21 of the 
Charter prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
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С) EMU and Member State sovereignty 
Even if it were possible to treat the issue of the spelling of the name of the 
single currency as one of language, so that arguments inspired from the EU's 
respect for linguistic equality and diversity could legitimately be relied on in 
support of claims against the uniform spelling of its name, one should not loose 
sight of the impact on the debate of the 'institutional' aspect of the challenge to 
the uniform spelling of 'euro', in view of the allocation of competences, in the 
field of the EMU, between the Community and the Member States. 
It should be remembered that, far from simply representing a supranational 
economic policy co-ordination framework, the EMU is so intimately linked to 
the European integration project that, Member States have voluntarily agreed 
to transfer to the Community Institutions and the ECB a host of critical 
decision-making powers in the areas of economic and monetary policy. While 
the resulting challenge to the classical notion of national sovereignty is, 
perhaps, unprecedented, the transfer to the EU level of supreme authority over 
economic and monetary policy matters has consistently been treated as a sine 
qua non condition for attaining closer economic and, ultimately, political 
integration among Member States. 
The name of the single currency, while not a monetary or economic policy 
issue in itself, was the outcome of a political agreement in the field of the 
EMU, a field of exclusive Community competence under the Treaty. As the 
exclusive holder of competence in monetary matters, it is only natural that the 
Community alone should determi ne the name of the single currency. Con-
sequently, it cannot be argued that the Council has acted ultra vires and in breach 
of the principle of subsidiarity in decreeing, through the legal acts establishing 
the framework for the introduction of the euro, the spelling of the name of the 
single currency in the languages of the Member States. 
It should also be remembered that, pursuant to Art. 5(3) of the Treaty of 
Accession 2003, " the 'new' Member States are expressly bound to comply, as 
"This is confirmed by Art. 123(4) Treaty on European Community, according to 
which the designation of the name of the single currency falls within the sole competence 
of the EU Council sitting in the composition of the euro area Member States. 
33
 This unequivocally provides that: 'The new Member States are in the same situation 
as the present Member States in respect of declarations or resolutions of, or other positions 
taken up by, the European Council or the Council and in respect of those concerning the 
Community or the Union adopted by common agreement of the Member States; they 
will accordingly observe the principles and guidelines deriving from those declarations, 
resolutions or other positions and will take such measures as may be necessary to ensure 
their implementation'. 
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a matter of law, with the Madrid European Council political agreement, as 
this was part and parcel of the acquis communautaire at the time of their 
accession. An ex post facto challenge to the validity of the European Council 
decision on the definition of the name of the single currency would therefore 
be repugnant to the rationale of the sui generis Community legal order,3"1 not 
least because it would be directed against an agreement reached by a body 
which, albeit not enjoying the status of an Institution, is often considered as a 
key source of gravitas in the European integration process, responsible for 
providing 'the Union with the necessary impetus for its development' and for 
'defining the general policy guidelines thereof'.35 
It follows that the 'sovereign right' effectively claimed by some of the 
Member States to spell the name of the single currency in accordance with their 
linguistic rules and usage traditions appears to be inconsistent with the 
exercise by the Community of its exclusive competences in the field of the 
EMU and, for these reasons, contrary to first principles. 
D) Qualifications to the 'principle of linguistic equality' 
A linguistic equality backed challenge to the uniform spelling of the name of 
the single currency postulates that the 'principle of linguistic equality' has the 
status of an absolute Community law principle from which no derogation is 
possible. However, an enquiry into the Community language rules suffices to 
reveal the existence of a wide range of qualifications to that principle. The 
origins of these de facto and de jure qualifications can be traced back to a 
multitude of sources, including primary and secondary Community law, the 
case law of the ECJ and the CFI and the language regime of the Community 
Institutions. Taken together, these qualifications suggest not only that there 
is no absolute 'principle of linguistic equality' within the EU but, more 
importantly, that, to the extent that such a principle does exist, this is subject to 
a number of exceptions or restrictions the logic of which is no different in 
nature to the one which this article suggests should prevail with regard to the 
issue of the spelling of the name of the single currency. The following 
34
 In Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos V Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] European Court Review 1, 
[1963] Common Market Law Reiew 105, the European Court of Justice ruled that the 
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields'. 
35
 Art. 4 Treaty on European Union. 
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paragraphs will examine each of the principal sources of qualifications to the 
'principle of linguistic equality'. 
a) Primary and secondary Community law qualifications to 'linguistic 
equality ' 
As we have seen earlier in this paper, the legal basis for the implementation of 
multilingualism by the Community Institutions is laid down in Arts 21, 314 
and 290 TEC and in the provisions of the Regulation. 
An enquiry into the Treaty basis for multilingualism and, more particularly, 
in Art. 21 TEC, reveals the existence of a number of restrictions in the 
language rules of the EU. Art. 21 TEC, the most far reaching of the relevant 
Treaty provisions, guarantees the right of every EU citizen to write to any of 
the Community Institutions or bodies in any of the languages stipulated in Art. 
314 TEC, receiving an answer in the same language. However, Art. 21 TEC 
covers written communications only, provided that these have been initiated 
by a citizen of the EU, thereby excluding from its scope oral and written 
communications initiated by third country nationals, resident in the EU. 
Furthermore, Art. 21 TEC refers to Community Institutions only, excluding 
other Community agencies or bodies from its scope of application. Finally, Art. 
21 TEC covers communications initiated from natural persons only, thereby 
excluding legal persons from its scope of application. 
A closer examination of the Regulation, which enumerates the 'official and 
working' languages of the Community Institutions, guarantees communications 
between the Community Institutions, the citizens and the Member States in all 
official languages and stipulates that regulations and other documents of general 
application must be drafted in all official languages, also reveals the existence of 
a number of inbuilt qualifications to its principles. Thus, the Regulation refers 
to the language regime of the Community Institutions ou/y-thereby excluding 
from its scope of application other EU agencies or bodies-and acknowledges 
national official languages only-thus excluding from its scope of application 
regional languages. 6 Moreover, the Regulation only addresses the written use 
of languages, offering no guidance in connection with verbal communications 
between the Community Institutions and the outside world. Last but not least, 
Art. 6 of the Regulation acknowledges that the Community Institutions have the 
power to implement their general language regime, in accordance with the 
principles outlined in the Regulation itself, by stipulating in their Rules of 
"'The 'official version' of multilingualism guaranteed by the Regulation has drawn 
criticism: see Yves, P.: Managing or Celebrating Linguistic Diversity in the EU (2004) 
http://www.iee.umontreal.ca/pubicationsfr_fichicrs/COLLOQUE-2004/lvesIESfinal.pdf. 
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Procedure (RoP) which of the official languages of the Union are to be used in 
specific cases, while Art. 8 gives Member States with more than one official 
national language the choice of deciding whether or not all of these languages 
will enjoy the status of a 'working' language of the Union, reserving never-
theless for the Council the procedure for their establishment, in accordance 
with the general rules of the law of the Member State involved. 
Taken together, these limitations significantly qualify the claim that the 
principles enshrined in the Treaty or the Regulation establish an absolute 
Community 'principle of linguistic equality'. 
b) Judicial qualifications to 'linguistic equality' 
The case law of the ECJ and the CFI are similarly inconsistent with the inter-
pretation that the principles enshrined in the Treaty or the Statute establish an 
absolute Community 'principle of linguistic equality'. 
In Kik V OHlMyi the Court of First Instance (CFI) held that the language 
rules laid down in the Regulation do not amount to principles of Community 
law and do not embody a specific, Community law 'principle of linguistic 
equality' that cannot legitimately be derogated from: to decide otherwise 
would be to disregard the character of the Regulation as secondary law.38 On 
appeal,39 the ECJ confirmed that Art. 314 TEC does not enshrine an absolute 
Community law principle of 'equality of languages', adding that even where an 
individual decision is published in the Official Journal, only the language of 
the relevant procedure will be authentic and can be used to interpret that 
decision.40 It follows that, because no absolute value attaches to the provisions 
of Art. 314 TEC, there will be circumstances where documents intended to 
produce legally binding effects can legitimately be drafted in some of the 
official languages of the Union only, carrying equal weight and authenticity as 
37
 Case T-120/99, Kik v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks 
and Designs) (OHIM) [2001] European Court Review 11-2235, paragraphs 58 to 59. 
38
 This interpretation is consistent with the language of both Art. 290 Treaty on 
European Community and Art. 6 of the Regulation, of which the former enables the 
Council to amend the rules governing the languages of the Community Institutions and to 
establish different language rules as it sees fit, while the latter expressly recognises the 
Community Institutions' freedom to stipulate in their RoP which of the official languages of 
the Union will be used in specific cases. 
39
 Case C-361/01 P, Christina Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) [2003] European Court Review 1-08283, paragraph 82. 
4(1
 Ibid, paragraph 87. 
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tools for the interpretation of legislative intention.4' The ECJ further held42 that 
the language regime of an Institution or body will occasionally be the result of a 
delicate balancing act between conflicting interests, requiring the engineering of 
linguistically appropriate solutions to practical difficulties, and concluded that 
the Council's choice, in the case of the OH1M, to treat differently some of the 
more widely used official languages, was appropriate and proportionate. 
In a recent Opinion,43 Advocate General Maduro stated that, notwith-
standing the fundamental importance of the concept of linguistic diversity and 
its status as an EU-wide institutional rule, it is impossible to infer the existence 
of an absolute principle of equality between Member State languages as there 
will be circumstances, which must nevertheless be 'justified on every occasion',44 
where this principle will not prevail: 'It is necessary to accept restrictions in 
practice, in order to reconcile observance of that principle with the imperatives 
of institutional and administrative life. But those restrictions must be limited 
and justified. In any event, they cannot undermine the substance of the 
principle whereby the Community Institutions must respect and use all the official 
languages of the Union'.45 Advocate General Maduro distinguished between (i) 
communications between the Community Institutions or bodies and citizens of 
the EU, where the principle of linguistic diversity deserves the highest level of 
protection and cannot be subject to restrictions resulting from 'technical 
41
 It is implicit in the European Court of Justice ruling that, while Art. 21 Treaty on 
European Community embodies a Community law principle (a specific expression of the 
general principle of equality and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality under Art. 
12 Treaty on European Community), Art. 314 Treaty on European Community, to which 
Art. 21 Treaty on European Community refers, is not a general Community law principle, 
since the latter's focus is on the protection of the rights of individual citizens while that of 
Art. 314 is on the duties of the Community Institutions in their external relations or internal 
operations. 
4
~ Case C-361/01 P, Christina Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) [2003] European Court Review 1-08283, paragraphs 
92-94. 
43
 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-160/03 (Spain v Eurojust) of 16. 
12. 2004. The Opinion reviews the relevant principles and case-law and is one of the rare 
occasions where the issue of the languages of the Community Institutions and bodies has 
been dealt with by the European Court of Justice to such length. In its judgment, delivered 
on 15 March 2005, the European Court of Justice declared the application for annulment 
brought by Spain under Art. 230 Treaty on European Community inadmissible and did not, 
for that reason, examine the issue of the compatibility of the linguistic recruitment 
requirements of Eurojust with the language regime of the EU. 
44
 Ibid, at paragraph 38. 
45
 Ibid, at paragraph 40. 
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difficulties which an efficient institution can and must surmount';46 (ii) the 
administrative procedures of Community Institutions or bodies, where 'certain 
restrictions based on administrative requirements' will be tolerated, as long as 
the interested parties have been put in a position where they can properly take 
note of the position of the Institution concerned;47 and (iii) rules on the internal 
functioning of Community Institutions or bodies, where the choice of the 
language to be used for internal communication 'is the responsibility of those 
institutions'4* as long as the basic reasons of administrative efficiency behind a 
limited number of working languages do not result in an internal language 
regime that is entirely dissociated from the rules governing the external 
communication of the Community Institutions or bodies and do not undermine 
the essence of linguistic diversity. 
c) Institutional qualifications to 'linguistic equality' 
The discretion that the Regulation grants to the Community Institutions in the 
application of its principles has led to the establishment of several different 
working language regimes, one by each of the Community Institutions, designed 
to reflect their distinct business requirements and external communication 
needs. These inevitably challenge the linear application by the Community 
Institutions of the 'principle of linguistic equality'.4'1 
The European Parliament has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the 
pursuit of multilingualism as a condition of democratic representation and as 
an integral part of European culture, worthy of protection. Its language rules 
are laid down in Rule 138 of its RoPM) which establishes not one but two distinct 
regimes, broadly corresponding to the division of the Parliament's work between 
public deliberations and committee work. Thus, while a fully multilingual regime 
applies to plenary sessions, multilingualism is less consistently pursued in 
connection with committee and certain delegation meetings. Given that committee 
hearings is where most of the preparatory work leading to the adoption of 
Community legislation takes place, it is possible to treat the provisions of Rule 
138 as significant qualifications to Parliament's practice of multilingualism. 
4
'' Ibid, at paragraph 43. 
47
 Ibid, at paragraph 44. 
4
* Ibid, at paragraph 46. 
44
 For a recent, detailed examination of the application of multilingualism by the 
Community Institutions and the European Central Bank, see Athanassiou, P.: The 
application of multilingualism in the European Union Context. European Central Bank 
Legal Working Paper Series (2006) No. 2, http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp2.pdf 
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 16th edition, July 2004, available at: http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2? 
PROG=RULES-EP&L=EN&REF=TOC. 
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The language regime of the Council is prima facie characterised by the 
application of full multilingualism, both because the Council represents the 
interests of Member State governments and because its main function is to 
adopt legislation.51 The language rules of the Council are laid down in Art. 14 
of its RoP.72 according to which regulations and other documents of general 
application cannot validly be adopted or enter into force unless drafted in all 
the official languages of the Union.53 However, Art. 14 allows for derogations 
from the language rules in force, where the Council has unanimously decided 
to waive their application 'on grounds of urgency'.54 Further limitations apply at 
lower levels within the Council, including within the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives,55 and in a number of other Council preparatory bodies.56 
Except for a few and relatively vague references to 'official', 'working' and 
'authentic' languages,57 the RoP of the Commission55 are silent on the issue of 
its language regime. Notwithstanding the Commission's commitment to multi-
lingualism, as evidenced in its recently adopted Action Plan54 and Communi-
51
 Art. 202 Treaty on European Community. 
52
 O. J . L 106, 15.4. 2004, 22. 
53
 Under Arts 251 and 252 Treaty on European Community, the same rule applies to 
Council common positions which cannot be communicated to the Parliament unless 
adopted in all official languages. 
54
 Derogations may be used in the first few months after the accession of new Member 
State where a revised translation in an official language is difficult to obtain within the 
specified period. Whenever the Council has recourse to an Art. 14 derogation, its decision 
is to be recorded in the Council minutes and, where appropriate, the Council should make 
efforts to thereafter adopt the missing language version(s). 
55
 The Comité des Représentants Permanents operates on the basis of an informal, 
mostly trilingual, language regime (English, French and German), although documents 
submitted to it are occasionally available in other official languages. 
Ahead of the 2004 enlargement, the Seville European Council asked the Council to 
study the question of the use of languages and to consider practical means of improving the 
situation, without prejudice to basic principles. Further constraints to the provision of full 
translation and interpretation arrangements have since been introduced to ensure that the 
Council can cope with post-enlargement demands. 
57
 Under Art. 18 of the RoP of the Commission: 'For the purposes of these Rules, 
"authentic language or languages" means the official languages of the Communities in the 
case of instruments of general application and the language or languages of those to whom 
they are addressed in other cases' . 
58
 O. J . L 308, 8. 12.2000. 26. 
54
 COM(2003)0449 final. This was the Commission's response to the December 2001 
Parliament resolution referred to above. On 27 July 2003 the Commission adopted its 
Action Plan 2004-2006 for the promotion of language learning and linguistic diversity. 
The Action Plan (i) makes concrete proposals for 45 measures to be taken between 2004 
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cation,60 the most supranational of the Community Institutions has, due to its 
composition and operational requirements, opted for a more restricted language 
regime. Thus, while full translation and interpretation are made available in 
formal occasions and public fora, the de facto working languages of the 
Commission are limited to English, French and, to a lesser extent, German, 
also depending on the policy that is being dealt with. This limited working 
language regime is nevertheless without prejudice to the discharge by the 
Commission of its legislative initiative tasks in all the official languages of the 
Union or to the Commission's commitment to practise multilingualism in its 
external communications.61 
The language regime of the ECJ differs from that of the other Community 
Institutions.62 Underlying the ECJ's commitment to multilingualism is its concern 
with providing access to justice and ensuring the effective protection of the 
rights that individuals derive under Community law. Art. 29 of its RoP provides 
that the 'language of a case' can be any of the official languages of the EU, 
including Irish, as determined by the applicant.63 In proceedings involving a 
preliminary ruling, the language of the case is that of the national court or 
tribunal which has requested the preliminary ruling and is to be used in written 
and 2006 with the threefold objective of extending the benefits of language learning to all 
EU citizens as a lifelong activity, improving the quality of language teaching and building 
a language-friendly environment in Europe and (ii) proposes a series of actions to be taken 
at European level with the aim of supporting actions taken by local, regional and national 
authorities. 
60
 See footnote 13. 
61
 See also Principle No 4 of the 'Code of good administrative behaviour for staff of 
the Commission in their relations with the public' ('Dealing with enquiries'), pursuant to 
which: 'In accordance with Art. 21 Treaty on European Community establishing the 
European Community, members of the public who write to the Commission shall receive a 
reply to letters in the language of the initial letter, provided that it was written in one of the 
official languages of the Community' . 
62
 The sui generis nature of the European Court of Justice's language regime is 
acknowledged in Arts 290 Treaty on European Community and 7 of the Regulation. 
63
 Certain exceptions apply where the defendant is a Member State or a natural or legal 
person having the nationality of a Member State (the language of the case coincides with 
the official language of that State; where that State has more than one official language, the 
applicant may choose between them), where the parties jointly request the use of another 
official Community language or where a request by one of the parties for the use of another 
official Community language has exceptionally been granted by the European Court of 
Justice (on the understanding that such a request cannot be submitted by an Institution). 
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and oral pleadings by the parties and in supporting documentation.64 However, 
while the ECJ 's judgments are issued in the official languages of the Union, 
and although Judges and Advocates General may use any language or require 
the translation of any document into the language of their choice,65 internally 
the ECJ deliberates in French only (this also is the language of its internal 
administration). The use of a single working language, while no doubt intended 
to help avoid extensive cross-translation and to ensure the consistent use of 
vocabulary, represents a notable limitation to the ECJ 's practice of multi-
lingualism. 
It follows from Art. 24 of the RoP66 of the Court of Auditors that its audit 
reports and opinions must be made available in all the official languages of the 
Union when due for publication in the Official Journal of the European Union 
(OJ). Letters from the President and other observations as well as documents 
forwarded officially to the Community Institutions or governed by the Staff 
Regulations are translated into all official languages of the Union, in common 
with documents intended for general circulation, such as Court of Audit 
brochures, documents providing information on its work or documents for 
internal use and circulation to the national audit institutions. However, in 
common with the ECJ, the dominant internal working language of the Court of 
Audit is French (although English and German are also used but to a lesser 
extent). 
d) Exceptions to 'linguistic equality' in the case of certain national and 
regional Member State languages 
Although the official (and, by implication, also the working) languages of the 
Community Institutions generally coincide with the official languages of the 
Member States, there are some exceptions to this rule in the case of Member 
States with more than one official languages. The particular situation of these 
languages adds a further qualification to the application of the 'principle of 
linguistic equality' within the EU. 
64
 It follows from Art. 31 of the European Court of Justice RoP that documents drawn 
up in the "language of a case' or in any other language authorised by the European Court of 
Justice, under Art. 29, are regarded as authentic and cannot be challenged on language 
grounds. 
RoP of the European Court of Justice, Art. 29 (3). 
66O. J. L 81, 20. I. 2005. 3. 
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Irish, the "first"67 national language of Ireland was, until recently, not 
recognised as an official Community language,68 although the Treaties and the 
European Constitution,64 were already drawn up or officially translated into 
Irish.711 The status of the Irish language had originally been determined by an 
agreement under the terms of which Irish was to enjoy the status of a 'Treaty 
language', meaning that the Treaties would be officially translated or drawn up 
in Irish, while Irish would be listed in the Treaties as an authentic language. In 
this regard, the status of Irish within the EU was unique. Further to Ireland's 
request in November 2004, the Council unanimously adopted a Council 
regulation that recognizes Irish as the 21s1 official Community language from 1 
January 2007.71 The Community Institutions' obligation to adopt and publish 
regulations and other documents of general application in Irish is nevertheless 
subject to a partial72 and temporary derogation.73 
Luxembourgish, Luxembourg's national language,74 is another example 
of an official national language which is not an official Community lan-
guage. However, unlike with Irish, Luxembourgish has never been recognised as 
an authentic, 'Treaty language'. 
Following the accession of Malta to the EU, Maltese, Malta's 'first' 
national language,75 became an official and a working language of the EU. 
67
 Under Art. 8 of the Irish Constitution, in the event of a conflict between the Irish and 
the English language texts of the Constitution, the Irish text prevails. 
68
 See Art. 1 of the Regulation which does not include Irish among the official and 
working languages of the Community Institutions. 
69
 The European Constitution formalised the designation of Irish as a Treaty language 
and, also, changed the existing official and working language dichotomy by introducing a 
third language designation ( 'Constitution's languages'-see Art. l-10(2)(d)). 
711
 See Arts 53 Treaty on European Union and 314 Treaty on European Community. 
71
 See press release for the 2667th session (13 June 2005) by the European Council. 
General Affairs and External Relations. Council Regulation (EC) No 920/2005, O. J. L 
156, 18. 6. 2005. 3. 
72
 Under Art. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 920/2005 of 13 June 2005 (O. J. LI56, 
18. 6. 2005. 3.) the derogation does not apply to regulations adopted jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council. 
73
 Under Art. 2, ibid, the derogation is for a renewable five year period beginning on 
the day on which the amending Council Regulation applies. 
74
 Loi sur les régimes des langues. 1984, Art. 1. Under Luxembourg law, legislation is 
drafted in French only, although Luxembourgish, alongside French and German, can be 
used for court proceedings and administrative purposes. 
75
 Under Art. 74 of the Maltese Constitution, "(E)very law shall be enacted in both 
languages and. if there is any conflict between the Maltese and the English texts of any law, 
the Maltese shall prevail". This rule does not apply to those acts which expressly provide 
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However, as it was technically impossible to guarantee the drafting in Maltese 
of all regulations and other documents of general application adopted by the 
Community Institutions, a partial7'1 and temporary77 derogation similar to the 
one referred to above in our discussion of the particular situation of Irish, has 
applied from the Community Institutions' obligation to draft and publish such 
acts in Maltese. 
Turning to the situation of regional languages, the reader will recall that, by 
acknowledging only national official languages, the Regulation excludes from 
its scope of application languages enjoying official status in part only of the 
territory of certain Member States. Considering that, apart from the 20 official 
Community languages, the number of regional and other 'minority' languages 
spoken across the territory of the EU exceeds 60 this restriction in the scope of 
application of the Regulation translates itself into a significant restriction in the 
scope of application of the 'principle of linguistic equality' itself. The recent 
recognition by the Council7* of the 'semi-official' status of Catalan,74 Basque 
and Galician, in return for the assumption by Spain of the resulting costs, 
could set a precedent which, if followed, might gradually pave the way for the 
future use by the Community Institutions of other regional languages.80 
otherwise, e.g. to the Companies Act, Art. 2(7) of which specifically provides that, in case 
of conflict, the English language text prevails over the Maltese text. Some secondary 
legislation is adopted in English only such as, for instance, Central Bank of Malta directives 
or directives of the Maltese Financial Services Authority. Other legislation in technical 
areas, such as the Banking Act, the Central Bank of Malta Act or the Companies Act, 
drafted both in English and Maltese, contain no express provision on which version 
prevails in case of conflict. 
76
 Under Art. 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 930/2004 (O. J. L 169, 1. 5. 2004), the 
derogation does not apply to regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and 
the Council. 
Arts 1 and 2, ibid, the derogation is for a three year period and can be extended for a 
further one year period. 
7S
 See Press Release for the 2667th session (13 June 2005) of the European Couneil, 
General Affairs and External Relations. 
74
 The particular situation of Catalan, which is spoken by more people than several 
official Community languages, had already prompted the adoption of the 'Resolution on 
languages in the Community and the situation of Catalan' (O. J. С 19, 28. 1. 1991. 42). 
s
" See Press Release of the Committee of the Regions. 16 November 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/languages/en/document/81, according to which the Committee of the 
Regions has recently entered into an agreement with the Spanish Ambassador to the EU 
approving, for the first time, the use of Spanish regional languages by a Community body. 
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III. The spelling of 'euro': a further legitimate qualification to the 
'principle of linguistic equality' 
Our enquiry into the Community language rules and our examination of the 
language regime of the Community Institutions has revealed the existence of 
multiple qualifications to multilingualism. The freedom that the Community 
Institutions enjoy to interpret and adapt the Community language rules in 
accordance with their distinct needs, the choice that Member States with more 
than one national official language have to decide which of these will enjoy the 
status of 'working' languages of the Union and the limited scope of the principle 
enshrined in the Treaty represent significant qualifications to the general appli-
cation of multilingualism within the EU. In the same vein, the parallel existence 
of several language regimes, at different levels and for different purposes, 
suggests that it is only in connection with their external communication needs 
that the Community Institutions strictly adhere to multilingualism.81 Measured 
against the background of the absence of a global language-related framework 
of rules and against the ECJ's acknowledgement that restrictions on linguistic 
equality can, in appropriate circumstances, be justified, provided that these are 
based on objective considerations, the abovementioned qualifications inevitably 
question the extent to which it is possible to speak of a 'linguistic equality 
principle', in the sense of a fully fledged, firmly entrenched and clearly 
established Community law principle. One is perhaps safer approaching the 
debate surrounding multilingualism as one which lends itself more to presump-
tions than to solid principles. 
To the extent, however, that a 'principle of linguistic equality' does exist, it 
can plausibly be argued that the overriding nature of the common interest in 
the success of the EMU and the negative impact on the attainment of the 
81
 Similar considerations also apply to the language regime of the EU agencies and 
bodies. Thus, while the Regulation establishing the The Office of Harmonistaion for the 
Internal Market [Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the 
Community trade mark, O. J. L 11, 14. 1. 1994. 1.] expressly provides in Art. 115 for a 
specific, limited language regime applicable to the OHIM, the corresponding regulations in 
the case of other Community agencies, such as the Community Plant Variety Office, the 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, the European Centre for the Development 
of Vocational Training or the European Environment Agency and the European Environment 
Information and Observation Network, are either silent on the linguistic issue or expressly 
provide that the Community agencies to which they relate are subject to the language rules 
enshrined in the Regulation. The same is also true of some of the more recent Community 
agencies such as the European Network and Information Society, the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control or the European Railway Agency. 
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EMU's objectives resulting from the parallel existence of variations in the name 
of euro, would suffice to justify reading a further qualification to the application 
of this principle with regard to the issue of the spelling of the name of the 
single currency. 
It should first of all be remembered that the name of the single currency is 
an essential part of its definition: in a remarkably simple and straightforward 
manner, Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 defines the single currency solely 
by reference to its name.52 As the legal definition of the euro makes no 
reference to a benchmark against which to establish its exchange value, it 
follows that the name of the single currency is an indissoluble part of its legal 
identity that should not be interfered with, even if such name were to be deemed 
inconsistent with the language rules and traditions of some of the Member 
States. 
Moreover, a multiplicity of spellings in the name of the single currency and 
the parallel existence of national variations of that name would inevitably 
subvert the application to the euro, a currency that 'exists simply as a result 
of a sovereign declaration',83 of the principle of monetary nominalism, inherent 
in Arts 123 and 2 TEC and of Council Regulation (EC) No 1 103/97 respec-
tively84 and, inevitably, generate uncertainty and confusion in terms of its 
status as legal tender across the territory of the EU as well as with regard to its 
singleness. 
Perhaps the most decisive justification for opposing variations in the name 
of the single currency and for rebutting counter-arguments (including those 
drawn from the EU's respect for linguistic diversity), stems from the 
importance of the euro as a symbol of the EU.85 Over and above its function 
as a means of payment, the single currency represents a tangible emblem of 
8
~ Art. 2 of the Regulation unequivocally provides that: 'As from 1 January 1999 the 
currency of the participating Member States shall be the euro. The currency unit shall be 
one euro. One euro shall be divided into one hundred cent ' . 
53
 Cabotte, J .-Ch.-Moulin, A.-M.: The Legal Status of the Single Currency. Banque 
de France Bulletin Digest, 107 (2002), 100. http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/eurosys/ 
telechar/docs/eurcash3.pdf. 
84
 The principle of monetary nominalism is crucial to the rationale for token money, 
i.e. money without any intrinsic value other than that assigned by the issuing bank. This 
argument is valid against calls for a differentiation in the spelling of the euro in banknotes 
and coins where the importance of preserving the highest degree of identity possible 
between individual examples of the single currency circulating within the EU, would be 
necessary to achieve fungibility. 
83
 Significantly, the European Constitution included, in Art. 1-8, the single currency 
and its name in its exhaustive enumeration of the 'The symbols of the Union ' . 
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the common identity of the Member States and the visible embodiment of their 
shared commitment to the furtherance of European integration. While national 
currencies have certainly borne the burden of such symbolism over the 
centuries, each within the confines of their territory, it is possible to argue that 
the symbolic charge of the euro by far exceeds that of any other previous 
currency, since the euro stands not only for a commonly accepted medium of 
exchange and value but, ultimately, for a symbol of the political and economic 
communities from which it has sprang and for a portable reminder of a 
monetary union unprecedented in European history. Thus, if the euro is to 
fulfil its dual role as a palpable symbol of the Union's shared identity and as a 
potent integration tool central to the success of the common European project, 
language-motivated variations in its name should be avoided, not least where 
legally binding texts are concerned, even if this would mean reading a further 
qualification to the 'principle of linguistic equality'. 
What the qualifications to the 'principle of linguistic equality' examined in 
this article have in common is the fact that they are underpinned by an 
objective justification. Such qualifications, particularly as reflected in the 
language regime of the Community Institutions, agencies or bodies, are almost 
invariably justified by reference to the need to strike a balance between the 
EU's respect for linguistic diversity and the inevitable constraints subject to 
which the Community Institutions operate. Moreover, as we have already seen 
earlier in this article, both the CFI and the ECJ have ruled that the provisions 
of the Treaty and of the Regulation that jointly spell out the language regime 
of the EU do not amount to absolute principles of Community law. Further-
more, both Courts have accepted that there will be circumstances where a 
restrictive language regime can be adopted by an Institution, provided that 
this is based on objective and proportional considerations that do not give 
rise to unwarranted differences of treatment and do not undermine the basic 
assumptions underlying multilingualism and the Community's commitment to 
its preservation. Applying mutatis mutandis the reasoning of the Community 
Courts to the particularities of the EMU, it is submitted that there is little to 
suggest that the public interest in the success of the EMU and the self-evident 
importance of the identity of the name of the single currency as a prerequisite 
for the achievement of the EMU's goals would not qualify as objective 
considerations of the highest order, justifying a further limitation to linguistic 
diversity with regard to the question of the spelling of the name of the single 
currency and legitimizing its uniform spelling, notwithstanding the apparent 
tension between the EMU's objectives and the language traditions and usages 
in some of the Member States. 
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IV. Conclusions 
The EU's remarkable linguistic pluralism and its respect for linguistic diversity 
are core features of the Union, intimately related to its unique nature as a sui 
generis, treaty-based organisation consisting of 25 European countries with 
distinct, yet closely linked cultural and historical traditions. Despite the EU's 
promotion of multilingualism and the EU-wide consensus on the cultural and 
political importance of linguistic diversity, an examination of the Community 
language rules and of the policy of the Community Institutions in this field 
reveals that these are subject to several limitations and that multilingualism is 
not an absolute imperative but, instead, a value that should be balanced against 
other, equally important, albeit occasionally conflicting values. 
The EMU is an area where the Community 's policy of respect for multi-
lingualism needs to be balanced against the imperatives of economic and 
monetary union. Therefore, to treat the question of the spelling of the name of 
the single currency as a linguistic question, in the context of which language 
driven considerations need necessarily be attributed a predominant status, would 
be to loose sight of the status of the actual principle of linguistic equality under 
Community law and to ignore the fact that, over and above its function as a 
means of payment, the single currency is also a symbol that must be constant 
and unchanged across the official Community languages, not least where its 
use in legally binding texts is concerned, if it is to fulfil its rallying role and 
integrating mission. 
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On Bishop Virgil's Litigations in Bavaria 
Abstract. Virgil, the bishop of Salzburg of Irish origin (749-784) opened a new chapter in 
the history of his episcopate: he had the earliest works of the historiography of Salzburg 
compiled: the Gesta sancti Hrodberti confessoris, the Libellus Virgilii and the Liber 
confraternitatum; he had the Rupert Cathedral constructed, which was consecrated in 774; he 
extended the rights of the episcopate and that of the Saint Peter Monastery and he organised 
the mission among the Carantanians. This paper deals with three aspects of the activity of 
Virgil, the abbot and bishop of Salzburg: the conflict between Bonilacius and Virgil (I.); the 
determination of the date of Virgil's ordaining (IL); and the debates for the goods and rights 
of the Saint Peter Monastery and the episcopate of Salzburg, which were noted down by 
Virgil in the Libellus Virgilii.(III.). 
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Virgil1 arrived from Quierzy in Bavaria at the end of 745 or at the beginning of 
746,2 after spending two years at the court of the maior domus, Pippin III. It 
was on behalf of him that Virgil started his journey to the duke of Bavaria, 
Odilo; consequently,1 Virgil must have arrived in Quierzy as early as the end 
of 743 or the beginning of 744 at the time of Odilo's Frank subjection.4 Virgil 
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 Cf. Freund, S.: Von Tassilo zu Karl dem Großen. Die Salzburger (Erz-) Bischöfe 
und die Reichspolitik. In: v. Kolmer, L.-Rohr, Chr. (Hrsg.): Tassilo III. von Bayern. 
Großmacht und Ohnmacht im 8. Jahrhundert. Regensburg, 2005. 79; Dopsch, H.: Rupert, 
Virgil und die Salzburger Slawenmission. In: 1000 Jahre Ostarrichi - Seine christliche 
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sqq.; 81. sqq.; 137. sqq.; 153. sqq.; 96. sqq. 
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 Bonifatius, epistolae 68. Monumenta Germaniae Historica EE selectae. Berlin, 1916. 
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 Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum 2. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 
Hannover, 1997. 
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 Cf. Annales Mettenses priores a. 743. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Hannover-
Leipzig, 1905. 
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followed the Irish custom of the peregrinatio pro amore Christi,5 he left his 
home with his companions including Dobdagrecus (Dubdá-Cích),6 who was 
called proprius episcopus in the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum; 
just like his companion Sidonius, Virgil definitely began his work in Bavaria 
as an ordained clergyman.7 Without going into a detailed discussion of Virgil's 
origin and activity in Ireland,5 it is worth considering the question briefly 
which monastery Virgil and his companion came from. Shortly before his 
death, in the summer of 784, Virgil had the abbots of the monastery of Iona 
entered in the Liber confraternitatum so that the abbots in the Saint Peter 
Monastery in Salzburg should pray regularly for them afterwards. The list 
contains not only the abbots f rom Iona: in the first place is Saint Patrik, the 
apostle of Ireland; the ninth abbot of Iona, Adamnan, is followed by Keranus 
(Cíarán), the abbot of Clonmacnoise, and Columban. the abbot of Luxeuil-
Bobbio. The list ends with Slébíne, the abbot of Iona, who died in 161.4 If Iona 
is accepted as Virgil's homeland and it is supposed that he arrived on the 
Continent as an abbot, the question may arise which monastery was led by him 
Ó Néill, Pagraig P.: Bonifaz und Virgil: Konflikt zweier Kulturen. In: v. Dopsch, 
H.-Juffinger, R. (Hrsg.): Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar unci Gelehrter. Salzburg, 1985. 
80; Breatnach, P. A.: Über Beginn und Eigenart der irischen Mission auf dem Kontinent 
einschließlich der irischen Missionare in Bayern. In: Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar und 
Gelehrter. Salzburg, 1985. 85. 
6
 Conversio 2. 
Bonifatius, epistolae 68; 212. 
* About this see Ó Fiaich, T.: Virgils Werdegang in Irland und sein Weg auf dem 
Kontinent. In: Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar und Gelehrter. Salzburg, 1985. 17. sqq.; Moisl, 
H.: Das Kloster Iona und seine Verbindungen mit dem Kontinent im siebenten und achten 
Jahrhundert. In: Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar und Gelehrter. Salzburg, 1985. 27. sqq. 
' Liber confraternitatum 20 Ca 2 - е 2 Forstner, K. (ed.): Das Verbrüderungsbuch von 
St. Peter in Salzburg. Codices selecti 51. Graz, 1974); Wolfram. H.: Virgil als Abt und 
Bischof von Salzburg. In: Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar und Gelehrter. Salzburg, 1985. 
342. sq.; Wolfram. H.: Salzburg. Bayern, Österreich. Die Conversio Bagoariorum et Caranta-
norum und die Quellen ihrer Zeit. München, 1995. 254; Löwe, H.: Salzburg als Zentrum 
literarischen Schaffens im 8. Jahrhundert. Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger 
Landeskunde 115 (1975) 100; Grosjean P.: Virgile de Salzboug en Irlande. Analecta 
Bollandiana 78 (1960) 92. sqq. About the Liber confraternitatum see Forstner, К.: Das 
Salzburgcr Skriptorium unter Virgil und das Verbrüderungsbuch von St. Peter. In: Virgil 
von Salzburg. Missionar und Gelehrter. Salzburg 1985. 135. sqq.; McKtterick, R.: 
Geschichte und Gedächtnis im frühmittelalterlichen Bayern. In: v. Niederkorn-Bruck, M . -
Scharer, A. (Hrsg.): Erzbischof Arn von Salzburg. Wien-München, 2004. 70. sqq.; 
McKitterick, R.: Social memory, commemoration and the book. In: Ridyard, S. (ed.): 
Reading and the Book in the Middle Ages. Sewance Medieval Studies 11 (2001) 5. sqq.; 
Fentress, J .-Wickham, C.: Social memory. Oxford, 1992. 
ON BISHOP VIRGIL 'S LITIGATIONS IN B A V A R I A 51 
in the meantime since he cannot be considered an abbot of Iona. Paul Grosjean 
takes side against the thesis that Virgil was Ferg(h)il, the abbot of Aghaboe 
(Achad Bo),10 and this point is also supported by Herwig Wolfram, who does 
not preclude the possibility that Virgil might have had a connection with the 
monastery of Aghaboe, Trim, or Meath." Apart from the general custom of 
peregrinatio, we are reduced to conjecture as to what personal motive for 
abandoning Iona Virgil might have had. It cannot be ruled out that the schism 
that influenced the spirit of the monastry of Iona for a long time might have 
influenced this decision since the Liber confraternitatum lists the names of the 
counterabbots of Iona too.12 
I. The conflict between Bonifacius and Virgil crystallized around the current 
problems of Bavaria in the 740's; nevertheless, the differences in their views 
were rooted in their different origin, worldview and cultural background. 
Raising the aforesaid centres of Bavarian Christianity to episcopic rank that 
revived during the period of Duke Theodo and Emmeran (Haimhrammus), 
who worked in Regensburg, Rupert (Hrodbertus), who acted in Salzburg, and 
Corbinian (Corbirianus), who did service in Freising, would mean great 
progress also for the dukes of Bavaria which was not abundant in cit ies." So 
Duke Theodo went to Rome in 715 or 716 in order to negotiate; consequently,14 
Pope Gregory II (715-731) commissioned bishop Martinianus and two of his 
assistants, Gregorius and Dorotheus to assign the exact borders of the three or 
four episcopates to be established in Bavaria in accordance with Duke 
Theodo's division of his dukedom among his sons, and to summon the nobles 
and the priests on these territories, among other things, in order to investigate 
the priests' faithfulness and lawful ordination.'5 
Pope Gregory II ordered that after taking three bishops' advice the new 
episcopates' bishops should be chosen, although the right of confirmation stayed 
10
 Grosjean: op. cit. 97. sqq.: 100. sqq. 
" Wolfram: Salzburg, Bayern, Österreich, op. cit. 255. 
12
 Grosjean: op. cit. 92. sqq.; Wolfram: Salzburg, Bayern, Österreich, op. cit. 255. 
13
 Reindel, K.: Das Zeitalter der Agilolfinger. In: v. Spindlcr. M. (Hrsg.): Handbuch der 
bayerischen Geschichte I. München, 1981". 196. sqq. 
14
 Liber pontificalis 19. (Le liber pontificalis 1. Paris, 1886.); Paulus Diaconus: 
História Langobardorum 6, 44. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Hannover, 1878.) 
15
 Kolmcr, L.: Regensburg oder Salzburg? Die Christianisierung der Bayern und die 
Errichtung kanonischer Bistümer. In: v. Dopsch, H.-Kramml, P. F.-Weiß, A. S. (Hrsg.): 
1200 Jahre Erzbistum Salzburg. Die älteste Metropole im deutschen Sprachraum. Salzburg, 
1999. 13. 
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within the authority of Rome.16 In the most important episcopal center an 
archbishopric was to be founded, and the last decision about the archbishop's 
person-just as in the case of the bishops-was the priority of the Pope. If there 
was no proper person available, the Pope should be notified, and in this case he 
himself would send an archbishop to take the position.17 Pope Gregory Il 's 
direction partly repeated the resolutions of Council of Braga in 583 and those 
of the Council of Lateran in 679, referring to the Anglo-Saxon ecclessiastical 
organization. is The Pope proceeded pursuant to his predecessors' routine in 
similar cases-as in the case of the English Church with its center in Canterbury-
namely, he had reservations concerning the local clergy, and he was reluctant 
to decree the archbishop's ordination, ie. he wanted to build a system of dioceses 
that was under the direction of Rome.14 This endeavour was in line with the 
goals of the Agilolfing dynasty inasmuch as they aimed at establishing an 
independent local Church that was free from the influence of the Church of the 
Frank Empire. Probably as far back as this early stage they intended to make 
Salzburg the center of the Bavarian Church " which eventually took place only 
in 798. It is not known why this episcopal organisation was not established 
soon after the Pope 's resolution, the discords of the Agilolfing-dynasty and 
Karl Martell's politics to broaden his power might have played a part in the 
temporary failure of the plan."1 
Pope Gregory Il 's missionary politics concerning German territories confined 
to entrusting Bonifacius on 15 May 719 with missionary work without naming 
any particular territory;22 and after ordaining him bishop on 20 November 722 
he sent Bonifacius to the countries and territories inhabited by Germans."3 
Later he read his reports and answered his questions.24 Although dioces had no 
accurately defined borders, by the time of the rule of Pope Gregory III (731-
741) the age of the travelling bishops had ended; their place was taken by 
16
 Cf. Bonifatius, epistolae 28; Ó Néill: op. cit. 79. 
17
 Reindel, К.: Die Organisation der Salzburger Kirche im Zeitalter des hl. Rupert. 
Mitteilungen Gesellschaft für SalzburgerLandeskunde 115 (1975)96. sq. 
18
 Bauerreiß, R.: Kirchengeschichte Bayerns I. St. Ottilien, 19582. 58. 
14
 Schniidinger, H.: Das Papsttum und die bayerische Kirche - Bonifatius als 
Gegenspieler Virgils. In: Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar und Gelehrter. Salzburg, 1985. 93. 
' " Reindel: Das Zeitalter der Agilolfinger, op. cit. 226. 
"' Schmidinger: op. cit. 93. 
"" Jaffé, Ph. Regesta pontificum Romanorum. Graz, 1956. 2157; Bonifatius, epistolae 12. 
23
 Jaffé 2160; 2161 : Bonifatius, epistolae 17; 18; 19; 21; 25. 
4
 Bonifatius, epistolae 24; 26; Schieffer. Th.: Winfried-Bonifatius und die christliche 
Grundlegung Europas. Freiburg i. Br., 1980. 149. sqq. 
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bishops with constant residence.2" A year after his accession to the throne, in 
732, the Pope himself commissioned Bonifacius,who became an archbishop 
after the pallium was given to him, although he had not taken a diocese, to 
reorganise the Bavarian Church and to ordain bishops if necessary.26 Bonifacius 
visited Bavaria as far back as 719,27 and from 733 to 735 he visited all the 
Bavarian dioceses.28 Pope Gregory III appointed Bonifacius legate and in his 
letters to the archbishops of Bavaria and Alemannia (Wiggo, Liudo, Rydolt, 
Phyphylo and Addo) he ordered them to assemble at a place determined by 
Bonifacius on the banks of the river Danube to consult.24 Bonifacius named 
four dioceses: Regensburg, Passau, Salzburg and F r e i s i n g . T h e s e cities not 
only gained a significant role as secular centers, their sacred legitimation as far 
as Regensburg, Salzburg and Freising were concerned was ensured by the 
missionaries: Emmeran, Rupert and Corbinian.31 
The bishops of these four dioceses were not recognised as Archbishops, 
although their episcopal rank was not questioned, but the place of the Arch-
bishops were filled by new bishops ordained by Bonifacius: John in Passau, 
Erembert in Freising, and Gaubald/Gawibald in Regensburg.32 In Passau, Vivilo 
was kept in his place despite reserves, which was confirmed by the Pope, 
though his confirmation was not without a tone of reprimand." (Augsburg, 
which was founded far before the Bavarian Church, and Säben, which was 
included into the Bavarian dioceses later, are not mentioned; the Bishopric of 
Eichstätt including partly Bavarian, partly Swabian territories would be 
25
 Wolfram, H.: Die Zeit der Agilolfinger. Rupert und Virgil. In: v. Dopsch, H. (Hrsg.): 
Geschichte Salzburgs I. Salzburg 1981. 136. sqq. 
Jaffé 2239; Bonifatius, epistolae 26; Schieffer: op. cit. 153. sqq.; Schmidinger: op. 
cit. 94. 
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 Vita Bonifatii auctore Willibalde) 5. Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Hannover-
Leipzig, 1905.) 
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 Ibid. 6. 
' j a f f é 2247; Bonifatius, epistolae 44; Löwe, H.: Bonifatius und die bayerisch-
fränkische Spannung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen dem Papsttum 
und den Karolingern. In: v. Bosl, K. (Hrsg.): Zur Geschichte der Bayern. Wege der 
Forschung 60. Darmstadt, 1965. 280. sq. 
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L.-Rohr, Chr. (Hrsg.): Tassilo III. von Bayern. Großmacht und Ohnmacht im 8. Jahrhundert. 
Regensburg, 2005. 24. 
31
 Schmidinger: op. cit. 94. 
32
 Vita Bonifatii 7; Reindel: Das Zeitalter der Agilolfinger, op. cit. 229. sq.; Schieffer: 
op. cit. 180. sqq.; Kolmer: op. cit. 14; Erkens: op. cit. 25. 
33
 Bonifatius, epistolae 45; Jaffé 2251. 
30 TAMÁS NÓTÁRI 
founded only in 743/44.34) The oragnization of dioceses by Bonifacius was 
soon firmly established through promoting local traditions: Saint Emmeran's 
relics were placed with solemnity in Regensburg, Tasilo had Saint Valentine's 
relics taken to Passau in 764, Bishop Arbeo placed Saint Corbininan's earthly 
remnants in Freising in 765 and Virgil arranged for the veneration of Saint 
Rupert's and his companion's relics in the Cathedral of Salzburg.35 
The question of establishing an Archbishopric was temporarily left un-
mentioned, the reason for this was probably that Bonifacius thought it was 
unnecessary to found a metropoly that joined the bishoprics, so he supervised 
the activity of the bishops as the Pope's legate and as a missionary arch-
bishop.36 Although he had reached the peak of his influence by this time, 
certain criticism was formulated against him, and with the deepening conflict 
between the Frank maior domus and the Agilolfings, Odilo and Bonifacius also 
estranged since the archbishop joined Karlmann openly.37 Pope Zechariah 
(741-752) sent Sergius as legate to Bavaria, whom Odilo could consider 
Bonifacius's deputy, and it might have been to the Pope's interest to gain the 
Bavarian duke as an ally against the Langobards. The mission of Sergius ended 
unluckily: he appeared in the Franks' camp before the fight between Odilo and 
his brothers-in-law, Karlmann and Pippin, and warned them in the name of 
Saint Peter against war; after the duke 's defeat he was imprisoned. After this 
incident, Zechariah renewed Bonifacius' rank as legate in Germany and in Gallia, 
yet Bonifacius' respect decreased to such an extent that even the Bavarian 
bishops ordained by him were reluctant to participate in the council convoked 
by him.38 It was at the end of Bonifacius' career that one of his gravest conflicts 
occurred: his argument with Virgil. 
Virgil and his follower, Sidonius, who worked in Bavaria after 745, were 
commissioned by Bonifacius to rechristen those Bavarians who received the 
sacrament of baptism from a local priest with the phrase "in nomine patria et 
filia et spiritus sanctii",34 Shortly before this, on 5 November 744 Pope 
Zechariah appointed Bonifacius legate of Germany and Gallia,40 through that 
34
 Reindcl: Das Zeitalter der Agilolfinger, op. cit. 230. sqq. 
3
 Schmidinger: op. cit. 95. 
36
 Schieffer: op. cit. 184. 
37
 Prinz, F.: Frühes Mönchtum im Frankenreich. Kultur und Gesellschaft in Gallien, 
den Rheinlanden und Bayern am Beispiel der monastischen Entwicklung (4. bis 8. Jahr-
hundert). München-Wicn, 1965.442. sq. 
38
 Schmidinger: op. cit. 95; Kolmer: op. cit. 14. 
39
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40
 Ibid. 58; Kolmer: op. cit. 15. 
ON BISHOP VIRGIL 'S LITIGATIONS IN BAVARIA 55 
he became a mediator between the papacy and the Frank Church.41 Virgil and 
Sidonius refused to execute the order; they turned to Rome, and the Pope 
decided the argument in their favour; therefore, on 1 July 746 he informed 
Bonifacius that his order was incorrect, and announced that it was sufficient to 
cleanse those who were christened with the wrong phrase by the touch of his 
hand, and that christening in the name of the Holy Trinity is valid even if it 
is delivered by a heretic.42 Pope Zechariah's reasoning seems to be plausible 
since Pope Gregory III had proposed a similar solution for the linguistic 
problems.4' Nevertheless, if other orders sent to Bonifacius by Gregory II, 
Gregory III and Zechariah are taken into consideration, Bonifacius' uncertainty 
and rigour is understandable.44 Bonifacius definitely knew the ecclesiastical 
standpoint about the delivery of sacrament by heretics; yet, in this case he set 
out from the idea that christening without naming the Holy Trinity was invalid, 
as it was confirmed by previous papal verdicts. The Bavarian priest delivered 
the sacrament in the name of the homeland, the maid and the Holy Spirit, which 
was justly disapproved by Bonifacius.4" Virgil's and Sidonius' resistance might 
have revolted Bonifacius all the more since the Council known as Concilium 
Germanicum, which was held in 742, put the control of christening by priests 
under episcopal authority."' From his point of view, Virgil 's procedure was not 
reprehensible either since according to Irish customs the delivery of the 
sacrement was the sovereign right of every priest, not even the bishops had the 
right to interfere. Furthermore, he understood that in the case of this priest who 
used this peculiar formula to christen it was not heresy or a mind yearning for 
teaching new doctrines what he had to face but simple ignorance.47 
Bonifacius continued to argue by writing a new letter to the Pope, in which 
he accused Virgil of heresy concerning the doctrine of antipodoi; namely, that 
there were people living on the other side of the Earth, and they were illuminated 
by another Sun and another Moon.48 The doctrine about the globular figure of 
the Earth was not in contrast with the opinion of ecclessiastical authorities, 
such as Augustinus, Isidorus Hispalensis and Beda Venerabilis; nevertheless, 
regarding the issue of antipodoi Augustinus and Beda Venerabilis refrained 
41
 Löwe: Bonifatius und die bayerisch-fränkische Spannung, op. cit. 279. 
4
~ Bonifatius, epistolae 68; Schmidinger: op. cit. 96. 
43
 Bonifatius, epistolae 45. 
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46
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4b. Darmstadt, 1968.) 2; Bonifatius, epistolae 56. 
47
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from expressing an opinion, and Isidorus unambiguously claimed that it is a 
creature of imagination.4'1 At the same time, the doctrine of antipodoi implied 
the questioning of the unity of mankind and by that the universality of re-
demption.50 Bonifacius, as a pragmatic and organising mind,51 had little interest 
in investigations and speculations about natural sience, so in Virgil's accusation 
his antipathy against the Irish abbot most probably played an important part.52 
Being aware of these accusations, in his letter written on 1 May 748 Pope 
Zechariah no longer supported Virgil and Sidonius so unconditionally as he 
had done before, and the fact that he distanced himself also from Sidonius 
unambiguously shows that his opinion was changed not only by Bonifacius' 
accusations against Sidonius regarding his cosmological misconseptions. 
Zechariah summoned Virgil and Sidonius to Rome, and sent a letter to Duke 
Odilo, who had died in the meantime, in order to secure that Virgil would 
really set off, and he distanced himself from the claim that he had promised 
him the bishopric of Salzburg. Instead, he questioned Virgil 's clerical authority 
and ordered that Bonifacius, who was nevertheless encouraged to be concilia-
tory and gentle, should bring Virgil and the Irish priests concerned to the 
Council, and if they were guilty of heresy, they should be expelled from the 
Church.5, The further consequences of the case are not known; Virgil did not 
set off to Rome, and no schism occured either; Virgil was possibly given the 
vacant seat of the bishopric of Salzburg with papal consent, presumably 
evading the legate Bonifacius. Pippin Ill's permission for acquiring the diocese 
of Salzburg, which was necessary both de facto and de iure after the Bavarian 
defeat in 743, was available.54 The papal licentia was obtained presumably 
44
 Cf. Löwe, H.: Ein literarischer Widersacher des Bonifatius, Virgil von Salzburg und 
die Kosmographie des Aethicus Ister. Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur in 
Mainz. Abhandlungen dergeistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse 11 (1951) 939. sqq. 
(Otto Prinz refuses the authorship of Virgil-Prinz, О.: Die Kosmographie des Aethicus. 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 14. 
München. 1993. 1-84.) 
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51
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Bonifaz und Virgil, op. cit. 77. 
" Schmidinger: op. cit. 97. 
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by Odilo,55 which makes it evident that the bavarian Duke and Virgil could 
cooperate well, even against Bonifacius.56 (Heinz Löwe brought Cosmographia, 
the work attributed to Aethicus Ister, most probably correctly, into connection 
with the accusation of the doctrine of antipodoi, claiming that Virgil wanted to 
take sarcastic revenge with this opus written under this pen name after 764 on 
his former rival, Bonifacius, who died a martyr in 754.57) 
II. The second chapter of Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum first lists 
the superiors (bishops and abbots) of the church after Rupert's death, or, departure 
from Salzburg,58 and starts to expound Virgil's origin and his activity in 
Bavaria. The order of the abbots and bishops in this chapter of the Conversio is 
the following: Bishop Rupert, Bishop Vitalis, abbot Anzogolus, abbot Savolus, 
bishop Flobargisus, bishop John and bishop Virgil. The order given in the Liber 
confraternitatum59 and in a verse in De ordine conprovincialium pontificum 
are different.60 Whereas in the Liber confraternitatum bishop and abbot Vitalis 
takes the second place after abbot Anzogolus, according to the Conversio 
Rupert himself appointed Vitalis to be his successor. The aforesaid verse might 
be responsible for the inverted order of Anzogolus and Vitalis, since this 
33
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Iohannis episcopus et abbas, Virgilius episcopus et abbas. 
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source lists only those of Rupert's successors who received the episcopal rank. 
Nevertheless, it is a fact that little is known about the men listed after Rupert 
and before Virgil, sometimes nothing is known except for their names.61 The 
first who was ordained for the episcopy of Salzburg, which became a bishopric 
in 739, was bishop and abbot John, who was appointed by Bonifacius, and 
who is known as the person who received the donations of the nobility. Several 
sources refer to John's friars long after his death.'" Bishop John departed this 
life on 10 June 746, or as it seems more probable in 747 on the same day.6. 
In the years after his arrival in Salzburg, Virgil occupied the office of an 
abbot since, as it is claimed in the Conversio, he postponed his ordination to 
bishop for about two years, and the work was accomplished by Dobdagrecus, 
who accompanied him to Bavaria.'14 Virgil's ordination took place in all 
probability on 15 June 749,65 though according to the Conversio he was 
willing to have himself ordained only on 15 June 767, at the constant entreaty 
of the people and the bishops. Although the day of the ordination was not 
questionable, its year was a controversial issue for a long time since the two 
dates mentioned in the Conversio, i.e., Virgil's arrival in Bavaria in 745/746 
and the period of two years' waiting before his alleged ordination in 767 could 
not be harmonised. When answering this question, four points must be taken 
into consideration: Virgil's place in the order of the Bavarian bishops; the 
foundation of Otting, which took place in the year of Virgil's ordination, and 
which was dated by Pippin and Odilo jointly, though without reference to the 
year.''6 The statement in the second chapter of the Conversio which claims that 
Virgil took over the direction of the church of Salzburg in 746/47 and he was 
willing to have himself ordained only two years later "populis petentibus et 
61
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episcopis regionis illius";67 and finally that Virgil 's name occurs as abba(s) in 
the documents of the archives.68 
The minutes of the Council of Dingolfing in 776/77,64 which contain the 
agreement about the community of prayer implemented by the Bavarian 
bishops and abbots, was signed by the following people: Manno, the bishop of 
Neuburg; Alim, the bishop of Säben; Virgil, the bishop of Salzburg; Wisurich, 
the bishop of Passau; Sindbert, the bishop of Regensburg; and Arbeo, the 
bishop of Freising.70 The order of the signatures was determined by the time 
spent in office, the date of ordination, as determined by the pseudoisidorian 
collection based on the Western Gothic Ordo de celebrando concilie There-
fore, if the people signing the minutes of the Council of Dingolfing followed 
this order, it seems to be impossible that Virgil was ordained bishop only in 
the year 767 since Arbeo was presumably ordained in 764, and he is explicitly 
mentioned as bishop in a text dating from 17 May 765 in the Traditio 
Frisingensis.72 Herwig Wolfram argued for 755 as the year of the ordination 
as far back as 1971 referring among other things to this fact;73 yet, this has not 
become a generally accepted standpoint in the literature.71 (Obviously, the order 
of the signatures might lead to incorrect conclusions, especially when the 
signatures of those absent were added to the minutes later.75) Nevertheless, in 
this case those who signed the document were most probably present at its 
compilation.76 The fact that the Notifia de pacto fraternitatis in Dingolfing 
contains the names of the signatory bishops in the order of their ordination is 
67
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supported by other sources. A letter of donation from 770 contains two lists of 
the witnesses, in the first one Tasilo III is placed first followed by bishop Alim 
and Arbeo. 
The second list begins with Virgil, and Wisurih is placed second.77 Another 
document from Freising dated 16 November 777 deals with a donation imple-
mented with the approval of the duke and the nobility in the presence of 
Bishop Virgil. Arbeo, the bishop of Freising, and Odalhart, the bishop of 
Neuburg, who replaced Manno two months before, are indicated as witnesses.75 
The founder of Kremsmünster refers to three bishops present: Virgil, Sindbert, 
the bishop of Regensburg, and Waltrich, the bishop of Passau.74 Whereas the 
Notitia de pacto fraternitatis put Wisurich before Sindbert, the founder of 
Kremsmünster, it placed Wisurich's successor, Waltrih, after Sindbert. Although 
there are sources from the first half of the year 777 implying that Wisurich was 
still alive, it can be concluded that at the time of the foundation of Kremsmün-
ster Waltrich had not been in office for a long time.5" Following Herwig 
Wolfram, from the aforesaid facts it can be inferred that Wisurich, the bishop 
of Passau, to whom reference is made only between 770 and 777, was certainly 
ordained before Arbeo, and the same stands also for Sindbert, the bishop of 
Regensburg. Therefore; Virgil's ordination must have taken place before 
764/65; consequntly, 767, the year indicated in the Conversio is incorrect.51 
The Breves Notitiae states Otting was founded in the year Virgil was 
ordained bishop, and emphasises that the ceremony took place during the reign 
of Pippin and his nephew, duke Tasilo.52 Double dating (royal and ducal) can 
be found in other sources from Freising from 754/55 and 760/62.53 After Grifo 
(Hiltrud's stepbrother), who temporarily seized power, was driven out from 
Bavaria with Pippin's help, the eight-year-old Tasilo was appointed Duke of 
Bavaria by Pippin.5' Over Tasilo guardianship was exercised by his mother, 
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Hiltrud until her death in 754, and through her, indirectly by his uncle, Pippin 
between 754 and 757.85 It was in the imperial assembly in 757 in Compiégne 
that Pippin freed Tasilo f rom his guardianship; nevertheless, the sources 
of official Frank historiography do not disclose this fact.51' Referring to 
Bitterauf s edition, Herwig Wolfram calls the attention to a piece of the Traditio 
Frisingensis,87 and after investigating the textual tradition draws the conclusion 
that it was possible to use double dating also after 757; yet, after 763 no 
instance of this is found. Consequently, it can be stated that the investigated 
paragraph about the year of Virgil's ordination in the Breves Notitiae can by 
no means refer to the events in 767.88 This interpretation is corroborated by the 
fact that the Breves Notitiae calls Tasilo Pippin's nepos, emphasising his 
dependence. Moreover, according to the narrative Count Gunther asks King 
Pippin's permission for the donation with the consent and on the advice of 
Tasilo.89 
From these facts it becomes evident that the foundation of Otting-and 
Virgil's ordination in the same year-took place probably in the period when 
748 (Ed. Kurze, F. Monumenta Germaniae Historica SS rer. Germ, in usum seholarum 6. 
Hannover, 1895.); Annales Mettenses priores a. 749 
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Pippin was directly or indirectly Tasilo's guardian; that is, between 748/49 and 
757. It can be righteously assumed that the period, of two years according to 
the Conversio, which passed between Virgil's arrival in Bavaria (745/46) and 
his ordination might have been one year longer since the 15th of June in 749 
was Sunday, which was an ideal day for the ordination. The fact that Virgil was 
ordained bishop in the period when the Frank ruler produced great influence 
on the Bavarian Dukedom unequivocally chimes in with the good personal 
relationship between Pippin and Virgil.9" 
Virgil is referred to as abba(s) in two sources that give an account of events 
between 747 and 748: (i) the description of the argument of the cella sancti 
Maximiliani in the Notitia Arnonis, which involved Duke Odilo who died on 
18 January 748; consequently, the date of the conflict can be defined in 747;91 
and (ii) a piece in the Tradito Frisingensis about a donation, which was begun 
by Odilo and ended by Tasilo after his father's death." Based on these arguments 
it can be assumed that the period of waiting and delaying mentioned in the 
Conversio can be counted from 747; and that Virgil having acted as an abbot 
until that time, who adherred to both the Irish and the Rupertian tradition that 
attributed great significance to cloistered life, was ordained bishop of Salzburg 
on 15 June 749. It was after that he took over the bishop's office from 
Dobdagrecus, who most probably possessed a bishop's rank of only a general 
nature, but had not been appointed de iure to direct the Bishopric of Salzburg. '3 
III. Virgil had taken a firm stand to defend the rights of the Saint Peter 
monastery already as an abbot. The Irish regula also demanded this from an 
abbot who was responsible for the monastery. Nevertheless, Virgil wanted to 
enforce the requirements of the continental (Frank) system, which was in 
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contradiction with the Irish tradition in several points."4 Although he had a 
good personal relationship with Duke Odilo, after taking over the direction of 
Salzburg, he began an argument concerning the cella sancti Maximiliani in 
Bischofshofen, i.e. for the goods of the Saint Maximilian friars' house. The 
cella sancti Maximiliani in Pongau was founded by Saint Rupert with the 
consent of Duke Theodo and with the cooperation of the brothers Tonazanus 
and Urso, but it was soon destroyed by the invading Slavs.95 According to the 
first part of the Libellus Virgilii that is in the Breves Notitiae"' the place on 
which the friar's house was built had been found by Tonazan, Rupert's servant, 
and by Ledi, the Duke's servant.97 After arriving home from the Franks from 
his exile in 741, Odilo gave the fortune of Saint Maximilian to his faithful 
assistant minister Ursus/Urso, who followed him to exile, in order to rebuild 
the friars'house, which was derelict for a long time. (Probably it was not only 
Ursus who had a position of trust around the Duke, but also his predecessors, 
the members of the genealógia Albina had had a closer relationship with dukes 
Theodo and Theodbert before.98) 
The relation of the Notifia Arnonis about this event is less perspicuous and 
logical. After the establishment of the monastery, Tonazanus and Urso sent 
their successors, Vurmhari and Cissimo (the Libellus Virgilii mentions Tonazan's 
and Ledi 's successors, Wernharius and Dulcissimus99) to the Saint Peter 
monastery in Salzburg in order to study. After growing up, they asked Rupert 
to permit them to dispose over half of the estate that was donated to the 
monastery by their predecessors as a life interest. Rupert permitted this, 
however; he stipulated that the other half of the estate belonged to the Saint 
Peter monastery. Later on Vurmhami and Cissimo secured for their successors 
the life interest of the estate that was owned by them; yet, the subordination 
to Salzburg continued until the time of the rule of Odilo.100 Urso, Odilo's 
assistant minister asked for the whole of the estate as beneficium, and Odilo 
fulfilled this request and he seized the estate from the monastery of Salzburg 
by force. Abbot Virgil demanded that the estate should be returned by the 
Duke, who wanted to offer his estate in Laufen as replacement, but the abbot 
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did not accept this. So Odilo kept the estate that was seized from the monastery 
unrightfully for himself."" 
Virgil does not mention the re-establishment of the cella in the second 
chapter of Libellus Virgilii which is the core of the Breves Notitiae, and which 
deals with Pongau and the cella sancti Maximiliani.n)2 He confines himself to 
relate that Odilo gave the cella Maximiliani and its estates as beneficium to his 
assistant minister, Ursus.103 This event took place before Virgil 's arrival in 
Bavaria, without episcopal approval. The lack of the episcopal approval is 
presumably a sign of Odilo's effort to restrict the episcopal influence on 
donations related to ducal rights, and to enlarge his sphere of power by the 
donation of estates to monasteries and to churches.104 Virgil took definite steps 
to separate the ecclessiastical/episcopal and the secular/ducal benefices and the 
rights connected to them, in spite of his good relationship and cooperation with 
Odilo. Virgil gives a picture about the conflict with Ursus which is biassed and 
not without contradiction."13 Ursus, the assistant minister of the Duke was a 
member of the genealógia Albia, the members of which were dedicated to God 
and Saint Maximilian by Duke Theodbert, when Rupert consecrated a church 
at the same place, Pongau.""' Moreover, he emphasised that Duke Theodbert 
donated the cella Maximiliani to Rupert and to his episcopal residence.107 It 
cannot be ascertained, whether it was Virgil himself who mentioned the 
residence in connection with Rupert, who did not find and did not establish a 
101
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residence in Salzburg, or it is a result and interpolation of the editorial work on 
the Breves Notitiae.108 In order to find an excuse for Duke Odilo, Virgil later 
adds that Odilo did not know that the church in Pongau was built and 
consecrated by Rupert with the donations of Theodo and Theodbert and the 
friars' house and the people living there were donated to the bishopric of 
Salzburg by Duke Theodbert."14 Odilo might have been soon informed about 
the legal situation; despite this, he refused to gratify Virgil's demand that he 
should return the cella Maximiliani that he had formerly given to Ursus. 
According to the Breves Notitiae, Odilo's reason for this was that he did not 
want to disappoint his assistant minister."" After this, Virgil tried to obtain the 
half of the estate found by Rupert and the duke's servants, Tonazan and Ledi 
for the church. (The other servant's name in the Notitia Arnonis was the same 
as that of the assistant minister, Ursus/Urso.)1" 
Virgil's struggle was not against Duke Odilo, he wanted to oppose the 
Bavarian custom according to which the ecclessiastical properties that were 
established by the donations of the duke and the nobility were returned to the 
successors of the establishing family, or, as in the case of Pongau, to the 
'discovering' family, as feudal tenure.1" It was indirecly due to the reforms of 
Bonifacius, who was Virgil's great enemy, that Virgil could take firm steps in 
order to defend the rights of the bishopric and the Saint Peter monastery, since 
only after Bonifacius' reform did it become possible to strictly separate ducal 
and episcopal monasteries and churches in Bavaria. In the case of the friars' 
house in Pongau, we cannot talk about ab ovo ducal or episcopal estab-
lishment, since the bishopric of Salzburg had not existed at the time of the 
establishment of the cella Maximiliani, and Bavaria did not have a bishop 
108
 Dopsch: op. cit. 99; Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum. op. cit. 207154. 
104
 Breves Notitiae 8, 3. Et Otilo dux nescius erat, qualiter domnus Rudbertus eundem 
locum ad Pongo primo cepit construere et ecclesiam ibi edificavit et consecravit 
concedentibus ducibus Tlieodone et Theodberto filio eius. Sed et hoc nescivit, quod 
Theodbertus dux ipsos homines ibidem tradidit et ipsam cellam cum omni traditione sua 
confirmavit sancto Rudberto episcopo ad sedem htvavensem episcopatus sui. 
1
 Breves Notitiae 8, 5-6 . Postea vero, cum Virgilius peregrinus douante Otilone duce 
suscepit regimen ipsius Iuvavensis sedis et episcopatum, cognita ista supradicta causa 
venit ad Otilonem ducem et dixit ei отпет banc causam ab initio per ordinem rogavitque 
eum secundum iustum indicium hoc reddere sancto Petro ad ipsam sedem. Sed Otilo noluit 
eundem Ursum presbiterum suum contristare neque tollere ei illud beneficium ... 
111
 Breves Notitiae 8, 6. ... tunc autem cepit Virgilius episcopus medietatem inde 
querere propter ilium servum sancti Rudberti Tonaz.anum nomine, qui hoc ipsum primo 
cum Latino vicino suo invertit. 
112
 Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum. op. cit. 208. sq. 
66 TAMÁS NÓTÁRI 
who was ordained according to the canon. Odilo urged the establishment of 
monasteries under ducal authority and he entrusted non-Bavarian bishops with 
the consecration in order to defend his rights and in order to exclude the 
bishops' arising claim to authority.113 Since Virgil was reluctant to accept the 
estate in Laufen that was offered as replacement for the estate in Pongau, 
Odilo had to give half of the demanded estate to Virgil, where the bishop 
consecrated a church in order to represent the legal claim."4 At the same time, 
Ursus built a church in Oberhalm with the help of the Duke, and this was 
consecrated by a roaming bishop, Liuti, who did not have jurisdiction. Never-
theless, Virgil placed the church which he called 'discord'(Discordia) under 
excommunicatio and banned his priests from service there.115 The Libellus 
Virgilii-and by this also the Breves Notitiae-disclose only that this situation 
was unaltered until Bishop Virgil was alive.'"1 It is worth mentioning that 
Virgil's procedure and standpoint in the argument about the legal authority over 
the cella Maxirniliani was much closer to Bonifacius' ideology that represented 
continental views than to the Irish customs, widespread in Virgil's homeland, 
which left the right of disposal over monasteries in the hand of the establishing 
clans.117 
Virgil defended the rights of the bishopric with the same resolution in the 
conflict related in the third part of the Libellus Virgilii118 that developed around 
the friars' house established by Count Gunther in Otting. In the year of Virgil's 
ordination a cella and a church were established in Otting on his estate in the 
district of Chiemgau. He asked the bishop to come in order to reveal his intention 
to summon there friars and to appoint an abbot to lead them and to give a part 
of his estate to provide for them."'1 Virgil asked under whose jurisdiction the 
abbot and the friars would belong and whose dominium it would be. Count 
Gunther refused to answer, so Virgil refused to consecrate the church, the 
monastery and to ordain the abbot until he did not receive information about 
the status of the monastery under the canon law.120 Therefore; the Count 
considered the case and promised that the monastery would be established 
pursuant to the regulations in the canon law and he would place the monastery, 
113
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the church and their fortune under the authority of the bishopric of Salzburg 
if Virgil was willing to consecrate the church, which was accepted by Virgil 
and he consecrated the whole place and the basilica to Saint Stephen.121 
Consequently, the Count gave the church and all its possessions to the bishop 
by handing over the altarcloth (per pallium altaris) in order for him to govern 
it in accordance with the regulations of the canon (ad regendum secundum 
canones) like the other churches in the diocese.1"" 
According to the report of the Libellus Virgilii, the bishop received the 
jurisdiction over the monastery and church of Otting, ie. the argument ended 
more succesfully than the confrontation with Odilo's assistant minister, Ursus, 
a few years before. Nevertheless, the question may arise whether this report 
corresponds to the facts.123 Many decades later, at the time of the writing and 
edition of the Breves Notitiae the author of the passage inserted a sentence 
at the end of the chapter, which recounted that there was yet another a 
negotiation and a legal procedure between Arn and Wenilo concerning the 
church of Otting, in the presence of Richolf and Gerold, the ministers of 
Charlemagne.121 According to this, the jurisdiction over the church remained 
contested and the final decision was reached only after Tasilo's dethronement 
in 788.125 The litigants included Arn, the bishop of Salzburg and Wenilo, a 
member of the clan of Gunther, who were the legal successors.126 The Notitia 
Arnonis also mentions the arguments concerning Otting, and based on this 
account it can be rightly assumed that these possessions were illegally seized 
from ecclessiastical authority under the rule of the Agilolfings, and only the 
court constituted by the ministers (missi) of Charlemagne returned them to the 
bishopric of Salzburg.127 With regard to the establishment by Gunther the only 
thing the Notitia Arnonis refers to is the permission of the duke; therefore, the 
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count might have assigned Otting to the monastery of Saint Peter; however, 
nothing is said of the role of the bishop and the importance of the regulations 
in the canon law. This practice, namely, that the ducal licentia/permissio was 
sufficient to establish an Eigenkirche/kloster was fully in compliance with the 
Bavarian custom of the time.128 Virgil tried to document the truth of his stand-
point in the minutes in the Libellus Virgilii in the case of the cella Maximiliani 
in Pongau and also in the case of Otting; nevertheless, his efforts to assert the 
ecclessiastical/episcopal legal claim-as it turns out from the collation of the 
different sources-was unsuccesful. Virgil based the rights of the church and 
the friars' house in Pongau on the consecration by Rupert without referring to 
the regulations in the canon law. On the other hand, he demanded in the case 
of Otting that Count Gunther should renounce his rights regarding the church 
before and a prerequisite for the consecration, and based his arguments on the 
canon, thus reasoning for the legality of the ecclessiastical authority in two 
different ways.129 
Pope Gelasius I (492-496) had already made efforts to limit the rights of the 
secular establishers: according to his decree the bishop could only consecrate a 
church if Rome had given a permission and the establishers had to give up 
their rights before the consecration. They had to deposit the funds to supply the 
established church in custody, and as early as the 4th and 5th centuries they had 
to accept the legal authority of the bishop over self-established churches, their 
possessions and the priests serving there.13" These directives could not be 
completely effective, especially on the territories where the ruling (royal or 
ducal) power was based on the ecclessiastical benefices. The regulations of the 
canon could be enforced somewhat imperfectly in Bavaria before the arrival 
of Bonifacius: the duke could dispose over the ecclessiastical institutions 
established by him arbitrarily, and the authority over the church was an 
important constituant of ruling power.1,1 The Langobard tradition was similar 
to the Bavarian, the establishers of the churches and cloisters retained the legal 
authority over the institutions established by them thus supporting the financial 
safety of their successors who chose ecclessiastical career. This was ensured 
by making a contract on returning the authority, which paved the way for the 
development of the so called priest clans. It was Charlemagne who put an end 
to this situation that was contrary to the canon law both in Bavarian and 
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Langobard territories; nevertheless, the bishoprics established by Bonifacius 
and his ecclessiastical reform in Bavaria gave the opportunity to Virgil to 
enforce the authority that was due to him pursuant to the canonical decrees, 
though his effort was not always successful as it can be seen in the case of 
Pongau and Otting. At the same time, Bonifacius did not define the borders of 
the dioceses; therefore, it was the bishops themselves who had to put an end to 
the Eigenkirche and Eigenkloster system that was under the authority of the 
secular establishers and integrate the benefices into their own bishopric.132 
A process similar to that in Bavaria had taken place on Frank territories 
years before, after the Council of Chalcedon, and the Councils of Orléans and 
Aries in 511 granted extensive authority to bishops,133 vesting them with the 
right to appoint and dismiss the abbots of the cloister in their dioceses, to 
consecrate churches, altars and to ordain priests and to determine and observe 
the rules of life in the cloisters, which allowed them to supervise the benefices 
of the cloister. The establisher and his family could not retain or receive the 
authority over the church or cloister established by him, only the institutions 
established by the king were exempted to a certain extent; they could pursue 
their own management and administration.131 Although cloisters were estab-
lished in the first half of the 7th century in the Frank Empire; i.e., the Notre 
Dame cloister in Luxeuil, Rebais and Soissons, where the establishers could 
keep their authority and the cloister could freely dispose over the donations, 
these privileges were based on the bishop renouncing the rights which belonged 
to him de iure canonico. The Carolings made successful efforts to gain authority 
over more cloisters since they regarded them a strong support of their power. 
The Bavarian dukes followed only the practice of the Frank maiores domus, who 
possessed royal prerogatives. The legal state of the Irish cloisters augmented 
this tendency since the cloisters organised the Irish way could choose the 
bishop who was asked for the consecration, and in certain cases the bishop 
himself, who fulfilled the abbot's function at the same time, tried to organise 
an independent diocese for the cloister.135 
In the Bavarian tradition it was necessary to have the ruler's permission to 
establish a cloister, which involved ducal defence, and the dukes disposed over 
the cloisters that were established by them or with their contribution, ie. the 
cloisters were entirely integrated into the Bavarian feudal system. Bonifacius's 
reform tried to end this practice by the restoration and creation of the episcopal 
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authority, and this effort gave rise to an unresolvable conflict between the duke 
and the nobility and the bishops. Nevertheless, there is no point in supposing a 
serious political conflict between the bishop and the duke, as it was not true 
in the case of Odilo and Virgil either. Bonifacius's reform did not end the 
Eigenkirche system of the nobility since the wider circle of the clan was 
excluded from the inheritance and the right of disposal by the traditio given to 
the bishopric, which subsequently returned the church as a beneficiwn to a 
certain member of the family which gave the donation. This was recorded in a 
conclusive deed valid in court. What they did was place the Eigenkirche 
system under episcopal authority and influence the order of inheritance with 
the help of the regulations of the canon law. It depended on the power of the 
establishers and donators how long this situation subsisted. In most cases-to 
fulfil the essence of the traditio-the bishopric was given the church in question 
with all its possessions."6 
The cases related in the Libellus Virgilii and the consequences drawn from 
them make several tendencies clear which occured during the reign of the two 
last members of the Agilolfing dynasty. It cannot be considered accidental that 
the Bavarian bishoprics were held together under the archbishopric of Salzburg 
only after Charlemagne's takeover in 798, since the establishment of the 
archbishopric would have considerably infringed the rights of the dukes and 
impaired the possibility to interfere with the abbots' and bishops' decisions. It 
would have deprived the dukes of their rights to chair the councils.137 
Virgil's activity in Bavaria, his argument with Bonifacius and his struggle 
for the possessions of the Saint Peter monastery and the bishopric of Salzburg 
is peculiar; it does not lack contradictions in certain points which, after all, 
tend towards synthesis in their relationship with each other. Virgil could fight 
for the enforcement of the canon law only by building on the basis that was 
laid by his great enemy, Bonifacius, by following the tradition that was Frank 
in mentality rather than Irish, and while doing so he created the first spiritual 
golden age of Salzburg. 
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Abstract. This paper studies Ihe law pertaining to political parties in Hungary, from the 
viewpoint of establishing and maintaining of political pluralism. In the period of 1989-1990. 
the transition from the one-party system to the democratic and pluralistic state of law could 
be followed up relative to the development of the law pertaining to the political parties, which 
is based on the rules that foreclose the contingent development of unconstitutional political 
system. 
The paper reviews the concept of the political party according to the constitutional law, 
the normative framework of functioning and the regulations of the internal organization of 
political parties. The provisions of primary importance concern: a) equality of political parties, 
b) forbidden purposes and instruments, c) rules of incompatibility, d) state subvention. Rules 
concerning the internal organization require the openness and the prevailing of democratic 
will-making also inside Ihe political parties, so contribute to the maintaining (he democratic 
competition of political parties. 
The author emphasizes the factors that determine multiparty-system, and argues that 
electoral thresholds and the effective method of state-financing of political parties contest 
the principle of equality and harm the fair-competition. Thresholds and subvention are both 
based on the effectiveness of political parties-though being capable to prevent the party 
system and the parliament from fragmentation, nonetheless, they prefer extensively, if not 
unconstitutionally, the political parties in the Parliament, so they can be seen as being designed 
to protect the current political elite. 
Keywords: political parties, party law, political pluralism, state subvention of political 
parties, electoral systems/electoral law 
Constitutionality, established by provisions affirming and demarcating rights 
as well as by rules safeguarding these rights as institutional guarantees of the 
prevailing social-political system provided under Constitutions, is principally a 
requirement to be observed by governments primarily as a sequel to the grievous 
experiences of history. The bewildering precedent of the Weimar Republic is 
only one regrettable instance to admonish posterity that no political establish-
ment can dispense with the rules that foreclose the contingent development of 
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unconstitutional political systems.1 Nonetheless, according to András Sajó 's 
view, effective Constitutions are not designated to safeguard future societies. 
Since Constitutions are mere corollaries of ("creations related to") the fears 
generated by previous political systems, they set forth the modus operandi of 
the exercise of political power.2 
In view of the post-transformation constitutional processes in Central-Eastern-
Europe, it is particularly valid to assert that Post-Communist political systems, 
by reason of disquieting historical experiences, intended to institute multifarious 
constitutional safeguards, so as to protect the pluralism of political parties. 
Therefore, the respective provisions can be construed with respect to the 
former exclusive role of the Communist Party. In this paper, we'll briefly 
expound the rules of the Constitution and other law governing political parties 
in Hungary framed with the purpose of legally substantiating and sustaining 
pluralist democracy and the underlying multi-party system. 
As a matter of course, countries in the former Soviet-bloc had had to comply 
with the Stalinist "constitutional" pattern, therefore, they had implicitly declared 
the autocracy of the communist party (e.g., Hungary in 1972 set forth, "The 
Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class shall be the leading force of 
society.", Poland in 1952 stipulated, "The Polish United Workers' Party shall 
be the leading political force of the society designated to build socialism."). 
Nevertheless, memories of the multi-party system prevailing in Hungary before 
the communist-socialist era had not faded by the time of the change of regime, 
when Parliament annulled the provisions substantiating the exclusive power of 
the Socialist Workers' Party under the Constitution. Nonetheless, as Halmai 
concurrently noted, law pertaining to political parties as a sub-division of the 
law of associations cannot per se ground the democratic functioning of the 
multi-party system, because these regulations have a limited scope of effect.3 
Consequently, the observance of the effective legal environment established 
during the 18 years following the political transformation would be an in-
1
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dispensable condition of the democratic functioning of the multi-party-system 
even in our days. 
1. Freedom of the Foundation of Political Parties 
1.1. The Definition of Political Parties and Their Functions 
The freedom of the foundation of political parties is derived from the concept 
of the freedom of association, since political parties are construed as special 
associations to be governed by specific rules as to their purposes and functions. 
The specificities of law pertaining to political parties, which derive from their 
specific constitutional relevance established in 20lh century, are adequately 
intelligible on the basis of the conceptual position of the pertinent rules. 
Scilicet, the freedom of the foundation of organisations is conceived as a civil 
right within the scope of the fundamental freedom of association under Art. 
63 and the political freedom of the foundation and functioning of political 
parties is stipulated under Art. 3 of the Constitution of Hungary. Such reversed 
positioning of the pertinent regulation has been frequently criticised for its 
inconsistency,4 nevertheless, it can be justified on grounds of the prominent role 
of political parties as 'intermediaries' between the State and the individual, 
as instruments to effectuate the will of the citizens between elections." 
Political parties are not regulated under all constitutions, since the framers 
of constitutions tend to exclude that area.6 Nevertheless, the Constitution of 
Hungary specifies rules pertaining to political parties as follows: "Political 
parties [...] may be freely formed and may freely function, provided that they 
respect the Constitution and other law established in accordance with the 
Constitution" (Para. 1 of Art. 3), "political parties shall participate in the 
formation and declaration of the common will of the People" (Para. 2 of Art. 3), 
"political parties may not directly exercise public authority, therefore, they 
may not control State organs..." (Para. 3 of Art. 3). Whereas, it does not 
4
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circumscribe the concept of political parties, nor does other pertinent law, such 
as Act 2 of 1989 on Associations or Act 33 of 1989 on the Functioning and 
Finances of Political Parties (hereinafter: Act on Political Parties), therefore, it 
shall be construed on the basis of the specified functions. The latter statutes 
specify further conceptual elements of functioning, e.g., nomination of candidates 
for elections, democratic functioning, publicness of finances, exercise of 
public authority by representatives, reservation of membership for natural 
entities. Accordingly, political parties are civil organisations with extra 
functions (which, according to the current Head of State of Hungary, is a 
"staggering concept of political parties"). Although, the freedom of the founda-
tion of political parties is construed as a form of the fundamental civil right of 
association, it may be limited by law pursuant to constitutional authorisation, 
so as to demarcate the manners and the scope of interference by the State and 
public authorities.7 
1.2. Normative Framework of Functioning 
a) Equality 
The right of the foundation of political parties construed as associations shall 
be unrestricted as a condition of the equality and fair competition of political 
parties: the entry of new entities in the competition can be guaranteed in this 
manner.5 Furthermore, during campaigns, since the neutrality of public authorities 
is prescribed, each political party will have equal chances to become a governing 
party or a party in opposition." Equal opportunity is meant to be guaranteed 
by way of equal legal remedies or by the delegation of representatives to 
electoral committees pursuant to law governing elections, such as Act on Election 
Procedures,10 pursuant to Art. 3 of which, the equal chances of candidates 
are stipulated, whereas, Art. 106 provides that local public media shall at 
least once, free of charge broadcast political advertisements of nominating 
organizations and of candidates for mayorship in proportion to the nomination 
or electoral lists, from day 15 preceding voting to day 3 before voting. All 
independent candidates are entitled to exercise this right jointly, in proportion 
to their nomination. On the final day of the election campaign, national organs 
of media shall broadcast a round-up on eight nominating organisations that 
have put forward most candidates for representatives and mayorship on the 
Halmai: Freedom of Association, op. cit., 147. 
8
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basis of a nation-wide aggregation. Joint candidates and lists shall be taken 
into consideration according to their rate of nomination. 
Therefore, the provisions of the Constitution and other law underwrite 
political pluralism, since they treat political parties on an equal basis." Equality, 
however, is fundamentally contested by the effective method of financing 
political parties by the State (see below). 
b) Purposes and Instruments 
The scope of objectives of political parties specified under deeds of foundation 
shall be supervised both upon registration and during functioning, as well. The 
most severe specified sanctions are the denial of registration and dissolution as a 
safeguarding measure, which independent jurisdiction is authorised to apply.'2  
(N.B., The admissibility of dissolution by reason of risks known from history 
was a matter of debate in Germany and established with a view to hindering the 
reorganisation of totalitarian parties.)" Nevertheless, according to the assertion 
of the current Head of State of Hungary (appointed to manifest the unity of the 
nation and to protect the democratic functioning of state organisation pursuant 
to the Constitution), "The dissolution of a political party is always a political 
decision. The judgement whether or why a party is deemed dangerous in re 
democracy is always dependent on the actual political situation, because it is a 
preventive measure."14 Whereas, the European Court of Human Rights, which 
has been in several cases designated to decide on the substantive restrictions of 
the purposes of political parties, has consistently argued that the danger of the 
curtailment of democracy shall be an acceptable justification for limitations, 
especially for those the institution of which is necessitated by historical 
experience. 
In 1998, in its Decision on Socialist Party and others v. Turkey, ECHR held 
that „one of the principal characteristics of democracy is that it creates op-
portunities for resolving the problems of a country through dialogue, without 
recourse to violence, even if those problems are irksome. Scilicet, a basic 
prerequisite of democracy is guaranteeing the freedom of expression, on grounds 
of which, no justification obtains for the elimination of a political group solely 
by reason of its endeavour to initiate and effectuate public debate on the 
situation of specific segments of the population and their involvement in public 
life, in order to seek democratic solutions to the mutual satisfaction of all 
11
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parties concerned."15 Concerning the appeal of another Turkish party, the 
Court argued that it derives from the core concept of democracy that diverse 
political programs may be put forward and debated, even those that contest the 
actual organisation of a State, provided that the respective programs shall not 
violate democracy.16 
Nonetheless, according to the argumentation of the current Head of State of 
Hungary, the special protection of the freedom of the foundation of political 
parties as a civil right of party founders is recognised as constitutional on 
grounds of the function of political parties as mediators between the State and 
the People, i.e., of the relatedness of its content to the fundamental rights of 
communication. Substantive restrictions can be admitted exclusively with 
regard to this relation. Therefore, as opposed to the indication of the objective 
of the political party (which may be reduced to the phrase: performance of 
the constitutionally specified duties of political parties), the specification of 
political purposes under the deed of foundation of the political party cannot be 
made mandatory (may not be required) under Hungarian law, furthermore, neither 
the submission, nor the existence of a political program shall be specified as 
requirements for the registration of a political party.17 With respect to funda-
mental freedoms of communication and law pertaining to political parties, 
the provisions that guarantee the freedom of mass communication need to be 
highlighted, since the freedom of the media (as the main battleground of the 
competition of parties) is a universally recognised prerequisite of political 
pluralism safeguarded by the prohibition of censorship.15 
Nevertheless, various institutional guarantees de facto obtain to delimit the 
scope of purposes and instruments. Accordingly, the Preamble of the Consti-
tution stipulates that the Republic of Hungary is a state founded on the rule of 
law, which effectuates a multi-party system and parliamentary democracy, 
which, as an imperative, is further substantiated pursuant to Para. 1 of Art. 3 
with a limiting clause. A safeguarding provision pursuant to Para. 3 of Art. 2 
stipulates that no entity may attempt the forcible acquisition, exercise or the 
exclusive possession of public authority, consequently, every citizen has the 
right and obligation to take action against such attempts in all manners 
permitted by law. Furthermore, Para. 3 of Art. 3 precludes that political parties 
15
 Para. 45 of Decision of 1998 on Socialist Party and others v. Turkey. 
16
 Para. 41 of Decision of 1999 on Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey. 
1
 Sólyom: op. cit. 65-66. and 76-77. 
15
 Cf.. Garlicki. L.: Principles of the System of Government in the Republic of Poland. 
In: Sarneeki, P.-Szmyt, A.-Witkowski. Z. (eds.): Principles of Basic Institutions of the 
System of Government in Poland. Warszaw, 1999. 61-62. 
LAW PERTAINING TO POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL PLURALISM.. . 77 
exercise public authority directly. Accordingly, no single party may exercise 
exclusive control of a Government organ. Pertinent statutes prohibit the founda-
tion of party organs in workplaces and provide that the exercise of the right of 
association may not involve criminal offences or a call for criminal offences 
and may not violate others' rights and freedoms. Furthermore, on grounds of 
the exercise of the right of association, no military organisation may be 
established.14 
c) Rules of Incompatibility 
Under the provisions of the Constitution, party membership shall be incom-
patible with the fulfilment of specific public offices, because the functioning of 
personae fulfilling these offices shall be attached to the requirement of 
impartiality, therefore, incompatible with the promotion of political causes. 
Consequently, the fulfilment of the offices of the Justices of the Constitutional 
Court and of the Head of State of the Republic of Hungary, of the Judiciary 
and the Persecution is incompatible with party membership. " The prohibition 
of party membership as to the official personae fulfilling offices of the armed 
forces, of the police is stipulated under Para. 4 of Art. 40/B. In its pertinent 
Decision on Rekvényi v. Hungary, ECHR held that the freedom of association 
of the applicant, i.e., the General Secretary of the Independent Trade Union 
of the Police, was not violated under Para. 2 of Art. 1 1 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
prohibiting party membership of persons fulfilling offices of the armed forces, 
the police and certain offices of state administration. According to the argument, 
"in view of the background of Hungary's recent history and the sustenance of a 
politically committed police force, which used to support a totalitarian regime 
' "For a comparison, see, Art. 13 of the Constitution of Poland of 1997: The 
functioning of political parties and other organizations, the programs of which bear the 
marks of totalitarianism, Nazism, fascism or communism, as well as those whose programs 
or activities instigate racial or national hatred, admit recourse to force for the purpose of 
the obtainment of political power or of influencing State policy or secrete their organi-
sation or members shall be prohibited. In Poland, pursuant to Arts 6 - 7 of Act of 1997 on 
Political Parties, it is also stipulated that political parties shall not implement or take over 
the implementation of duties of public authorities specified as such by law and may not 
organize or establish political party organs at workplaces. 
20
 Cf., Para. 1 of Art. 30, Para. 5 of Art. 32/A, Para. 3 of Art. 50, Para. 2 of Art. 53 of 
the Constitution, cf., Para. 3 of Art. 178, Para. 3 of Art. 195 of the Constitution of Poland. 
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for decades, the Court considered the efforts to depoliticise the police by no 
means arbitrary."21 
d) State Subvention of Political Parties 
Whereas, it is stipulated under the Constitution that the State shall not interfere 
with the competition of political parties, the majority of European states are 
actively involved in financing parties from the state budget. Such an arrange-
ment has been established basically on the following grounds: on the one hand, 
with a view to the curtailment of the influence of private interest-groups, on the 
other hand, the more professional functioning of political parties as organs 
operating in the public sector should be facilitated by financial support.~ 
Nevertheless, party-financing raises the moot questions concerning the position 
of the State and the equality of political parties. As a matter of course, the 
revenues of political parties always affect their respective positions in the 
competition, furthermore, revenues are indispensable for persistence. Therefore, 
the State has a crucial role as to the maintenance of the competitiveness of 
political parties, consequently, it may also violate the principle of equal 
opportunity. Evidently, for the purpose of counterbalancing such defaults, 
formal and normative criteria as to the scale of state subvention will have to be 
stipulated, which preclude the consideration of the programs and ideologies of 
political parties.2 ' This way, although, we may have reservations concerning 
the differences in financing parliamentary or non-parliamentary political parties, 
the current system of state subvention does undeniably sustain both the smaller 
political parties in opposition and the multi-party system. The current Head of 
State of Hungary raised the question, whether the State may be obligated to sub-
sidise political parties, if they cannot perform their constitutionally stipulated 
duties without state support.24 In view of the fact that the plurality of political 
parties (at least of two parties) is a prerequisite of the functioning of the 
current political and constitutional system, the answer needs to be affirmative. 
Therefore, the duties of the State encompass not only the recognition of political 
pluralism, but its promotion, as well, which implies the sustenance/organi-
See. Para. 57 of Decision of 1999 on Rekvényi v. Hungary. For commentaries on this 
decision, see, Fundamentum. 3 (1999) No. 3. 
"" Enyedi, Zs.-Körösényi, A.: Pártok és pártrendszerek (Political Parties and Party 
Systems). Budapest, 2004. 137. 
23
 Sólyom: op. cit. 120. 
4
 Sólyom: op. cit. 123. 
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sation of political pluralism and securing compensation in the scope of 
affirmative action for parties holding disadvantageous positions in opposition. " 
The effectual normative framework of public financing of political parties 
is provided under Act on Political Parties, according to which, the results of 
the previous election shall determine the admissibility of publicising the 
finances of a political party and the scale of public funding. The obtainment of 
1 p.c. of the votes in national elections is stipulated for political parties as the 
lowest limit for entitlement to public funds. According to the German pattern,"6 
Act on Political Parties further provides that the proportion of public finances 
may not exceed 50 p.c. of all revenues of political parties. This regulation, 
however, could not be upheld, in recent years, state funding has equalled the 
proportions of 8 0 - 0 p.c. of all revenues of parliamentary parties.27 
Within the purview of Act of 1990 on Remuneration, Cost Reimbursement 
and Other Benefits of Members of Parliament, the fractions of parliamentary 
parties are entitled to receive different amounts of funding according to their 
positions (in Government or opposition), such as a monthly amount equivalent 
to the basic remuneration of twenty-five Members of Parliament, furthermore, 
30 p.c. of the basic remuneration of each member of the party/parties in govern-
ment and 60 p.c. of the basic remuneration of each member of the parties in 
opposition shall be granted for the coverage of expenses of operation from the 
budget of the Office of Parliament.28 Independent Members of Parliament shall 
be granted 75 p.c. of their basic remuneration in support of their work. The 
payment of a lower rate of remuneration for parties in Government can be 
explained by their privileged positions in state administration and infrastructure, 
whereas, the opposition in Parliament has been compensated by the specifi-
cation of such a distinction. 
2. Regulation of the Internal Organisation of Political Parties as 
Associations 
In the followings, we'll provide a brief conspectus of the rather laconic regulation 
of the internal organisation of political parties under Hungarian law. As Halmai 
25
 On grounds of the territorial lists of political parties. Cf., Para. 2 of Art. 5 of Act on 
Political Parties. 
26
 See, Halmai: Rights Related to Communication, op. cit. 243-244. 
27
 Source: Financial reports of parties published on their websites. 
28
 Before 01. 01. 2003, the respective rates had been 25 p.c. and 50 p.c., thus, the 
difference has increased. 
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noted in 1990, in countries that had been subjected to totalitarian regimes, 
Constitutions stipulate explicit rules pertaining to internal democracy. These 
rules and the conforming regulation under Hungarian law governing political 
parties are designated to prevent the deformation of political life by giving way 
to totalitarianism.24 
2.1. The Constitution of Hungary does not require explicitly that political 
parties and other social organisations have a democratic structure or function 
according to democratic principles. Whereas, Act 2 of 1989 on Associations 
does require that democratic functioning on the basis of the principle of self-
governance is stipulated under deeds of foundation, that clause would need to 
be substantiated by the Constitution, since the stipulation of that requirement 
qualifies as a restriction of the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of 
association. Nevertheless, as the pertinent argument of the current Head of 
State of Hungary generally applicable to constitutional democracies demonstrates, 
the requirement of democratic functioning can be inferred from the Consti-
tution: "If the Constitution establishes a democratic State, political parties, 
having a constitutive role in it, cannot function according to departing principles. 
The internal democratic structure of political parties derives from their consti-
tutional functioning. If the duty of a political party is the mediation the 
common will of the People towards the State, it will he organisationally apt to 
manifest the political will of the People within the political party, which may 
shape the program and policy of the political party. Nevertheless, it is primarily 
the role of political parties in shaping the will of the State that requires 
democratic will-formation within political parties. [ . . . ] The State will be 
democratic, so far as mediation on the part of political parties guarantees that 
the People exercise sovereignty.""1 
To evade further ambiguity, we'll attempt to render a definition of democratic 
functioning. Hungarian statutes don't provide many guidelines. The Polish Consti-
tutional Court, on the basis of the concept of political parties circumscribed 
under the Constitution, held that a political party should establish its internal 
organisation (membership and structure) on the democratic principles of 
equality and voluntary access. As Chmaj argued, "For the purpose of avoiding 
non-conformity of its purposes to the Constitution, a political party shall in 
its deed of foundation or other legal document define the purpose of its 
-
4
 Halmai: Freedom of Association, op. cit. 147. Cf.. Para. 1 of Art. 21 of the Constitution 
of Germany, Para. 2 of Art. 10 of the Constitution of Portugal, Art. 6 of the Constitution of 
Spain and Art. 49 of the Constitution of Italy. 
30
 See, Sólyom: op. cit. 55-56 . 
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foundation in relation to the scope of State policy and the purpose per se as 
well as the instruments specified for its realisation shall be democratic. [...] 
The phrase of 'democratic methods' refers not only to the 'external' scope of 
activities of a party, but also to its 'internal' activity."31 Russian law governing 
political parties provides a concise list of binding democratic criteria, which 
includes: the insurance of openness of structure, formation of party organs via 
elections and majority decisions made by members.3" 
2.2.Democratic Principles (that should govern the main aspects of the internal 
organisation of a political party are as follows): * ' 
a) Openness 
The finances of political parties are recognised as the most delicate aspect of 
public functioning. Therefore, Art. 9 of Act on Political Parties stipulates a 
warranting rule, according to which, financial reports of parties shall be publicised 
in the press or the Hungarian Official Gazette. 
Membership in political parties is a further precarious element of openness, 
since the fundamental right of privacy encompasses the confidentiality of 
political commitment. 
In its pertinent Decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that democratic 
political parties, which may not exercise public authority directly under Para. 3 
of Art. 3 of the Constitution, may claim the protection of their documents or 
files similarly to other legal entities on grounds of the privacy of personal data 
under the provisions of the Constitution and other law. Although, pursuant to 
Act on Association and Act on Political Parties, the exercise of the freedom of 
association is attached to publicity in specific areas, such as finances and deeds 
31
 Chmaj: op. cit. 105. 
32
 Cf., Art. 8 of Act 95-FZ of 2001: The activities of political parties shall conform to 
the elements of voluntary membership, equality, self-governance, legality and openness. 
Political parties shall be free to determine their internal structure, objectives, forms and 
methods of their activities in compliance with pertinent Federal Law. Accordingly, the 
operation of political parties shall be public, consequently, information on their consti-
tuency and program shall be accessible for the general public. The formation of oligarchies 
shall be prevented by guaranteeing equal opportunity for the ci t izens of the Russian 
Federation (for men and women without distinction) as members of political parties for 
participation in the Supreme Bodies of political parties, for candidature for the positions of 
representatives and various offices in the organs of state administration as well as in bodies 
of local self-governments. 
33
 Cf., Decision of 1952 of the German Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 2,1 ff.). Quoted 
in: Halmai: Freedom of Association, op. cit. 143. 
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of foundation, otherwise, functioning shall be attached merely to self-govern-
ance and the observance of democratic principles. Scilicet, the stipulation of 
public access to information of public interest under Art. 61 of the Constitution 
is a constitutional guarantee designated to promote the control of authorities 
that exercise public authority.34 
b) Freedom of Establishing and Terminating Membership 
Restrictions of membership in political parties were already mentioned with 
respect to incompatibility, whereas, coerced membership is also prohibited. 
Some authors established that the citizens' unlimited right to acquire member-
ship derives from the democratic features of the internal organisation of political 
parties.35 Whereas, according to the judgement of ECHR, freedom of association 
does not imply freedom of accession to political parties, since associations are 
on no grounds obligated to admit all applicants.36 
With respect to the freedom of terminating membership in political parties, 
the provisions that guarantee voluntary withdrawal and preclude arbitrary 
exclusion are of great importance. Arbitrary exclusion is applicable, if the 
member is excluded for reasons indicated under the deed of foundation of the 
party, or, it is not the leader of the political party, but the Congress or other 
Supreme Body that decides on exclusion by a qualified majority. In some 
countries, political parties are obligated to include the rules of admission and 
exclusion as an obligatory element under the deed of foundation.1 
c) Majority Rule and Exclusion of the Leader-Principle 
Democratic organisation evidently implicates these elements, however, Hungarian 
law governing associations and political parties is not explicit on these matters. 
What is merely stipulated under Art. 12 of Act on Associations is that the 
powers of the Supreme Body of the political party are secured by law, which 
is meant to prevent that an oligarchy in the party unsubstantiates internal 
democracy by acquiring the fundamental powers of members. Accordingly, the 
most important powers of the Supreme Body shall be: adoption and amend-
ment of the deed of foundation, admission and exclusion of members, election 
of the Party Leader, liquidation of the political party, nomination of candidates 
34
 Decision no. 34 of 1994 of the Constitutional Court (VI. 24.) (AB.), III. 2-3. 
35
 For a summary of this view, see, Halmai: Freedom of Association, op. cit. 143. 
36
 See, Cheall v. United Kingdom (1985). Quoted in: Sólyom: op. cit. 105. 
3
 Hungarian law does not specify such a rule, nevertheless, see. Point (2) of Para. 1 of 
Art. 9 of Act on Parties in Poland, and Point c) of Para. 2 of Art. 21 of Act on Parties in 
Russia. 
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upon the election of representatives to State organs, adoption of the political 
program of the party. Nevertheless, as to practical experience, we can discern 
that Party Leaders have overwhelming and ultimate influence over general 
members.38 
d) Freedom of Expression of Members and Legal Remedies 
Freedom of expression is exercised in the scope of active involvement in the 
activities of organs of the political party guaranteed under Arts 9 - 1 0 of Act on 
Associations. A member of the organisation may participate in the activities of 
the organisation, may exercise the right of election or may be elected to its 
organs. Any member of the organisation may apply for legal remedies vis-a-vis 
majority decisions in case of unlawfulness. 
3. Further Factors Determining Political Pluralism 
We cannot fail to mention other factors determining the functioning of the 
system of political parties constitutive of multi-party systems, which are of 
great importance with special respect to the competition of political parties and 
their equal opportunities. These may eventuate in a system of a duality or 
plurality of parties. The provisions of the Constitution that stipulate political 
pluralism may be expounded in their completeness exclusively with respect to 
these factors to be reviewed in the following: 
3.1. Electoral Systems 
Majority electoral systems are destined to favour the most powerful and success-
ful party as well as ignore a large segment of votes, thereby, the composition 
of legislation fails to reflect the actual variation of the political standing of 
society. Due to the disproportionateness of such systems, the stability of 
government majority is satisfactorily achieved, which promotes the efficiency, 
but obstructs the accountability of Government. Whereas, proportional electoral 
systems further diversity in representation dependent on the size of constituencies, 
on the basis of a mathematical formula applied irrespective of the reach of 
political parties.34 Therefore, in principle, the proportion of representatives in 
legislation conforms to the proportion of votes obtained by the specific party, 
which, however, may entail the instability of government. Mixed-systems, 
38
 See, Enyedi-Körösényi: op. cit. 130-135. 
39
 Quoted in: Enyedi-Körösényi: op. cit. 255-263. 
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such as the multi-mandate electoral system attempt to combine the advantages 
of the two basic systems.40 
Although, it is primarily majority systems that tend to generate two-party 
systems, the Hungarian party-system officiously progresses towards a bipolar 
structure, scilicet, in 2002 and 2006, the two largest political parties obtained 
90 p.c. of the votes in national elections. Nevertheless, these results are 
putatively rather ascribable to electoral behaviour, than to the electoral system. 
3.2. Parliamentary Thresholds 
Both majority and proportional electoral systems establish thresholds as 
limitations of access to Parliament, so as to avert the fragmentation of the 
party-system and of Parliament.41 However, the system currently prevailing in 
Hungary obstructs the evolution and empowerment of new political formations, 
especially in view of the system of public financing of political parties, which 
further weakens the positions of smaller political parties. Thence, consequential 
and extensive groups of society lose the chance of representation in Parliament 
implying that their views fail to influence decision-making by the State and 
social will-formation. 
Reservations concerning thresholds are grounded on the constitutional 
requirement of the equal opportunities of political parties. According to the 
argument of the current Head of State of Hungary, the institution of thresholds 
infringes the principle of equality, because, "although, the threshold limiting 
access of political parties to Parliament seems to be an objective criterion, the 
requirement of maintaining the efficiency of the functioning of Parliament 
cannot justify the prescription of holding the currently effective rate of 5 p.c. 
or other percentage of the votes for the admission of a political party to 
411
 In Russia, which lacked political pluralist traditions, the electoral system was framed 
by reformers with a view primarily to the establishment of the multi-party system. The 
system of proportional election has furthered the formation of political parties and 
movements. Sakwa. R.: Russian Politics and Society. New York. 2002. 166-167. 
41
 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled in 1952 that the 5 p.c. threshold 
(Sperrklausel) prescribed in Schleswig-Holstein was constitutional, since the stipulation of 
certain degrees of thresholds is admissible, but raising it above this level shall be unlawful. 
Scilicet, the maintenance of the balance of democratic representation and of the efficient 
functioning of the legislative organ is imperative. Nevertheless, thresholds are designed to 
prevent democracy from the fragmentation of the political system. (BVerfGE 1, 208.) 
Quoted in: Szente, Z.: Európai alkotmány- és parlamentarizmustörténet (The History of 
Constitutionalism and Parliamentarism in Europe). Budapest, 2006. 243. 
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Parliament."42 On the contrary, emphasising efficiency entails similar dangers 
to those inherent in the unlimited proportional electoral system and threaten 
the functioning of legislation per sc.43 
3.3. The system of financing political parties 
We've expatiated on the main aspects of the effective system of state 
subvention of political parties, finally, we need to highlight its effects with 
respect to the previously mentioned factors of political pluralism. As we noted, 
the system is based on the principle of efficiency (formerly: aptitude) and on 
the results of the previous national elections. That system, however, tends to 
exclude newly emerging and small political parties, since it will recognise 
them as efficient, on condition that they reach certain results in extremely 
expensive national campaigns (relying on their own sources). According to this 
rationale, new and small political parties are expected to compete relying on 
their own resources, while it is public financing that accounts for the 
"efficiency" of political parties currently in Parliament.44 Consequently, the 
gap between larger and smaller political parties is undeniably widening, since 
the political parties in Parliament are entitled to extensive, if not unconstitutional 
privileges, whilst, the ascent of smaller parties is sheerly precluded under the 
present system. 
For the confirmation of this statement, we'll inquire into the results of the 
national elections of 2006. Accordingly, four political parties in Parliament in 
the former parliamentary session obtained 97 p.c. of the votes. Only one party 
could surpass the prescribed 1 p.c. threshold of financing and a new party, that 
of the Christian-Democratic People's Party was admitted to Parliament on the 
basis of a coalition agreement with Fidesz as its "pseudo" party. Ceterum censeo-
the effective regulation of financing of the multi-party system is designed to 
protect the concurrent political elite. 
42
 Sólyom: op. cit. 114. 
43
 Haberland, S.: Die verfassungsrechtliche Bedeutung der Opposition nach dem 
Grundgesetz (The Constitutional Concept of the Opposition pursuant to the Constitution). 
Berlin, 1995. 50, 56-57. 
44
 En passant, according to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, elections are designated to 
facilitate efficient governance by a parliamentary majority, and this objective shall legitimate 
the override of fragmented parties. See, Ipsen, J.: A politikai pártok [helyzete a Német 
Szövetségi Köztársaságban J. In: Allamtan. írások a XX. századi általános államtudomány 
köréből. [The Position of Political Parties in the German Federal Republic. In: Takács, P. 
(ed.): Political Science-Studies on General Political Science in 20lh Century"]. Budapest, 
2003. 726. 
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Case Note: Ynos - Intertemporality and the Jurisdictional 
Jurisprudence of the ECJ 
The case Ynos Kft. v János Varga} decided by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) on the 10lh of January 2006 carries both symbolic and interpretative 
value. It is symbolic, in the sense that the case relates to the very first reference 
for preliminary ruling ordered by a court of one of the ten new Member States 
that acceded in 2004. On the other hand it is also extremely significant from 
the overall perspective of the new Member States' judiciaries, as the ruling 
relates to the temporally defined limits of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The 
relevance of the ruling may also be further underlined by the fact that a large 
number of both old and new Member States intervened in the case.2 The ECJ-
probably much to the surprise of many'-declined its jurisdiction to answer 
the questions raised by the Hungarian City Court of Szombathely. Indeed, 
according to Advocate General Tizzano delivering the Opinion4 on the case: 
the ECJ could have declined its jurisdiction on three separate grounds. The 
interesting feature of the judgement however is exactly choice of grounds by 
the Court of Justice to decline its jurisdiction, as I will try to highlight in the 
following. 
Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law 
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1
 Judgement of the Court on the 10th of January 2006. C-302/04, Ynos (Judgement). 
:
 Apart from the Commission, the governments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Spain, 
Poland, Latvia and Hungary intervened. 
1
 See for example: Zegnál J.: Hungarian property dispute goes to European Court, 
Budapest Business Journal, 07. 22. 2005. Nemessányi Z.-Kovács В.: Esélylatolgatás az 
első magyar előzetes döntéshozatal iránti kérelem sorsáról (közösségi jog i és polgári jogi 
gondolatok), www.jogiforum.hu/publikaciok/215. 
4
 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, delivered on 22 September 2005. Case C-
302/04 (Opinion). 
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Admissibility 
The main proceedings pending before the City Court of Szombathely related to 
civil claims of Ynos Ltd. based on a standard form agency contract concluded 
with Mr. Varga in 2002, that is two years before Hungary's accession to the EU. 
In the course of the proceedings, the defendant Mr. Varga raised the objection 
that the relevant clause of the contract, on which Ynos ' claim was based, 
constituted an unfair contractual term and the claim must therefore be dismissed. 
On the 10th of June, 2004, just one month after the accession of the ten new 
Member States to the EU the Szombathely City Court referred three questions 
to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.5 The first two questions 
related to the compatibility of a certain article of Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
(Directive) on unfair terms in consumer contracts6 and the relevant article of 
the Hungarian Civil Code,7 which had already been enacted in 1997s exactly in 
implementation of the said Directive. The Szombathely City Court took the 
view, that in so far as the Hungarian norms relevant to the dispute constituted 
an implementation of the Directive, and in so far as there is a possible conflict 
between the two norms, the dispute must be resolved in the light of the 
Directive. Finally, the third question related to the applicability of Community 
law to a dispute which arose before Hungary acceded to the EU. 
Although the Advocate General affirms, that the said Hungarian provisions 
are incompatible with the Directive in question, the central part of his Opinion 
deals in essence with the absence of the jurisdiction of the ECJ to rule on the 
reference submitted by the Hungarian court. Advocate General Tizzano indicates 
three separate grounds for ruling the reference to be inadmissible: 
1. First, and foremost, for reasons of the temporal reach of Community law;4 
2. Second, for reasons of inadequate statement of facts in the reference 
submitted;10 
3. And third, for the questions' lack of relevance to the settlement of the 
dispute at hand, that is: for reasons of posing a hypothetical question." As the 
5
 Order of the Szombathelyi Városi Bíróság, No. P.20.231/2004/19., filed under 
706.879 by the European Court of Justice on the 19. 07. 2004. 
6
 Art. 6 ( 1 ) of Directive 93/13/EEC. 
7
 Art. 209 (1) of the Hungarian Civil Code. 
8
 Law No CXLIX/97. 
4
 Opinion, Items 40-44. 
Opinion, Items 52-57. 
11
 Opinion, Items 38-39, 63. 
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Court of Justice ruled the reference inadmissible only on grounds of the 
temporal reach of Community law, I shall restrict my analysis to this issue. 
The temporal reach of Community law: contesting the 
"Dzodzi line of cases" 
In his analysis, Advocate General Tizzano reversed the order of the questions, 
contending, that the answer to the third question, namely the applicability of 
Community law to disputes arising before accession, might render answering 
the first two questions redundant. The Advocate General considers the third 
question to be of a more general reach. In fact, it relates not only to the temporal 
scope of Community law in Candidate Countries before accession, b u t -
intrinsically linked to this issue-also the preliminary question regarding the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ to answer questions related to disputes arising under the 
pre-accession regime. 
Reframing the question of the Szombathely City Court on applicability as 
one of jurisdiction, the Advocate General goes on to delimit the facts of the 
dispute from the decision on the dispute in a temporal aspect. Drawing on the 
principle established by the ECJ to exclude its jurisdiction in cases where the 
provision of Community law referred for interpretation was "manifestly 
incapable of applying",12 he concludes, that as Hungary was not bound by the 
Directive at the time the facts of the case occurred, the ECJ has no jurisdiction 
to interpret the provision. Contrary to allegations, that Hungary could be bound 
by Community law in the pre-accession period due to its implementative 
obligations under the pre-existing Association Agreement," the Advocate General 
stresses, that the Association Agreement between Hungary, the EU and the 
Member States which came into force in 1994 must be interpreted in the light 
of the Treaty of Accession of 2004." As the Treaty of Accession provides that 
provisions of the founding Treaties and acts adopted by the institutions shall be 
binding upon the date of accession, it is only from that time that the new 
Member States are to be considered addressees of Community law. The fact 
that Hungary, under the Association Agreement undertook to approximate its 
legislation to Community law, and that Hungary implemented the said Directive 
12
 Opinion, Item 40, referring to C-85/95, Reisdorf. 
11
 Association Agreement of 16. 10. 1991. 
14
 Treaty of Accession of 16. 04. 2003. 
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already in 1997, does not mean, that Hungary was bound by Community law 
before the date of accession.15 
Here, Advocate General Tizzano follows the classic line of arguments long 
put forward by other Advocates General in relation to the temporal scope of 
Community law and the respective limitations to the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
inherent therein. But Tizzano was also cautious to point out that the Court could 
interpret the Directive on grounds of an overriding Community interest in 
future uniform application of EC law in the new Member States. On this point he 
refers to the so-called Dzodziu' line of cases, where the ECJ in opposition to 
the opinions of the Advocates General did not decline its jurisdiction where "the 
facts of the cases were outside the scope of Community law but where these 
provisions had been rendered applicable by domestic law."17 As Lenaerts18 points 
out, the Ynos case may be seen to fit into this category. The Hungarian Law of 
1997 implementing the said Directive clearly refers to the Directive itself.14  
Delgado and Munoa suggest that the ECJ "as the supreme interpreter of the Com-
munity legal order, could not remain impassive to the development of different 
interpretations by the national courts of the same Community provision".20 But 
Advocate General Tizzano, opposing the Dzodzi line of cases goes on to state: 
"[However, I must say that such] a conclusion would leave me somewhat 
perplexed. 
If that conclusion were accepted, it would lead to a further extension of a 
precedent which, I feel, should only be the exception, since, as has been the 
subject of objection both in the legal literature and by some Advocates General 
( . . .) it stretches the scope of the Court's jurisdiction to its limit (...) allowing 
the Court to give a ruling in cases where Community law clearly does not 
apply to the main action and there is only a future, and therefore purely 
hypothetical interest in its uniform application."21 
13
 Opinion, Items 41-44. 
16
 C-197/89, Dzodzi. 
17
 Lenaerts, K.: Unity of European Law and Overload of the ECJ-the System of 
Preliminary Rulings Revisited, The Global Community. Yearbook of International Law 
and Jurisprudence 2005. New York, 2006. 225. 
18
 Ibid. 228. 
14
 Art. I 1 (5) of Law No CXLIX/97. 
11
 Delgado, Munoa (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review, 159. 
21
 Opinion. Items 49-50, referring to: C-197/89 Dzodzi; C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher; 
C-88/91 Federconsorzv, C-73/89 Foamier, C-130/95 G Hoy, C-28/95 Leur-Bloem; C-7/97 
Bronner; C-1/99 Kofi sa Italia; C-267/99 Adam; C-43/00 Andersen og Jensen. 
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The judgement: temporal delimitation of jurisdiction 
In its Findings the Court laconically states: 
"In this case, as the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings occurred 
prior to the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union, 
the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the Directive." ~ 
The only available precedent the ECJ draws on to substantiate this reason for 
declining jurisdiction is the case Andersson from 1999.2 ' In its ruling on 
Andersson, the ECJ stressed: "The fact that the EFTA State subsequently became 
a Member of the EU ( . . . ) cannot have the effect of attributing to the Court of 
Justice jurisdiction to interpret the EEA Agreement as regards its application to 
situations which do not come within the Community legal order".24 Implying 
that the case underlying Ynos does not come within the Community legal 
order, the ECJ discards the further reasons for declining jurisdiction set forth by 
the Advocate General and delimits the temporal scope of its own jurisdiction 
establishing a clear temporal framework for future references. 
The innovative feature of this judgement lies in a departure of the ECJ from 
its previous, flexible approach to references of pre-accession background. This 
judgement, delivered on the first reference ever submitted by a new Member 
State court marks a new era of jurisdictional jurisprudence of the ECJ. Without 
explicitly touching upon the temporal reach of EC law as regards applicability, 
the Court certainly clarifies its jurisprudence related to the temporal aspects of its 
jurisdiction. It was obvious, that the first references f rom the new Member 
States would be linked with temporal aspects of Community law. Therefore, 
he ECJ probably saw fit to decide this question on the very first possible 
occasion perhaps to channel these future references. That this judgement is 
based on a premeditated decision to limit a possibly great number of inter-
temporal references may further be supported by the fact that it does not 
necessarily follow from the hitherto existing case-law of the ECJ. To name just 
a few examples: 
In Data Delectafi the Court disregarded temporal concerns put forward by 
the Advocate General and delivered a ruling on a question of a Swedish appellate 
court submitted just after accession. Obviously, all facts of the case as well as 
" Judgement, Item 37. 
23
 C-321/97 , Andersson. 
24
 Ibid, Item 30. 
25
 C-43/95, Data Delecta. 
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the first instance judgement had occurred before accession, but the ECJ refrained 
from addressing the question. Similarly, in Konle,26 the Court of Justice accepted 
its jurisdiction, although the facts of the underlying Austrian case and the 
respective contested decision occurred before accession. It must be pointed out 
however, that contrary to the Hungarian court in Ynos, the referring Austrian 
court did not raise this temporal aspect in its reference. 
In Saldanha,21 the Austrian court in its reference stated, that in accordance 
with Austrian procedural law, Community law had mandatory effect to pending 
cases from the date of accession. The Advocate General objected that the temporal 
scope of Community law cannot be determined by reference to national law. 
The ECJ however, overruled the Advocate General 's opinion, and ruled on the 
immediate applicability of Community law for future effects of situations arising 
prior to accession. 
Finally, in Beck and Bergdorf2* as well as in Stefan,29-two cases concerning 
pre-accession contractual relationships-the ECJ affirmed its' jurisdiction as 
well as the immediate effect of Community law. 
Conclusion: possible motivations of the Court 
Why, then, has the ECJ departed from this broad approach to the temporal scope 
of Community law and its respective jurisdiction? The relevant literature points 
out, that most of the above cases related to rules of judicial and administrative 
procedure and not substantive law; although, as also noted, this perspective 
would mean that the application of Community law could be divergent in the 
Member States, depending on the respective national distinctions between 
substantive law and procedural law.30 
Another point raised, is that the only other case, namely Andersson, where 
the ECJ expressly dealt with temporal aspects and declined its jurisdiction, 
related to a situation that had been completely settled and therefore also would 
not have had any further legal effects. The judgement reflected the Opinion of 
Advocate General Cosmas suggesting a delimitation between settled or "fixed" 
26
 C-302/97, Konle. 
27
 C-122/96, Saldanha. 
28
 C-355/97, Beck. 
24
 C-464/98, Stefan. 
Kaleda, S. L.: Immediate Effect of Community Law in the New Member States: Is 
there a Place for a Consistent Doctrine? European Law Journal (2004) 1 11-112. 
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situations involving true retroactivity and "existing" situations still producing 
legal effects involving quasi-retroactivity and immediate application.11 
Most probably the ECJ wishes to introduce a coherent framework for the 
temporal scope of EC law, and would like to affirm its jurisprudence put forward 
in the Andersson case. Possibly facing a great number of comparable references 
from the new Member States, the Court of Justice seized the opportunity to 
ascertain the limits of its jurisdiction. All in all, the judgement bears great 
relevance for the new Member States. If the ECJ was willing to give rulings in 
previous inter-temporal cases based on a favourable attitude toward references 
from new Member States, these times are over. The sole guidance the new 
Member States judiciary may seek from the Court in such inter-temporal cases 
lies in its established case-law, which they are bound to know. 
11
 Fo r a de ta i led d i scuss ion , see: Kaleda ( 2 0 0 4 ) , 104. 
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CSABA VARGA* 
Comparative Legal Cultures? 
Renewal by Transforming into a Genuine Discipline 
Abstract. 'Comparative law' was born to challenge national self-centredness at the turn of 
the 19th to 20th centuries, without transcending-notwilhstanding its admission of social and 
cultural-historical approaches in the study of law-the perspectives of rule-positivism. 
'Comparative legal cultures' attempts at explaining the prevailing cultural and traditional 
diversity that has generated, among others, western law with its modern formalism and the 
alternative ways of reaching social order in other cultures. By its focus upon the underlying 
culture and, thereby, also upon the hermeneutic understanding of legal phenomena, the latter is 
expected to offer growingly adequate responses to timely questions such as the universalisability 
of law and human rights, the convergence of the continental Civil Law and the British 
Common Law, or the development and future of the legal set-up in the Central and Eastern 
European region. 
The interest of the comparative study of legal cultures is thus one in the history of 
ideas, dedicated to human problem-solving as the cultural response of people to external 
challenges. For the description of living complexes in terms of mere rules can result at most 
in 'thin description' with the exclusion of 'thick description', the more so as rules (just as 
concepts) are only the consequences of a kind of possible representation, therefore, relying 
exclusively upon them may contribute to dissolving even prevailing interrelations, atomising 
organic components as fragmented into detached elements. Or, institutional thinking not-
withstanding, not even the subject's formalism can serve as a ground for restricting human 
completeness and integrity, cultural diversity, as well as responsibility to be taken for these. 
Keywords: comparative law & comparative legal cultures; law as text & reduction of law to 
rules; understanding of socialist law & transition to rule of law; rapprochment & convergence 
of Civil Law and Common Law 
1. Legal Comparativism Challenged 
Human thinking is not only uninterruptedly continuous, but even when viewed 
as a process, it cannot be described otherwise than as a kind of oscillation. In 
this oscillation, besides power concentrations alternating with each other and 
Scient if ic Adviser, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungar ian Academy of Sciences, 
H - 1 2 5 0 Budapest РОВ 25 ; Professor, Di rec tor of the Inst i tute for Legal Phi losophy, 
Pázmány Péter Catholic Univers i ty of Hungary [ht tp: / /varga. jak.ppke.hu| 
E-mail : va rga@jak .ppke .hu 
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adding up to wave crests and wave-troughs, any prevailing movement arises 
as a result of the ceaseless whirl of currents-and thereby drifts-coming from 
various directions. Routine and practical experience provide us some help from 
the past-forming a framework for our everyday action and, moreover, holding 
out promises of a perspective, a kind of illusory security-, however, in our 
presence at any given time, it is us who define fixed points for ourselves, in 
order to be able to arrange the entities at our disposal, as well as our concerns, 
into a kind of order at all. Therefore, when perceiving our ongoing occupations 
either as problem-solving or as acts of creative power, we have to be aware 
that, considered from a future perspective, all this may seem nothing other, or 
more ambitious, than just one of the episodes of stumbling from one blind 
alley into another. 
What is, then, the proper way of cultivating scholarship at all? While looking 
for continuity from the past and for identity in the present, we are understandably 
conservative in designating our interest. When referring to our specific subject, 
we still speak of 'legal theory' in educational contexts, while we mention 
'philosophy of law' at our biannual world congresses as accustomed since the 
founding act of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy in Berlin in 1909; although the topics of subjects we teach and of 
scholarly papers we present do not recall, even in the way they pose a question 
or in their conceptual culture, the tradition acquired from previous generations 
in our youth. Namely, instead of "the system of legal sciences", of "legal 
axiology" or the "theory of legal relations", fashionable in the past decades, 
nowadays "semantics", "hermeneutics" and "legal reasoning" or "logical analysis 
of law" are customarily dealt with. For the issues related to the "concept of 
law" or "legal ontology and epistemology" have all become, if you like, outdated, 
archaic and irrelevant as traditional fields: the question of philosophical founda-
tion has, for decades now, been replaced by the thrill of the social construction 
of reality1 that may lurk behind the scenes of manipulative applications we are 
1
 Fur the term, see Berger. P. L.-Luckmann, Th.: The Social Construction of Reality. 
A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York, 1966. Questions not properly 
considered up to the present are why and how the philosophical perspective and the 
requirement for thorough foundation have disappeared from our legal thinking over the 
past few decades, and what they have been or are going to be replaced by, if at all. From 
the British analytical jurisprudence (e.g., H. L. A. Hart, J. Raz and N. MacCormick) to the 
American and Western European theories of reasoning (e.g., R. M. Dworkin on the one 
hand, and A. Aarnio, R. Alexy and A. Peczenik on the other), law is simply taken as given 
in an unquestioned culture, as are the social values and the culture of reasoning, held as 
specifically characteristic of a given community. By supposing their having been accepted 
from the very start, the task of legal theory now seems to be simply confined to raising 
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nowadays driven to incessantly search for. For what else could the way of 
scholarly interest be? All we can try is to respond to renewed challenges 
which-alongside new considerations, methodologically proven statements and 
conceptual distinctions-launch new waves and provoke currents, while the 
actors in the debates among the various positions emerging within these mostly 
turn back only very rarely and randomly to viewpoints, considerations and 
arguments dismissed as unworthy of further debate earlier in the discussion, 
and which viewpoints, consequently, had drifted away from the mainstream. 
The same holds true of the comparison of laws which emerged as part of 
the comprehensive movement of comparativism by the advent of the "age of 
comparison", as Nietzsche once rightly noted.2 When the inquiry into the 
various particularities of human construction, community language, national 
law (etc.) proved too limited to develop further towards the end of the 19th 
century in the cult of positivism, "comparative anatomy", "comparative 
linguistics" and "comparative jurisprudence" emerged as a result. Of course, 
this could only imply a radical change away from the normal course of 
development, where also the self-closing retirement into the subject's own 
particularity was most determinedly pushed to the extreme. Accordingly, it is 
not by chance that it was France, the native land of national chauvinism, to 
become the centre of comparative jurisprudence, and the European continent 
became preferred as its number one field of investigation. However, all the 
comparative movement in law has proved to be a non-recurrent task. In its 
turn, the very mention of such non-recurrence involves the recognition that, in 
the history of thinking, "isms" in general are inevitably bound to be assimilated 
step by step into and eventually absorbed by human thought in formation: as 
soon as the revolting breakthrough is made and reformatory thought is accepted, 
it ceases to survive as a separate entity. Just as present-day debates do not use 
terms of, e.g., Platonism or structuralism any longer, there is no specific need to 
explain why we resort to and call for-among others-comparison in our scholarly 
work. It is enough to note, maybe, that it is no longer usual for any monographic 
treatment of legal topics to be done without a genuine comparative-historical 
approach in the background. 
Well, as far as the association of qualifying terms 'comparative' and 
'historical' is concerned, only our once characteristic narrow-mindedness and 
awareness to, by explaining and developing also in details of interrelations, the human 
manipulative practice shaping the law in action. As a particularly telling panorama, see 
Luc, J.-Wintgens, L. J. (ed.): The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. My Philosophy of 
Law. Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1999. 
2
 Nietzsche, F.: Humain, trop humain (1878]. Paris, 1988. 49-50. 
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our self-closing into national boundaries in legal scholarship can explain why 
our Civil Law predecessors on the European continent had to emphasise, in 
their one-time breakthrough, the necessity of comparison (and not that of 
historicity) as being most in need of development. For historical jurisprudence, 
evolving around the middle of the 19th century within the Common Law as a 
follow-up of legal development generated by the practice of judicial decisions 
(having been cumulated one upon another as judicial precedents), was an 
entirely natural outcome;3 moreover, due to the shift of emphasis in the practical 
life of law to the search for judicial reason that arrives at declaring what the 
law is through a specific methodology of problem-solving, jurisprudence was 
not urged to transcend national borders, as it already achieved to carry out free 
search for similar sources in its quest for meaning, on the one hand. On the 
European continent and especially in France, on the other, the emphasis had 
for long been centred on the legislator as the representative and symbol of a 
national will and, therefore, any legal development could only be considered a 
national accomplishment. This is the reason why, with us, historical interest was 
gradually left out of the topicality of positive law, to form some complementary 
and additional subject as a separate discipline, both external to and irrelevant 
for everyday practice. 
As noticed above, having achieved the breakthrough, legal comparativism 
has lost its specific function. For a moment, let us contemplate: if every analysis 
is already based on a historico-comparative approach, whoever would need a 
particular movement suitable just to force open doors? Continental positivism 
as the scholarly stand based upon the exclusive moment of statutory text-
enactment became to a certain extent antiquated by the first third of the 20th 
century anyway and, by the middle of the same century, the emphasis shifted 
firmly to the judicial process which was also to involve moments of social and 
cultural conditioning, thereby opening the gates to textual hermeneutics. Step 
by step, the text-positivism of the one-time legislatory definition of the law4 
and also the sociologism relating to the law's social environment" have eventually 
3
 Cf. Szabadfalvi, J. (ed.): Historical Jurisprudence. Budapest, 2000. 14-35 and 281-
285, respectively. 
4
 Cf., e.g.. Varga, Cs.: Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 1991., 
especially ch. V. paras. 2/a and 4, introducing on the example of the classic type-framing 
Code civil (1804), how the definition of the law through legislatorial text in the juridical 
exegesis, characteristic of the early 19th century, has become gradually reduced to the role 
of providing a merely referential framework and disciplinary medium for the otherwise 
growingly free judicial declaration of what the law should be and/or is. 
3
 It is remarkable that anything in germ of a sociology of law had been heralded in 
parallel with the theoretical assertion of legal positivism, when two professors with same 
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been replaced by the open-chanced pondering of any (con)texture of the present, 
in which the questions "from where?" and "what?" are increasingly substituted 
by the ones of "how?" and "to what?".6 
Even in the field of law, the scene of our everyday life no longer seems to 
be just a case of determinations, but the starting point of creative and decisive 
switchings actually effected by each of us at any moment in those several roles 
we play, and thereby also the free medium for the manipulation of everything 
we have appropriated from our environment. As a consequence of all the 
above, the increase in awareness of the multiple and thorough repercussions of 
the humanities as a scholarly tradition upon the law and the requirement of 
social theoretical approach in legal thinking, the examination of law in parallel 
with other social regulative forces, as well as the adoption of an anthropo-
logical perspective (in the light of which law seems to be just one of the possible 
representations of the ideal of order required for any social formation), well, all 
these have led to a change in the search for specificity in law more powerfully 
in the context of culture as a whole (or, more precisely, in the context of the 
cultural response we offer in law to the various challenges, characteristic of the 
given human community and civilisation).7 
backgrounds in Vienna, Hans Kelsen, formulating in theory the self-defining self-identifi-
cation of positive law, on the one hand, and Eugen Ehrlich, appointed to the new university 
of Czernowitz and theorising upon his new experience relating to the mess of co-existing 
folks and laws in Bukovina and Galicia in order to finally realise the empirical justifiability 
of some "living law" with no official support whatsoever in the background, on the other, 
contrasted sociologism and positivism in legal thinking. For the debate in Archiv für 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie from 1916 to 1917, see Stanley L. Paulson (hrsg.): 
Hans Kelsen und die Rechtssoziologie. Aalen, 1993. 
6
 For the theoretical background, cf. Varga, Cs.: An Inquiry into the Nature of the Judi-
cial Process. In l[nternationales]R[echts]I[nformatisches]S[ymposium] 2006 Proceedings 
[Vienna, February 2006J (A bírói folyamat természetének kutatása. Jogtudományi Közlöny 
XLIX (1994) 11-12, 459-464) and, in monographic treatment, his Theory of the Judicial 
Process The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 1995. as well as his The Context of the 
Judicial Application of Norms, in: Krawietz, W.-MacCormick, N.-von Wright, G. H. (ed.): 
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, Festschrift for 
Robert S. Summers. Berlin, 1994. 495-512 [for paras. i - i i | and Law, Language and Logic: 
Expectations and Actual Limitations of Logic in Legal Reasoning, in: Ciampi, C.-F. Socci 
Natali-G. Taddei Elmi, I (ed.): Verso un sistema esperto giuridico integrale. Padova, 1995. 
665-679. 
7
 For a theoretical justification and background, cf. Varga, Cs.: A jog mint kultúra? 
[Law as culture?] Jogelméleti Szemle 2004/3 <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/vargall.html> as well 
as Macrosociological Theories of Law: From the »Lawyer's World Concept« to a Social 
Science Conception of Law. In: Kamenka, E.-Summers, R. S.-Twining, W. (ed.): 
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2. Comparative Legal Cultures versus Comparative Law 
As a consequence, the starting point is no longer either the law of a nation or 
its sectoral history, but the cultural medium in continuous formation, in which 
references, as the fixed and fixing points of human thinking and action-beliefs 
and values, preferences and aims, traditions and skills, methods and procedures-
may have developed in a given (and not another) way, that is, the medium in 
which a certain (and not another) notion of order and the associated (and not 
another) store of instruments (with a proper conceptual scheme and the role it 
may attribute to abstract logic) could evolve. If, in an inverse move, we start 
thinking from the endpoint, this explains why the comparative study of legal 
cultures neither supposes any kind of codified list, nor any set of questions, nor 
taxonomy, nor previously established methodology, regarding (or following) 
which the discipline of comparative legal cultures and its focus on the whole 
variety of cultures and ages should provide a response. Just to the contrary. 
According to its inherent approach, out of itself and through its in-built learning 
processes, each culture generates proper (general and sectoral) formations, 
frameworks and schemes, often ones and in manners characteristic exclusively 
of it-approaches and problem-sensitivities, organisational principles and notional 
distinctions, institutionalisations and procedural paths, methods and skills-, 
which are suitable, in their systemic totality, to define the specific character of 
an order which is going to be described by us a posteriori as a legal one, 
particular to the given culture. 
By this point, we can claim to have indeed arrived, from the classical move-
ment known as 'comparative law', at the cultivation of 'comparative legal 
cultures'. For our inquiry neither stays within the boundaries of law, nor does it 
start from an analysis of the available store of positive legal instruments, nor is 
it determined by the latter. For the most part, it concentrates neither on our 
ongoing present, nor wishes to contrast the formalised institutions-provided that 
they can be related at all-of certain nations to those of others. Instead, it attempts, 
with a cultural anthropological focus, to examine different possibilities (potentials 
and availabilities) as historically formed alternatives f rom a civilisational 
developmental perspective. The question here is exactly why a particular (and 
not another) legal idea and institutionalisation emerged in a given medium. And 
Soziologische Jurisprudenz und realistische Theorien des Rechts. Berlin, 1986. 197-215. 
IRechtstheorie, Beiheft 9] and Macrosociological Theories of Law: A Survey and 
Appraisal. Tidskrift för Rättssociologi 111 (1986) 3 -4 , 165-198. 
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the question it intends to answer is: why and how a certain (and not another) 
store of instruments has developed in the given place and time from all of this?8 
'Comparative legal cultures'? How have we arrived at this very term? The 
linguistic expression itself is obviously a derived further development from the 
disciplinary term of 'comparative law' as widely accepted today. For this very 
reason, justified criticism for the former relates and applies to the latter as 
well. For it should be admitted that in their literal senses both the basic term 
and its derivation are, properly speaking, meaningless (and entirely alien to 
the very spirit of language), as contrasted to the properly compounded French 
terms droit comparé ('compared law'='law that is compared, i.e., taken in 
comparison'] and cultures juridiques comparées. Despite this all, it is still 
capable of easy identification, and it is obvious for everyone that it is, by its 
very meaning, nothing other than a simplified and shortened version for the 
complex expression of the 'comparative study of law [and, respectively, of 
legal cultures]'. 
Apart from the rudimentary recognition of the obvious truth according to 
which "every national law should be explained as a proper part of human 
culture",4 the movement of comparative law neither sought nor realised anything 
other than its own release from the national seclusion of domestic legal 
positivisms. Although the worldwide leading classic of legal comparativism 
from our recent past rightly claimed that 
"the comparison of laws is an important general cultural means for the 
lawyer, without which-and without the historical background serving as its 
completion and homologue-one cannot arrive at conclusions beyond the 
sphere of the given law and thus at a universality required of any genuine 
scholarship",10 
the discipline has not subsequently become anything more than a sheer method-
however necessary it may be for any scholarly result to be reached-, selected 
8
 As a former research project proposal by the author, see his A jog és történelmi 
alternatívái |Law and its historical alternatives]. [1982] in: his Útkeresés Kísérletek -
kéziratban [Searches for a path: unpublished essays], Budapest, 2001. 127-131. 
4
 Kohler, J.: Über die Methode der Rechtsvergleichung. Zeitschrift für das Privat- und 
öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart XXVIII (1901), 273-284. 
10
 David, R.: Le droit comparé, enseignement de culture générale. Revue internationale 
de Droit comparé II (1950), 682-685. Cf. also Péteri, Z.: Some Aspects of the Sociological 
Approach in Comparative Law, in: Péteri, Z. (ed.): Droit hongrois - droit comparé Etudes 
pour le VIIIe Congrès international de droit comparé. Budapest, 1970. 75-94. 
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out from the obviously desirable methodological complexity. In addition to the 
fact that bi- and multilateral comparisons of national laws have since (and largely 
due to this very movement) become accepted in scholarship, its fundamental 
and imperishable merits include having drawn up the actual" and intellectually 
processed and historically developed" global map of the world's legal systems;13 
having taken the pioneering initiative of elaborating categories used for 
classifying (by drawing "family resemblances" for) the various legal orders and 
arrangements, together with having undertaken a largely static, descriptive 
presentation of the laws and orders on both a universal and especially a European 
" See, e.g., Randall, H. J.: Law and Geography. In: Kocourek. A.-Wigmore, J. H. (ed.): 
Evolution of Law Select Readings on the Origin and Development of Legal Institutions III. 
Formative Influences of Legal Development. Boston, 1918. eh. 6; Wigmore, J. H.: A Map 
of the World's Law. The Geographical Review 19 (1929), 114-121 [starting from the 
statement that nine-tenth of the Earth's population is governed by a dozen of laws, among 
which the Anglican, the Germanic, the Hindu, the Islamic, the Japanese, the Chinese, the 
Romanesque and the Slav ones continue exerting mass influence, while the Egyptian, the 
Greek, the Hebrew, the Canon, the Celtic, the Mesopotamian, the Roman and the maritime 
laws have in their original quality disappeared since]; Desserteaux, M.: Droit comparé et 
géographie humaine. Annales de Géographie LVI (1947), 81-93. [mostly identifying 
European legal ideas with their Christian roots "at present actually extant too" (83, note 2, 
as well as 85); and placing, in a remarkable way, the "mixed Roman method" between the 
"German" deductivism and the "English" inductivism, which, in case the statutory solution 
is deficient, applies, in addition to the deductivity of inferences from statutory dispositions, 
subsidiary empirical constructions inductively (in French. Spanish or Swiss law) or relies 
on French jurisprudence as a suppletive source (in Belgian or Rumanian law) (86); and 
foreseeing a joint intermediate method as the proper future solution for Europe (92)]; 
David. R.: La Géographie et le Droit. La Revue de Géographie humaine et d'ethnologie 2 
(1948), 78 et seq.; Sand, P. H.: Current Trends in African Legal Geography The 
Interfusion of Legal Systems. New York, (1971]. 27.; E. S. Easterly, III: Global Patterns of 
Legal Systems: Notes Toward a New Geojurisprudence. Geographical Review 67 (1977), 
209 et seq.; Guelke, L.: The Role of Laws in Human Geography. Progress in Human 
Geography I (1977), 376 et seq.; Economides, K.-Blacksell. M.-Watkins, Ch.: The Spatial 
Analysis of Legal Systems: Towards a Geography of Law? Journal of Law and Society 13 
(1986) 161-181. 
12
 See, e.g., Wigmore, J. H.: A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems I—III. St. Paul, 
Minn. 1928. 
11
 For a historical overview, cf. Varga Cs.: Theatrum legale mundi avagy a jogrend-
szerek osztályozása, in: Szilágyi, E H.-Paksy, M. (ed.): lus unum, lex multiplex Liber 
Amicorum: Studia Z. Péteri dedicata (Studies in Comparative Law, Theory of State and 
Legal Philosophy). Budapest, 2005. 219-242. and On the Classification of Legal Systems 
[Abstract], 243-244. 
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level.14 In this way, it has succeeded in raising the awareness of the relativity, 
the uniqueness, as well as the considerably accidental character of the various 
national legal orders, taken as the exclusive subject of jurisprudence since the 
classical age of the codification of national laws. 
To the luck of us all, introduction to the main legal systems of the world 
under the heading of "comparative law" has become almost a sine qua non 
of legal education; as an independent scholarly trend, however, it soon became 
exhausted. Scholars and critics have for decades now been constantly complaining 
of its being "obstinately repetitive and sterile",15 of its having a "precarious 
character"16 of a "mediocre quality",17 resulting in "disappointing"18 "theoretical 
misery",1" ending in "marginalisation"20 and "superficiality",21 all in all, in 
methodological and theoretical "failure",22 rightly "plagued by the absence of 
any sustained theoretical reflection on [...] that comparative law is nothing 
more or less than a methodology".23 As an expression of this depreciation through 
14
 E.g., Schlesinger, R. В.: Comparative Law Cases and Materials. Brooklyn-London, 
1950.; David, R.: Traité élémentaire de droit civil comparé Introduction à l'étude des 
droits étrangers et à la méthode comparative. Paris, 1952.; Arminjon, P.-Nolde, B.-Wolff, 
M.; Traité de droit comparé I—III. Paris, 1950-1952.; Schnitzer, A.: Vergleichende Rechts-
lehre. Basel, 1945. [I—II. Zweite Aufl. (Basel, 1961)]; David, R.: Les grands systèmes de 
droit contemporains. Paris, 1964.; Duncan, J.-Derrett, M. (ed.): An Introduction to Legal 
Systems. London, 1968.; Zweigert, K.-Kötz, H.: Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf 
dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, I [Grundlagen]-II [Institutionen]. Tübingen, 1971-1969.; 
Constantinesco, L. J.: Rechtsvergleichung I—III. Köln, 1971-1972.; David, R. et al. (ed.): 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Tübingen, 1973-1985.; Rheinstein, M.: 
Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung. München, 1974.; Eörsi, Gy.: Comparative Civil 
(Private) Law Law Types, Law Groups, the Roads of Legal Development. Budapest, 
1979.; Rodière, R.: Introduction au droit comparé. Paris, 1979.; Schlesinger, R. B.-Baade, 
H.-Damaska, M. R.-Herzog, P. E.: Comparative Law Cases-Text-Materials. 5th ed. Mineola, 
N. Y., 1988.; Bogdan, M.: Comparative Law. Deventer-Cambridge, 1994.; Fromont, M.: 
Grands systèmes de droit étranger. 2e éd. Paris, 1994. 
15
 McDougal. M. S.: in The American Journal of Comparative Law I ( 1952), 29. 
10
 Hall, J.: Comparative Law and Social Theory. Baton Rouge, 1963. 6. 
17
 Rigauxm F.: in Revue du Droit international et de Droit comparé XXX (1978), 73. 
18
 Shapiro, M.: Courts. Chicago, 1981. vii. 
14
 Constantinesco, L.-J.: Traité de droit comparé. III. Paris, 1983.21. 
Frankenberg, G.: Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law. Harvard 
International Legal Journal 26 (1985) 2. 
21
 Watson, A.: Legal Transplants. 2nd ed. Athens-Georgia, 1993. 10. 
22
 Legrand, P.: Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory. Modern Law 
Review 58 (1995), 262. 
23
 Samuel G.: Comparative Law. In: Gray, Ch. В. (ed.): The Philosophy of Law An 
Encyclopedia. New York-London, 1999. 137. 
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external evaluation, it has recently been omitted from a collective represen-
tation of social sciences, not being listed as one of the many international 
comparativisms taken into account.24 In addition to rewriting the above 
mentioned map time and again and to promoting legal borrowing and the law's 
adaptation,25 the most important of its tasks today is to serve the harmonisation 
and the prospective unification of laws and also the codification of a common 
European private law. In its turn, all this reinforces the discipline exactly in its 
standing decisive features, namely, at a focus on prevailing (valid and 
effective) regulations, its reliance upon positive law and handling the law as a 
given and ready-made instrument. 
In contrast to the classical stance of comparative law, the comparative 
study of legal cultures has from the very start been interested in the genesis 
and formation of the law's various phenomena and operations, that is, in how 
law evolved within various civilisations, producing various cultural responses 
in human efforts at problem solving, with varying moral and religious founda-
tions and value preferences in successive ages in a way rebuilding again and 
again. Or, this is also an interest in the history of ideas, manifesting itself in the 
general frame of the history of civilisations, dedicated to societal problem-solving 
capacity even when we are making formal and homogenised instruments and 
institutions, to arrive at a picture of the evolutionary progress sometimes taken 
as traditional history, characteristic of the given civilisation(s),26 or to arrive at a 
"
4
 The special issue of La Revue européenne des Sciences sociales (1986) mentioned 
only anthropological, economic, linguistic, psychiatric, religion-historical and sociological 
comparativisms as living. For the above criticism of comparative law, see especially 
Legrand, P.: Le droit comparé. Paris, 1999., passim, particularly at 8. 
3
 "Borrowing from abroad has become a recognised legislative practice in most 
contemporary states." Sand: Current Trends in African Legal Geography, op. cit. 24. We 
have widely recognised since the elaboration of "cultural patterns" by Lévy-Strauss, С.: 
Les tristes tropiques. Paris, 1955.—that "the comparatively rapid growth of human culture 
as a whole has been due to the ability of all societies to borrow elements from other 
cultures and to incorporate them into their own." Linton, R.: The Study of Man An 
Introduction. New York, 1936., 324. For a critical overview with a critical assessment, cf. 
Varga, Cs.: Transfers of Law: A Conceptual Analysis, in: Mamoru Sadakata (ed.): Hungary's 
Legal Assistance Experiences in the Age of Globalization. Nagoya, 2006. 21-41 . jwith 
an abstract-Reception of Legal Patterns in a Globalising Age- in : Jimenez, J. J . -Gil , J . -
Pena, A. (ed.): Law and Justice in a Global Society. Addenda: Special Workshops and 
Working Groups (IVR 22nd World Congress, Granada, Spain, 24-29 May 2005). Granada, 
2005. 96-97.}. 
26
 E.g. Fikentscher, W.-Franke, H.-Köhler, О. (ed.): Entstehung und Wandel rechtlicher 
Traditionen. Freiburg-München, 1980.; Jesus Lalinde Abadia: Las Cultures represivas de 
la humanidad (H. 1945) I [Adat y otras (pueblos infraevolucionades), Darma (Sudeste 
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cultural anthropological explanation of the legal choices we make,27 or to arrive 
at the construction of a comparative functional representation of the actual 
state that can be concluded from the practical appearance, utilisation and 
enforcement of the law through the sociological description of the medium by, 
and within, which law is conditioned and operated.28 
Obviously, another ethos, another interest and another problem-sensitivity 
are at work here when they are related to the ones employed in the pioneer age 
of comparison. The path is evidently not already paved, and-instead of mere 
intellectual arguing-a new trail can only be broken if we set out on it. "Those 
who can, do it, those who cannot, explain it"-despite its one-sided injustice, 
this traditional wisdom tells a lot about the one-time Prussian pattern, so 
deeply ingrained in the socialist regime imposed upon us, thoroughly over-
ideologised. For we know: in huge parts of Moscow-dominated Eastern and 
Central Europe, cultivation of scholarship was virtually impossible, yet lengthy 
explanations introducing emptied textbooks proudly declared the abstract 
aspiration for a scholarly quality in the foursome of subject, method, structure, 
and purpose, which were set in stone. "Too much argumentation kills the deed"-
every thinker is expected to assume personal conviction and humility so that 
even if he is quite uncertain or formulates sheer presumptions, he shall cover 
the entire path of cognition. 
An open question is, therefore, what the student of comparative legal 
cultures can achieve over the long run. Another question is the assessment of 
the reserves inherent in the bulk of fragmented studies comparing legal 
cultures, which have been published so far. A number of papers, coming from 
asiático), Chíng (Extremo Oriente), Meecharu (Oriente Medio), Maat (Antiguo Egipto), 
Dike (Antigua Grecia), lus (Roma-Biyancio), Torá (Judíos), Charía (Arabes)] - II 
[Directum (Europa latina e Iberoamérica), Reht (Europa germánica), Jog (Hungría), Prawo 
(Europa eslava), Common law (Mancomunidad anglo-sajona)]. Zaragoza, 1992.; and, most 
recently, Glenn, H. P.: Legal Traditions of the World Sustainable Diversity in Law. 
Oxford, 2000. For the last title, cf. also Varga Cs.: Legal Traditions? In Search for Families 
and Cultures of Law. Acta Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005), 177-197. 
27
 In addition to the first title in note 29, cf. also Feest, J.-Blankenburg, E. (ed.): 
Changing Legal Cultures. Onati, 1997.; Nelken, D. (ed.): Comparing Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot, 1997.; Feest, J.-Nelken, D. (ed.): Adapting Legal Cultures. Oxford, 2001.; Bell, 
J. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. (Aldershot: Dartmouth (in preparation)]. 
28
 E.g., by Blankenburg, E.: Legal Cultures Compared, in: Ferrari, V. (ed.): Laws and 
Rights. Bologna, 1991. 93-101., Culture juridique comparative, in: Arnaud, A.-J. (ed.): 
Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit. 2e éd. Paris, 1993. 141-
142. and Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures, in: Comparing Leged 
Cultures, op. cit. 41-68. 
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the discipline of 'comparative law' strictly taken and, labelled as irrelevant, 
neither collected, nor studied by genuine comparativists, have, notwithstanding, 
investigated certain culturally relevant legal issues. 
3. Contrasting Fields 
Interestingly enough, the route I have tried to explore24 has received confirmation 
(thought-provoking themselves, and opening up new prospects as well) from 
most unexpected quarters in the recent past. In an attempt to describe the legal 
systems of Central and Eastern European countries now on the path of their 
transition to the rule of law,30 on the one hand, and in an effort to challenge the 
allegedly spontaneous convergence of the historical blocks of Civil Law and 
Common Law development, to be completed anyway through the European 
legal rapprochement,31 on the other, it has been noted that the "dogmatically 
entrenched and thoughtlessly transmitted preconceptions" of classical compara-
tive law (which "often operate as false generalisations and universalisations of 
what are, in fact, little more than localised, western-liberal perspectives"32), 
owing to their "epistemological barrier",33 actually close down and block the 
way to cognition, instead of opening up and paving-by substantiating-it. For 
reducing law to mere rules not only transmits an image which falsely 
represents legal experience34 but, by its search for rationality, foreseeability, 
certainty, coherence, and clarity at any price, it also "strikes a profoundly anti-
humanist note".35 By reducing the complexity of the law's actual operation to 
29
 Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. Aldershot-Hong Kong-Singapore-
Sydney-Dartmouth-New York, 1992., as well as Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures: 
Attempts at Conceptualization. Acta Juridica Hungarica 38 (1997), 53-63. 
311
 Puchalska-Tych, B.-Salter, ML: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe: The 
Need for a Dialectical Analysis. Legal Studies 16 (1996) 2, 157-184. 
31
 Legrand, P.: European Legal Systems Are not Converging. The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 45 ( 1996), 53-81. 
32
 Puchalska-Tych-Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe... op. cit. 159. 
33
 Legrand: European Legal Systems Are not Converging, op. cit. 60. For the concept 
of "obstacle épistémologique", see Bachelard, G.: La formation de l'esprit scientifique 
Contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective, 14e éd. Paris, 1989. 
34
 Cf. Salter, M.: The Idea of Legal World. International Journal of the Legal Profession 
1 (1994), 291-295. 
35
 Puchalska-Tych-Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe... op. cit. 179, 
as well as Legrand: European Legal Systems Are not Converging, op. cit. 60. 
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the static and abstract formalism of one given official state doctrine,36 classical 
comparative law can at the most reproduce such complexity only in a superficial 
and simplifying way.37 
a) The Historical Understanding of Socialist Law 
As far as socialist law is concerned, 'comparative law' had-as the above 
mentioned British comparatists claim-generated a quite artificial concept upon 
the basis of an ideal type that had never actually existed anywhere. For it 
reduced various national legal systems with differing historical backgrounds 
and developmental abilities to one common denominator38 upon the basis of 
Muscovite-type imperialism alone (while formulating, in a sanctimonious way, 
an implicit theoretical justification for the then convenient Western politics 
of submissiveness). Ironically-shall we add-the collapse of communism was 
necessary for Western complacency eventually to realise that Westerners had 
seen something of themselves in socialism, while they easily ignored the 
features that had made communism so inhumane, destructive, unbearable and 
fatal as it was. For instance, never having been able to overcome its own domestic 
everyday routine in due time, the West used to consider outward appearances 
(of mere verbal declarations in the law of posited texts) as actually effective 
and legally enforced normative contents of socialist law.34 Therefore, it did not 
36
 Since its classical European definition-in Weber, M.: Rechtssoziologie (1960) and 
Kelsen, H.: Reine Rechtslehre (1934)-, the very concept of legal formalism has acquired a 
function of constituting criterion also in American theoretical literature. Cf., e.g., Weinrib, 
A.: Legal Formalism. The Yale Law Journal 96 (1988), 949 et seq.; Shauer, F.: Formalism. 
The Yale Law Journal 97 (1989), 509 et seq.; McBarnet, D.-Whelan, C.: The Elusive Spirit 
of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control. Modern Law Review 54 (1991), 
848 et seq.; Summers, R.-Atiyah, P.: Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law. New 
Haven-London, 1987. 
37
 Puchalska-Tych-Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe. . . op. cit. 183. 
38
 Ibid., para. 2, 164-174. 
39
 For the stubborn dominance of such a non-realisation and non-awareness having 
done, with its blindness, serious harms to the peoples in the Central and Eastern European 
region until the change of regimes controlled by the West was effected, see, by Varga Cs.: 
Transition to Rule of Law On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary. Budapest, 1995. 
as well as Önmagát felemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának dilemmái |Man elevating 
himself? Dilemmas of rationalism in our age], in: Mezey, K. (ed.): Sodródó emberiség 
[Humankind adrift]. Budapest, [2000], 61-93; with a theoretical explanation, Rule of Law — 
At the Crossroads of Challenges. Iustum, Aequum, Salutare [Budapest] I (2005) 1-2, 73-88; 
and for western papers with the same realisation (as translated into Hungarian), also Varga, 
Cs. (ed.): Kiáltás gyakorlatiasságért a jogállami átmenetben [A call for practicality in the 
transition to rule of law]. Budapest, 1998. 
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believe the conceptual attempts either which criticised socialism upon the 
recognition of its nature as a culture built on sheer lying, i.e., on dictatorial 
deception and lip-service. Referring to such experience, among other scholars 
in the region, 1 repeatedly tried to call the attention of international 
professional fora to the facts that, firstly, in contrast to the worldview of the 
traditionally self-closing legal positivism, the genuine nature of law can only 
be identified outside itself; secondly, the formalism of modern law is only a 
part of the ideology of the legal profession of the West from the 18th to 20th 
centuries; consequently, thirdly, extending the scope of formalism as a 
criterion from the internal sphere of professional deontology to the overall 
ontology of the legal phenomenon will necessarily conceal the distinctive 
features of those arrangements that are based on other principles (e.g., on 
divine revelation in Islamic and Jewish law) or which refer to formalism (e.g., 
in socialisms) mostly out of mere political-ideological motives.40 Or, as the 
same British comparatists propose (with reference to my own attempt),41 the 
solution is "the multitextuality of the legal cultures" as opposed to the "de-
contextualised picture" of 'comparative law', that is, to rely on "an entire 
contextual matrix in which the state law operates" (and, in it, also on the "micro-
social level of grass-root lived-experience") within the "widely acknowledged 
[...] field of legal scholarship" of 'comparative legal cultures'; bearing the 
lesson in mind that 
4,1
 See, by the author, as a clearly theoretical argument, Is Law a System of Enactments? 
in: Peczenik, A.-Lindahl, L.-van Roermund. В. (ed.): Theory of Legal Science. Dordrecht-
Boston-Lancaster, 1984. 175-182.; for questions raised in socialism, Law as a Social 
Issue, in: Wronkowska, S.-Zielinski, M. (ed.): Szkice z teorii prawa i szczególowych 
nauk prawnych Professorowi Zygmuntowi Ziembinskiemu [Outlines for legal theory: a 
festschrift for Prof. Zygmunt Ziembinski]. Poznan, 1990. 239-255. ; and as the pathology 
of Socialism and, therefore, also as a claim for laying the foundations for a specifically 
issue-sensitive legal ontology, Liberty, Equality, and the Conceptual Minimum of Legal 
Mediation, in: MacCormick, N.-Bankowski. Z. (ed.): Enlightenment. Rights and Revolution 
Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy. Aberdeen, 1989. ch. 1 1, 229-251. {reprinted in 
Varga, Cs. (ed.): Marxian Legal Theory. Aldershot-Hong Kong-Singapore-Sydney-
Dartmouth-New York, 1993. 501-523.). As to the modern law's formalism, seen as a proper 
professional deontology, that is, as the very form of the l aw ' s ontological existence 
(instead of the merely epistemological perspective of assessing it ideologically, or sheerly 
ideology-critically as a false consciousness, only motivated by the juristic world-concept 
["juristische Weltanschauung"]), see, also Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács' World 
Concept. Budapest, 1985 [reprint 1998). 193, passim. 
41
 Comparative Legal Cultures, op. cit. xvii. 
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"a living body of law is not a collection of doctrines, rules, terms and phrases. 
It is not a dictionary, but a culture; and it has to be approached as such."42 
b) Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law 
As to the convergence of European legal systems, a French-Canadian professor 
teaching at the Sorbonne in Paris gave voice to his doubts,43 which later stirred 
up an aggressive yet all the poorer international debate,44 in response to two 
4
~ Puchalska-Tych-Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe... op. cit. 183; 
181, note 114; 182 and note 118, as well as 182, referring to Cotterrell, R.: The Concept of 
Legal Cultures, in: Comparing Legal Cultures, op. cit. 13-32. and Nelken, D.: Who can you 
Trust? The Future of Comparative Criminology [a lecture presented at the workshop 
entitled Comparing Legal Cultures, op. cit. (Macerata, May 18-20, 1994)], to Comparative 
Legal Cultures, xv-xxiv as well as Zedner, L.: In Pursuit of the Vernacular: Comparing 
Law and Order Discourse in England and Germany. Social & Legal Studies 4 ( 1995), 517-
535. Cf. also Friedman, L.: Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Culture, in: Clark, D. S. 
(ed.): Comparative and Private International Law. Essays in Honour of John Henry 
Merryman on his 70th Birthday. Berlin, 1990. 
43
 Cf., by Legrand, P.: Europen Legal Systems... op. cit., passim, as well as his Sens et 
non-sens d'un Code Civil Européen. Revue internationale de Droit comparé 48 (1996), 
779 et seq.. Against a European Civil Code. Modern Law Review 60 (1997), 44. et seq., 
and Le primat de la culture, in: P. de Varaeilles-Sommières (ed.): Le droit privé européen. 
Paris, 1998. 1-5. It is to be mentioned that Markesinis, B. S.-Why a Code is not the Best 
Way to Advance the Cause of European Legal Unity. European Review of Private Law 
(1997), 519-524- , acknowledging the unfeasibility of a common code yet wishing to 
substantiate the convergence, introduced the German law of contracts in English in a series 
of collective works, adapting the method of 19th-century German pandectism-"first 
deconstruct and then reconstruct"-to English conditions. This laudable initiative was, 
however, qualified by its critic-Legrand, P.: Are Civilians Educable? Legal Studies 18 
(1998), 216 et seq., particularly at 227, note 63-as the "trivialisation" of German law. 
Markesinis, in return, gave way to a rejoinder of a personal tone in his Studying Judicial 
Decisions in the Common Law and the Civil Law: A Good Way of Discovering Some of 
the Most Interesting Similarities and Differences that Exist between these Legal Families, 
in: van Hoecke, M.-Ost, F. (ed.): The Harmonisation of European Private Law. Oxford-
Portland-Oregon, 2000. 117-134, especially 133. 
44
 Cf., just for one example, van Hoecke, M.: The Harmonisation of Private Law in 
Europe: Some Misunderstandings, in: The Harmonisation... op. cit. 1 - 2 0 [relying 
rather idealistically solely on measures of education and socialisation! and, especially, 
Chamboredon, A.: The Debate on a European Civil Code: For an »Open Texture«, in: ibid., 
63-99 [giving a post-modern expression to ancient wisdoms gained from the European 
experience of codification by combining legislatorial moderation, as well as from raising 
awareness of the use of flexible concepts and systematic interpretation). All this was 
accompanied by such overtones in the overall debate that G. Samuel-English Private 
Law in the Context of the Codes, in: ibid., 47—felt prompted to state: "Weak theorising, 
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resolutions taken by the European Parliament on the commencement of the 
preparation, respectively actual drafting, of a Common European Code of Private 
Law,45 about which enthusiastic reports were at once released, concluding 
from the signs of "converging" and "a continual rapprochement" that "a new 
ius commune is thus in the making".46 
What are, then, these daring allegations? The description of living complexes 
in terms of mere rules results in "thin description" at the most, excluding 
"thick description" the more so as the rules are-just as the concepts-only the 
outcome of some feasible mental representation.47 Thus, any exclusive reliance 
upon or over-emphasis of them may only contribute to the dissolution of existing 
interrelations by atomising and fragmenting their organic components.48 Since 
in case of any law "you have to know where it comes from and what its image 
of itself is",4' we can only conclude that there is a difference between Civil 
Law and Common Law, which is both irreducible and irresolvable at the same 
simplistic metaphors and the arrogant dismissal of opponents' arguments do Europe no 
favours." 
45
 'European Parliament's Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of 
the Member States' Official Journal C158/400 (26 May 1989) and 'European Parliament's 
Resolution on the Harmonisation of Certain Sectors of the Private Law of the Member 
States' Official Journal C205/518 (6 May 1994). 
46
 de Groot, G.-R.: European Education in the 21st Century, in: De Witte, В.-Forder, С. 
(ed.): The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education. Deventer, 1992, 11 ; 
Glenn, H. P.: La civilisation de la common law. Revue internationale de Droit comparé 45 
(1993), 567; as well as Markesinis, B. S.: Bridging Legal Cultures. Israel Law Review 27 
(1993), 382. 
47
 Ryle, G.: The Thinking of Thoughts: What is »Le Penseur« Doing?, in: his Collected 
Papers II: Collected Essays, 1929-1968. London, 1971. 480, as well as Stengers. I.: Le 
pouvoir des concepts, in: Stengers, I.-Schlenger, J.: Les concepts scientifiques Invention et 
pouvoir. Paris, 1991. 63-64. It is to be remarked that the "praesumptio similitudinis", 
proposed by Zweigert, K.-Kötz, H. in their An Introduction to Comparative Law. 2nd rev. 
ed. Oxford-New York, 1992. 36, according to which even radical differences in conceptuali-
sation may result in similar functional solutions in practice-as once expressedly observed 
by Zweigert, К. in his Solutions identiques par des voies différentes (Quelques observations 
en matières de droit comparé). Revue internationale de Droit comparé XVIII (1966), 5-18- , 
does not offer a refuge, because it indicates exactly the unsuitability and the barriers of 
text-formalism. 
48
 "We have put into people's heads that society is a creature of abstract thought when 
it is constituted by habits and customs. When you submit habits and customs to the 
grindstone of reason, you pulverize ways of life based on longstanding traditions and 
reduce human beings to the state of anonymous and interchangeable atoms." Lévy-Strauss, 
C.-Eribon, D.: De près et de loin. Paris, 1988. 165. 
44
 Merryman, J.: in The American Journal of Comparative Law 35 (1987), 441. 
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time. For it is made up of the difference between mentalities and worldviews 
with their implied presuppositions and attitudes, aspirations and empathies, 
which all constitute the deep structure and local rationality of thinking in terms 
of all the above and serve as the indispensable key to their cognition. This is 
why the classic of studies in Roman law once spoke (as if of the Hegelian 
Volksgeist) something of a secret intellectuality,50 recalling the original idea of 
Montesquieu: "It is not the body of laws that I am looking for, but their soul!".51 
4. Concluding Remarks 
With this, we have returned to the self-closure of 'comparative law'. Although 
the programmatic methodological requirement according to which "the 
comparativist must eradicate the preconceptions of his native legal system"52 is 
well known, actually it is the Western concepts of order, ethos and rationality 
that are usually asserted as universal claims under the veil of "a non-
transparent and taken-for-granted Western ideology of value-free scientific 
approach to research".53 This is what manifests itself in the global sanctioning 
of the Western ideal of law54 and especially in the service of current Atlantic 
and European endeavours which deliberately restrict the chances for survival 
of other ideals of order and legal arrangements,55 and also in the competition 
50
 Pringsheim, F.: Inner Relationship between English and Roman Law. Cambridge 
Law Journal (1933-1935), 348. 
51
 Montesquieu: Dossier de Y Esprit des Lois. In: Caillois, R. (ed.): Oeuvres complètes 
II. Paris, 1951. 1025. Legrand: European Legal Systems Are not Converging, op. cit. 55 et 
seq. explains in more detail the impossibility of convergence by the example of the radical 
differences both in legal reasoning and systématisation, and the use of rules and the role of 
facts, as well as the in meaning of entitlements and the varying presence of the past. 
52
 Zweigert-Kötz: An Introduction to Comparative Law. op. cit. 32. 
53
 Puchalska-Tych-Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe... op. cit. 160. 
54
 For a stand taken by legal philosophy, see, e.g., Surya Prakash Sinha: Non-universality 
of Law. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 81 (1995). 185-214. According to his 
radical conclusion, "law itself is parochial to Western civilisation", therefore "transforming 
non-legal cultures into legal societies", as forced by the majority of international 
organisations, is both harmful (as it evacuates cultural patterns) and subversive for the 
larger part of the world (209 and 211). 
55
 One of the fields of such fights today is the question of the universalisability, 
without a cultural loss, of human rights, taken as an ideal and as a store of instruments 
enacted by Atlantic documents in accordance with the Western legal ideal. See, e.g., Pollis, 
A.-Schwab, P. (ed.): Human Rights Cultures and Ideological Perspectives. New York, 
1979.; Surya Prakash Sinha: Human Rights: A Non-western Viewpoint. Archiv für Rechts-
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for patterning the future European law through the re-writing of its past history56-
in short, which manifests itself in all preferences called ethnocentrism in 
und Sozialphilosophie 67 (1981), 76 et seq.; Hassan, R.: On Human Rights and the 
Qur'anic Experience, and Mitra, К.: Human Rights in Hinduism. Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies 19 (1982), 51-65, resp. 77-84; Hjiirpe, J.: The Contemporary Debate in the Muslim 
World on the Definition of »Human Rights«. In: Ferdinand, K.-Mozaffari, M. (ed.): Islam 
State and Society. London, 1988. 26-38.; Welsh, C. Jr.-Leary, V. (ed.): Asian Perspectives 
on Human Rights. Boulder, 1990.; Preis, А.-В. S.: Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An 
Anthropological Critique. Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996), 286-315.; Dembour, M.-B.: 
Human Rights Talk and Anthropological Ambivalence: The Particular Contexts of 
Universal Claims. In: Harris, O. (ed.): Inside and Outside the Law Anthropological Studies 
of Authority and Ambiguity. New York-London, 1996. ch. 2, 19—40; Luf, G.: Peace and 
Human Rights as Seen by the Churches. In: Bsteh, A. (ed.): Peace for Humanity Principles, 
Problems and Perspectives of the Future as Seen by Muslims and Christians. New Delhi, 
1996. 143-157 and, for the debate, 158-177.; Lindholt, L.: Questioning the Universality of 
Human Rights The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in Botswana, Malawi 
and Mozambique. Aldershot-Buriington USA-Singapore-Sydney, 1997.; Marfording, A.: 
Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture: An Examination of Japan. Human 
Rights Quarterly 19 (1997) 3, 431-448.; Perry, M. J.: Are Human Rights Universal? The 
Relativist Challenge and Related Matters. Human Rights Quarterly 19 (August 1997), 461-
509.; Boaventura de Sousa Santos: Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights. 
Sociologia del Diritto XXIV (1997), 27-45.; Hjärpe, J.: Some Problems in the Meeting 
between European and Islamic Legal Tradition Examples from the Human Rights 
Discussion [multipl.|. [Lund:] [n.y.] 21. The set of questions naturally involves interference 
through exerting political or economic pressure or via so-called humanitarian aid. For 
Central and Eastern Europe, see the titles in note 39 and, for an example distant but 
touching upon so called "Westernisation strategies", Wai Man Sin-Chu Yiu Wai: Whose 
Rule of Law? Rethinking (Post-)Colonial Legal Culture in Hong Kong. Social & Legal 
Studies 7 (1998). 147-169. 
36
 After remarkable historical foundation-above all, by Koschaker, P.: Europa und das 
römische Recht. München, 1947. and Wieacker, F.: Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung. Göttingen-Vandenhoeck-
Ruprecht, 1952-and serials-first of all. Coing, H. (hrsg.): Handbuch der Quellen und 
Literatur der neueren Europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte München, 1973-1988. and lus 
commune I—( 1973—)—, accompanied by theoretical overviews-e.g., Wieacker, J.: Founda-
tions of European Legal Culture. The American Journal of Comparative Law 38 (1990), 1 -
29., Arnaud, A.-J.: Pour une pensée juridique européenne. Paris, 1991., as well as Gessner, 
V.-Hoeland, A.-Varga, Cs.: European Legal Cultures. Aldershot-Brookfield USA-
Singapore-Sydney, 1996., a discipline called 'European legal history' was born. For its 
outlines, see, e.g., Schulze, R. (hrsg.): Europäische Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte 
Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung. Berlin, 1991. and Schulze, R.: European Legal 
History: A New Field of Research in Germany. The Journal of Legal History 13 (1992). 
270-295. According to critics-e.g., Osler, D. J.: The Myth of European Legal History. 
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scholarship, cultural imperialism in politics, and neo-colonialism in practice. 
In fact, in the absence of any theoretically elaborated or methodologically 
founded opposing force, all such impacts have recently been marshalled mostly 
under the banner of 'comparative law' or at least with its active support. 
Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that no kind of formalism can serve 
as an excuse for any restrictions on human entirety and cultural diversity, as 
well as on the professional responsibility to be taken for these.57 Accordingly, 
in our approach to legal institutions we also have to recognise individual and 
collective accomplishments in all human attempts at creating order, and 
provided they have produced values, we have to appreciate and try to preserve 
these as such.5x 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 16, 393-410-, all this endeavour dedicated to erecting a 
'European legal history' has only been conceived as to re-write history according to 
present-day interests, so as to conclude, by justifying the alleged past existence of a lus 
commune by the one-time allegedly dominant intellectual performance of today's major 
European powers, to the advent of a ius commune in the European Union with a hegemonic 
role to be played in its framing by a German-Dutch-French bloc. For the pitfalls (with 
underlying methodological biases) of such a new Euro-historicism, see, among others, 
Anton Schuurman, A.: Globalisering en geschiedenis. Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis 
27 (2001), 385-410.; Borgolte, M.: Vor dem Ende der Nationalgeschichten? Chancen und 
Hindernisse für eine Geschichte Europas im Mittelalter. Historische Zeitschrift (2001), 
561-596.; and Hoenicke Moore, M E.: Euro-Medievalism: Modern Europe and the Medieval 
Past. Collegium (Summer 2002), 67-79. 
57
 Cf. Zacher, H. F. (ed.): Democracy Some Acute Questions |The Proceedings of the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 22-25 April 1998] 
Vatican City, 1999. and Zacher, H. F. (ed.): Democracy Reality and Responsability [The 
Proceedigns of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 
23-26 February 2000J, Vatican City, 2001. 
5S
 For a number of further related questions, cf. Krawietz, W.-Varga, Cs. (ed.): On 
Different Legal Cultures, Pre-Modern and Modern States, and the Transition to the Rule of 
Law in Western and Eastern Europe. Berlin, [2003]. Rechtstheorie 33 (2002) 2-4. 
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Hong Kong's Copyright Laws: 
Recent Developments and Dilemmas 
Abstract. In January 2005 a Hong Kong resident was arrested and charged with distributing 
three Hollywood movies over the internet using BitTorrent software. At his trial, the 
prosecution argued that the defendant's actions amounted to the criminal offence of "distribution" 
under section 118 (1) ( 0 of the Copyright Ordinance. The defence countered that defendant's 
actions in uploading the files to his computer did not constitute distribution and amounted 
to no more than "making available" copyright materials-which was covered under civil 
provisions in section 26 of the same Ordinance. The defendant was found guilty and became 
the world's first BitTorrent user to be criminally convicted of piracy. The case has opened 
up strong debate in Hong Kong, with moves afoot to introduce a new raft of copyright 
legislation. 
Keywords: copyright, technology, online, piracy, Hong Kong, Asia 
In the last days of British rule, Governor Chris Patton signed into law a raft of 
new legislation, including the Copyright Ordinance which came into effect on 
30 June 1997,1 the day before Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty. 
The ordinance proved a useful tool for the new administration and a number of 
prosecutions were pursued under its ambit-but it had limitations. For example, a 
company that manufactured vehicle components could buy a computer program 
licensed for use in one computer to organize its inventory. But what if the 
company then installed the same software on dozens of other computers used 
by its employees? Under the Copyright Ordinance it was unclear whether such 
action would incur criminal liability since the business of the company was not 
to sell computer software but to sell vehicle components. Using the same 
principle, if a restaurant or bar played an illegal music recording during the 
course of its business it would most likely not be criminally liable. Amend-
ments were made to the Copyright Ordinance in an on-going effort to preserve 
L L M ( L o n d o n ) , P h D (Glasgow) , Di rec tor of the Double D e g r e e P r o g r a m m e , 
Facul ty of Ar ts , H o n g K o n g Baptist Un ive r s i ty , K o w l o o n Tong, Hong K o n g , Tel: ++ 
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E-mai l : m a c k e n z i @ h k b u . e d u . h k . 
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 C o p y r i g h t O r d i n a n c e (Cap 528) , H o n g Kong ( 2 0 0 6 ) . 
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its relevance and applicability but such has been the pace of technological 
advance in the last decade that copyright legislation in Hong Kong (and, it 
must be said, in many jurisdictions outside Hong Kong) has risked falling 
behind the realities of the digital present. 
While the Copyright Ordinance dealt reasonably adequately with the copying 
and bootlegging of tangible copyright entities, such as books, newspapers, 
CDs, VCDs and DVDs, one area where its provisions seemed particularly 
vulnerable was on-line piracy. The Ordinance was drafted at a time when file 
sharing was a little known and little feared phenomenon. When file sharing 
first came into digital vogue in 2000, annual retail record sales in Hong Kong 
topped $913 million. By 2004 sales had declined to $219 million-a fall of 
almost 75% in five years. Multimedia recording industries raised a chorus of 
alarm but the government, smarting from massive public protests in 2003 and a 
humiliating climb down on its draconian anti-subversion laws, was anxious to 
avoid any kind of new legislative foray that might smack of heavy handedness. 
Instead, enforcement agencies insisted that existing legislation was sufficient but 
proposed closer collaboration with the film and music industries in pursuing 
on-line offenders. In 2004 the Intellectual Property Investigation Bureau of the 
Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department proposed a taskforce, comprising 
Bureau and industry representatives, to tackle the problem of on-line piracy. In 
December of the same year the taskforce met for the first time. Within a 
month, its work had resulted in the arrest of Chan Nai Ming, a thirty-eight year 
old unemployed resident of the Tuen Mun area. 
The "Big Crook" Case (2005)2 
It was alleged that Chan had attempted to distribute three Hollywood movies 
via the internet using BitTorrent peer-to-peer file sharing technology. He had 
uploaded the files on to his computer and posted their availability on a popular 
BitTorrent movie newsgroup website. Perhaps unwisely, Chan had used the 
internet alias "Big Crook" and his posting was spotted by a Customs officer.3 
In October 2005, Chan was convicted of attempting to distribute copyright 
material without the permission of the licensor and sentenced to three months 
:
 "Big Crook" was the internet moniker of Chan Nai Ming whose case was heard in 
the Tuen Mun Court (HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming (ШТЬЩ) TMCC 1268/2005) and his 
subsequent appeal in the Court of First Instance (HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming ((ШЛВД) 
HCM A 1221/2005). 
3
 Ibid. 
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jail, though released on bail pending appeal. He had become the world's first 
BitTorrent user to be convicted of piracy. In December 2006 the defendant's 
appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal and he was sent to prison. 
Chan Nai Ming 's defense counsel argued that making copyright protected 
material available on a computer using BitTorrent software did not amount to 
"distribution." Chan had at most "made available" the movies in question, 
which, it was submitted, was different to distributing them. The act of "making 
available" copies of copyrighted material is covered under Section 26 of the 
Copyright Ordinance but it is subject to civil and not criminal liabilities. 
(1) The making available of copies of the work to the public is an act 
restricted by copyright in every description of copyright work. 
(2) Reference in this Part to the making available of copies of a work in 
the public are to the making available of copies of the work, by wire or 
wireless means, in such a way that members of the public in Hong Kong or 
elsewhere may access the work from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them (such as the making available of copies of works through 
the service commonly known as the INTERNET).4 
Section 26 interprets the act of "making available" copyright material a 
relatively passive action in which those copying from the source do so "from 
a place and at a time individually chosen by them." The Internet is explicitly 
identified as an example of a context where the act of "making available" 
copyrighted materials could take place. Had the copyright holders pursued Chan 
under these civil provisions they could have sought damages from him for loss 
of copyright earnings, obliged him to remove the files from his computer, and 
required him to undertake to desist from such activities in the future. 
Clearly, though, there were greater issues at stake and the State, with the 
full backing of the industry, decided to pursue the case as a criminal prosecution. 
In order to do so, it had to be argued successfully that Chan's actions amounted 
to distribution which is covered under Section 118 of the Ordinance and which 
carries with it criminal penalties (a maximum four-year jail term): 
1) A person commits an offence if he, without the license of the copyright 
owner -
(a) makes for sale or hire; 
(b) imports into Hong Kong otherwise than for his private and 
domest ic use; 
4
 Copyright Ordinance, Sec t ion 2 6 . 
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(c) exports from Hong Kong otherwise than for his private and 
domest ic use; 
(d) possesses for the purpose of, in the course of, or in connection 
with, any trade or business with a view to committing any act 
infringing the copyright; (Amended 64 of 2000 s. 7) 
(e) for the purpose of, in the course of, or in connection with, any 
trade or business-(Amended 64 of 2000 s. 7) 
(i) sells or lets for hire; 
(ii) offers or exposes for sale or hire; 
(iii) exhibits in public; or 
(iv) distributes; or 
(f) distributes (otherwise than for the purpose of, in the course of, or 
in connection with, any trade or business) to such an extent as to 
affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, (Amended 64 of 
2000 s.7) an infringing copy of a copyright work.5 
Clearly Chan was not liable under sections l(a)-(e) , since his seed files 
were not uploaded with any trade or business intent, and were offered neither 
for sale nor for hire. His criminal culpability rested entirely on section 1(f) and 
on the definition of "distributes." Unfortunately, the Copyright Ordinance does 
not offer a definition of the term. 
In order to adjudicate in some working sense the difference between 
making something available and distributing it, we need to understand some of 
the technical aspects of the technology that Chan was using. The nature of 
BitTorrent, or peer-to-peer (P2P) technology is complex and, as 1 shall argue, 
blurs the distinction between uploader and downloader. A typical scenario 
would involve a peer (the seeder) uploading a movie on to his computer with a 
"torrent" extension name (the seed file). Using hashing algorithms, the seeder 
will already have broken down the movie into smaller pieces. The seeder will 
then advertise the .torrent file on a website where another computer (the "tracker" 
server) will coordinate file distribution. Say, for example, five visitors to the 
site (a so-called "swarm" in BitTorrent-speak) decide to obtain a copy of the 
movie. Under the coordination of the tracker server, each visitor (or "peer") 
will be directed to the seeder computer and begin downloading the movie, bit 
by bit. However, the peers will also be directed to each other's computers. They 
may then gather the component bits of the movie not only from the seeder 
computer but also f rom other swarm computers which may be at varying stages 
5
 Copyright Ordinance, Section 118. 
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in the same downloading process. Curiously, then, the more people downloading 
the same movie through BitTorrent technology, the faster the downloading 
process becomes, since the more computers that become involved the greater 
the number of downloading routes that become available to a given peer 
computer. This runs quite contrary to normative computing experience where, 
typically, the more people who wish to download a file, the longer it takes. 
There are two crucial issues in the BitTorrent scenario. Firstly, the seeder 
computer needs to make itself available (that is, it needs to be on-line) but it 
has no control over which users (if any) access its information. In other words, 
whether its information is distributed or not is outside the control of the seeder. 
Secondly, such is the nature of BitTorrent software that each of the peer computers 
at any given moment may be either downloading or uploading information-they 
may be downloading component bits from the seeder or other peer computers 
but, since other peer computers may be downloading f rom them as well, they 
are also by definition uploading for the benefit of others (effectively acting as 
proxy "seeders" themselves). 
The magistrate in the Tuen Mun Court where Chan was first convicted ruled 
that (a) by keeping his computer on-line, and therefore making it possible for 
peers to download the files, and (b) by creating inlay images of the film sleeves 
on his computer, the defendant had actively distributed copyright materials 
without permission. 
This was not merely "making available" the BitTorrent files. These were 
positive acts by the defendant, leading to the distribution of the data. He 
intended that result. In no way can the defendant's involvement in the 
downloading of this material be properly described as passive. The fact that 
the recipients of the packets of data, originating f rom the defendant's 
computer, might have received it by indirect routes does not alter the nature 
of the defendant's act of distribution.6 
This interpretation of Chan's actions allows a lot of latitude for the definition 
of the term "distribution." To "distribute" something suggests an active agency 
and, arguably, the act of distribution in this case was initiated by BitTorrent 
peer users who had connected with the seeder and other computers in the 
swarm-or, indeed, the tracker computer itself. From a purely terminological 
point of view, Chan's actions seem to be accommodated more accurately by 
the description "making available" than by the term "distributing." True enough, 
6
 Magistrate Colin Mackintosh, HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming ( Ш Л Щ ) (2005): T M C C 
1268/2005. Paragraph 34. 
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without Chan's initiating actions, the distribution could not have taken place-
but could his actions be captured more accurately by the phrase "making 
available" (Section 26 of the Ordinance, which explicitly refers to internet 
usage) and should the remedy have been civil rather than criminal? 
Chan's conviction reflected a growing and understandable frustration felt 
by enforcement agencies, the recording industry and perhaps the judiciary 
itself. There was some speculation that the ruling would be overturned on 
appeal. However, on 12 December 2006 the Court of Appeal dismissed Chan's 
appeal, with Justice Beeson noting in her judgment that Hong Kong's laws had 
to protect the city's international standing. The Ordinance, she affirmed, was 
designed "to help maintain Hong Kong's important and hard-won position as a 
responsible member of the worldwide trading community" (HKSAR v Chan Nai 
Ming (ШТЬЩ), HCMA 1221/2005 (paragraph 79).7 This suggested a decision 
based as much on territorial policy as on legal principles-which is an acceptable 
position for a higher court to take, of course, but how much more persuasive it 
would have appeared had it been constructed on firmer legal footings. At the 
time of writing, Chan's legal team was preparing a last ditch petition to Hong 
Kong's highest court, the Court of Final Appeal. 
In the weeks following Chan's conviction in October 2005, the number of 
seed files uploaded in Hong Kong fell by 80% according to official figures. 
The government took this to signify that the criminal proceedings against "Big 
Crook" had paid good dividends and the digital industries that had suffered 
most from piracy were unanimous in their approval of the outcome. Further 
high profile prosecutions of low profile alleged offenders followed. In March 
2006 seven major music companies launched an action against a fifty-four year 
old man from the working class neighborhood of Sheung Shui for allegedly 
uploading, downloading and storing copyright protected music. The companies 
are demanding undisclosed damages from the man-he argues that he does not 
even know how to turn on the home's computer and that, if there has been any 
wrong doing, most likely his teenage daughters were the culprits. Later in the 
same week, record companies filed a writ in the High Court accusing a 
housewife from the middle class neighborhood of Laguna City of uploading, 
downloading and storing copyrighted music on her computer. Both cases are 
ongoing. 
In May 2006, following complaints from industry copyright owners, Customs 
officers arrested a 16 year old school boy in Sau Mau Ping, Kowloon, and 
accused him of configuring his computer as a server for the distribution of 
music and film files. It was the first time that anyone had been arrested in the 
7
 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming ( Ш П Щ (2005). op. cit. 
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territory for distributing copyright digital materials through a website se rve r -
and though this was not a BitTorrent case there could be a hint that authorities 
may now be willing to test in the courts the criminal liability of a "tracker" 
server. The teenager was sentenced to a one year probation order in January 
2007. Again in May 2006, the Film Industry Response Group, an industry 
group formed specifically to tackle the problem of movie piracy, obtained a 
court order requiring four internet service providers to reveal the identities of 
42 account holders whose computers had allegedly been used to pirate 
copyright movies using BitTorrent software. Letters sent to the 42 individuals 
demanded that they undertake not to download movies again and required each 
to pay HK$23,000 in compensation-a f igure based on cases in the United 
States were compensation ran to US$3,000. If the individuals do not comply, 
the letters threaten to take them to court and prosecute them under the 
Copyright Ordinance. It seems very possible, therefore, that the civil liability 
of BitTorrent peer users will be tested in the courts in the near future. 
New Legal Proposals 
Following consultations with the public and the recording industry, in 2006 the 
government published a consultative document titled Copyright Protection in 
the Digital Environment (CPDE) which called for public discussion of wide-
ranging changes to the copyright laws. Public consultation will end in April 
2007 after which time the Government will set about drafting and enacting 
relevant legislation. The new proposals are loosely modeled on the US Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA)8 which criminalized the production 
and the dissemination of copyright material and, in particular, increased 
penalties for Internet infringements. 
However, the proposed Hong Kong legislation differs conspicuously in two 
important respects from the DMCA. Firstly, under Chapter 1 of the C P D E 
proposals, the matter of criminalizing the downloading of copyright materials 
is raised. In mooting this possibility, the C P D E shows clearly its awareness of 
the frustration felt by big business: 
... copyright owners from different industries (including the music, movie, 
computer software, publishing industries, etc.) claim that rampant Internet 
infringement activities have seriously hampered their development and 
their loss could hardly be compensated by damages awarded as a result of 
8
 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998). United States 112 Stat. 2860. 
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individual civil actions. Some suggest that unauthorized downloading 
activities should constitute [a] criminal offence.4 
If, indeed, downloading per se becomes a criminal activity under Hong 
Kong law this would constitute a significant departure from international 
practices. In Singapore downloading of copyright materials attracts criminal 
liability if it is conducted on a significant scale or if it is for commercial gain; 
in the United States downloading may be regarded as a criminal activity if it is 
conducted for commercial gain or if the retail value of the downloaded materials 
exceeds US$1,000. However in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Canada-countries to which Hong Kong has traditionally looked 
for its legal models-the unauthorized downloading of copyright materials 
incurs only civil liability. 
Critics of Hong Kong's post-1997 governance regularly accuse it of pandering 
to the whims of big business, and of doing so at the expense of the man in the 
street, the individual. It is true that the CPDE is a consultation document but 
while it articulates the various possibilities for criminalizing downloading, it 
fails to articulate as fulsomely the case for maintaining unauthorized down-
loading as a civil offence. The inference of the document is not whether 
downloading should be criminalized or kept as a civil liability but, rather, to 
what extent it should be criminalized. 
Secondly, while the DMCA has been criticized in the US for jeopardizing 
the principle of "fair use" some academic commentators outside the US have 
regarded the provisions as comparatively flexible.10 In contrast, the Hong 
Kong proposals for "fair use" are extremely narrow. The term is used only 
once in the body of the CPDE text [chapter 6(9)] and there in relation to the 
somewhat esoteric issue of the temporary reproduction of copyright works (as, for 
example, in the creation of a temporary buffer copy in the course of digital 
streaming). What is absent from the document is a sustained awareness of 
anyone's point of view apart from that of the copyright holder. Yet, in truth, 
there is another equally important stakeholder in this process and one whose 
9
 Copyright Protection in the Digital Environment (1.4) (2006), Government Printer, 
Hong Kong. 
10
 Those who have vigorously opposed the D M C A ' s provisions include digital lobby 
groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (see http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/) 
and the Ant i -DMCA Organization (see http://www.anti-dmca.org/index.html). Michael 
Pendleton, Associate Director of Chinese University of Hong Kong ' s School of Law has 
suggested that, in comparison to Hong Kong's provisions, the US has a "wide ranging 
'fair use' de fence" (South China Morning Post, Monday 22 January 2007). 
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views ought to be taken into account- the individual user himself or herself. 
From the consumer's perspective, it might well be argued that Hong Kong's 
film and music industries have been too slow in providing sufficient digital 
content for legal downloading purposes. The territory's traditional predilection 
for multimedia gadgetry has left end-users frustrated by the paucity of legal 
materials available for download. For its part, the industry feels that uploading 
its video and music catalogues on to the internet in neat digital packaging presents 
insuperable security obstacles. We therefore find ourselves in a situation where 
consumers want greater variety and choice in their download menus but digital 
industries are afraid to open the larder doors. 
Conclusion 
Hong Kong's Basic Law, which came into effect on 1 July 1997, contains specific 
provisions for the protection of intellectual property. Article 139 affirms that 
the "The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, 
on its own, formulate policies on science and technology and protect by law 
achievements in scientific and technological research, patents, discoveries and 
inventions." And Article 140 undertakes to "protect by law the achievements 
and the lawful rights and interests of authors in their literary and artistic creation." 
Yet, translating intent into action has not been easy and in the ten years 
following the return to Chinese rule the question of intellectual property rights 
has loomed large-not least in the spheres of Hong Kong's film and recording 
industries which have suffered heavily from piracy. A point has been reached 
where Hong Kong 's digital businesses and the Government itself now believe 
that only by enacting a fiercer set of copyright laws can the territory's creative 
industries be safeguarded and allowed to flourish. 
No-one can argue it is just and fair that intellectual property should be 
protected but the supposition that a combination of criminal laws and court 
actions is the best way to change people's behavior and nurture creativity may 
be misplaced. Alice Lee," a prominent Hong Kong Law professor, has warned 
the Government to think carefully about future legislation, suggesting that 
"overzealous attempts to protect copyright could actually stifle creativity by 
restricting the flow of information."12 And Michael Geist," a Canadian authority 
11
 Lee, Alice (20 December 2006): Interview. The Standard. Hong Kong, China. 
12
 Interviewed in The Standard, Wednesday 20 December 2006. 
13
 Geist, Michael (22 January 2007): Interview. South China Morning Post. Hong 
Kong, China. 
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on intellectual property laws, has noted that even the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act is now being "viewed by many as an extreme example of 
implementing the WIPO [World Intellectual Property Organization] Internet 
Treaties. Many countries-including Canada and New Zealand-have begun to 
distance themselves from the DMCA-style approach."14 Indeed, a softer line on 
the policing of intellectual property, one that gives consumers greater access 
to, and flexibility in the use of, digital materials, may well pay dividends if it 
can be combined with alternative mechanisms for collecting copyright revenues. 
14
 Interviewed in the South China Morning Post, Monday 22 January 2007. 
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Ábstract. The essay reflects upon the debate over intentionalism about statutory interpretation, 
and argues for a moderate version of intentionalism. It argues that the debate over 
intentionalism cannot be sorted out without establishing a viable conception of legislative 
authority. The outlines of such a conception are put forward by throwing some light on the 
concept of "representational authority". The essay also argues that the problem of legal 
interpretation touches upon issues of sovereignty. It implies that some important issues of 
the normative theory of legal interpretation are linked to substantive political philosophical 
problems. 
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Introduction 
The following essay is a contribution to the age-old debate among jurists over 
the proper role of legislative intentions in statutory interpretation. The debate 
plays out in legal theory as the controversy between intentionalists and non-
intentionalists. Intentionalists claim that legislative intentions play an important 
role in statutory interpretation. Non-intentionalists, on the other hand, insist that 
legislative intentions cannot have that role: intentionalist methods are forbidden 
in the legal practice.1 My analysis will present an incomplete argument for a 
version of intentionalism about statutory interpretation. The argument is based 
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1
 S e e Moore , M.: In te rpre t ing In te rp re t a t ion . In: M a r m o r , A. (ed.): Law and Inter-
pretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy. O x f o r d , 1995. 24. 
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on certain conceptual considerations concerning the authority of statutory 
provisions. 
I deliberately employ here a rather broad and weak formulation of inten-
tionalism that does not refer to one particular interpretive method.2 Intentionalism, 
as I depict it here, can take several forms. One option is linking the inten-
tionalist position to the well-known view that textual interpretation is about 
retrieving authorial intentions, and regarding legislators as the authors of 
statutes. Another option is the claim that, although textual interpretation is not 
necessarily about retrieving intentions, there is something special about legal 
interpretation that vindicates intentionalist interpretive strategies. And an inten-
tionalist can also claim that intentionalist interpretive strategies should play a 
vital but only partial role in legal interpretation. 
As the preliminary remarks should make it obvious, the present essay 
concentrates on the problems of normative theories of legal interpretation that 
engage with norms that determine what qualifies as a successful legal inter-
pretation or as a justifiable interpretive strategy. For this reason, I do not 
undertake to defend here any descriptive theory of legal interpretation. How-
ever, each normative theory of legal interpretation presupposes something that 
belongs to the realm of descriptive theories: a plausible account of the process 
and the constitutive features of legal interpretation. Without such an account in 
its background, a normative theory of legal interpretations is totally irrelevant. 
For this reason, it may be useful to reveal the main conceptual points about 
interpretation and legal interpretation that I will rely on. As this is not the task 
of the present analysis, I do not provide arguments for them, but I hope that 
they are not too controversial, and will not scare off my potential readers. 
First, a few words on interpretation itself. When we talk about interpretation, 
we tend to treat textual interpretation as the central case. As the subject of my 
paper is statutory interpretation, this is not at all against my intentions. However, 
for philosophical reasons, it is better to settle for a more general definition. 
Interpretation is one of the activities directed towards understanding meaning.3 
Of course, its theoretical problem is not identical with that of understanding 
meaning: interpretation actually presupposes the ability of understanding 
In light of the wide variety of the uses of the "argument from intention", it would 
seem rather odd to talk about one particular intentionalist interpretive method. Cf. 
MacCormick, N.-Summers, R. S.: Interpretation and Justification. In: MacCormick, N . -
Summers, R. S. (eds.): Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study. Aldershot, 1991. 522-
525. 
3
 See Moore: op. cit. 2. 
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meaning.4 Interpretation is required when understanding meaning is problematic 
in a distinctive way: having access to the pertinent meanings requires some 
effort that is within the scope of our linguistic skills.5 Interpretation should be 
taken as a process that substitutes one linguistic expression for another.6 When 
we effortlessly understand the meaning, which is very often the case,7 inter-
pretation is not necessary. When the meaning to be understood transcends our 
linguistic skills (e.g. when someone speaks to us in a language that we are not 
familiar with), interpretation cannot be successful. 
As to legal interpretation, the crucial preliminary point is that I take it to be 
strongly connected to legal reasoning. The theoretical problem of legal inter-
pretation is a part of the broader theoretical problem of legal reasoning. The 
link between the two problems is established by the fact that, in modern legal 
systems, legal reasoning normally has to rely on reasons that are drawn from 
recognized sources. It is also characteristic of modern legal systems that the 
law authenticated by the recognised sources is incorporated in written legal 
documents ("legal texts"). Legal reasoning often has to rely on textual inter-
pretation to have access to the relevant legal reasons. Legal reasoning must be 
capable of providing a proper reading of legal texts. It is also important that 
when legal theorists or lawyers speak of legal interpretation they tend to think 
of a specific interpretive activity that figures in the process of making 
particular legal decisions, and I will be no exception. Although a whole series 
of interesting theoretical problems arise from other activities that can also be 
associated with interpreting law (like following or violating the law, or designing 
new laws), the present analysis will ignore them. 
Of course, there are several kinds of legal texts, and they are all proper 
objects of legal interpretation. One can interpret judicial or administrative 
decisions or even international treaties. But as I have chosen the controversy 
4
 See Marmor, A.: Interpretation and Legal Theory. Oxford, 1992. 21. This implies 
the rejection of the view that the theoretical problem of interpretation, at least sensu largo, 
covers the whole problem of understanding. For such a view, see Bankowski, Z . -
MacCormick, N.-Summers, R. S.-Wroblewski, J.: Method and Methodology. In: 
MacCormick-Summers (eds.): Interpreting Statutes...op. cit. 12. 
5
 Dummett, M.: A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson and 
Hacking. In: LePore, E. (ed.): Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of 
Donald Davidson. Oxford, 1986. 463. 
6
 Of course, making this point has a Wittgensteinian pedigree (although the relevant 
analysis by Wittgenstein addresses significantly different issues). See Wittgenstein, L.: 
Philosophical Investigations. Oxford, 1958, s. 201. See further Dummett: op. cit. 464. 
7
 Cf. Hacking, I.: The Parody of Conversation. In: LePore (ed.): Truth and Inter-
pretation... op. cit. 451. See further Dummett: op. cit. 464. 
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about intentionalism as the subject of the present paper, I will focus on statutory 
interpretation. I use the terms "legal interpretation" and "statutory inter Allan 
pretation" interchangeably below. 
There is a crucial methodological point that I will rely on throughout this essay 
but that I will not try to justify in detail: a normative theory of legal inter-
pretation cannot be some general theory of interpretation applied to law. The 
character of statutory interpretation is very much determined by its function: it 
serves a practical function in being part of a practice that seeks to provide 
practical guidance. This function has a lot to do with the way we think about 
the role of the legislature and the judiciary in the life of our society, that is, with 
issues concerning the proper allocation of institutionalized public authority in a 
political society. It cannot be an accident that most of the theoretical battles 
over legal interpretation are fought in the realm of constitutional theory. And, 
of course, constitutional theory heavily relies on political philosophy.8 Some of 
the relevant theoretical problems of legal interpretation must belong to practical 
philosophy, more specifically to political philosophy. 
I do not argue, however, that the whole theoretical problem of legal inter-
pretation belongs to political philosophy. Tom Campbell argues for something 
like this, and I would like to distinguish my position from his claims. Campbell 
does not deny that theories concentrating upon the general features of 
interpretation have a bearing on our understanding of legal interpretation." But 
he denies the possibility that we can lay the foundations of a normative theory 
of legal interpretation by way of a politically neutral conceptual analysis. The 
views we have about legal interpretation are ultimately dependent upon the 
way we perceive issue like that of the separation of powers, the role of the 
judges, etc. 
Up to this point, I agree with Campbell's suggestions. However, he goes on 
to reconsider the very concept of legal interpretation. He treats theories of 
legal interpretation as being inevitably part of a broad political theory about 
the proper allocation of power in society. And as the whole theoretical issue is 
deeply embedded in political philosophy, it seems to him that "selecting a 
theory of legal interpretation (...) is not dependent on any general theory of 
8
 See Perry, M. J.: Why Constitutional Theory Matters to Constitutional Practice (And 
Vice Versa). In: Leyh, G. (ed.): Lego! Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 1992.250. 
" See Campbell, T.: Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation. In: Goldsworthy, J . -
Campbell, T. (eds.): Legal Interpretation in Democratic States. Aldershot. 2002. 30. 
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interpretation or controversial theory of meaning."10 This is where Campbell 
goes too far. What we can legitimately claim is that theories of general inter-
pretation are indeterminate in respect of some crucial issues of legal interpretation, 
and they need to be supplemented with other (e.g. political philosophical) 
considerations. But even if the emphasis shifts towards political philosophy, we 
still need conceptions of legal interpretation that are consistent with some 
viable view on the general features of interpretation. In this sense, selecting a 
theory of legal interpretation is indeed dependent on general theories of inter-
pretation. The practical philosophical considerations that help to account for 
the distinctive features of legal interpretation should not be taken as isolating 
the theoretical analysis from the broader philosophical problem of interpretation." 
General theories of interpretation are not unimportant for us, but what we can 
learn from them just cannot be enough to lay the foundations for a tenable 
normative theory of legal interpretation. 
My analysis will face political philosophical problems that are identified as 
intrinsically relevant to normative theory of legal interpretation. However, the 
pertinent political philosophical issues will be left open for they cannot be 
answered adequately on the basis of the considerations mobilized by this essay. 
That is why I said in the first paragraph that the argument presented here would 
be incomplete. 
Without accepting the abovementioned methodological point about the 
role of political philosophical considerations, 1 would not have written this 
particular essay. In respect of the general theories of interpretation, I happen to 
be a sort of intentionalist. 1 believe that any full understanding of a text must 
pay attention to the intentions that gave rise to the speaker's meanings in the 
interpreted text. If I could take it as implying the truth of intentionalism about 
legal interpretation, the refutation of non-intentionalism would not require a legal 
theoretical analysis. But the challenge of non-intentionalism is more stubborn. 
For one, non-intentionalists can accept that any full interpretation needs to pay 
attention to authorial intentions, and yet insist that legal interpretation aims at 
no more than a partial understanding of the legal text. It is possible that non-
intentionalist interpretive strategies are capable of revealing the "legally relevant" 
10
 Ibid. 33. 
11
 For similar reasons, I reject attempts to reduce the whole activity of interpretation to 
some moral or political function. This view is well exemplified by Stanley Fish who 
regards interpretation as the effort of a morality (or agenda) "to extend itself into the world 
by inscribing its message on every available space". Fish, S.: There is No Such Thing as 
Free Speech and it's a Good Thing, Too. New York, Oxford, 1994. 142. I do not think that 
such approaches can be coherent. 
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meanings of legal texts, while intentionalist strategies reveal something else-
something legally irrelevant. 
It indicates that we should pay attention to the features that make legal 
interpretation specific. As far as I can see, those features are associated with 
the close connection between legal interpretation and the process of making 
legal decisions. The following two of them are certainly crucial for us. The first 
is that legal interpretation has a strictly practical orientation. Legal inter-
pretation seeks to reveal the practical guidance that the legal text provides, and 
remains indifferent to anything that goes beyond this task. The second feature 
is that legal interpretation raises issues concerning the agent of interpretation 
in a peculiar way. 
The first distinctive feature makes it a prerequisite to any plausible theory 
of legal interpretation to have a good understanding of the kind of practical 
guidance that the law seeks to provide, and general theories of interpretation 
are unlikely to be able to facilitate this understanding. A general theory of 
interpretation can make us understand that legal interpretation is guided by 
practical orientations,12 but it cannot be specific enough in respect of the 
relevant practical orientations.13 Practical orientations have many versions, and 
it is simply beyond the reach of a general theory of interpretation to provide the 
necessary specification for the practical orientation inherent in legal inter-
pretation. If we want to identify the kind of practical guidance characteristic of 
law, we face issues concerning the authority of law. Conceptual points about 
the authoritativeness of law will play a crucial role in the following analysis. 
The second distinctive feature I mentioned manifests itself in the fact that 
legal interpretations carried out by the decision-makers have an overriding 
significance. Every lawyer knows that there are many ways of understanding 
the practical requirements involved in a particular legal directive, and many 
techniques of interpretation can be mobilized to support those "understandings". 
But the understanding that really matters is that of the judiciary. Once it is 
revealed, the debate over the correct interpretation of the directive becomes 
largely academic.14 This point is underlined by the fact that the overriding 
12
 See Gadamer. H.-G.: Truth and Method. London, 1989. 324-341. 
13
 This problem of specification is well brought out by Arthur Glass who rightly claims 
that Gadamer's concept of 'application' is far too ambiguous from a legal theoretical point 
of view. See Glass, A.: A Hermeneutical Standpoint. In: Goldsworthy-Campbell (eds.): 
Legal Interpretation in Democratic States, op. cit. 136. However, he seems to treat it as a 
shortcoming of Gadamer's analysis. In my view, it is not: it is an acceptable implication of 
the abstractness of Gadamer's analysis. 
14
 Of course, there is an element of rhetorical exaggeration in this claim. The inter-
pretations of legal texts by the police, prosecutors, administrative agencies, etc. all matter 
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significance of the decision-makers' interpretations is not dependent on their 
expertise (on their epistemic authority). Judicial interpretations are often con-
demned as mistaken (even silly) and often for good reasons. Nevertheless, they 
can and do retain their priority to rival interpretations. They can be defeated 
not by providing a better interpretation of the misinterpreted legal directives 
but by setting in motion certain institutional procedures (like legislation or 
overruling). 
It indicates that, for a normative theory of legal interpretation, considerations 
concerning the institutional characteristics of law can turn out to be more 
decisive than anything that we can learn from any general theory of inter-
pretation. It seems to me that the most important current debates over legal 
interpretation (including the debate between the intentionalists and the non-
intentionalists) cannot really be addressed by any approach that general theories 
of interpretation can offer.15 Non-intentionalists can still win the day if they are 
capable of building their claims on a superior understanding of the institutional 
features of legal interpretation. 
Legal authority and intentionalism 
We have seen that the character of legal interpretation is partly determined 
by the institutional features of law. However, the law has many institutional 
features, and most of them are largely irrelevant to our present concern. We 
need to point to the particular features that may prove decisive in respect of the 
debate over intentionalism. 
Contemporary legal theorists have many suggestions concerning this issue. 
Some of them concentrate on substantive practical philosophical issues (like 
issues of legitimacy). Jeffrey Goldsworthy's suggestion points to a commitment 
to the value of legislative supremacy-'d commitment deeply embedded in our 
ideas about constitutionalism. For Goldsworthy, legislative supremacy becomes 
an empty phrase if intentionalism fails. If the intentions of the legislators do 
not matter, we end up with some sort of judicial supremacy: the judges' own 
value judgements will guide and limit the changes of the meanings of statutes.16 
(even when they disagree with the judges ' understanding). But not in a way that would 
undermine the point I am trying to make. 
15
 See Glass: op. cit. 146-147. 
16
 See Goldsworthy, J.: Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal 
Positivism. In: Golds worthy-Campbell (eds.): Legal Interpretation in Democratic States, 
op. cit. 55. Of course, substantive arguments can support non-intentionalism as well. See, 
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I find this argument particularly attractive. But the argument relies on an 
intimate connection between issues of interpretive strategy and the authority 
relations inherent in the institutional structure of law. That connection cannot be 
established without revealing important conceptual points about the authority 
of law. Substantive arguments like this must be built upon the relevant conceptual 
arguments.17 This is why my analysis will concentrate on conceptual arguments 
concerning intentionalism and non-intentionalism. 
Many contemporary legal theorists believe that the decisive conceptual 
feature of law that is ultimately relevant to the debate over intentionalism 
concerns the authority relations on which the whole structure of law was built. 
Some of them also believe that understanding the characteristics of legal 
authority vindicates intentionalism. In the following analysis. I will take this 
view as the standard conceptual justification of intentionalism. The rest of the 
views will be seen as challenges to this argument. 
We can easily point out the connection between the problem of legal authority 
and legal interpretation. I have mentioned above that legal interpretation aims 
at understanding the practical guidance that the law provides to us by way of 
the legal text. As practical guidance can be provided in many ways, it is part 
of the interpretive task to understand the nature of the practical guidance 
provided by the law. Successful legal interpretations presuppose a good under-
standing of the difference the law makes to our lives. 
Sometimes the practical guidance consists in revealing reasons that are 
worth considering. (This is a version of giving advice.) But the law is not a 
system that seeks to give us mere advice. Sometimes the practical guidance 
helps us understand the connection between some pre-existing duty and a certain 
course of action. But it is not characteristic of the law to refer back to pre-
existing duties. On other occasions the practical guidance itself creates a 
duty to behave in a certain way. In this case, the practical guidance is of an 
authoritative nature. Many claim that this is exactly the kind of practical guidance 
that that law typically provides. In the typical case, legal interpretation must 
lead to understanding the directives of law as authoritatively binding on us. 
But how is this related to the issue of intentionalism? The key conside-
ration is that legal directives are not genuinely authoritative. It is the nature of 
e.g., Ball, T.: Constitutional Interpretation and Conceptual Change. In: Leyh (ed.): Legal 
Hermeneutics... op. cit. 133-134. 
17
 On the level of conceptual analysis, it may turn out that Goldsworthy's claim partly 
misconceives the problem of legislative supremacy. For a suggestion to this effect, see 
Allan, T. R. S.: Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review. In: 23 
(2003) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 563-584. 575. 
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authority relations that they are constituted as human relations,18 Only persons 
or groups of persons can have genuine authority. Legal directives are always 
issued by persons or groups of persons, and must be taken as manifestations of 
their authority claims. The legal directives that we reveal from legal texts have 
some kind of derivative authority: they are always some person's (or persons') 
judgement on other people's conduct.'4 The function of legal texts is to help us 
figure out what practical guidance the genuine authorities have given to us. 
This formulation of the features of legal authority undeniably lends some 
support to intentionalism. It seems that such considerations (and some related 
ones) underlie Joseph Raz 's claim that the justification for treating law as valid 
derives from the authority of its makers, and laws are to be understood in light 
of the intentions of their makers. It is built into the notion of practical authority 
that law claims.20 Larry Alexander and Andrei Marmor, who use Raz's theory of 
authority as a starting point, are both committed to pretty much the same view."1 
Challenges to intentionalism I.: The availability of legislative intentions 
We now have an idea of the standard conceptual justification of inten-
tionalism. We can begin to assess the challenges to it. As the pertinent version 
of intentionalism relies heavily on explaining the normativity of law in terms 
of certain authority relations, one obvious way of challenging this view is to 
call into question the account of legal authority underlying it. There are authors 
who deny that the law claims authority,22 and there are others who deny that 
law can have practical authority.23 Their views are certainly relevant for us, 
particularly because some of them have been explicitly used to put forward 
non-intentionalist claims about legal interpretation."1 However, I set aside those 
18
 Cf. Raz, J.: Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford, 1994. 216-217. 
19
 See ibid. 
20
 See Raz, J.: Why Interpret? In: Ratio Juris, 9 (1996) 359. See further Raz, J.: Intention 
and Interpretation. In: George, R. P. (ed.): The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal 
Positivism. Oxford, 1996. 280. 
21
 See Alexander, L.: All or Nothing at All?: The Intentions of Authorities and the 
Authority of Intentions. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and Interpretation... op. cit. 358-363. 
Marmor: Interpretation and Legal Theory, op. cit. 176. 
22
 See, e.g., Soper, Ph.: The Ethics of Deference. Cambridge, 2002. xiv. and 54. 
23
 See, e.g., Hurd, H. M.: Sovereignty in Silence. In: 99 (1990) The Yale Law Journal, 
945-1028. 1007-1022. 
24
 See e.g. Hurd, H. M.: Interpreting Authorities. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and 
Interpretation... op. cit. 
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suggestions in the present essay. A proper assessment of them would require 
us to provide an extensive discussion of the theoretical problem of authority 
and the conceptual characteristics of law, and that would go well beyond the 
ambitions of the present inquiry. I am convinced, however, that there are 
important conceptual characteristics of law that cannot be accounted for if we 
deny that law claims practical authority. I have expressed and defended that 
conviction elsewhere.13 I restrict myself to the claim that an analysis of the 
normativity of law that remains within the boundaries of the Razian account of 
practical authority is still the best available theoretical option for us. I accept 
that most of the claims I make in this essay stand and fall with this contro-
versial commitment. 
We had better turn now to other challenges to the standard conceptual 
justification of intentionalism. Many non-intentionalists think that the best way 
to undermine the intentionalist position is calling into question our ability to 
retrieve any legislative intention that could be used as a basis for interpretive 
claims. In the relevant sense, there is no legislative intention that could help 
the intentionalist. In the past twenty years, two important and influential 
authors, Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, have put forward non-inten-
tionalist claims along these lines. They certainly deserve some attention here. 
Let me start with Waldron's arguments. His central claim revolves around 
the obvious fact that modern statutes are produced by the deliberations of large 
multi-member assemblies.2'1 Waldron readily admits that intentionality plays a 
crucial role in the legislative process.27 The specific target of his critique is 
the concept of "the intention of the legislature": there is no state or condition 
corresponding to this concept. It makes sense to talk about the intentions of the 
individual legislators but attributing particular intentions to the legislature or 
the statute is a different matter. Individual intentions usually point to various 
directions, and what we know about the intentions of individual legislators is not 
enough to settle any interpretive dispute (even though such intentions can be 
loosely associated with the human authorship of the statute). Hence, intention-
alism must be wrong. 
The trouble with this argument is that what we have here is not really a 
refutation of the conceptual possibility of finding genuine legislative intentions 
25
 See Bődig, M.: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia: Jogelméleti módszertani vizsgáló-
dások [Jurisprudence and Practical Philosophy: Jurisprudential Methodological Investiga-
tions], Miskolc, 2004. 525-527. 
"''See Waldron, J.: Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation. In: Waldron: 
Law and Disagreement. Oxford, 1999. 121. 
27
 See ibid. 142. 
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behind a product of legislation but some difficulties that make it often difficult 
or even hopeless. It seems to me that that makes Waldron's argument ineffective 
against several forms of intentionalism. The argument is ineffective against relying 
on "legislators' intentions" in a minimalist sense: the legislators participate in 
a process that has legislative effect, and understand the process as having that 
function. On this ground, we can ascribe to the legislative body the intention that 
the enacted clauses should take effect as valid legal rules.28 It is more important to 
us that there is room here for another, slightly stronger sense of "legislators' 
intentions". Quite wisely, Waldron does not deny the possibility of group 
• 29 
intentions. A combination of intentions can sometimes amount to a collective 
intention,30 and we have no reason to deny that it can happen to legislative 
assemblies as well. But admitting this amounts to saying that the intentionalist 
approach can work at least in some cases.31 Hence, Waldron's argument is 
strong enough to force the intentionalist to admit that intentionalist interpretive 
strategies can break down. Furthermore, it may be strong enough to show that 
it can happen very often. However, these are claims that a sensible intentionalist 
would not deny anyway. It is enough for her to claim that legislative intentions 
matter in legal interpretation-when they are available. 
Let me turn now to Ronald Dworkin. As is well known, his Law's Empire 
has a series of arguments that are directed against a form of intentionalism.32 
These arguments are well known, and I will not rehearse them here. But let us 
look at the exact target of his arguments. He calls his target the "speaker's 
meaning view" of statutory interpretation: "it assumes that legislation is an occasion 
or instance of communication and that judges look to legislative history when a 
statute is not clear on its face to discover what state of mind the legislators tried 
to communicate through their votes."33 So the target is an extreme version of 
intentionalism that sees the task of the interpretive enterprise in retrieving 
certain mental states of the legislators. I have no wish to deny that Dworkin's 
28
 See MacCormick, N.: Legal Reasoning ancl Legal Theory. Oxford, 1978. 209. In a 
sense, even Waldron grants this. See Waldron: op. cit. 127. 
29
 He seems to admit the theoretical possibility of an "Aristotelian synthesis" of the 
views and actions that contributed to the legislative process. See Waldron: op. cit. 136-
138. Andrei Marmor certainly took advantage of this when he tried to reply to Waldron's 
non-intentionalist arguments. See his Authorities and Persons. In: Legal Theory, 1 (1995) 
337-359., 341-342. 
30
 See Bratman, M.: Shared Intention. Ethics, 104 (1993) 97-113. 
31
 Jeffrey Goldsworthy is quite right in claiming that common sense sometimes can 
reveal legislative intentions. See Goldsworthy: op. cit. 49. 
3
~ See Dworkin, R.: Law's Empire. London, 1986. 317-327. 
33
 Ibid. 315. 
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arguments are devastating for those who are committed to this "psychologised" 
version of intentionalism. But we can talk about legislative intentions in more 
than one sense,34 and there can be versions of intentionalism that are not guilty 
of this rough "psychologism". As a matter of fact, one can see in contemporary 
versions of intentionalism a strong "depsychologising" tendency. Raz's "inter-
pretation without retrieval",35 the concept of "inchoate intention" developed by 
Alexander and Sherwin,36 or Allan's "constructive intention"37 are all instructive 
examples in this respect.38 In contemporary legal theory there has been much 
argument about the meaningfulness of attributing intentions to legislative bodies. 
It seems to me that the actual upshot of those arguments is that we see the 
inadequacy of a certain "psychologising" approach to legal interpretation that 
was doomed anyway. 
Challenges to intentionalism II.: The problem with old laws 
In my view, the most serious challenge to the standard conceptual justification 
of intentionalism is what we may call the problem with old laws. I have 
indicated that the legislators' intentions matter because they have authority 
over us. But what if it makes no sense, at least in a number of cases, to speak 
of the authority of those who enacted the interpreted statute? Some claim that 
this is exactly the case with laws enacted long ago. Michael Moore, for 
example, makes a case for non-intentionalism partly by claiming that much 
34
 Cf. Bix, В.: Questions in Legal Interpretation. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and Inter-
pretation... op. cit. 142-146. 
ъ
 See Raz, J.: Interpretation Without Retrieval. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and Inter-
pretation... op. cit. 
36
 See Alexander, L.-Sherwin, E.: The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas 
of Law. Durham, London, 2001. 7-14. 
3
 See Allan: Constitutional Dialogue... op. cit. 581. See further Allan, T. R. S.: 
Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intent: A Reply to Professor Craig. In: Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 4. 563-583. 568. It is worth noting that Allan's ideas 
concerning constructive intention are hotly debated by Paul Craig, and Allan's ideas have 
been developed partly in the debate with Craig. See Craig, P.: The Common Law, Shared 
Power and Judicial Review. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 2. 237-257. , 241-
242. Craig. P.: Legislative Intent and Legislative Supremacy: A Reply to Professor Allan. 
24 (2004) 4. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 2. 585-596., 585-587. 
38
 Ironically, even Dworkin can be seen as advocating some sort of a "depsychologised" 
intentionalism. The judge who represents Dworkin 's ideal of proper statutory inter-
pretation "will treat Congress as an author earlier than himself in the chain of law." 
Dworkin: op. cit. 313. 
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of the legal material to be interpreted was created by people who have no 
authority above us. Their "authorship" cannot account for the claims the legal 
documents make on our actions.39 
As far as I can see, contemporary intentionalists do not have a good answer to 
the problem of old laws. Andrei Marmor, for example, sees it as a problem of 
legal validity: we need to explain the continuing validity of the norms of the 
legal system. He claims that this continuing validity is determined by certain 
rules or conventions.40 These rules or conventions may be regarded as part of 
the "rule of recognition" of the pertinent legal system. The problem is that this 
suggestion heavily relies on a form of legal positivism (a conventionalist view 
of the normativity of law) that is highly controversial. In fact, I regard that version 
of legal positivism as profoundly mistaken.41 So I shall keep away from it. 
In my view, the best effort to tackle the problem is made by Joseph Raz. 
His solution is based on the idea that continuity is a prominent value in legal 
systems. We attribute legal normativity to old laws because we respect the 
ethical reasons that call for continuity in the operations of the legal system.43 
This may be the best available effort but it still seems problematic to me. It 
implies that there is a crucial difference between new laws and old laws in 
respect of the grounds of their normativity. In the case of new laws, these 
grounds are associated with the authority of their makers, while in the case of 
old laws they are associated with certain specific moral values. The problem is 
that this view presupposes that some laws are normative for different reasons 
than others in our legal systems, and I see no reason to accept this presupposi-
tion.43 We should have a better way of handling the problem with old laws. 
Authority and sovereignty 
The problem with old laws may well be taken as indicating that we should dig 
deeper into the implications of the view that the features of legal authority 
have a crucial impact on the issue of proper interpretive strategy. The source 
of the problem is obvious. The account of legal authority that we relied on 
39
 See Moore: op. cit. 14. 
4
" See Marmor: Authorities and Persons, op. cit. 355. 
41
 See Bódig: op. cit. 63-102. 
42
 See Raz: Why Interpret? op. cit. 359. 
431 do not claim that all laws should be taken as authoritative for exactly the same 
reasons in a legal system. But Raz 's view allows for a divergence of the reasons underlying 
the normativitity of different laws that I do not find tolerable. 
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assumed that legal authority is a relation between human beings: it has a 
personal element. It serves the intentionalist position well in certain respects 
(it explains quite neatly why the legislators' intentions matter), but it leads to 
problems where the personal "bond" between the authority and the subjects 
is broken though the directives issued by the authority still claim to be 
authoritatively binding. 
We need a better understanding of the authority relations involved in legal 
decision-making. It may be that, at the end of the day, we will be forced to 
accept Waldron's suggestion that we should not treat the authority of the legal 
text as dependent on the authority of its authors. We have got to give up the 
"personification" of legal authority: we have got to attribute impersonal authority 
to legislative decisions. 
This claim happens to be another limb of Waldron's non-intentionalist 
argument that we have taken into consideration above. According to Waldron, 
the authority of statutes has not much to do with the personal qualities of the 
legislators for the authority claim inherent in those statutes "consists in their 
ability to integrate a diversity of purposes, interests, and aims among their 
members into the text of a single legislative product".44 If the integration of the 
diverse purposes could be carried out by an impersonal mechanism, it would 
have an equally legitimate claim to authority.45 
I have no wish to consider here Waldron's suggestions concerning the 
reasons that make subjection to the authority of an impersonal mechanism 
reasonable. Even if they were appealing, Waldron would still miss the point. 
The standard conceptual justification of intentionalism is not based on justi-
ficatory claims concerning certain possible versions of legal authority: it is 
based on an account of the conceptual features of legal authority. So the real 
question is whether Waldron's suggestions46 are capable of giving a better 
account of those features. And it seems that they are not. Waldron's impersonal 
conception of legislative authority cannot account for at least one important 
feature of the normative force of legal directives: their (relative) content-
independence.41 One can hardly attribute content-independent normative force 
to impersonal mechanisms.48 
44
 Waldron: op. cit. 121. 
45
 See ibid. 126-127. 
46
 See ibid. 131. 
47
 See Marmor: Authorities and Persons, op. cit. 345-346. 
48
 It is something that seems to be implied in the very definition of content-independence. 
When Joseph Raz characterizes the content-independence of authoritative directives one of 
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It seems to me that the idea that legal authority is based on relations 
between persons is basically sound. But we have to make clearer the personal 
element of legal authority. We have got to see that legal authority is personal 
in a relatively weak sense. To see an authority relation that is personal in a 
strong sense, we may point to parental authority. It is so strongly personal that, 
in a sense, it excludes succession. It sometimes happens that a man takes the 
position of the original father in the family. Can we say that the stepfather's 
role will be a continuation of the parental authority of the original father? I do 
not think so. The stepfather will not become a proper authority without 
successfully establishing a unique personal relationship with the children.14 
Without that, he will never have proper parental authority (no matter what 
the law says). And, if he does establish the necessary personal relationship 
successfully, his authority will have not much to do with the parental authority 
of the original father. It will be a new authority relation and not the continuation 
of a previous one. 
Legal authority is not personal in this sense. Old legal officials are often 
replaced with new ones but it would be silly to claim that the newly appointed 
officials need to establish some special personal relationship with anyone in 
order to become proper legal authorities. They are proper authorities from the 
very moment of their appointment, and their practice is the continuation of the 
practice of their predecessors. If there are unfinished jobs (undecided cases) 
left by their predecessors, it will be their duty to finish them, and it will not be 
a new procedure in any relevant sense. 
What should all this indicate to us? I think the difference between legal and 
parental authority has a lot to do with the fact that the legal official, unlike the 
father, does not stand for himself in the authority relation. It is not her person 
that matters but the role she plays. This is why she can be replaced without 
destroying the authority relation. One way of putting this insight is to say that 
the legal official is a representative (while the father does not represent 
anyone). For this reason, let me call the legal officials' authority "representa-
tional authority".5'1 
the features he mentions is that "his saying so would be reason for any number of actions". 
See his The Morality of Freedom. Oxford, 1986. 35. 
44
 Of course, I have no wish to deny that someone who "takes up" the role of father 
may have roughly or exactly the same rights and duties as someone who had that role 
biologically. 
" 'This consideration is relevant to one of Waldron's further claims. He argues that 
intentionalism is in conflict with the rule law, and, for this reason, it raises legitimacy 
problems. If we suppose that the legislators have personal authority over the law they enact 
"it is impossible that a law could have authority vis-à-vis a legislator." Waldron: op. cit. 
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Some elements of this claim can be found in several theoretical accounts,51 
and it is should sound familiar for those aware of the ordinary facts of 
everyday legal practice. Judges do not announce their decisions in their own 
name: they announce them in the name of the Republic or the Crown or 
something like that. Statutes are not kept in the archives under the name of the 
particular legislators.52 But how could it provide the basis for tackling the 
problem with old laws? Well, it allows us to say that, in the case of legislative 
authority, it is not a particular group of legislators to which we should attribute 
authority but an institutionalized assembly that is "filled" with different members 
time to time without any real change in the character of the underlying 
authority relation. Even if all the former members are replaced with new ones, 
the proceedings of the assembly will be the continuation of the same authority 
relation. Old laws have the same authority as the new ones if they are associated 
with the same authority relation. They are embedded in a continuous authoritative 
practice.53 
It seems obvious to me that this revised version of the standard conceptual 
justification is still good enough to give support to the intentionalist cause. 
Institutions like legislative assemblies do not exercise their authority without 
having members who act in their name. Although the legislators are only 
representatives, as long as they hold their positions in the legislature they are 
the ones who are entrusted to provide practical guidance in the form of 
statutes: their intentions matter. And, in this respect, there is no difference 
between the legislators of the present and the past.5 ' 
139. We can fend off this objection, however, by insisting that the legislators have personal 
authority over the law only within the limits of their institutional role. In every other 
respect, they are no less bound by it than any other subject. See Marmor: Authorities and 
Persons, op. cit. 355. 
sl
 Cf. Raz, J.: On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries. 
In: Alexander, L. (ed.): Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations. Cambridge, 1998. 184-
185. See further Marmor: Authorities and Persons, op. cit. 355. 
5
" Cf. MacCormick, N.: Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts. Law and Philosophy. 
17 (1998) 301-345. 332. 
53
 Of course, there may be complications with this approach. As the right to legislate 
is sometimes transferred from one assembly to another, we will have to cope with the 
problems of institutional change. 
4
 This point could be amplified by a consideration that I largely ignore here. The fact 
that different legal officials operate within the framework of identical or closely related 
authority relations manifests itself in the fact that the legislators' decisions become 
embedded in the practice of many other officials who will inevitably shape them. Later 
legislators amend the old statutes, and the judicial practice has an impact on the ways they 
are understood. 
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Legal Authority and Sovereignty 
Though this may sound promising, the analysis is in need of a series of further 
clarifications if it is to be regarded as really successful in solving our problems 
with old laws. We have got to provide an answer to the question: "who is 
represented by the legislators?" There are two kinds of answers that certainly 
will not do here. It would be misguided to claim that legislators are represen-
tatives of the law because our problem raises questions about the way the law 
itself becomes authoritative. The very existence of law presupposes certain 
authority relations that we have to account for here. It would be equally misguided 
to claim that legislators are the representatives of the legislative assembly to 
which they belong. Legislative bodies do not exist until they are set up by 
certain people. 
It is quite clear what kind of answer we need. If we raise questions concerning 
the grounds of the officials ' authority we want to know something about 
sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty is a tricky issue partly because sovereignty 
can have several sources and can take several forms. But this is not the real 
problem: we can restrict our attention (without fatally undermining the validity 
claims of our analysis) to the case of constitutional democracies where we 
have a standard answer to the question of the source of authority. In respect of 
constitutional democracies, the first step in the analysis is easy. The legislators 
openly announce themselves as representatives: representatives of the people. 
It seems that we need to look for some conception of popular sovereignty, and 
the legislators should be treated as representatives of the political community 
as a whole. However, a series of conceptual problems are likely to arise at this 
point. One could say that political communities are not agents: they never make 
decisions, and never set up institutions. And although the political community's 
inability to act explains why it needs representatives, it is likely to make highly 
controversial any suggestion concerning the process that endows legal institu-
tions and officials with their authority. 
Of course, there can be ways of handling this problem. For example, we can 
take recourse to political morality, and argue that some shared political morality 
turns a multitude of people into a political community.53 Then, official action 
(and, most of all, the legislative practice) can be treated as authoritative as long 
as it remains within the boundaries of that shared political morality. Justificatory 
question concerning the practice of the officials can be tentatively answered 
with the help of a legitimising process in which the ordinary members of 
the political community are invited to participate. Unfortunately, this line of 
55
 See Bódig: op. cit. 540-541. 
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argument is likely to lead to a series of controversial and rather counter-
intuitive claims-and not only because one can reasonably doubt whether we can 
in fact find a shared political morality in an existing political community. There 
is something odd in treating the law as being based on a pre-existing political 
morality. Typically, it is the law (especially the Constitution) that helps people 
acknowledge the issues of political morality, and it functions as the best reliable 
source of information about the political morality of their community. 
Although I have struggled with them,56 I have no wish to pretend that I know 
how to handle those extremely complicated issues. However, I am sure that we 
have to confront them if we work on normative theories of legal interpretation. 
It does not mean that anyone who is about to rely on intentionalist interpretive 
strategies must tackle the problems of sovereignty. But the theoretical efforts 
cannot escape them. In order to have a proper understanding of the distinctive 
features of legal interpretation, we need to refer to the grounds of law's 
normativity, and it leads to some of the complicated problems of normative 
political theory. 
It is important to emphasise that the core idea that I set forth here is not at all 
alien to contemporary analyses of the problem of legal interpretation."7 It is hard 
to deny that legal interpretation has a lot to do with the proper allocation of 
institutionalized public authority in a society. When the constitutional inter-
pretation is at issue, legal theorists tend to realise this. Both Joseph Raz's and 
Michael Moore's accounts of constitutional interpretation heavily rely on claims 
concerning the grounds of the normativity of the Constitution."8 In this that 
respect, most legal theorists realise that the theoretical problems of legal 
interpretation raise political philosophical issues. We need to take it seriously 
when we conduct our debates over intentionalism. 
56
 See ibid. 525-535. 
7
 See Allan: Constitutional Dialogue.. . op. cit. 582-583. 
58
 See Raz: On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions, op. cit. 173. See 
Moore: op. cit. 14. 
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The United Nations Security Council is unique in numerous aspects. First and 
foremost, it is unique with respect to its composition involving both permanent 
and non-permanent members, its decision-making procedure founded on a 
right of veto of permanent members as well as its exceptionally broad powers 
virtually lacking any institutional control and including a right to adopt legally 
binding decisions. It is also unique owing to its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, extreme flexibility, influence 
on global politics, public recognition and the tremendous amount of attention 
drawn by its activities. Last, but not least it is unique regarding the quantity 
and harshness of criticism formulated against it. There has not existed another 
body in the history of international relations-including its predecessor and 
"companion in misfortune", the Council of the League of Nations-that has stood 
in the crossfire of criticism for such a long period of time, caused disappointment 
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or been declared a scapegoat with such frequency, or given rise to the need of 
comprehensive reform so often. Even though claims of reorganization are 
coeval with the Council itself, critical voices and calls for reform have sensibly 
grown more abundant at the turn of the millennium. This study, therefore, 
seeks to throw new light on efforts aimed at the reconstruction of the Security 
Council by invoking certain theses of organization theory. 
Reform is a normal and inevitable part of life in every organization. The 
need for change may originate from a number of sources. It may arise as a 
consequence of external factors, such as fundamental change of organizational 
environment, external pressure of members striving for reallocation of power 
within the organization, or negative judgement by the public opinion.' Organi-
zations, however, may be compelled to change by various internal factors, as 
well. These factors include, for instance, structural and operational defects in 
the organization, emerging power struggles between organizational units created 
in line with the division of labour, low internalization of organizational values 
or general discontent among members as well as limited membership involve-
ment.2 In case an organization fails to adapt to its new environment, or ignores 
the expectations of its members or the public opinion, it may easily become 
unable to fulfill its tasks and be marginalized or even dissolved. Thus reform, 
1
 It is frequently claimed that organizations do not operate in a vacuum. See Blau, P. 
M.-Scott, W. R.: Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. San Francisco, 1962. 9. 
Being an open system, the organization is in constant interaction with its environment: it is 
both an author and an object of environmental change. Its activities shape the environment, 
the characteristics of which in turn, whether or not produced by the organization, greatly 
determine organizational structure and procedure. The environment, therefore, generates 
specific requirements for the organization, and the better it meets these requirements the 
more successful it will be. See Guiot, J. ML: Szervezetek és magatartásuk. [Organisations 
sociales et comportements] (Ritter, M. transi.) Budapest, 1984. 81. 
2
 Low membership involvement poses an extremely serious problem in voluntary 
organizations primarily established for the mutual benefit of members. International 
organizations come under this category, because states join them in a voluntary manner and 
in anticipation of certain benefits. "Voluntary" in this case means that only those states 
belong to international organizations that have expressed the desire to become members, 
and only those remain members that have not expressed the desire to withdraw. See Virally, 
M.: Definition and Classification of International Organizations: A Legal Approach. In: Abi-
Saab, G. (ed.): The Concept of International Organization. Paris, 1981. 52. 
T H O U G H T S ON THE NECESSITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 145 
as a general rule, is an essential precondition of long-term organizational 
survival rather than a purely aesthetic intervention. 
This is excellently illustrated by the history of the Warsaw Pact3 and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.4 The former was unavoidably doomed to 
failure at the end of the Cold War, as its members, having regained their 
freedom of choice with the fading of Soviet influence and lacking both the 
internalization of organizational values and the willingness to participate, had 
no intention whatsoever to preserve the organization by means of reform. The 
Warsaw Pact did not have a chance to adapt to the requirements of the new 
world order; therefore, it was terminated on the basis of fundamental change 
of circumstances.5 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the other hand, 
survived the alteration of organizational environment thanks to the unflagging 
loyalty of its members, and as a result of wide-ranging reforms-including the 
admission of new members, the rearrangement of capabilities and the under-
taking of novel responsibilities in addition to original goals-it was at least 
temporarily able to sustain its raison d'êtref 
Consequently the emergence and intensification of demands for a 
comprehensive reform of the United Nations, embracing the restructuring of 
the Security Council, is to be considered a normal and inevitable phase of 
organizational lifecycle.7 Irrespective of increased media and public attention, 
3
 Promulgated in Hungary by Act No. Ill of 1955 on the promulgation of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of 
Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German 
Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed in Warsaw, on 
14 May 1955. 
4
 Promulgated in Hungary by Act No. I of 1999 on the accession of the Republic of 
Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty, and on the promulgation of the text of the Treaty. 
5
 Cf. Parliamentary Resolution 54/1990. (VII. 3.) on the relationship between the 
Republic of Hungary and the Warsaw Pact. 
6
 For a detailed analysis, see Asmus, R. D.: A NATO kapunyitása. Az új korszak és a 
szervezet átalakítása [Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New 
Era] (Magyarics, T. transi.). Budapest, 2003; Valki, L. (ed.): A NATO: történet, szervezet, 
stratégia, bővítés [NATO: History, Structure, Strategy, Enlargement] (Gombás, I. transi.). 
Budapest, undated; Wijk, R., de: A NATO az ezredforduló küszöbén. Küzdelem a konszen-
zusért [NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium] (Barta, R. transi.). Debrecen, 1998. 
The comprehensive reform of the alliance verifies the statement according to which 
"[every] organization seeks to survive in whatever way it deems appropriate". See Hall, R. 
H.: Organizations: Structure and Process. Englewood Cliffs, 1972. 36. (Insertion mine.) 
7
 The restructuring of the Security Council is, therefore, neither independent nor 
absolute objective. Similarly to other efforts, including the strengthening of the General 
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it should not be deemed an extraordinary event or a hard evidence of organi-
zational incapacity. What is more, the delegates participating at the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco had been 
absolutely aware of the need for future changes. This is made obvious by the 
fact that the final text of the Charter explicitly provides for a general review 
conference, originally not envisaged by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals8, over 
and above the clause on "regular" amendments.9 There was widespread agree-
ment on the necessity of such conference in San Francisco as it was admitted 
that since the Charter could not be perfect and all eventual developments in 
international affairs could not be anticipated, the organization would have to 
be scrutinized and modified in the light of its experience and the situation then 
prevailing in order to secure its continued existence. Delegates furthermore 
emphasized that the newly inserted provision did not mean that the organi-
zation would be temporary, but on the contrary, this solution would guarantee 
its effectiveness and durability.10 
The travaux préparatoires suggest that the founders specifically expected a 
need for changes to arise in the future with regard to the Security Council. For 
example, delegates from Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and Mexico initially called for 
an increase in the size of the Council, but in subsequently withdrawing their 
motions, they expressed their hope that their views would be realized as soon 
as the evolving circumstances permitted." The Cuban representative, in 
explaining his refusal of permanent membership on the Council, also pointed 
out that the group of great powers could undergo significant changes in the 
future as it had done throughout history.12 
For the time being the Charter has been expressly amended only once on 
account of the Security Council: a set of new provisions, effective since 31 
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat, it is a means to and an 
inferior goal of the comprehensive reform of the entire organization. For that reason, 
Secretary-Gencral Kofi Annan has underlined in various reports that "no reform of the 
United Nations would be complete without reform of the Security Council". Strengthening 
of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change. Report of the Secretary-General, 9 
September 2002, U.N. Doc. A/57/387, para. 20; In Larger Freedom: Towards Develop-
ment, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 
2005, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, para. 169. 
8
 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization, Chapter XI. 
9
 Charter of the United Nations, Arts 108 and 109. Promulgated in Hungary by Act 
No. I of 1956 on the promulgation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
10
 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 251; Vol. VII, 438. 
11
 Ibid. Vol. XI, 282. 
12
 Ibid. 291. 
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August 1965, has increased the number of its members from eleven to 
fifteen.13 However, this measure was followed by several de facto amend-
ments and practical modifications affecting both composition and procedure, 
such as the settlement of the question of Chinese and Russian representation, 
the clarification of procedural issues concerning abstention and absence as 
well as various minor changes in the conduct of business performed of the 
Council's own accord. 
The declared objective of Security Council reform is the increase of effective-
ness.14 Each and every particular suggestion contained in official or unofficial 
proposals, from the improvement of representativeness to the democratization 
of decision-making to the enhancement of transparency, is merely a means to 
and an inferior goal of the realization of this objective. Hence in the course 
of scrutinizing the necessity of reform, one needs to examine effectiveness 
first. Effectiveness is a notion relating to the goals of an organization or an 
organizational unit-it reflects the degree to which these goals are achieved.15 
Since effectiveness can be measured, it appears to offer a readily applicable 
and objective scale by which not only the necessity, but also the success of 
reform can be judged. Still, this is only make-believe. The determination of 
effectiveness is, in fact, highly problematic as the object of measurement, that 
is to say, organizational goal is far from being such tangible a category as it 
13
 G.A. Res. 1991 A, 1285th plen. mtg., 17 December 1963, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1991A 
(XVIII). 
14
 G.A. Res. 60/1, 8th plen. mtg., 16 September 2005, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 153. 
15
 See Barnard. Ch. I.: The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, 1938. 56. Effective-
ness should not be confused with efficiency. The criterion of efficiency dictates that, of 
two alternatives having the same cost in terms of application of resources, that one be 
chosen which will lead to the larger result and the greater attainment of the organizational 
objectives. See Simon, H. A.: Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization. New York, 1949. 122, 179. Nonetheless, it is 
obvious that „an organization can be efficient without being effective, and vice versa". 
Hall: op. cit. 96. In Hungarian, both „effectiveness" and „efficiency" translate into the very 
same expression (hatékonyság). Thus it occurs that under the rubric of effectiveness, authors 
actually discuss the efficiency of the Security Council, that is, its „ability to adopt rational 
decisions on the basis of reliable information in a timely fashion". See e.g. Turbék Z.: A 
Biztonsági Tanács reformja [The Reform of the Security Council], Kiil-Világ 2 (2005), 37. 
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may seem."1 Nonetheless, any examination of the justification of efforts seeking 
to increase the effectiveness of the Security Council requires a careful 
investigation of the goals of that principal organ. 
An organizational goal is a state of affairs that the organization attempts to 
realize.17 Being a consensual aggregate of individual interests and efforts of 
members,18 this abstract and collective goal constitutes the purpose of co-
operation within the organization, forms the source of its legitimacy, and 
provides directions for and limitations upon its functioning. The true meaning 
of the concept of organizational goal is, however, much deeper than that. It 
equally embraces official goals as pronounced by the founding instrument as 
well as miscellaneous other documents and statements of high-ranking officials 
of the organization, operative goals as exposed by the "everyday" practices, 
decisions and behaviours of the organization, and even unofficial operative 
goals generated by individual or group interests that can be supportive, 
subversive or irrelevant from the point of view of the organization.14 Which 
should be taken as the basis of determination of effectiveness? Official goals 
are easily identifiable, but frequently vague and ambiguous, operative goals 
are more obvious, but extremely hard to disclose, whereas unofficial operative 
goals are by themselves inadequate for measuring effectiveness as they do not 
form part of the official policy of the organization. Moreover organizational 
goals change with time: the aforementioned case of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization superbly exemplifies that an organization may reconsider the 
relative importance of certain goals, undertake new objectives, or even abandon 
outdated ones. Further difficulties arise from the fact that organizations usually 
have more than one, hierarchically structured goals as a result of which the 
achievement of a given goal can be dependant on the successful realization of 
an additional goal."" (Not to mention those not entirely rare scenarios in which 
certain organizational goals are in conflict with each other.) 
The official goals of the United Nations are laid down in the preamble as 
well as in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. Even though a sole section appears 
16
 See Champion, D. J.: The Sociology of Organizations. New York. 1975. 41 ; Hall: op. 
cit. 99-100. 
' See Etzioni, A.: Soziologie der Organisationen. [Modern Organizations] (Baetge, J. 
transi.) München, 1967. 16. 
18
 Cf. Simon: op. cit. 114. 
14
 See e.g. Perrow, Ch.: The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations. American 
Sociological Review. 26 (1961), 855-856. 
""The structure of organizational goals is hierarchical in a sense that at a given level 
any goal is simultaneously an ultimate goal of a goal inferior to it, and a means of the 
attainment of a more global, superior goal. See Guiot: op. cit. 31-32. 
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to explicitly deal with the purposes of the organization, it is practically impos-
sible to draw a sharp and clear-cut distinction between purposes, principles 
and what is included in the preamble, as emphasized by the rapporteur of a 
committee on general questions at the San Francisco conference. Hence these 
provisions do not bear substantial differences and should be understood and 
applied in function of the others in spite of their being located in three distinct 
structural units.21 
Being an introduction of the Charter, the preamble reflects the common 
intentions of founding states, which brought them together at the conference in 
San Francisco, moved them to unite their will and efforts, and made them 
harmonize, regulate and organize their international actions.22 The first four 
paragraphs of the preamble, therefore, enumerate the general purposes of the 
organization, that is, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
to protect fundamental human rights and equal rights of nations large and 
small, to maintain justice and ensure respect for international law, and to 
promote social progress and better standards of life."3 (The following passages 
of the preamble contain means rather than goals as the two segments are 
connected by the phrase "and for these ends".) 
The specific purposes of the organizations are embedded in Article 1. These 
goals are the aggregation of common ends of members, they constitute the 
raison d'être of the organization, and the cause and object of the Charter.24 
Article 1 states that the purposes of the United Nations are: 
"1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
21
 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 387-388. As purposes and principles are indivisible, 
they together constitute the test for the effectiveness of the organization and the expected 
faithful compliance with the provisions of the Charter. See ibid. 388. The most important 
difference between purposes and principles is that the former directly entail obligations 
neither for the organization nor for the members, whereas the latter undeniably possess a 
normative character. See Randelzhofer, A.: Art. 2. In: Simma, B. (ed.): The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary. Oxford, 1995. 72. 
22
 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 388. 
23
 Charter of the United Nations, preamble. For details, see Cot, J. P.-Pellet, A.: 
Preambule. In: Cot, J. P.-Pellet, A. (ed.): La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire Art. 
par Art.. Paris-Bruxelles, 1985. 1-22; Goodrich, L. M.-Hambro, E.: Charter of the United 
Nations. Commentary and Documents. Second, revised edition. London, 1949. 87-92; 
Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental 
Problems. London, 1951. 3-12; Wolfrum. R.: Preamble. In: Simma: op. cit. 45^48. 
24
 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 388. 
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the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment 
of these common ends."25 
The operating principles of the organization are contained in Article 2, 
wherein members recognize the sovereign equality of states, and pledge to 
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed arising from the treaty, to settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the threat or use 
of force, to give the organization every assistance in any action it takes, and to 
abstain from assisting states against which preventive or enforcement actions 
are taken. In addition, the organization vows to ensure that non-members also 
act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary, and under-
takes not to intervene in matters, which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.26 
These purposes and principles all point toward an ultimate goal, an ideal 
hundreds of years old: collective security.27 Collective security is one possible 
"'Charter of the United Nations, Art. 1. The „purpose of purposes" is, of course, to 
maintain peace. Bedjaoui, M.: Art. 1 (Commentaire générai). In: Cot-Pellet: op. cit. 24. In 
a similar manner, see Jiménez de Aréchaga, E.: International Law in the Past Third of the 
Century. Recueil des Cours 159 (1978-1), 91. For details, see also Goodrich-Hambro: op. 
cit. 93-98; Kelsen: op. cit. 13-53; Wolfrum, R.: Art. 1. In: Simma: op. cit. 49-56. 
26
 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 2. For details, see Cot-Pellet: op. cit. 71-160 
(contributions by Dupuy, R.-J.-Mbaye, K.-Zoller, E.-Carpentier, J.-Virally, M.-Mahion, 
A.-Guillaume, G.); Goodrich-Hambro: op. cit. 98-121; Randelzhofer: op. cit. 72-76. 
7
 A significant number of scholars of the late Middle Ages and Enlightenment-
including Duc de Sully, Crucé, E. Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, J.-J. Kant, I. and 
Penn, W.-envisaged the preservation of peace in a similar way, within the framework of an 
organization. However, the first collective security organization, the League of Nations, 
was established only after World War I. The Covenant of the League of Nations was 
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technique to maintain or restore international peace and security, and to prevent 
or suppress unlawful forceful actions. It is based on the assumption that the 
most expedient means of safeguarding peace is deterrence, that is to say, if 
any potential aggressor acting in a rational manner faces-preferably as early 
as in the preparatory stage of his attack-the overwhelming force of the entire 
centralized collective security system, and as such, inevitable defeat.28 Collective 
security, however, demands a great deal of sacrifice from participating states 
in exchange of benefits offered. The effective functioning of such system 
entails the fulfilment of several subjective and objective requirements. From a 
subjective point of view it necessitates loyalty, confidence, responsible policy-
making, positive commitment, impartiality and even-handedness from members 
with a view to deter or repel an aggressor, whoever that might be. It also calls 
for recognition of interrelatedness and interdependence, partial surrender of free-
dom of action, subordination of national interest to public good, and renunciation 
of unilateral use of force. Collective security, furthermore, objectively requires 
the coexistence and active participation of several great powers of roughly equal 
strength, universal membership, economic vulnerability of members, general 
disarmament, along with an adequate legal environment, and a centralized 
institutional background capable of operating the system and realizing its goals.24 
Thus in the concept of collective security "security represents the end; collective 
defines the nature of the means; system denotes the institutional component".111 
In the past six decades collective security has been embodied and insti-
tutionalized by the United Nations. The Security Council contributes to the 
functioning of collective security by means of exercising its powers in line with 
promulgated in Hungary by Act No. XXXIII of 1921 on the promulgation of the Treaty of 
Peace with the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and 
Belgium, China, Cuba, Greece, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-
Croat-Slovene State, Siam, and Czechoslovakia, signed at Trianon, on 4 June 1920. 
28
 A system of collective security should not be mistaken for an alliance based on the 
principle of collective defence. The former has universal membership, and is directed against 
an abstract aggressor emerging within the system, while the latter is characterized by 
limited membership embracing like-minded states and a specific external enemy. 
24
 See Claude, I. L., Jr.: Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of Inter-
national Organization. Third, revised edition. New York, 1964. 229-238. See also Basdevant, 
M.: La sécurité collective. L'Organisation de la Paix 5 - 7 (1936), 9 -36 ; Delbrück, J.: 
Collective Security. In: Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Vol. 
3. Use of Force, War and Neutrality, Peace Treaties. Amsterdam-New York-Oxford, 1982. 
104-114; Kelsen, H.: Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of 
the United Nations. American Journal of International Law 42 (1948), 783-796. 
3(1
 Claude: op. cit. 223. (Italics omitted.) 
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the division of organizational labour. Being part of the system, each and every 
activity it performs serves either directly or indirectly the achievement of the 
official organizational goals, although as a result of the division of labour, its 
own objectives are limited and inferior to the overall organizational goals-
hence there is a part-whole relation between the two categories. What are the 
official goals of the Security Council? There is no provision in the Charter 
under such heading, but the determination of tasks as contained by Article 24 
might as well be considered as goal-setting. This article reads: 
"1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf. 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance 
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers 
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid 
down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII."31 
To put it briefly, under the chapters listed in paragraph 2, the Security 
Council contributes to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and 
may investigate any dispute or situation, which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute, and recommend appropriate procedures or 
methods of adjustment. In exercise of its nearly absolute power of discretion, it 
has an exclusive right to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and to make recommendations, adopt 
provisional measures, or take enforcement measures not involving the use of 
armed force, or give authorization to the use of military force with a view to 
suppress such situations. The Council may even decide to utilize regional 
arrangements or agencies in the course of taking enforcement measures if it 
deems that appropriate.32 (The Council, however, no longer exercises its Chapter 
XII powers owing to the termination of the trusteeship system. Furthermore it 
seems to carry out its duties under Article 26 concerning disarmament only in 
part, given that the overwhelming majority of successes on this field have not 
been achieved as a result of its work.33) 
31
 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 24. 
32
 See ibid. Arts 33-34, 36-38, 39^t2 and 53. 
33
 Ibid. Art. 26: "In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international 
peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and 
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Bearing all that in mind, the official goals of the Security Council can be 
summarized as follows. First, by contributing to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes it seeks to prevent the emergence of crises involving a threat to or a 
breach of the peace. Second, the Council attempts to ensure the rapid suppression 
of actions amounting to a threat to or a breach of international peace and 
security by resorting to methods it considers suitable, regardless to whether 
these actions occur within or between states. Third, once the situation has been 
normalized, the Council strives to maintain peace by adequate procedures. It 
may be observed that the triad of "prevention-suppression-maintenance" 
perfectly matches the first and most important purpose of the organization as 
laid down in Article 1, paragraph 1. For that reason, the Council can rightly be 
qualified an institutional depositary of collective security, notwithstanding its 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security being 
primary, but admittedly not exclusive. 
The operative goals of the Security Council are understandably in harmony 
with official goals, although in the past six decades the body has also pursued 
objectives that can hardly be derived from the text of the Charter. Without 
intention to be exhaustive, the following operative goals can be exposed by 
examining the practice of the Council: to avoid direct confrontation of great 
powers at any cost; to settle crises not involving a direct confrontation of great 
powers as rapidly as possible; to apply enforcement measures in a pragmatic 
fashion; to delay or omit the taking of enforcement measures against un-
predictable regimes; to refrain from serving selfish interests of great powers; 
to impede organizational action in case of disagreement among permanent 
members; to provide a forum for discussion of the most pressing issues of 
international peace and security, and thereby to enable a partial release of 
tensions; to develop innovative solutions in order to overcome various legal 
and practical anomalies, obstacles and challenges; to limit publicity whenever 
it would be inconvenient; to fiercely protect its special powers vis-à-vis other 
economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Art. 47, plans to be submitted to 
the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of 
armaments." See Prandler, A.: Az ENSZ Biztonsági Tanácsa [The U.N. Security Council], 
Budapest, 1974. 156. 
14
 "The responsibility conferred [upon the Security Council] is »primary«, not exclusive. 
This primary responsibility is conferred upon the Security Council, as stated in Art. 24, »in 
order to ensure prompt and effective action«." Certain Expenses of the United Nations 
(Art. 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 
1962, 163. (Insertion mine.) 
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principal organs; and to preserve its geopolitical influence and authority." 
(It should not be forgotten that these are the operative goals of the Security 
Council as an organizational unit. Unofficial goals of Council members, as 
indicated by the fifth element of this enumeration, form a distinct category. 
The occasional and harshly criticized idleness of the Council is a consequence 
of individual goals and interests of members as reflected by their respective 
votes rather than the goals of the body itself. The relevant operative goal of the 
Council is merely to resist the organizational reception of certain individual 
goals in absence of a minimum agreement of its members.) 
The effectiveness of the Security Council needs to be scrutinized in the 
context of the aforementioned goals. But as the vagueness of these goals leave 
room for divergent interpretations and their achievement requires continuous 
performance, the degree of goal attainment is extremely hard to establish.36 
The next phase of analysis, therefore, implies the elucidation of indicators of 
effectiveness, that is to say, signs unequivocally revealing the existence or 
absence of success of activities. 
III. 
A little simplification facilitates the formulation of the fundamental question 
pertaining to the examination of effectiveness: How can collective security be 
measured? Which indicators signify whether or not the Security Council as 
depositary of collective security has achieved its objectives? 
Should the system of collective security be declared effective only if it 
eliminates the risk of violent crisis once and for all? Discord is an inevitable 
part of life in every group of people, thus the possibility of violence is an 
intrinsic feature of relations both within and between human communities. 
Naturally it does not necessarily mean that the actual eruption of hostilities is 
predestined. But an overly intensive clash of interests, or a failure or deliberate 
rejection of peaceful settlement mechanisms may easily render conflict resolu-
tion by civilized means, and as a result, the prevention of breaches of the peace 
impossible. Even if it occurs, it should not be seen as a fault of the collective 
35
 Innovative solutions mentioned in the enumeration above include, for instance, the 
practice of authorizations to use force, the creation and development of peacekeeping, the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals, and the introduction of sanctions against 
individuals, legislation and alternative forms of consultation. 
36
 Measuring effectiveness is more difficult if the organization has a permanent goal. 
See Etzioni: op. cit. 21. 
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security system. Prevention by peaceful dispute settlement is but one of the 
elements of collective security, the failure of which is not only anticipated by the 
system-that envisages the implementation of other procedures in such cases-but 
also constitutes the primary reason for its existence. A perpetual elimination of 
international and non-international crises posing threat to peace is, consequently, 
an inapplicable standard for the measurement of effectiveness of a collective 
security system. Success in absolute terms might be imaginable in a Utopia, but 
is inconceivable in a world of states. 
If the absolute absence of violent crisis cannot be utilized as indicator of 
effectiveness of collective security, could relative success serve as such? As 
commonly known, the frequency of international armed conflicts drastically 
decreased after World War II as compared to the previous era.'7 Somewhat 
shadowed by an alarmingly high number of non-international armed conflicts, 
which may likewise seriously threaten international peace, this delightful 
tendency begs the question as to what extent this decrease can be attributed 
to the functioning of the collective security system. It is difficult to give a 
definitive answer, because the behaviours and decisions of states are shaped 
by numerous considerations. The deterrent effect of enforcement actions of 
the Security Council to some extent undeniably contributes to the significant 
decrease of the number of international armed conflicts. From this point of 
view, the system does work effectively. Equally undisputable is the fact, 
however, that it is not the only reason why states tend to avoid direct military 
confrontation since the end of World War II. The deep internalization of the 
comprehensive prohibition of the use of force, the strength of the enemy, or the 
expected reaction by domestic or international public opinion sometimes can 
have as much, if not more, restraining force as an enforcement action taken by 
the Council, and hopefully implemented by member states. The low frequency of 
international armed conflicts, therefore, only partially indicates the effectiveness 
of collective security. (This "indicator" certainly fails to reveal the effectiveness 
of management of non-international conflicts, although they also come under 
the scope of the system.) 
Having that in mind, in appears more expedient to focus our investigation 
on activities of the Security Council aimed at the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security rather than the sheer number of conflicts. 
Between 17 January 1946 and 30 June 2006 the Council has held 5,481 meetings, 
and passed 1,693 resolutions. The quantity of official meetings and numbered 
resolutions, however, does not provide a clear picture of the actual volume of 
37
 See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 11. 
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work. As have been mentioned in passing with regard to operative goals,38 the 
Security Council has developed certain "alternative" forms of consultation 
besides official meetings. The most important among these are perhaps informal 
consultations held in private with the exclusion of both the public and other 
members of the organization. Even though these consultations officially do not 
even qualify as meetings, and have neither statutory basis nor numbers, 
members are inclined to use them to revise previous decisions or enforcement 
measures, to discuss issues related to peacekeeping, to hear reports, or for any 
other purposes. No records are made at informal consultations, but with a view 
to secure a minimum amount of transparency, the president habitually holds 
informal briefings to other member states "on behalf of members of the Security 
Council" as opposed to official meetings after which he makes statements 
"on behalf of the Security Council". Evidently informal consultations also 
provide an opportunity for making decisions, yet these cannot be classified as 
resolutions and their legal nature is subject to debates.39 The significance and 
practical weight of informal consultations is well illustrated by the fact that 
their number markedly surpassed that of official meetings in every year in the 
period between 1990 and 2000.40 
It is also worth noting that a variety of other consultations exist involving 
one or more members of the Security Council. These consultations include, for 
example, meetings of caucus groups (permanent members, western permanent 
members, European Union member states, or non-aligned countries), contact 
groups or groups of friends as well as meetings with troop contributors, "Arria 
formula" meetings with other member states or third parties, and "Somavia 
formula" meetings with the participation of non-governmental organizations.41 
The number of resolutions cannot measure the true performance of the 
Security Council either for two main reasons. First, several decisions assume a 
form other than a resolution and appear, for instance, in presidential statements 
or communiqués. Second, under special circumstances even the rejection of a 
draft resolution can promote the effective functioning of the system of 
collective security. In this case there is no perceptible output, nevertheless the 
38
 Cf. supra note 35. 
" S e e Bailey, S. D.-Daws, S.: The Procedure of the Security Council. Third edition. 
Oxford, 1998. 61-68. 
4(1
 See Table on Number of Security Council Meetings and Consultations: 1988-
2002. (B. Holt, K. Muller et al. prep.) at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/ 
secmgtab.htm. 
41
 See Bailey-Daws: op. cit. 68-75. The number of official meetings neither reflects 
the volume of work within sanctions committees functioning as "committees of the whole". 
See ibid. 365. 
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idleness of the Council-once again, exceptionally, not as a general rule-may 
advance international peace and security. (Horribile dictu, it is partly due to 
the idleness of the Security Council brought about by lack of unanimity of its 
permanent members that the already tense relations of opposing blocs had not 
deteriorated further during the Cold War.) 
Consequently, one needs to take into consideration indicators better suited 
to measure effectiveness in addition to figures relating to official meetings and 
resolutions, such as the number of resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, the rate of occurrence of non-armed and armed enforcement 
actions as well as relevant statistical data concerning peacekeeping missions. 
From among Security Council resolutions passed between 17 January 1946 
and 30 June 2006 as many as 367 were adopted with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression: 324 resolutions contain 
an explicit reference to Chapter VII, whereas the remaining 43 resolutions 
merely determine the existence of a treat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or 
an act of aggression without expressly referring to the chapter itself.42 In these 
resolutions the Council has taken enforcement actions not involving the use of 
force against states, entities or individuals in the wake of several grave crises 
often affecting more than one country.43 
The Security Council had authorized the use of force only on two occasions 
during the Cold War; however, the frequency of such actions has remarkably 
increased subsequent to the downfall of the bipolar world. Hence by mid-2006 
the Council has deemed the use of military coercion necessary with regard to 
more than a dozen conflicts.44 (It should be noted that the number of crises is 
definitely not equal to the number of resolutions containing enforcement 
42
 See Johansson, P.: UN Security Council Chapter VU Resolutions, 1946-2002: An 
Inventory. Uppsala, 2003. The number of Chapter VII resolutions adopted between 1 January 
2003 and 30 June 2006 was established by the author. Figures indicated do not contain 
resolutions that merely refer to a Chapter VII resolution, but contain neither an express nor 
an implied reference to that chapter. 
43
 During the period under consideration, enforcement actions not involving the use of 
force has been taken in Afghanistan, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia. Cf. http://www.un. 
org/News/ossg/sanction.htm. 
44
 During the period under consideration, the Security Council has authorized the use 
of force in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(and formerly in Eastern Zaire), Haiti, Iraq, Korea, Lebanon, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Southern Rhodesia, Timor-Leste, and the former Yugoslavia. (Depending on inter-
pretation, Liberia and Sudan may be added, as well.) 
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measures. The Security Council has passed countless resolutions pertaining to 
each crisis, and sometimes decided to take armed or non-armed enforcement 
actions more than once. It has to be emphasized also that certain resolutions leave 
room for divergent interpretations or classifications, so the aforementioned 
statistics may slightly deviate from data originating from other sources.45) 
The United Nations has established sixty peacekeeping missions in more than 
forty countries of five continents between 29 May 1948 and 30 June 2006.4(1  
The overwhelming majority of these operations were dispatched by the Security 
Council, while only two missions were set up by the General Assembly.47 As of 
the last day of the period under consideration, fifteen peacekeeping missions 
has been in operation in addition to twelve special political and peacebuilding 
missions directed and supported either by the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations or the Department of Political Affairs. The total number of personnel 
serving in the ongoing fifteen peacekeeping missions has been 87,707, whereas 
the number of personnel serving in special political and peacebuilding missions 
has amounted to 2,256. Altogether 109 member states of the organization have 
so far contributed with uniformed personnel to the success of peace operations, 
48 
and the estimated total cost of these operations has exceeded 41 billion dollars. 
These figures indeed speak for themselves; still they do not reflect the actual 
effectiveness of measures of the Security Council. A handful of commonly 
known and clear-cut cases apart, such as the success in Cambodia or the 
tragedy in Rwanda, the practical effectiveness of enforcement measures and 
peacekeeping operations are subject to divergent assessments. It has occurred 
time and again that the Council, the affected state, the members of the inter-
45
 For example, some authors maintain that the Security Council has authorized the use 
of force also in Albania, the Central African Republic, and Guinea-Bissau. Cf. Blokker, N.: 
Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to 
Authorize the Use of Force by "Coalitions of the Able and Willing". European Journal of 
International Law 11 (2000), 544. 
4Л
 See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko. This figure does not contain missions 
authorized by the Security Council, but functioning outside the auspices of the United 
Nations, such as Kosovo Force (KFOR), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or 
Operation Artemis. 
47
 These two missions were the United Nations Emergency Force I. (UNEF I.) and 
the United Nations Security Force/United Nations Temporary Executive Authority 
(UNSF/UNTEA). Cf. Bothe, M.: Peace-keeping. In: Simma: op. cit. 587-588. 
4K
 See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Peace and Security Section. United 
Nations Department of Public Information, July 2006, DPI/1634/Rev. 61; United Nations 
Political and Peacebuilding Missions. Peace and Security Section, United Nations Depart-
ment of Public Information, July 2006, DPl/2166/Rev. 36. 
T H O U G H T S ON THE NECESSITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 159 
national community and the public opinion have evaluated the achievements of 
a given action in a contradictory manner.44 With the success of suppression of 
crises being in most instances relative, and the results of conflict prevention and 
maintenance of peace being intangible, one may hardly answer the question 
pertaining to the effectiveness of the Security Council with a definitive "yes" 
or "no".50 
Nonetheless, in the light of achievements it can be plausibly stated that the 
prevailing structure and working methods of the Security Council are equally 
adequate for the attainment of organizational goals, that is to say, the body is 
perfectly capable of effective functioning even as it is-with existing objective 
limitations, of course, such as the absence of agreements under Article 43 of 
the Charter.51 A continuous and systematic utilization of this capability depends 
exclusively on the willingness of Council members as well as states and inter-
national organizations obliged or requested to implement its decisions. Neither 
the current structure nor the working methods of the Security Council hamper 
effective functioning: the real obstacle emanates from subversive unofficial 
operative goals and political interests of states. Restructuring and reorganization 
of work are, therefore, not inescapable preconditions of increasing effectiveness-
this objective could be achieved simply by enhancing the willingness of states 
participating in the making or the implementation of decisions in some other 
44
 In absence of universally applicable indicators of effectiveness, differences in the 
determination of the degree of goal attainment are fairly common in the world of organi-
zations. In addition, the more complex an organizational goal is the more difficult the 
measuring of effectiveness becomes. See Hall: op. cit. 98-103. As regards public opinion, 
it can be stated that "people's attitudes toward the United Nations and other international 
organizations tend to be associated with their beliefs (1) as to the extent to which such 
organizations affect their own and other nations, and (2) whether the observed or imagined 
effects are »good« or »bad«." Sprout, H.-Sprout, M.: Foundations of International Politics. 
Princeton, 1962. 569. 
54
 For a similar opinion concerning the entire organization, see Seidel, G.: Ist die UN-
Charta noch zeitgemäß? Archiv des Völkerrechts 33 (1995), 22. Nevertheless, the High-
level Panel admitted that the effectiveness of the Council has increased since the end of the 
Cold War. See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 246. 
See also Higgins, R.: Peace and Security: Achievements and Failures. European Journal of 
International Law 6 (1995), 445^160. 
51
 Charter of United Nations, Art. 43, paragraph 1: "All Members of the United Nations, 
in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake 
to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special 
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of 
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." 
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way. (It might be added that new states are apparently keen on joining the 
United Nations, which arguably indicates a somewhat firm belief in the 
effectiveness of the collective security system.) 
Since arguments pertaining to the increase of effectiveness of the Security 
Council do not necessarily justify calls for reform, one may raise the question 
as to what other circumstances could render a comprehensive restructuring so 
imperative. Could a fundamental change of organizational environment provide 
sufficient basis for reform proposals? 
The Security Council was designed during World War II on the basis of 
international relations and potential threats of that period. Accordingly, the 
founders were chiefly guided by a desire to prevent the recurrence of a world 
war, to establish an effective mechanism for the suppression of interstate 
conflicts and to preserve the contemporaneous status quo when they drafted the 
structure, powers and procedure of the Council. The principal organ created 
under the sign of the "One World" paradigm, however, had never had the 
opportunity to operate under circumstances originally imagined - instead, it 
had to face the realities of Cold War as early as at its second meeting.3" 
The environment once again changed with the downfall of the bipolar 
world, when a network of previously unknown or underestimated threats and 
challenges has emerged. The collapse of the Soviet bloc brought about the end 
of a delicate balance of power, but the sole remaining superpower has soon 
proved to be incapable and unwilling to guarantee world peace even with the 
support of its allies. The disappearance of great power domination over small 
states in former zones of influence has led to the surfacing of hitherto contained 
tensions of ethnic, economic, territorial or other nature, and paved the way to 
the eruption of violent conflicts involving fatalities and flows of refugees on 
a scale of millions. Partly in relation to these conflicts grave violations of 
human rights and transnational organized crime, particularly arms trade, drugs 
trafficking and money laundering, have become alarmingly frequent. By the turn 
of the millennium international terrorism as well as proliferation of weapons of 
52
 Cf. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946-1951. New York, 1954. 
300-301. On changes of paradigm in international relations in the second half of the 20th 
century, see McWhinney, E.: The United Nations and a New World Order for a New 
Millennium. Self-determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention. The 
Hague-London-Boston, 2000. 3 et seq. 
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mass destruction backed both by authoritarian regimes and terrorist organi-
zations has also grown to be a burning issue. Serious challenges have likewise 
arisen from problems of the Third World, unequal distribution of global wealth, 
exploitation of natural resources, extreme poverty, famine, water shortage, and 
various diseases, all of which continuously reproduce the sources of conflicts 
unless taken care of by adequate measures. Finally, even positive phenomena, 
such as the rapid development of technology, globalization or increasing 
economic interdependence, may clearly entail security hazards.53 
According to Secretary-General Kofi Annan's High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change one of the principal tasks for any reform of the Security 
Council is to enhance its capacity and willingness to act in the face of new 
threats.54 Before one would unreservedly accept this statement, it is worth 
briefly examining as to what extent this task is necessary. Although the Security 
Council was primarily constructed to deal with interstate conflicts, the founders 
were completely aware of that it would function in a dynamically changing 
environment. In order to ensure prompt and effective settlement of situations 
endangering international peace and security, the Council was endowed with 
an exceptionally broad, nearly absolute power of discretion. Its authority is 
restrained by the following three sets of rules only: the peremptory norms of inter-
national law, the Charter of the United Nations, and its own Provisional Rules of 
Procedure.55 This virtually absolute power enables the Council to take action 
straight away against any new threat or challenge in a manner it deems fit.56 
The opinion of the High-level Panel calls for supplementary remarks 
concerning willingness, as well. Namely, occasional reluctance from resolute 
action stems from subversive unofficial operative goals of members rather than 
any structural defect of the Security Council itself. As commonly known, the 
collective will of that organ is established as an aggregate of individual wills of 
53
 See We, the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. Millennium 
Report of the Secretary-General, 3 April 2000, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000, para. 5, 31^10, 66-75, 
189-197; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 
11-23; In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. 
Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, para. 6-11, 76-86. 
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 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 248. 
55
 See Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev. 7. 
56
 In a similar manner, see G.A. Res. 60/1, 8th plen. mtg., 16 September 2005, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 79. 
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members in line with Article 27 of the Charter.57 The Council is "willing" to act 
only if at least nine of its members, acting on behalf of every member state of 
the organization, are willing to act and neither permanent member dissents. 
Otherwise the Council will be paralyzed.5K Hence the containment of threats 
and challenges emerging at the turn of the millennium could be secured with-
out the restructuring of the Security Council-only the motivational deficiencies 
of members need to be remedied, as already mentioned. (The reform might 
nevertheless serve as sufficient motivation for states, but it has nothing to do 
with organizational environment.) In sum, owing to its exceptionally broad 
powers, the Council is capable of taking effective action against any traditional 
or new threat or challenge provided that its members are willing to cooperate. 
The fundamental change of organizational environment, therefore, does not 
provide an acceptable explanation for the necessity of reform. 
Since the Security Council is theoretically capable of effective functioning 
even in the prevailing environment, one has to address the question whether 
power struggles within the United Nations could possibly substantiate reform. 
As already mentioned, the responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security is primary, but not exclusive. 
Owing to its general competence as well as "early warning" and preventive 
functions, respectively, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General are 
likewise involved with this particular subject.54 Similarly to other organi-
zations, specific responsibilities of principal organs of the United Nations have 
given rise to different sub-unit interests, the conflict of which has at times 
brought about fierce power struggles. (Suffice it to recall debates surrounding 
the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.6") Given that the relevant powers of the 
Council are exclusive, these conflicts actually do not affect its effectiveness. In 
57
 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 27: "1. Each member of the Security Council 
shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of nine members. 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided 
that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Art. 52, a party to a dispute 
shall abstain f rom voting." 
The failure of certain draft resolutions is a normal phenomenon in the conduct of 
business that can barely be labeled as a shortcoming. The veto cannot be qualified a 
deficiency either, as it is essential for the achievement of the dominant operative goal: the 
avoidance of direct confrontation of great powers. 
59
 See Charter of the United Nations, Arts 10-12 and 99. 
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other words, power struggles within the organization at most justify minor 
adjustments in the relationship of organs concerned, but fall short of substan-
tiating a comprehensive reform of the Security Council. 
Last, but not least one should examine whether some regularly criticized 
features of the Council-namely lack of representativeness, undemocratic decision-
making and absence of transparency-may plausibly necessitate reforms. It is 
easy to comprehend that in order to be able to fulfill its responsibilities in a 
timely and effective manner, the Council must be reasonably small, and due to 
the political sensitiveness of its decisions, it must work in private to some 
extent. In consequence, the lack of representativeness, undemocratic decision-
making and absence of transparency all stem from the special responsibility of 
the Council, that is, the maintenance and restoration of international peace and 
security. These features by themselves do not undermine effectiveness-on the 
contrary, from a certain point of view they are the very basis thereof. They 
constitute the price of participation in the strictly centralized collective security 
system. Sovereign members of the system, however, are willing to "pay" that 
price only in so far as they are satisfied with benefits received. If the Security 
Council carried out its duties with absolute effectiveness and to the content-
ment of every member state, the features in question would hardly be an issue 
of such gravity. But as the effectiveness of the Council significantly oscillates 
in practice (despite that it is capable of maximum effectiveness), quite a few 
member states-particularly disappointed subjects of failed crisis management 
activities, principal financial and troop contributors as well as states that merely 
perceive an opportunity for a reallocation of power within the organization-
consider the "price" intolerable, and prove reluctant to recognize the authority 
of such oligarchic body of doubtful effectiveness. Even though failures of the 
Council are chiefly caused by their own indolence (negative votes, denial of 
cooperation), unsatisfied states urge reforms: invoking the Council's lack of 
representativeness and transparency and its undemocratic decision-making, 
they demand deeper involvement in the making of decisions and insight into 
the confidential details of work. Their frustration may weaken the authority of 
the Security Council, decrease the willingness of member states to implement 
its decisions, and ultimately, it may further reduce the chance of successful goal-
attainment.61 Features that were originally meant to guarantee effectiveness are 
thereby transformed into obstacles in the way of effectiveness requiring 
61
 On authority and execution of authoritative communications in formal organizations, 
see Barnard: op. cit. 163, 166. It is noteworthy that members of voluntary organizations 
with poorly defined objectives tend to have the narrowest range of acceptance of authority. 
Simon: op. cit. 134. The United Nations is such an organization. 
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comprehensive reforms. (Negative public opinion works in a more or less similar 
fashion, although it exerts destructive effects on the organization through the 
medium of member state governments tracking the general attitude of voters 
rather than directly.) 
We have thus reached the genuine reason of Security Council reform, 
which is to sustain membership involvement. It appears that the necessity of 
reorganization arises not as a result of the Council's alleged incapacity of 
effective functioning or facing new challenges of the post-Cold War era. It is 
neither indispensable on account of lack of representativeness, undemocratic 
decision-making or absence of transparency. The reform of the Security Council 
is necessary because the majority of member states, acting upon divergent 
considerations, demands modifications. These claims are expressed both within 
and outside the organization. Accordingly, even though power struggles between 
the General Assembly and the Security Council cannot objectively substantiate 
reform proposals, the immense political pressure of members within the 
framework of the plenary organ might prove sufficient for coercing changes. 
This struggle has been going on for decades, although its intensity has varied 
with the alteration of political environment.62 The pressure remarkably increased 
by the end of the Cold War: the General Assembly has been continuously 
keeping the issue on its agenda since 14 December 1979,63 and adopted a 
number of resolutions since 11 December 1992,64 what is more, on 3 December 
1993, it has established an Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects 
of the question of Security Council reform.65 Hitherto the Council has been 
able to withstand the pressure of the General Assembly. It has created its own 
Informal Working Group to identify desirable changes in the practice of 
documentation and other procedural questions, and conspicuously strives to 
introduce any adjustments not requiring an amendment of the Charter of its 
own accord.66 Interestingly enough, these measures not only illustrate the 
ability of the Council to resist changes, but also reveal the limited nature of 
62
 The General Assembly had urged the restructuring of the Securi ty Council as 
early as late 1959. G.A. Res. 1404, 843rd plen. mtg. , 25 November 1959, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1404 (XIV). 
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 G.A. Dec. 34/431, 104th plen. mtg., 14 December 1979. See also Bailey-Daws: op. 
cit. 383; Fassbender, В.: UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constit-
utional Perspective. The Hague-London-Boston, 1998. 221. 
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 G.A. Res. 47/62, 84th plen. mtg., 11 December 1992, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/62. 
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 G.A. Res. 48/26, 69th plen. mtg., 3 December 1993, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/26. 
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 See e.g. Note by the President of the Security Council, 19 July 2006, U.N. Doc. 
S/2006/507. 
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that ability. Therefore, it remains to be seen how long the Council can and will 
endure under the mounting pressure. 
Certain states demanding reform of the Security Council are undeniably 
guided by an earnest desire to increase effectiveness. Others rather wish to gain 
broader control over their resources placed at the disposal of the organization, 
while still others merely seek to acquire a position within the organization that 
corresponds to their perceived political or economic weight. Reform proposals, 
consequently, originate from various individual and highly subjective interests 
rather than objective factors. (It also excellently portrays how reform as an 
unofficial operative goal of selected members is converted into an operative 
goal of the entire organization. The reception of this goal by the organization 
has been admittedly facilitated by the fact that adequately communicated 
measures taken in the general direction of reform may contribute to the 
temporary preservation of organizational legitimacy even without significant 
achievements.) Since the United Nations is a voluntary organization,67 it cannot 
ignore the demands of its members, irrespective of the degree to which these 
are justifiable. If member states require reforms, the organization-in order to 
secure its survival6S-must attempt to fulfill this requirement even if the problems 
with which members try to substantiate their aspirations primarily emerge as a 
result of low membership involvement rather than any critical structural defect 
of the principal organ under consideration. It has to be emphasized once again 
that the Security Council would be an appropriate means to reach its specific 
organizational goals as it is, if members of the United Nations did not condemn 
it to idleness by frequently obstructing its work or declining sufficient 
assistance for its actions out of sheer self-interest.69 
The founders of the organization not only anticipated the need of changes 
to arise in the future, but also the likely behaviour of member states. For that 
67
 See supra note 2. 
68
 The theory of organizational equilibrium holds that members of an organization are 
both positively and negatively motivated to participate in the organization. The former 
represents the benefits provided by the organization to its members, while the latter 
symbolizes the contribution of members to the co-operation within the organization. 
Members participate in the organization until their benefits originating from membership 
outweigh their contributions. Thus the organization can endure only as long as it is able to 
transform incoming contributions into benefits, and redistribute them to members in a 
satisfactory manner, thereby ensuring their continuous participation and further contribu-
tions. Cf. Barnard: op. cit. 56-59. 
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members' policies." Hoffmann, S.: Thoughts on the UN at Fifty. European Journal of Inter-
national Law, 6 (1995), 322. 
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reason, President Harry S. Truman had addressed the following solemn instruc-
tions to delegates on the occasion of signing the Charter of the United Nations: 
"You have created a great instrument for peace and security and human 
progress in the world. The world must now use it! If we fail to use it, we shall 
betray all those who have died in order that we might meet here in freedom 
and safety to create it. If we seek to use it selfishly-for the advantage of 
any one nation or any small group of nations-we shall be equally guilty of 
that betrayal. The successful use of this instrument will require the united 
will and firm determination of the free peoples who have created it. The job 
will tax the moral strength and fibre of us all."70 
Conclusions 
The reform of the Security Council had been anticipated by the founders of the 
United Nations as a normal and inevitable event in the life of the organization. 
Even though efforts aimed at comprehensive restructuring are coeval with this 
unique body, the turn of the millennium has witnessed a significant increase of 
critical voices and a strengthening of calls for reform. 
The declared objective of reform proposals is to enhance the effectiveness, 
in other words, the degree of goal-attainment of the Security Council. A careful 
investigation of organizational goals and relevant practice, however, reveals 
that a definitive statement concerning the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the 
Council can hardly be formulated as its record comprises both tragic failures 
and outstanding achievements. At any rate, these achievements indicate that 
the Council is capable of effective functioning even in its current form, thus 
neither its prevailing structure nor its working methods unavoidably hamper 
the attainment of organizational goals. The real obstacle in the way of maximum 
effectiveness emanates from subversive unofficial operative goals and interests 
of members, not f rom the current establishment. Hence a radical reorganization 
of the Security Council both in terms of structure and working methods is not an 
inescapable precondition of enhancing effectiveness, and in consequence, such 
arguments do not plausibly justify reform proposals. 
The fundamental change of organizational environment that occurred after 
the end of the Cold War likewise fails to substantiate the need for reform because 
70
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Session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 26 
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the Council has remained perfectly capable of taking prompt and effective 
action against any traditional or new threat or challenge by relying on its 
exceptionally broad powers and vast inventory in the field of maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security-provided, of course, that its 
members are sufficiently motivated. Similarly, power struggles between the 
General Assembly and the Security Council as well as certain intrinsic features 
of the Council-namely lack of representativeness, undemocratic decision-making, 
and absence of transparency-cannot convincingly explain the necessity of 
comprehensive reform either. 
It appears that reform proposals are rooted in various individual and highly 
subjective interests rather than objective circumstances. Therefore, the reform 
of the Security Council is necessary simply because the majority of member 
states, acting upon divergent considerations, demands modifications. Since the 
United Nations is a voluntary organization, it cannot ignore the demands of its 
members. In order to secure continuous membership involvement, and thereby 
its very survival, the organization must attempt to fulfill these demands even if 
the problems with which member states try to substantiate their aspirations 
primarily emerge as a result of their own indolence, not as a result of critical 
structural or procedural shortcomings of the Security Council. 
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Post-communist Property Reparations: 
Fulfilling the Promises of the Rule of Law? 
Abst rac t . Property reparation programs undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe after 
the fall of the communist regimes fail to fulfill 'the promises of the rule of law'. Reparation 
schemes do not have an exclusively reparative nature, moreover, reparation was deliberately 
linked with structural reform, and due to this duality, the scheme features a mixed distributive-
reparative character. This resulted in two troublesome aspects: on one hand, there is no evidence 
of a compelling argument, which justifies the mitigation of past property deprivations at 
large. On the other hand, it can not be satisfactorily demonstrated why property-related 
injustices enjoy a privileged status when it comes to reparations, in comparison to other 
types of losses. Further, bearing in mind the Hayekian objection towards distributive justice, 
even those who had been placed in an equal situation-i.e. all suffered past property injustices-
are not offered an objectively equal opportunity to claim redress. Due to the fact that the 
schemes addressed reparations-at least in part-from a distributive perspective (which resulted 
in an attempt to create a substantive equality between victims), the result that they achieved 
was objective inequality, as everyone was entitled to reparation between the same limitations, 
while everyone suffered losses of different extent. These differences in treatment between 
various former owners are mostly arbitrary, and in certain cases deliberately introduced so as 
to produce inequalities, and thereby meet the Hayekian concerns as far as they produce 
results that conflict with the idea of the rule of law. The analyzed provisions of the reparation 
schemes lead in practice to the creation of winners and losers of reparations, to a breach of the 
idea of formal equality before the law. In the conditions in which reparation schemes fall short 
f rom a thick conception of the rule of law (justice, rights or objective equality) it worth 
investigating, whether requirements of a thin reading-focusing on foreseability, clarity and 
consistency-are still met by post-communist property redistribution. Unfortunately at least 
under three aspects-valuation, time limits and probation-the reparation schemes' provisions 
are not beyond criticism. The complexity of tasks that transition societies had to face is 
obvious and uncontested. Transitional law, according to Teitel, is a sui generis paradigm, a 
vehicle of social, political and ideological transformation. The amendments to the rule of 
law ideal, justifiable in the context of transition can go as far as-for example- to allow 
governments to decide upon the concrete form of the reparation, the type of wrongs it want 
to address, the period in time intended to be covered. But they may not create winners and 
losers; they may not distinguish between those placed in the same situation. 
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1 7 0 CSONGOR KUTI 
This paper analyzes the property reparation programs of post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe from the perspective of the rule of law. It's central argument 
is that ultimately these schemes fall short from fulfilling what Skapska stylishly 
calls "promises of the rule of law."1 Writing about the essence of the rule of 
law, Raz notes that law should be able to actually guide human conduct.2 This 
view is nicely completed by Teitel, who argues that in periods of political 
upheaval, the rule of law serves to mediate the normative shift in justice. For 
natural lawyers, continues Teitel, the predecessor regime's immorality determines 
the necessity for a "fresh start", for the rule of law to be grounded in some-
thing else than adherence to the preexisting law.3 
The commitment to processes that "allow property rights to be secure under 
legal rules that will be applied predictably [...] is the essence of the rule of 
law"-tells us Cass.4 The question that arises than is: were reparation laws 
"good laws"? One must note that modern theories of the rule of law deny its 
moral features. Raz and Rawls speak about a legally good system, instead of a 
morally good one. Neumann adds that rational people need a predictable, not a 
fair system: "[wje know that life is not fair and we plan our lives accordingly ... 
it matters not at all whether this unfairness is found inside or outside the 
courtroom, so long as it is predictable."7 Moreover, law is essentially good, 
because there are good reasons to have law and be governed by it-adds 
Marmor.6 At most, it might be argued that the rule of law-although representing 
basically functional values-also promotes additional goods (beyond func-
tionality), such as impartiality, transparency etc., and these contribute to the 
popularity of the rule of law ideal.7 
Unfortunately, post-communist reparation schemes are problematic exactly 
under the above-mentioned features, which are thought to be essential for the 
rule of law ideal. The argument starts with the idea that property reparation 
schemes do not have an exclusively reparative nature, moreover, reparation 
was deliberately linked with structural reform, and due to this duality, the 
scheme features a mixed distributive-reparative character. This, however, 
1
 Skqpska, G.: Restitutive Justice, Rule of Law, and Constitutional Dilemmas. In: 
Czarnota-Krygier-Sadurski (eds.): Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism. Budapest, 
2005.215. 
2
 Raz, J: The Authority of Law. Oxford, 1977.211-212. 
3
 Teitel, R. G.: Transitional Justice. Oxford, c. 2000. 11-27. 
4
 Cass. R. A.: Property rights systems and the rule of law. http://ssrn.com/abstract_ 
id=392783, 2. 
5
 Neumann. M.: The rule of law: politicizing ethics. Burlington, VT, 2002. 45. 
6
 Marmor, A.: The rule of law and its limits. http://ssrn.com/abstract=424613, 53. 
7
 Ibid. 10. 
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represents a real problem for the rule of law, as, according to Hayek's remark: 
"any policy aiming directly at a substantive ideal of distributive justice must 
lead to the destruction of the Rule of Law." According to Hayek, the rule of law 
is inherently leading to economic inequalities, but this inequality is acceptable, 
until it is not deliberately produced, and until it consists in the differentiated 
treatment of the different persons, i.e. objective equality of opportunities is 
preferred to a subjective equality.x 
Building on this finding, one of the essential requirements that reparation 
schemes have to live up consists in offering objectively equal opportunities to 
those placed in an equal situation. However, the various limitations that are 
placed on reparations (person-related, temporal, quantitative and property-
based) betray concerns towards substantive equality, which in practice resulted 
in unjustified inequalities, producing arbitrary outcomes. 
But even if one endorses a minimalist reading of the rule of law, proposed 
by Raz, according to which it needs not to produce just outcomes,4 and accepts 
the functionalist view, which expects not more and not less than (reparation) 
laws to be predictable, coherent and consistent, may find that post-communist 
schemes fall short in some aspects (quantification, deadlines, evidence) from 
the requirements of a thin version of the rule of law too. 
Before addressing the issue of limited reparations, the justness of the entire 
scheme has to be assessed. Starting from Raz's argument, according to which 
justice is an ideal distinct from the rule of law, completed with Radbruch's 
view of the relationship between these two ideals as an antinomy between two 
essential elements of legality,10 it seems that this contrast is most difficult to 
deal with in regime change contexts. 
One compromising attempt is represented by Teitel 's argument, which 
maintains that in transitions, law's role itself is transitional and not founda-
tional. Transitional jurisprudence's task is to bridge conventional legality and 
radical transformation. Which values prevail in this conflict-argues the author-
are ultimately determined by particular historical and political legacies." To 
these factors the-economical and political-interests of the emerging new elite 
can be added, even accepting the amendment that present interests are to some 
extent contingent upon the legacies of the past. 
8
 Hayek, F.: The Road to Serfdom. University of Chicago Press, cl991. 59. 
9
 Raz, J.: Rule of Law and Its Virtue. In: Cunningham (ed.): Liberty and the Rule of 
Law. Texas, 1979. 4. 
10
 Radbruch, G.: Rechtsphilosophie. Heidelberg, 1987. 
11
 Teitel: op. cit. 215. 
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More importantly, however, it can be argued, that while the above-enumerated 
elements determine the prevailing values of transition, the appropriateness of 
the choice is function of the effectiveness of the chosen value in fulfilling the 
envisaged objectives. In other words: if radical transformation is the order of 
the day, and all this is done in the name of justice, the outcome of the process 
should be demonstrably just. Otherwise, lofty principles of justice will serve 
only as facades to arbitrariness. But property reparation schemes feature two 
troublesome aspects from this point of view. On one hand, there is no evidence 
of a compelling argument, which justifies the mitigation of past property de-
privations at large. On the other hand, it can not be satisfactorily demonstrated 
why property-related injustices enjoy a privileged status when it comes to 
reparations, in comparison to other types of losses. 
The linking of property reparations with reforms resulted in two broad and 
distinct goals that were expected to be realized through reparations. On one 
hand, to compensate individuals for the property losses they suffered as a 
consequence of unjust governmental actions. On the other, to resettle property 
relationships so as to achieve certainty in possessions which was regarded as a 
precondition for the creation of an efficient market economy. The processes 
were generally envisaged as being guided by the principles of the rule of law. 
Such is the case of Hungary, where property compensation had a declared 
social goal. Or, in Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal identified "a beneficial 
social aspect" of the compensation scheme dealing with the properties left 
beyond the Bug River.12 Similar conclusion was reached by the Estonian Supreme 
Court,'3 arguing that "ownership reform was undertaken in public that is in 
general interests. Ownership reform is a specific task of the state in building up 
a rule of law state and a market economy." The Lithuanian Constitutional 
Court has managed to find some social goals in reparations too, arguing that 
"[tjhe restoration of the rights to land has actually meant process of agrarian 
reform. [...] The restoration of the rights of ownership and land reform are 
inseparable processes. The restoration of the rights to land was the basic means 
for implementing of land reform."14 
Contrary views have been voiced, for example, by the Czech" and the 
Latvian'6 courts, which both held that the goal of restitution laws is (reparative) 
12
 К 2/04. Judgment of 15th December 2004, concerning the right to offset the value of 
property left in the former Eastern territories of Poland. 
13
 Decision 3-4-1-10-2000, of 22 December 2000. 
14
 On restoration of citizens' ownership rights to land, decision of 8 March 1995. 
151. US 38/02, judgement of 24 March 2004. 
16
 Case No. 04-01(99), judgement of April 20, 1999. 
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justice, i.e. the rectification of past wrongs, without mentioning any related 
social aims. This statement of the Constitutional Court is especially interesting 
in the case of the Czech Republic, where commentators identified, at least at the 
moment of the adoption, additional purposes of reparations, alike those that 
were mentioned above. According to Cepl for instance, the new political elite 
considered restitution as helpful means in speeding up privatization and 
developing market economy.17 However, it seems that by 2004 the Court 
managed to find a narrower ratio legis behind the restitution scheme. 
According to Stephen Holmes, the economic rationale could fail out of 
consideration of efficiency: record-keeping was poor under communist admini-
stration, the judiciary is under-sized and under-educated, and promises to 
restore property in kind creates serious uncertainty in possessions.18 Fact is 
that, for example, the Romanian restitution process generated about 1 million 
lawsuits19 and as of 2007, the process has not been terminated. Albeit, argues 
Holmes, "even if restitution is both economically inefficient and morally unjust, it 
is good policy,"20 because it helps legitimating the new property system, by 
preventing the former communist elite from appropriating (all) state assets. 
"Good policy," however, does hardly further the case of the rule of law. 
Undoubtedly, by adding additional aims to property reparations, as land 
reform, establishing the preconditions of a market economy etc. a strong 
distributive aspect of reparations is created. Kutz notes, for instance, that because 
on one hand communist takings of property were generally maintaining a 
semblance of legitimacy, and on the other hand the communist regimes are 'off 
the stage', post-communist reparations are pushed towards a more distributive 
approach to compensation.21 
The UN Human Rights Committee has stressed in the case of Somers v. 
Hungary, that objective compensation criteria of compensation have to be 
applied equally and without discrimination.22 Patrick Macklem considers that 
17
 Cepl, V.: A note on the restitution of property in post-communist Czechoslovakia. 
(7) Journal of Communist Studies 367, 1991, also quoted by Crowder, R. W.: Restitution in 
the Czech Republic: Problems and Prague-Nosis, (5) Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review, 237. 
18
 Holmes, Stephen in A Forum on Restitution: Essays on the Efficiency and Justice of 
Returning Property to Its Former Owners. East European Constitutional Review, 1993. 32. 
19
 Verdery, K.: The Vanishing Hectare: property and value in postsocialist Transylvania. 
Ithaca, N.Y. 2003. 46. 
20
 Holmes: op. cit. 33. 
21
 Kutz, Ch.: Justice in Reparations: The Cost of Memory and the Value of Talk. (32) 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2004. 298. 
22
 CCPR/C/57D/566/1993, Decision of 29 July 1996, para. 9.4. 
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this language is urging governments entertaining compensatory schemes to 
pay close attention to the demands of distributive justice.23 The Hungarian 
Constitution Court recognized this a couple of years earlier, when it argued 
that the constitutionality of the compensation law has to be assessed on the 
basis of distributive justice, taking into consideration not merely the interests 
of the victims, but also the concurrent constitutional tasks.24 
Turning to the two troublesome aspects mentioned above, the first funda-
mental question that needs an answer is whether communist takings of property 
demand reparations or not? Undoubtedly, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights creates a right to effective remedy for acts violating fundamental 
rights guaranteed by constitution or by law.25 A similar provision is reiterated 
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.26 Commentators 
note, however, that the scope and content of the right to redress is fuzzy and 
unclear, and it does not necessarily create an obligation to compensate every 
type of violation. Although a right to compensation is consistently recognized for 
victims of serious violations (such as torture, forced disappearance, extra-legal 
executions etc.)."7 
In addition, even if the major international documents, such as the Universal 
Declaration,28 a protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights29 or the 
European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights311 mention the right to property, 
none of them recognizes a right to restitution. 
In the case of Somers v. Hungary, the UN Human Rights Committee held 
that the Covenant did not protect the right to property, and therefore "there is 
no right, as such, to have (expropriated or nationalized) property restituted." 
On the other hand, the Committee also noted, that the Covenant itself entered 
into force with respect to Hungary in 1976, and therefore the Hungarian state 
23
 Macklem, P.: 1 Rybná 9 Praha 1: Restitution and Memory in International Human 
Rights Law. (16) European Journal of International Law, 2005. 10—11. 
24HCC, AB 15/1993. 1543/B/1991. 
25
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly 
resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
26
 Art. 2 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G. A. res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
27
 Orentlicher, D. F.: Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and Victim 
Compensation. In: Henkin and Hargrove (eds.): Human Rights: An agenda for the next 
century. American Society of International Law, 1994. 449. 
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 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, op. cit. art 17. 
24
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30
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may not be held responsible under its provisions for facts that occurred before 
that date. A similar conclusion was reached by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Jasiûnienè v. Lithuania, where the Strasbourg court refused 
to examine the nationalization of the claimant's land, on account of ratione 
temporis lack of competence.11 At the same time, the Court stated that the 
Convention does not guarantee the right to restitution of property. This argument 
was repeated also in Rucihska,32 and refined in Broniowski.33 Neither the hope 
that long extinguished property rights may be revived, nor a conditional claim 
which has lapsed as a result of failure to fulfill the condition, can be regarded 
as 'possession', in the meaning of the Convention and its Protocol No.l. Albeit 
even if there is no clear-cut standard for property restitution in international 
law, the obligation of successor regimes to repair the wrong done by their 
predecessor is unequivocally formulated.34 Moreover, it may also be invoked 
that general principles of international law also assert the requirement of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the expropriation of property. 
But in James and others, the European Court of Human Rights pointed out that 
the principles in question apply exclusively to non-nationals, thus they do not 
govern the treatment accorded by the states to their own citizens.35 
Symmetrically, most contemporary constitutions enumerate property among 
the protected rights, albeit merely takings, and not restitution are constitutionally 
regulated. At a domestic level, however, things are even more complicated, and 
reparation efforts face serious dilemmas related to the retrospective/prospective 
or individual/collective dimensions of reparations.36 
Kutz argues that "expropriation on its own is not a categorical wrong like 
murder or political repression; it does not by its very nature vault to the head 
of the line for repair."37 Posner and Vermeule, argue that property is always 
uncertain in domestic law, due to the government's freedom to regulate that 
property at any time. However, add the authors, such unsettling of property 
11
 Jasiûnienè v. Lithuania, Application no. 41510/98, Judgement of 6 March 2003, para. 38. 
3
~ Rucinska v. Poland, European Court of Human Right, Application no. 33752/96, 
Decision of 27 January 2000. 
33
 Broniowski v. Poland, ECHR, Application no. 31443/96, Judgement of 22 June 
2004, para. 182: Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 "does not guarantee a right to full compensation 
in all circumstances." 
34
 Meron, Th.: Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. Gloncestershire, 
1991. 171. 
35
 James and Others v. United Kingdom, Application no. 3/1984/75/119, Judgement of 
22 January 1986, para. 58-65. 
36
 Teitel: op. cit. 119. 
37
 Kutz: op. cit. 285. 
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rights is tolerated, if it promotes a pressing social goal and its achievement 
does not significantly undermine the market. ,s Of course, this reasoning applies 
within the framework of a market economy. Still, a Hungarian Constitutional 
Court opinion cited in the foregoing paragraphs of this chapter, managed to 
declare some of the nationalization decrees as unconstitutional, exactly because 
their goal could not be defended on the basis of social need, while their finality 
was the liquidation of an entire property class.34 (A quite contrary view was 
voiced by the Romanian Supreme Court, which held that the manner in which 
nationalization decrees have been applied could not be reviewed by the 
courts.40) The Hungarian Court's arguments back Sadurski's critique41 of Posner 
and Vermeule: communist takings were not promoting a pressing social goal, 
and they did significantly undermine the market (by basically terminating it), 
thus they fundamentally differ from 'normal' takings, accordingly the tasks for 
the post-communist governments in handling past legacies were fundamentally 
different too. 
As it was already hinted at in the foregoing passages, the legality of 
communist takings is controversial too. In many cases, the nationalization and 
confiscation failed to comply with the then existing legal requirements. But 
while legal takings are difficult to challenge, there is a much stronger case against 
illegal (or de facto) takings. One example of holding communist nationalization 
decrees unconstitutional is the above-cited example of the Hungarian Consti-
tutional Court. Failure to comply with obligations assumed through international 
conventions is another example in this sense: the above described cases of 
the properties left over the Bug River, and the Hungarian-Czechoslovakian 
population exchange agreement illustrate the problem. Another good example 
in this sense is Decree no. 52 of 1950 issued by the State Council of the People's 
Republic of Romania, which led to the nationalization of a large number of 
houses and apartments. The decree disregarded constitutional guarantees, as 
it provided that the expropriated goods are transferred to the state without 
38
 Posner, E. A.-Vermeule, A.: Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 
(103) Columbia Law Review. 2003. 68. 
39
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any compensation.42 The Lithuanian Constitutional Court has found that the 
"nationalization and other unlawful socialization of property" was started by 
the occupation government (i.e. Soviet Union). Therefore, even if the post-
communist government cannot be held responsible for the actions of the 
occupying forces, steps had to be taken towards the restoration of rights of 
people which had been violated.41 
Thus, under those circumstances in which the illegality of the takings can 
be demonstrated, there are strong reasons to recognize the 'survival' of former 
property rights, even if the state withholds the discretion to decide upon the 
concrete form of the compensation which may be granted in these cases. A 
category of exceptional cases is represented by the situations in which the state 
assumed an obligation (to compensate property losses) which was never ful-
filled. In these situations, the right to compensation should be recognized as 
flowing from the state's lack of compliance-as the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court put it: constitutional omission44-rather than made function of an ex gratia 
allotment. The major problem with ex gratia reparation is that governmental 
benevolence does not equate with justice. Official magnanimity does neither 
presume (recognize) the existence of entitlement, nor of any governmental 
obligation towards their holders. Such compensation, alike presidential pardon, 
is rather about those who exercise the discretion, than those who benefit from 
it. This constitutes one of the main controversies of the Hungarian compensa-
tion law (no. XXV of 1991): the preamble speaks about the principles of the 
rule of law and the society's sense of justice, but at the end of the day, the 
entire scheme is made a function of state generosity.43 
Critiques of the ex gratia approach to reparations have pointed it out that 
even acts of grace have to conform to constitutional requirements, and for 
instance should not affect the fulfillment of the state's constitutional, inter-
national or previously assumed legal obligations. According to this view, even the 
sequential approach to reparation (the periodicity of regulation, as opposed 
to the periodicity of execution) may appear problematic. Finally, it must be 
noted that magnanimity is classically regarded as a measure destined to 
42
 The Constitution of 1948, art. 10 provided that expropriations can be effected only 
for a public utility, through law and upon the payment of just compensation established by 
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attenuate the consequences of the application of harsh laws, and not as a 
lawmaking principle.46 
A peculiar case is the one of those who lost property as a consequence of their 
opposition to the regime, as an accessory punishment to criminal convictions. In 
many post-communist states, laws for the rehabilitation of those subjected to 
repression for political reasons were enacted. Rehabilitation also created the 
possibility to claim compensation for the property losses suffered. 
Interestingly, the Venice Commission, in its Opinion on the Albanian Draft 
Law on Recognition, Restitution and Compensation of Property, considered 
that the "practicable solution" would be that instead of the recognition of original, 
pre-expropriation ownership, the compensation acts should create the title for 
regaining property.47 In this regard, it worth noting the arguments of the 
Romanian Constitutional Court as to the contrary. The Court emphasized that 
in the case of properties, which were transferred into the state's possession 
through an unlawful act, or without any legal basis, the individual's legal right 
has never been extinguished. This means that symmetrically, the state has no 
ownership rights, and therefore these properties cannot be covered by the same 
acts, which regulate the legal status of property that passed into state owner-
ship. To hold otherwise, would either confer a retroactive effect on such a norm, 
or create a form of taking unknown to the constitution.45 
The second troublesome question that reparation schemes face is why do 
only certain wrongs committed under the preceding regime deserve compensa-
tion? In other words, what makes the difference between various past wrongs 
that justifies reparation? There are three possible justifications worthy of 
discussion: the recognition and protection of rights, the idea of past harm, and 
the principle of political persecution.44 
In post-communist context it is rather difficult to ground property reparation 
on the idea of rights. The communist regimes that effected the takings made 
use of their legal powers to do so, except for the cases where takings took place 
under military occupation, in breach of the existing legal provisions governing 
expropriation, or the state simply failed to fulfill its obligations regarding 
compensations. Thus, as Teitel observes, "[pjroperty rights entitlements arising 
46
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the constitutional problems raised by the partial compensation bill]. (34) Állam és Jogtudo-
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out of past wrongs are constructed ex post and are, simultaneously self-referential 
and justificatory of present property distributions."50 But, the right to property 
is neither the sole, nor the paramount fundamental right recognized by post-
communist constitutions. 
The principle of past harm, as a normative value, does not offer enough 
guidance in justifying property reparations, at least in the post-communist 
context. And that because it simply sweeps too broad. As Elster remarked, 
"essentially everybody suffered under communism".51 Some were imprisoned, 
placed under secret surveillance, had their books placed on index, barred from 
leaving the country or many simply lost career opportunities or suffered other 
losses. István Pogány noted that "the economic consequences of expelling 
Jews from certain sectors of employment [...] was at least as severe, for the 
individuals concerned and for their families, as the confiscation of property 
proved for others." The obvious result, to which the principle of past harm has 
to lead therefore, is universal and equivalent reparations. 
Therefore, the third justification, namely political persecution (discrimination) 
needs to be brought into play. The above-mentioned Hungarian Constitutional 
Court decision did also relay on the discriminating feature of past takings, 
while attempting to demonstrate their lack of compliance with constitutionally 
protected values. The argument of the Court maintained that the notion of 
public utility does not extend to takings that stigmatize or discriminate against 
individuals or groups.62 The nationalization process initially was targeting the 
assets of a certain class, later properties of a certain size, and finally the near 
complete annihilation of the institution of private property. 
Discriminative taking, as a ground for reparation appears perhaps most 
obvious in the case of Holocaust restitution. In Hungary, after the fall of the 
right-wing regime, an impressive number of decrees issued between 1945 and 
1947 provided for the return of immovable and movable goods-especially those 
pertaining to small businesses-and regulating the faith of heirless properties.51 
In post-war Czechoslovakia, Decree no. 5 annulled all transactions that occurred 
on the basis of racial or political persecution under the German Reich beginning 
with 29 September 1938. This was soon reconfirmed by Law no. 128 of 1946. 
Of course, Holocaust reparations take place in an entirely different context: 
50
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51
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confiscation of Jewish assets was part of a genocidal program, which makes 
these claims more compelling.54 
A paradoxical counter-example is represented by the Czech Constitutional 
Court's decision upon a challenge was targeting the decree on the Confiscation 
of Enemy Property and the Funds of National Renewal.5" The act in question 
identified as enemies of the nation persons of German and Hungarian nationality, 
with the scope of subjecting them to property confiscation. The presumption of 
enmity was refutable if these persons could demonstrate their loyalty to the 
Czechoslovak Republic. As the Court pointed out, the decree was based on 
a presumption of responsibility of the German and Hungarian minorities. 
However, the Court did not found any discriminatory feature in the decree 
under scrutiny, arguing that the presumption of responsibility is a 'just sanction', 
a 'proportionate response' to the Nazi aggression, and not a nationalistic 
revenge.5'1 The question of the "Benes decrees" was raised at international level 
in front of the UN Human Rights Committee by a complaint against Slovakia.57 
Here the applicant alleged that the restitution scheme was discriminatory because 
it left uncompensated the victims of the 1945 seizures. The Committee, however, 
found that the scheme does not appear "prima facie" discriminatory, simply 
because it deals with victims of communism, but ignores the victims of injustices 
committed by earlier regimes. For these reasons, the complaint was declared 
inadmissible. 
In any case, the criterion of persecution does not give a satisfactory 
explanation that may justify property reparations. True enough, it helps drafting 
the pool of beneficiaries by distinguishing those persecuted-the confiscation 
of dissident's assets is the paradigm-from all the others who may also have 
suffered some property losses. Still, not only property owners were persecuted 
under communist regimes, and from a moral perspective, for example persecution 
that took the form of imprisonment, can not be considered to be less worthy of 
compensation than confiscation.58 
54
 Kutz: op. cit. 285. 
55
 Decree No. 108/1945 Sb. 
5 6CCC, PI. US 14/94. 15-19. 
57
 Peter Drobek. v. Slovakia, Communication No. 643/1995 (31 May 1994), CCPR/C/ 
60/D/643/1995. 
18
 As Offe and Bönker, argue, "it would be morally wrong to let the choice of 
rectificatory strategies be distorted by the morally irrelevant fact that property can be given 
back, while years lost in prison cannot." Offe and Bönker in: A Forum on Restitution: 
Essays on the Efficiency and Justice of Returning Property to Its Former Owners, East 
European Constitutional Review, 1993. 31. 
POST-KOMMUNIST P R O P E R T Y REPARATIONS. 181 
Further, bearing in mind the Hayekian objection towards distributive justice, this 
paper argues that even those who had been placed in an equal situation-i.e. all 
suffered past property injustices-are not offered an objectively equal opportunity 
to claim redress. Due to the fact that the schemes addressed reparations-at 
least in part-from a distributive perspective (which resulted in an attempt to 
create a substantive equality between victims), the result that they achieved 
was objective inequality, as everyone was entitled to reparations between the 
same limitations, while everyone suffered losses of different extent. 
There are four main aspects under which the limitations placed upon 
reparations betray egalitarian attempts, while in practice they result exclusion: 
person-related limitations (citizenship and residence), quantitative (caps), 
temporal (cut-off dates), and finally property-based (distinctive treatment 
according to the nature of the lost property: movable or immovable, various 
immovable, commercial, religious and communal). These differences in treatment 
between various former owners are mostly arbitrary, and in certain cases 
deliberately introduced so as to produce inequalities, and thereby meet the 
Hayekian concerns as far as they produce results that conflict with the idea of 
the rule of law. The analyzed provisions of the reparation schemes lead in 
practice to the creation of winners and losers of reparations, to a breach of the 
idea of formal equality before the law. 
The most common person-related limitation on reparation is the one that 
requires for the victims to possess the citizenship and/or to be resident of the 
state against which they are willing to vindicate their claim to reparation. These 
requirements were set in order to exclude certain 'undesirable' individuals, 
who left the country during or even prior to the communist takeover. This is 
the case of the former, pre-communist elite and of the dissidents, and in many 
cases also of certain ethnic groups, like Sudeten Germans and Hungarians 
(expelled from post-war Czechoslovakia), Russians in the Baltic States, and 
Jews in several cases.59 
Under what I call 'strict regimes', both of the above conditions were-at 
least originally-contemplated by the restitution or compensation schemes, in 
certain cases a subsequent easement was brought by the courts. Lithuania, 
Czechoslovakia and subsequently Slovakia managed to stick to the harsh rule, 
while in the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland the residence condition 
was considered as unconstitutional and eliminated by the constitutional 
courts. 'Milder regimes' established only one-or, both, but alternatively-of 
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the two criteria. Accordingly, further distinctions may be made depending 
whether a policy fashioned exclusively the citizenship condition-which is 
obviously harsher, as it excludes those who lost their citizenship in the 
meantime-or it accepted also residence as an alternative-obviously milder, 
as it accommodates also returning expatriates. In this section fall the two 
other Baltic States, Hungary and Romania. The German solution constitutes 
an exception, as Property Act6" did not envisage any residence or 
citizenship related restriction on the potential circle of beneficiaries. The 
initial approach excluded, however from restitution properties taken during 
the Soviet occupation. 
Turning to the issue of quantitative limitations, it can be said that repara-
tion programs differed significantly under this aspect. In the case of Hungary 
and Poland, original properties were not returned-except for certain religious 
assets,-merely a partial compensation in form of vouchers, or the possibility to 
offset the value of the taken property against new acquisitions was offered 
instead. In the other analyzed countries actual restitution-of the originally taken 
or in kind-was contemplated, but to different extent: almost all programs 
included an upper limit on the reparations that could have been received by 
individual claimants. The question of ceilings is problematic, because instead 
of giving each individual an equal objective opportunity, it gives an equal 
subjective possibility to receive compensation within general and equal limits. 
This treatment goes categorically against the rule of law, according to the 
above-cited passages from Hayek, as they deliberately produce inequality. 
What is problematic here is the fact, that these schemes under the guise of 
equality result in fact in exactly its opposite, as they create an opportunity to 
full compensation for small holders, while former owners of larger estates 
necessary receive only a partial redress. 
The third type of limitations that were imposed by all reparation programs 
were related to the cut-off date, i.e. the point in past, which marks the 
beginning of the period of time that the scheme was meant to cover. As these 
programs were-at least partially-intended to rectify past injustices, they 
naturally had to have some definition of this 'past' . However, even if seemingly 
objective in its character, the cut-off dates could have been manipulated in 
such a way so as to discriminate between the victims, and to favor certain groups 
over another. In post-communist context the various reparation schemes came 
up with different solutions as to the setting of a cut-off date. Ranging from the 
Polish case, in which, due to its exceptional character of compensating only a 
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rather small category of victims, the cut-off date problem does not exist, as 
such, to the German approach, which logically and unequivocally rolled back 
the baseline so as to cover both Nazi and communist era takings, the policies 
fancy diverging cut-off dates. The Baltic States and Germany represent a fairly 
unproblematic category from this perspective, as their reparation programs were 
drafted in such a way so as to include from the outset both Nazi and 
communist era takings. 
Setting a timeframe for reparation law's applicability was an objective 
necessity: the legislators had to decide how far they intend to reach back 
into the past for rectifying former property injustices. Obviously, the history 
of property injustices can not be restricted to Nazi and communist takings. 
Rectification programs may attempt to deal with wrongs older than a century: 
the post-colonial examples of Native Indian, Aborigine and Maori claims 
constitute the relevant paradigm. Of course, to design such a scheme it does 
not take merely a willing government, but also a significant popular demand in 
this respect. The relative success of the above-mentioned examples is largely do 
to the existence of well-organized and goal-oriented organization of former 
owners, with a significant enough political weight to exert a sufficient pressure 
on the government.61 For example, Verdery notes about post-communist Russia, 
that restitution is impossible because collectivization took place much earlier 
than in the rest of the communist countries, while the preexisting private 
ownership structures were extremely unstable.62 Accordingly, the absence of a 
comprehensive reparation scheme is partly do to the lack of surviving victims. 
This lack of such survivors can be covered by organizations, as in the case of 
the indigenous claims, or, more closer to Europe, the various Jewish organi-
zations (arguably the most successful of them being the Claims Conference), 
that sustained with relative success claims for heirless properties. Being an 
essential element of any reparation program, the cut-off date is, in the same 
time, a handy tool of exclusion: through the setting of such baselines certain 
groups of victims can be distinguished and excluded from the benefits of the 
scheme. 
As to what concerns property-based distinctions, it must be said that in 
most cases the various types of properties were treated separately, sometimes 
also by separate norms. The most common distinction made by the legislators 
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was the one between agricultural properties (and forestry) and buildings, thus 
between different kinds of real property. This separation usually meant also a 
difference in treatment, and this in certain situations resulted in unequal outcomes 
for the former owners. Another type of-perhaps less artificial-distinction was 
the one between movable and immovable properties, and this was quite important 
too, as post-communist reparation schemes mostly avoided to address the issue 
of movables, a question which, in turn, was more present in Holocaust restitution 
claims. Finally, a third type of problematic property-based distinction was made 
on the basis of ownership: some of the programs discern between communal 
(and various forms of communal) and individual types of holdings, while in 
every case distinction is also made between commercial and non-commercial 
properties. Distinctions made according to the certain property objects produce 
exclusion-the loss of certain objects is simply not compensated, while other 
objects lost in similar circumstances are-or, attempt to equalize the outcome of 
the process, by including different categories of property under a broader 
ceiling. 
Finally, in the conditions in which reparation schemes fall short from a thick 
conception of the rule of law (justice, rights or objective equality) it worth 
investigating, whether requirements of a thin reading-focusing on foreseability, 
clarity and consistency-are still met by post-communist property redistribution. 
The European Court of Human Rights, in the Paduraru judgment has 
explained in some details the legal uncertainty that may be engendered by the 
norms' lack of clarity and coherence. It has also noted that the great number of 
complaints filed with the Romanian courts for the return of properties or for 
the annulment of purchase contracts is exactly the product of this uncertainty, 
while the judges required to decide these cases lack a sufficiently predictable and 
coherent legal ground. The Court has also noted that diverging outcomes are 
inherent in adjudication, but the role of the supreme judicial body would be 
exactly to solve such contradictions in the case law (and pointed towards to 
Romanian highest instance's indecision on controversial questions of law). 
Absent a mechanism that ensures coherence in adjudication, persistent and 
profound divergences in questions of great social interest can lead to the 
engendering of a permanent uncertainty and a loss of confidence in the 
judiciary, a fundamental component of "l'Etat de droit".63 
Accordingly, even at its most minimalist interpretation, the rule of law 
must mean the rule of regular and foreseeable law, which, in a perhaps over-
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optimistic reading may eventually amount to procedural fairness. Unfortunately 
at least under three aspects-valuation, time limits and probation-the reparation 
schemes' provisions are not beyond criticism. 
The practice of leaving the establishment of the concrete form and extent of 
the compensation to be received up to further governmental regulations was 
found unconstitutional in Lithuania64 (for breaching rule of law requirements 
such as clarity, certainty, security and protection of legitimate expectations), but 
was left unchallenged in Romania. In Hungary, the Constitutional Court found 
acceptable the government's reluctance to fulfill international obligations relating 
to compensation, holding that the common solution given by the Compensation 
law shall be applicable also to those whose original entitlement arose from 
international agreements.65 
Deadlines for filing claims to reparation proved unrealistically short, and 
even in those cases in which they were not challenged in court, they were 
subsequently prolonged-even repeatedly-to make it possible for more applicants 
to benefit from the project. In Czechia for instance, the Constitutional Court 
found the shortness of the deadline as an effective barrier for the applicants in 
pursuing their rights,66 while in Slovakia similar claims were dismissed on the 
grounds of that special circumstances justify special treatment.67 The length 
of the reparation proceedings was also problematic. The Lithuanian Supreme 
Court found a breach of the right to effective remedy,68 the Estonian Supreme 
Court spoke about the violation of the requirement of legal clarity,69 while the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court discovered an unconstitutional omission in 
cases in which the authorities failed to react in reasonable time.70 
Evidence-related problems have arisen either in combination with the short-
ness of deadlines (in Hungary, for e.g. it was possible to complete the submitted 
application even after the deadline has passed, but in Slovakia failure to comply 
with legal requirements was considered to result in the lapse of the claim), or 
due to the authorities refusal to allow access certain sites or documents. Lurther, 
certain forms of evidence, such as witness testimonies were not allowed in 
the majority of the analyzed cases. In Poland, for example, a witness-related 
requirement that in practice precluded anybody younger than 78 years of age 
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from deposing in the favor of the applicants, was found to be at odds with the 
principle of the rule of law.71 However, a Romanian provision that required 
depositions to be made by all the owners (or their heirs) of the plots surrounding 
the claimed land remained unchallenged. Conclusively, in many situations it 
was up to the constitutional courts to come to the former owners' rescue and 
clarify problematic provisions. While in some cases the constitutional courts 
came to the individuals' rescue by striking down some of the problematic legal 
provisions, or court decisions, in other cases they remained deferential, and 
upheld the legislative arrangements, and in the third instance, some of the 
problematic provisions passed unchallenged. Still, a massive involvement of 
constitutional courts in the reparation process is problematic in itself. As Sadurski 
notes, strong judicial review system may send a negative message, obscuring 
the rights discourse and lifting it from public discourse (deliberation) to the 
small, specialized world of constitutional experts. And this aspect is considered 
to be at least as important, as the undeniable gains-visible in reparations 
perspective from the above analysis-of having the legislation monitored by 
specialized guardians.72 
The post-communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe had two main 
options in entrenching a new political elite resulting from a combination of the 
old nomenclature and the leaders of the democratic opposition movements, 
which was experiencing a pressing need for legitimacy after the fall of the 
totalitarian rule. One was the political option, consisting in demonstrating 
allegiance towards democratic values and institutions-to the rule of law. Other 
was the economic option, the creation of a market economy that carried the 
promise of a well-being characteristic of the much envied capitalist societies. 
Unfortunately, the solution chosen was arguably the worst one, as transition 
governments attempted to achieve both options in the same time, under the 
false impression that the two totally distinct goals may legitimate and support 
each other. As this paper argues, it is theoretically untenable to pursue an even 
(or close to even) distribution of property in the name of reparatory justice on 
the basis of the argument that this would facilitate better the emergence of a 
market economy. It is equally wrong to talk about the role of privately owned 
property in a market economy, as an argument that justifies mitigation of past 
property injustices. 
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The complexity of tasks that transition societies had to face is obvious and 
uncontested. Czarnota, Krygier and Sadurski wrote in this context about the 
burden that has fallen upon "institutions of justice", in the attempt to conceal 
the competing interests and expectations, a process, which resulted in a trans-
formation of "expectations and the realities on which they are based."73 This 
view echoes to a certain degree Teitel's argument on the role of law during 
transitions. Accordingly, during transition periods, rule of law ideals are appli-
cable only with significant amendments, generated by the tumultuous context 
of the transformation process. Transitional law, according to Teitel, is a sui 
generis paradigm, a vehicle of social, political and ideological transformation.74 
The analysis of the various property reparation processes across Central 
and Easter Europe, however, create and uneasy feeling towards the above-
delineated conception of the transitional rule of law. For as it was argued, 
property reparations pursued a number of goals and not all of them were 
targeting the greatest benefit of the people. A redrafting of power structures 
was taking place, a struggle between the elites, which defined to some extent 
the context of transition, and thus, implicitly, the rule of law ideals, as Teitel 
correctly noted. Obviously, law had to be responsive to these circumstances 
of the political change.7" Albeit the question that arises is whether one may 
accept all the outcomes-the distinctions made by reparation schemes, the 
exclusion of certain groups (of former owners and of types of properties) from 
the benefits of the program-under the argument that "it is what the law does 
and it is the reason why law does it"?76 Is perpetuation of old (and creation of 
new) injustices justifiable by the sui generis nature of transition? 
The answer to these questions, in the light of problems analyzed in this 
paper must be a categorical no. Regardless, how specific the circumstances 
of transition from authoritarianism to democracy are, regardless of the 
transitional tasks of the rule of law, a core, a minimum of the ideal must be 
recognized as invariably surviving in any kind of regime context (transitional 
or not), for otherwise there would not be much left to talk about. This-on the 
footsteps of Krygier-I take it to be the protection against arbitrary exercise 
of power.77 Arbitrary, in property reparations context equates with unjustified 
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distinctions in the treatment of those placed in an equal situation. Whereas 
unjustified stands for the lack of any convincing argument that may explain how 
the envisaged scheme does contribute to a better furtherance of the multiple 
goals that it proposed to achieve. As it was argued, economic reform and 
mitigation of past injustices are goals, which can not explain and justify each 
other. 
The amendments to the rule of law ideal, justifiable in the context of transition 
can go as far as-for example-to allow governments to decide upon the concrete 
form of the reparation, the type of wrongs it want to address, the period in time 
intended to be covered. As it was shown in this paper, there are clear-cut 
guidelines neither in international law nor in legal theory that may shed enough 
light on these matters. But they may not create winners and losers; they may 
not distinguish between those placed in the same situation. For transition may 
come to an end, but the injustices that it entrenched will perpetuate. 
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Körinek László: Bűnözési elméletek [Theories of Crime]. BM Kiadó, Budapest, 
2006. 430 pp. 
This book-a much awaited addition to the Hungarian criminology literature-
was written by László Körinek, Chair of the Criminology Department at the 
University of Pécs, editor-in-chief of the Law Enforcement Review (the Law 
Review of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement), and former 
Under-Secretary for Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is. Since 
1971, there has not been any comprehensive criminology books published in 
Hungarian, thus for decades, scholars have had to do without a systematic 
examination, comprehensive historical overview and critical analysis of crimi-
nology models-theories about the causes underlying crime. The present volume 
fills this void, providing within its five chapters a classification of the spectrum 
of theories, also portraying the history and development of the field. 
In the preface to the comprehensive review of Hungarian as well as 
international theories of criminology, Professor Körinek makes no secret of the 
fact that-despite significant advances and valuable insights gleaned over the 
decades-this area of inquiry is yet to elaborate a theoretic framework that would 
be suited for a prime practical application: effectively curbing crime. Still, 
the author 's hope is that the theories and considerations he describes would 
stimulate contemporary and future research on the theory of criminology as 
well as associated practical applications. 
From the ancient beginnings until today, the book surveys the spectrum of 
theoretical explanations for understanding criminal behavior, along with the 
relevant Hungarian as well as international literature. In the second half of 
the book, the author provides a critical analysis of issues having to do with 
victimology, penology, the criminal justice system, police models, organized 
crime, terrorism and risk society. 
Chapter 1 distinguishes two approaches to examining the causes of crime: 
one seeks to uncover various causes (physical and mental alike) within the 
individual; the other is based on social determination. Three major contemporary 
paradigms are subsequently discussed: the etiological, cause-oriented paradigm, 
which focuses on examining the causes and circumstances of crime; the 
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emergence of a system of norms for criminal law; the interactionist model, 
which studies the authorities, their stigmatization; the radical or critical 
paradigm (which includes feminist, Marxist, postmodern, left-wing radical as 
well as peace-making criminology). Having introduced the spectrum of theories, 
the author goes on to outline how criminology qua field of inquiry emerged. 
Chapter 2 begins with the classical school associated first and foremost 
with Cesare Beccaria, centering on the actions of agents with free will. 
Subsequent discussion covers the Italian and French positivist tradition, both 
of which emphasize the biological and social determination of agents. The 
chapter closes with the mediating school made famous by Franz Liszt, which 
aims at reconciling the classical and positivist schools. 
Professor Körinek remarks that whether we look at phrenology involving 
the study of skulls and brains, whether we examine physiognomy, which 
emphasizes aspects of physical appearance indicative of character traits and 
personality, or whether we instead turn to theories that explain criminal 
behavior in terms of the operational malfunctions of society, there is one thing 
of which we can be certain: criminology has evolved into a genuine scientific 
field based mostly on empirical research. 
Chapter 3 is the most extensive chapter of the book, divided into ten 
sections to cover the theories of criminology emerging through the 20th 
century. The author begins with the anthropological school (which modernizes 
theories of phrenology, focusing on biological, physical-mental attributes), 
the rediscovery of physiognomy (which emphasizes character traits that can 
be identified based on physical appearance), eugenetics (research about the 
possibility of societal interference into human hereditary traits), endocrinological 
and biochemical anomalies as causes of criminal behavior, childhood brain 
damage, chromosomal abnormalities, and other theories that suggest neuro-
physiological and neuropsychological connections. Here, the reader is also 
provided with an overview of the methodology behind twin studies and 
adoption studies, as well as interconnections among intelligence, psychopathic 
behavior and crime. Section 2 delineates theories about antisocial, asocial 
and psychopathic personality, with special attention to the basic tenets of the 
psychoanalytic tradition, Containment Theory, Attachment Theory, Social 
Control Theory, Learning Theory, pointing out their major limitations, along 
with their implementation in cognitive behavior therapy. Section 3 moves on 
to Cultural Conflict Theory and Subcultural Theory (particularly the subculture 
of violence), which thrive to explain criminal behavior based on the incomplete or 
deviant socialization of the individual. Section 4 outlines neoclassical theories. 
In this section, the reader also finds descriptions of the theories known as 
Rational Choice Theory (according to which crime is based on a cost-benefit 
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analysis), Routine Activities Theory, Low Self-Control Theory, and General 
Criminal Theory. 
Personality-based theories examine crime based on mental factors; others, 
like the theories about social structure introduced in Section 5, regard 
individuals as embedded in society. Sociological theories attempt to make 
sense of the emergence of crime based on societal-environmental factors. 
Closely related to these theories are the structural approaches-Anomie and 
Social Disorganization Theory-examining crime from the perspective of 
structural functionalism. Section 6 covers institution theories, with special 
emphasis on Labeling Theory and Moral Panic Theory (both of which thrive 
to explain deviance based on the definitional practice of social control 
institutions), phenomenological and ethno-methodological approaches, as well 
as Interactionist Theory, which interprets crime as a malfunction within the 
web of interconnections between society and the criminal. 
The next pair of sections describe the Multi-Factor Approach and Social 
Protection Theory, both of which attempt to harmonize diverging viewpoints, 
trying also to explore new resocialization possibilities. The final pair of sections 
discuss radical (critical) and cultural theories of criminology (including left-
wing realism, anarchist, feminist, neo-Marxist, postmodern, constitutive, peace-
making and green criminology), which raise questions about the basic tenets of 
traditional criminology. 
Chapter 4 provides an introduction to six major issues and research 
topics that have been commanding criminologists' attention. The first section 
discusses victimology, hidden crime, and fear of crime (including subjective 
sense of safety, aggressive behavior, and vigilantism). Section 2 addresses 
fundamental issues of penology, penal science, with subsections devoted to 
capital punishment, life imprisonment without parole, mediation and shaming. 
Section 3 approaches the justice system as a system that possibly plays a role 
in the causal processes underlying criminal activity. Besides issues related to 
courts, the prosecutor's office, criminal policy, and criminal legislation are 
considered, along with various police models (based on criteria that are 
professional, society-oriented, or related to data processing), and the principle 
of zero tolerance. Although the book is explicit about not attempting to provide 
a detailed overview of criminology research related to specific criminal offenses, 
or even various types of criminal offenses, in the next pair of sections, it does 
cover the major issues and legal material pertaining to white-collar economic, 
organizational and organized crime, the criminal responsibility of the legal 
individual, as well as terrorism, and violence by the state. The final section is 
devoted to theories of security, risk society, the criminology of complex 
security, and new trends in crime prevention. 
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What is the future of criminology? Chapter five concludes by raising this 
very question, paying special attention to the current renaissance of criminal 
biology and euphenics. 
The author concludes that in the future, beyond scientific and academic 
influences on the field, criminology will continue to adjust its themes and 
choice of topics to the prevalent patterns of crime, with special attention to 
accounting for global as well as local problems, the preparation, follow-up and 
assessment of local and regional projects. 
Professor Körinek describes this in the final chapter of his book: „Theories 
of criminology cannot be compared to a building erected by generations of 
researchers substantively and proportionately building upon the scientific 
achievements of their forebears. Criminology is more like a rather eclectic 
piece of art. The eclecticism is due in part to the large array of contributing 
hands, but its primary source is the varied nature of the contributors' ways of 
thinking. In a rapidly changing world, with each era, scientific researchers tend 
to have a different view of what values are considered important: the aspect of 
criminal human behavior, perceived connections considered relevant keep 
changing... The practical significance of the sciences hardly needs stressing 
in the present era of the knowledge-based society. Applied research-in the 
strictest sense of the term become an obvious, inevitable necessity. And 
applied research is possible only if there is a theoretical basis to underpin it. 
Due to the very nature of the topic at hand, the delicate social issues it raises, 
and the dangers associated with crime as well as certain mistaken conceptions 
and applications of law enforcement, criminology will continue to be an 
indispensable subject of inquiry in the foreseeable future. The present work is 
aimed to make a contribution towards this goal." 
With its in-depth and all-encompassing coverage, Professor Korinek's book 
is sure to become an indispensable item in the libraries of scholars and 
students interested in criminology. 
András L. Pap 
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Boóc Á.-Dömötör L.-Sándor l.-Szappanos G.: A hiteles fordítás és a hites 
tolmácsolás alapvető kérdései [Fundamental questions of authentic translation 
and authentic interpretation]. HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2006. 357 p. 
In December 2006 Fundamental questions of authentic translation and authentic 
interpretation was published by HVG-ORAC. The authors Ádám Boóc, László 
Dömötör, István Sándor and Géza Szappanos aspired to summarize the most 
important legal problems concerning the questions of authentic translation 
and interpretation and to provide a draft of the national regulations in the 
context of an international overview. Composed of several chapters, the book, 
which can be considered the first Hungarian manual on this subject, reveals the 
regulation in this field of law in its complexity with accuracy, precision but 
still in a readable and easy-to-understand format. 
Authentic translation and authentic interpretation can be considered as 
autonomous professions. The legal terms make the translators' work hard, so 
besides the language one has to be thoroughly familiar with public administration 
and the culture of the given country in order to provide an appropriate trans-
lation. 
"Translation is distortion"-the authors remind us of the Italian saying in the 
introduction of the book, referring to the tremendous role and responsibility of 
the authentic and correct translation of our thoughts and business intentions to 
a foreign language has become. Hungary is not an exception as more and more 
Hungarian business associations build business relations with partners from 
a member state of the European Union. Several foreign investors established 
businesses in Hungary; the foundation of foreign firms has increased. 
The purpose of the work is to show the different regulation systems in 
foreign countries to the Hungarian readers and to make the Hungarian regula-
tions available to non-Hungarian speakers. The preparation and the utilization 
of an authentic translation and interpretation is a complex field raising linguistic-
questions, therefore the second chapter contains a theoretical essence and an 
analysis of some of the main points of special legal translation. 
Legal translation has undergone a change over the past decades and can be 
divided into categories in several ways. Peter Sandrini divides the translation 
of legal texts into four parts: 1) translation of a legal text between two legal 
systems; 2) translation of a legal text f rom different legal areas; 3) translation 
of a legal text within one legal area; and 4) translation of a legal text within 
one legal system. Consideration of the theory of translation of legal texts is 
relatively new in linguistics. 
The difficulties of the translation of legal texts are very well demonstrated 
by the legislation of multi-lingual countries. An especially good example is a 
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country where besides the dominating common law the influence of the continen-
tal law can be seen as well. The structure of laws in Canada and Switzerland 
are very different from that of the classical Roman law, which further 
complicates the job of the legal translator. 
When translating a legal text, besides the structural items, it is also very 
important how each sentence of the law is translated. The tradition that a 
charter shall be one sentence long goes back to ancient times. Eugen Huber, 
the originator of the Swiss Civil Code thinks that any clause of the law may 
consist of a maximum of three paragraphs with one sentence in each paragraph, 
and one sentence shall express only one regulatory idea. 
The translator of legal texts has to face further difficulties. A critical point 
is the complexity of the legal language. For example the English legal 
language originates from the vocabulary of the French and Latin languages, 
while at the same time the Scandinavian impact from the mid-10th century is 
also relevant. The work also points out that the English word law has a 
Scandinavian origin. 
There is a significant discrepancy among verdicts in different languages. 
French verdicts are characterized with a strict force of form thus translating 
them to a language with a different culture is a difficult task. Besides the 
structural discrepancies the translator of legal texts also has to pay attention to 
style. In the Canadian Penal Code the provisions are written in the imperative 
mode in English and in the declarative mode and passive voice in French. Lots 
of problem arise because the German legal systems do not show a consistency 
either. Besitz, or possession, does not mean the same in the Swiss, German and 
Austrian law, as in the first two it only means the possession while in the 
Austrian law it means the possession with the aim to appropriate. 
The ituation of the translator is even more complicated in cases where the 
legal language are used within a state differs from the official language of that 
state. The most typical example is The Netherlands, where the legal language 
of the European areas, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba very much differ. 
In the field of international legal translation difficulties of interpretation 
frequently arise. This is also related to the transition of international concepts 
to national law. It is worth noting here that there is a difference caused by the 
discrepancies of the legal systems whether the translator translates the laws 
themselves or the legal text. The legal translator shall not only translate the 
text from the source language to the target language but also to the special 
legal terms of the target language. It is less of a problem when the two legal 
systems are similar as knowledge of the special legal language makes it easier 
to match the special terms. The translator's work is harder when a legal term 
means different things in different languages. For example in Spain the word 
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judge has two meanings: one is jueces, they are the judges proceeding alone, 
and magistrados who work in council. 
What is the solution if a given term cannot be translated to a foreign 
language? According to the Dutch Gerrard-René De Root, the translator has 
three options: 1) the term is not translated, just left in the text and explained later; 
2) a paraphrase is used in the source language; 3) a new term is introduced 
in the source language with neologism. According to Susan Sarcevic the 
appropriate method is "making it natural", meaning the term of the source 
language is adapted according to the rules of the target language. 
It is important to mention that while translating legal texts it is possible and 
practical to rely on the foundations of Roman law this is not an exclusive solution. 
Today the terminology of Roman Law means a kind of international lawyers' 
"legalese". 
With regard to special legal translation one may think that the creation of a 
special legal dictionary would be an appropriate answer to the problems 
illustrated above. Of course there are lots of special dictionaries and Gerard-
René De Root set up certain requirements to such works. In De Root's opinion, 
it is worthwhile to call the reader's attention to the problems translators usually 
face when translating legal texts. In cases where the translation of a given term 
is impossible it has to be highlighted and specially marked. 
Besides the translation of special legal texts, authentic, or official, inter-
preters (generally involved in court procedures) also play an important role. 
In the procedure the interpreter immediately translates not only what was 
heard but does a sight translation of the documents introduced as well. Court 
interpreters and official interpreters in general have to comply with numerous 
rules of conduct and ethics. It is worth mentioning that the Australian Institute 
of Translators and Interpreters prepared a code of conduct for its members. 
When defining the role of the interpreter the code states that the interpreter 
shall never proceed as a representative or a client. 
While selecting the interpreter taking part in a court procedure not only the 
legal provisions have to be taken into account but also a list of other factors. 
Kurt Jessnitzer reminds us that in penal procedures when the victim of a sexual 
crime has to be heard the sex of the interpreter might be important. 
In the next chapter the authors discuss the legal provisions of foreign legal 
systems concerning authentic translation and authentic interpretation, and explore 
the role of authentic translation and foreign deeds in civil law. 
In German legal systems authentic translation and authentic interpretation 
have a high importance in civil, penal and administrative procedures. They 
play a significant role not only in procedures concerning foreigners but also in 
the translation of Community law. The discrepancy between the national and 
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Community law makes the life of the legal translator even harder. The 1961 
The Hague Convention on Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for 
Foreign Public Documents established a unity in a certain way concerning the 
authentication of foreign documents. 
The Zivilprozessordnung regulating the Austrian litigation procedure 
states that a public document issued in a foreign country has a full conclusive 
force in Austria only in the form of authentic translation. The German 
Zivilprozessordung provides that a translation to be used in a civil suit can 
only be translated by a translator specialized in legal translation who is duly 
registered by the court system of the given federal state. 
The German law contains special rules to notaries concerning the use of 
foreign languages. The deeds are made in German language. In cases where 
the client so requires and the notary is familiar with the given language, it is 
possible to prepare the deed in both languages. The same applies to authenti-
cation. 
It is also an important question which client can be seen as familiar with 
the given language. An important aspect is the client's ability to express his or 
her thoughts clearly and definitely thus being able to proceed. It is not seen as 
lack of knowledge of language when the client speaks with an accent or makes 
grammar mistakes when making a procedural statement. It has to be 
emphasized that while in several legal systems the rules pertaining to experts 
are also applied to interpreters, the German practice points out that the inter-
preter and the expert cannot be equated. The role of the interpreter is basically 
to establish a linguistic connection between the persons taking part in the 
procedure. 
The authors analyze the solutions of the Anglo-Saxon countries as another 
large group of foreign legal systems. Having numerous foreign connections 
and integrating persons of different national origin, in Canada authentic 
translations are undertaken by the Translation Bureau as state service provided 
to public administration agencies. In case a verdict is written in a language 
other than English or French its authentic translation has to be prepared in 
Québec. Bilingualism is also the case in Ireland, where a number of interpreters 
have to work in the court from time to time. In the area of Gaeltacht writs and 
notices have to be supplied with an authentic translation. 
Authentic translation is also used in the legal practice of England. A good 
example is the Act on Business Association of 1985, which provides for 
registered foreign associations to prepare authentic translation in certain cases 
in order to participate in the English legal practice, and the translator has to 
make a declaration regarding the true and faithful nature of the translation. 
In England the decision whether an interpreter is needed or not is the 
BOOK REVIEWS 197 
discretionary right of the judge. The English interpreter has to be sworn in 
prior to commencing interpretation. Moreover, English law makes a distinction 
between translator, interpreter, linguistic expert or other expert. 
The United States of America followed the so-called specialist way regarding 
special translation or interpretation, meaning that interpreters in special areas 
are trained in the particular professions. Because of the composition of the 
American society the need for Spanish official interpreters is the highest. 
In court procedures the president of the committee of proceeding judges 
makes the decision as to the assignment of an interpreter. In penal cases the 
cost of interpretation is covered by the State, in other cases the judge will rule 
on which party shall bear the costs. 
The importance of the task of authentic interpreters in the United States is 
also shown by the fact that the administrative office of courts has prepared a 
model clause of the text of the verbal and written oath. This oath places court 
interpreters under a strict obligation. It demands them to uphold the dignity of 
the court and to interpreting impartially and without private communication. 
The American Translators Association with more than 6000 members represents 
the rights of translators and interpreters. 
Minorities made the role of linguistic transfer important in Australia as 
well. In Australian public administration there are bodies of the authentic 
translation at a state and at the commonwealth level as well. At the common-
wealth level, the Translation and Interpreting Service was established in 1973, 
and at state level, mention should be made of the Legal Interpreting Service in 
Victoria state, which provides translation services to government agencies and 
to the police. This organization has its own code of conduct as well as 
regulations pertaining to aspects such as impartiality, accuracy and competency. 
As opposed to the United States, in Australia the general principle dominates, 
thus anybody wanting to be an interpreter has to take the accreditation 
examination organised by the National Accreditation Authority for Translators 
and Interpreters, or has to participate in training organised by this body. In 
New Zealand the use of official translations of deeds in court procedures 
should be highlighted. As is known, the official language of New Zealand is 
Maori. However, when submitting a document an official English translation is 
also necessary. 
Similarly to New Zealand foreign deeds and their utilization in court 
procedures play an important role in Hong Kong. As of the 1st of July 1997 
Hong Kong has been returned to China. From the legislative point of view this 
brought the need to translate the law into Chinese and for laws to be bilingual. 
However, Hong Kong enacted a law in 1986 permitting to create laws in either 
English or Chinese. 
198 BOOK REVIEWS 
As an exotic example, Malaysia is worth mentioning, where the Malaysian 
National Institute of Translation was established in 1993. The institute 
provides services in the following languages: Malaysian, English, Mandarin 
Chinese, Tamil, French, Arabic, Japanese, Korean and Latin. 
In the closing part of the chapter the authors analyse relevant questions of 
international civil law and the European Community law. In these fields of law 
the use of foreign deeds and their translations is especially frequent. Numerous 
examples are provided of international cooperation in the field of foreign 
certification, delivery of documents and acceptance of foreign deeds. It is 
worth highlighting the 1965 The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of 
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, which 
provided the possibility of direct service of documents between the judicial 
bodies of the member states. 
Directive 1348/2000 of the European Council expedited and upgraded the 
system of forwarding court and other documents. Its most important provision 
relevant to the subject matter of the book is that for reasons of security the 
document to be forwarded has to be accompanied by a predefined form that 
must be filled out in the language of the place of service or in any other 
language accepted by the member state concerned. 
The 1970 Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters states as the main rule that the letter requiring the evidence must be 
translated into the language of the country to which where the letter is sent. 
Concerning the world outside Europe, Inter-American Convention on legal 
assistance among the Central and South American countries, amended in 1979 
provides for the letter rogatory to be translated into the official language of the 
country where it is sent, but it is not compulsory to translate the annexes to the 
letter. 
Regarding Community law, difference in the languages of the parties rises 
as a fundamental problem in the practice of the principle of equal treatment. 
This is because there is a ground rule in all member states that the official 
language of the given member state shall be used in the national courts. 
The importance of the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance 
lies in the fact that it aims to set forth unified principles in the field of translation 
and authentication. However, beyond legal aid the role of translations can be 
important in admission and enforcement. Known by its French acronym SCIC, 
the Joint Service Translation and Conferences employs 500 interpreters and 
155 administrative staff. With its 1.2 million entries the multilingual 
terminology database called Eurodicautom is a major help for translators. 
At the end of the chapter the authors describe the regulations on documentary 
evidence in each European country. Council Directive 1206/2001 aiming at 
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expediting and simplifying the cooperation among courts regarding evidence 
in order to promote the functioning of the internal market. Under the Directive 
the request has to be sent in a unified form written in the official language of 
the addressee country. The language of requests and reference is the official 
language of the country addressed. Wherever other documents are attached to 
the request, they also have to be translated to the same language. 
The title of the first chapter of the book is The question of authentic 
translation in the Hungarian legal system and practice. It is to be noted that 
while Western European languages belong to the Indo-European language 
group, Hungarian is a Finno-Ugric language, therefore it is highly important 
that an authentic translation of the Hungarian official and other documents be 
provided. EU accession underscored the importance of foreigners participation. 
The role of authentic translation is increasingly recognized. 
As a starting point the Hungarian Constitution should be examined, which 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of language. In a significant part of 
court procedures the statements and attitudes of the parties are very important. 
It is to be ensured that neither party has to face a disadvantage because the lack 
of knowledge of a language. 
The authors of the book give a detailed description of the rules regarding 
the use of language in the following procedures: 1) public administration 
procedure; 2) civil action; 3) penal procedure; 4) arbitration procedure; 5) 
procedure concerning business associations. 
As regards public administration procedure Act CXL of 2004 provides that 
a client has the right to use their native language in their procedures with the 
authorities, and it sets forth detailed regulations on the use of language. The 
official language of procedure is Hungarian, however, it is possible to use 
other languages as well. Act LXXVII of 1993 on the rights of minorities declares 
that the use of the mother tongue has to be ensured to persons belonging to 
national or ethnic minorities in penal, civil and public administration procedures. 
The Act contains rules regarding the involvement of interpreters stating that an 
interpreter shall assist if the official does not speak the language spoken by the 
client or any other person taking part in the procedure. Translation of different 
documents are equally important in public administration procedure as it may 
have an essential influence on the whole course of the procedure. 
In Hungary civil procedure is regulated by Act III of 1952 on Civil 
Procedure. Among the fundamental rules the Act provides for Hungarian to be 
the language but also says that no one shall suffer a disadvantage on account of 
unfamiliarity with this language. The act provides that anybody may use their 
native, regional or minority language. The Act differs from penal procedure in 
the sense that the fee of the interpreter is included in the costs, so the party that 
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is obliged to cover the costs has to pay for the interpreting. It is possible to 
dispense with the services of an interpreter if the client does not speak 
Hungarian but the court is sufficiently familiar with the language the client 
speaks. In this respect the Act on Civil Procedure differs from the Act on 
Public Administration Procedure because according to the latter an interpreter 
is needed even if the proceeding official speaks the given language but other 
participants of the procedure do not. In civil procedure documents are 
important, in numerous cases decisive. The Act on Civil Procedure contains 
comprehensive and detailed provisions regarding deeds. 
Unlike civil procedure, penal procedure aims to enforce the punitive 
authority of the State and to apply the penal sanction. Act XIX of 1998 on 
Penal Procedure also ensures the use of native, minority and regional languages. 
A different provision compared to the Act on Civil Procedure is that the 
translation of a decision or official document ordered by law is the task of the 
issuing or executing court, prosecutor or investigating authorities. The party 
concerned may forego the right to have the document to be delivered 
translated. The costs of translation are included in the cost of procedure. In 
case the person obliged to pay is not able to do so a personal exemption can be 
provided. 
In penal procedure the use of an interpreter who has not taken the relevant 
professional examination is an offence and may result the annulment of the 
verdict of the court of first instance if the restriction of the lawful rights of the 
persons taking part in the procedure had a serious impact on the outcome of 
the procedure. 
Arbitration procedure is provided for by Act LXXI of 1994. As it is 
commonly known, arbitration may be an alternative to civil procedure. Arbit-
ration procedure may be used in economic or commercial cases, where the 
presence and actions of foreign participants is of decisive importance. 
Consequently documents in foreign languages are used very often. 
It is important to note that in international arbitration documentary evidence 
plays a major role. In addition the parties can agree freely on the language to 
be used in the arbitration process. If more than one language is stipulated, 
interpretation and translation need to be ensured. 
In the international arbitration procedure two kinds of interpretation are 
recognized. One type is when the interpreter assists with the hearing of a 
witness and is not required to render a word-by-word interpretation. The other 
one is a word perfect, consecutive interpretation. Experience in international 
commercial arbitration does not support the use of simultaneous interpretation. 
In Hungary Act IV of 2006 on Business Associations and Act V of 2006 on 
the Registration of Business Association, Registration Procedure by the Court 
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of Registration and on Final Settlement entered into force on 1st of July 2006. 
The language of these non-action procedures is Hungarian. Meanwhile foreign 
documents are often used in this procedure. The registration of business 
associations is in the public domain, it is therefore in the legal interest of 
businesses that the authentic Hungarian translation of foreign documents shall 
be available. In its annex the Business Associations Act provides for a number 
of cases where the authentic translation of foreign documents must be 
attached. 
The next chapter offers a detailed description of the legal status and 
activity of the Hungarian Office for Translation and Attestation Ltd. (OFFI by 
its Hungarian acronym). OFFI is a company in long-term state ownership. Its 
legal ancestor, the Central Translation Department was established by the 
government lead by Mr. Gyula Andrássy in 1886 and belonged to the Prime 
Minister's Office. Its head was the linguist József Ferencz. 
The year 1948 brought a significant change in the life of the Department. 
The Council of Ministers assigned the Minister of Justice to organize the 
Hungarian Office for Translation and Attestation. Its scope of activities was 
defined as follows: "1. Authentic translation of foreign language documents 
into Hungarian or other languages; either the full document or an important 
part thereof; 2. Attestation of a translation done by someone else; 3. Making a 
true copy of a foreign document; 4. Authentic interpretation". 
OFFI became a business entity in 1950 and in 1968 it was reorganised as a 
company. The scope of services was further enlarged in 1982: an expedited 
service was introduced, which meant that the letters of invitation and donation 
needed for travel purposes were translated on the day of the order if so required. 
After the change of the regime the role of the OFFI has become more and 
more important. OFFI assumed its current form on 25th April 1994 with a 
registered capital of 49.6 million forints and its seat in Budapest. Its scope of 
activities include four areas: 1) preparation of authentic translations; 2) language 
editing; 3) attestation of translations; 4) interpreting, whose main forms are as 
follows: liaison interpreting, consecutive interpreting (including court inter-
preting), technical interpreting (also known as interpreting for special purposes), 
and simultaneous interpreting. 
Advocacy of interpreters and translators is undertaken by the Hungarian 
Association of Translators and Interpreters. Its members work as professionals 
and receive financial consideration. 
Act XLI of 1991 on Notaries empowers the notary to issue a document in a 
foreign language if in possession of a relevant license issued by the Minister of 
Justice. However, the notary cannot attest a translation. Notaries' foreign 
language services cannot be equated with OFFI 's authentic translation services. 
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The monopoly of OFFI regarding the preparation of authentic translation 
and attestation was challenged in the Constitutional Court, however, the Court 
refused the petition reasoning that neither the preparation of authentic 
translations nor attestation or the issue of a true copy is an economic activity 
but is rather a state function, which can be provided for a fee. Thus OFFI, a 
business association established by the State, is providing a public function. 
The position of the Constitutional Court corresponds with the view whereby 
professional authentic translation and attestation are connected to a fundamental 
legal political and state interest and are performed on the basis of relevant 
statutory provisions. This unique state function is likely to be continued in its 
current system. 
The well-structured book is easy to understand by the non-legal reader. The 
authors supply ample bibliography. This is a work that duly deserves the 
interest of theoreticians as well as practitioners. 
Gábor Török 
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K A T A L I N S Z A M E L * 
Legal and Non-Legal Aspects of the Reform Process 
of the Hungarian Higher Education System 
Abstract. The essay surveys Hungarian higher educational reform in a historical perspective. 
Higher education is a special branch of public administration, where investment to human 
capital is of corollary importance even if the educational, research and fiscal autonomy of the 
given institutions is fully respected. The author investigates the legal aspects of how govern-
ment oversight and supervision (as envisaged in the communist model) has been dismantled 
over the past 25 years in Hungary. There is no doubt: with the development of institutional 
autonomy, state subsidies decline and higher educational institutions need to make an increasing 
effort to simultaneously maintain financial stability, meet market demands and reverse the 
current trend of deterioration regarding the quality of education. It is for this reason that the 
negotiations between higher educational institutions and the state must remain within the legal 
framework so that government supervision will not transform into total neglection. 
governance. 
Keywords: Hungarian higher education system, autonomy, institutions of higher education, 
university, college, credit system, normative financing, student loan, Credit Council 
Introduction: Higher Education-a Point of Conflict 
Preparatory work done in the process of drafting new legal regulation within a 
specific sphere of the law almost always brings up issues beyond the given 
subject tackled, and brings into focus contradictions that exist within the 
entirety of the legal system. This is a problem for scholars-who approach the 
legal regulation of a given sector with a scientific attitude-because the scientist 
can see beyond the specific task at hand, and when given the chance to draft 
law will inevitably try to, at the same time, remedy other internal conflict that 
exists within the legal system. This is particularly true when the task at hand is 
the regulation of an area known to be a key sector of the economy, and the 
nature of the reform to be rolled out is such that it promises comprehensive 
change, which-if successful-has the promise of leading to a paradigm shift. 
Senior Research Fellow, Institute f o r Legal Studies of the Hungar ian Academy of 
Sciences, H-1014 , Budapest . Országház u. 30. 
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It is no surprise that in similar situations the process of drafting law becomes 
closely tied to politics and becomes a point of conflict for politicians. In fact, the 
clash of interests that occurs in this phase can be quite beneficial to the process as 
a whole, because it can lead to an outcome that has a reasonable chance of being 
implemented in the end. It is far less fortunate if the process of legislation is 
caught in the crossfire of political animosity, and is faced with various interest 
groups strong enough to hijack the process, in the sense that their activity can 
lead to the neutralization of the most forward looking elements of the reform. 
There is no doubt that the population at large has always been keenly 
interested-in fact has been looking forward to-the changes affecting higher 
education, and it could also be seen that those Hungarian intellectuals working 
as academics employed by public universities have long been successful at 
slowing the pace of reforms. This attitude is rooted in their understanding that 
the intellectual capital represented by the concentration of their expertise at the 
universities makes them the most apt, competent, and committed body fit for 
the task. This very palpable intellectual advantage led to the birth of a concept 
of autonomy, which in practice meant the attempt to minimize dependency on 
the state. This endeavor was more-or-less successful, and also had the added 
benefit of providing a reasonably effective shield protecting higher education 
from attempts at change generated from outside-and this was true during even 
perhaps in the most dictatorial of political times. 
State-socialist management of higher education was-despite all its attempts-
merely a never fully implemented experiment at making higher education uniform 
by way of breaking up and breaking down university autonomy. However, 
higher education possessed a strong enough lobby position to maintain its 
relative independence at all times, and even increase the level of its autonomy 
when the time had become ripe for these measures to be brought. The reason 
why it is important to bring into the discussion these early steps of the reform 
of higher education that started in 2002 (and its outcome as well) is that the 
genesis of the process is essential to understanding the nature of the contra-
dictions the reform encountered after it was launched by the Hungarian 
Government in 2002. 
Education Reform as an Attempt at Breaking the Monopoly of State Control 
Law No. 1985. I. on Education was the first of its kind (enacted still in the time 
of state-socialism), in the sense that it was in fact reform oriented in practical 
terms, and not merely as a verbally declared goal. 
By the 1970's (during the years of the so-called new economic mechanism, 
when several sectors were targeted for real change) renewal of education had 
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also become necessary. Serious reform concepts were formulated by the staff 
of various government ministries involved with matters of higher education, 
but it was only in 1984 that these were complied into a single program of 
development that could serve as the basis for drafting a comprehensive new 
law. (Those directives that tried to introduce change prior to 1984 primarily 
attempted to reform the internal structure of institutions of higher education, 
but failed because the institutions only formally implemented the changes 
mandated, or did not do so at all.) The final draft of the law was based on the 
concepts outlined in the program, and therefore contained a lot of important 
changes to what was the declared purpose, content, and methodology of 
education, and the way educational and pedagogic institutions operated. As a 
novelty, it contained the rights of students of various ages, and dealt with the 
relations between educational institutions and society-issues that had previously 
been outside the scope of legal regulation. 
In 1985, when all levels of education were regulated in a single law for the 
first (and in fact also for the last) time, legislators attempted to draw up uniform 
principals and a common general section for the legal regulation of higher 
education and lower levels of education as well. This solution did not stand the 
test of time and proved unsuccessful from a legal perspective. This was due 
to the fact that both the internal management structures and outside control 
mechanisms of the two types of schools (lower and higher education) have 
different characteristics. 
General public education traditionally has had a management structure that 
is not collective in nature (even though the teaching staff also participates, and 
at times parents' representatives and even students do so as well), rather it is 
based on a system of personal responsibility of a single director. In contrast, at 
institutions of higher education-despite having a single person responsible for 
the proper management of the school-most important decisions are made by 
committee. 
Due to the fact that participation in public education is mandated by law 
up to a certain age, this branch of education has a relatively tight professional 
leadership control attached, which prescribes the substance of learning, in 
other words the material to be taught to students. This is true despite the fact 
that the degree, nature, and intensity of this leadership can vary a great deal, 
i.e. state regulation has varying degrees of detail and rigor. In contrast, higher 
education has traditionally been significantly freer in determining the content 
of what is being taught, in part because in this framework teaching is also tied 
to the principal of freedom of research (as a right of the academia). This makes 
it much easier for research findings to make their way into the textbooks and 
the substance of the curriculum, therefore larger discrepancies can be tolerated-
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and are in fact desirable-regarding the knowledge acquired and views held by 
various university students. There are further differences in how these institu-
tions are chartered and financed as well. 
Nevertheless, the legal definition of common principles that apply to all 
levels of education uniformly was politically important, and the new law did in 
fact cause a significant system-level overhaul to start in the sphere of education. 
(For example, it lead to more ethnic minority rights being observed, the 
reinstatement of various faith-based educational institutions, and more forceful 
attempts at advancing university autonomy.) However, a negative aspect of this 
single universal law was that certain nondesireable concepts and institutions 
were fixed by it, and solidified enough to be more difficult to change afterwards. 
It had regional political significance that the right was guaranteed by law 
for ethnic minorities to study using their native language at higher levels of 
education. There was another significant advance in comparison to the prior 
state of affairs, because for the first time a law declared the principal of 
professional independence for educational institutions, which was in stark 
contrast to state-socialist education policy, which-as stated previously-due to 
one of its main faults tried to force uniformity onto the system, (primarily in 
terms of ideology, but in other matters as well). 
The law attempted to make the organizational structure of institutions orderly 
by doing away with certain types of institutions (e.g. post-elementary school 
training institutions) and also removed the so-called university-like colleges, 
and so-called upper-level institutions. In the end, only the college and the 
university remained as the two exclusive (legitimate) forms that an institution 
of higher education could be chartered in. 
Following are the major regulations in connection with central administrative 
rights granting control over educational matters: 
- A "central director" capacity was granted over institutions of higher 
education for what was defined as a "direct" ministerial capacity, and 
maintained the concept of a "minister involved in training". (The latter 
concept is based on the fact that institutions of higher education were 
structurally under various ministers most closely associated with the given 
sector, and did not belong to the ministry of education itself.) 
- Building on the experience that the minister benefited a great deal in 
his/her director capacity from the support provided by expert-collectives, 
the law prescribed the participation of expert-committees with regard to 
certain activities of the directing ministers. 
- Proposal to widen the sphere of Tnaintainers' (i.e. institutions chartered 
by entities other than the state), but gave no further detailed regulation, 
instead turned the responsibility for the resolution of the issue over to 
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the Council of Ministers, with the added remark that-in general-the 
chartering of a new institution is conditional on the authorization of the 
Minister of Culture (who was-despite the often changing contempora-
neous name-also responsible for education matters). 
It was a significant change in the status of institutions of higher education 
that their professional independence was guaranteed at the level of law. The law 
took into account this principle and the duties of institutions of higher education 
when it determined the key areas of independence, which included the right to 
independently decide the substance of education, to organize scientific research 
programs, and to manage student matters with a large degree of independence; 
matters that institutions of higher education were required to manage based on 
their own fixed rules. According to the letter of the law, it is also a guarantee 
of independence that institutions of higher education gained the right to voice 
an opinion in all matters where the decision making power was the compe-
tence of the directing minister or other superior administrative body. In 
addition, institutions of higher education had the general right to make proposals; 
furthermore, the directing minister had a duty of passing on relevant infor-
mation to institutions that would be affected by certain planned measures. 
Management of institutions of higher education was split between the single 
person at the head of the institution-who carried overall liability for the general 
operation of the institution-, and various advisory committees; and in practice 
was their joint task. There were two different types of bodies that operated within 
institutions of higher education: representative councils and professional boards. 
Within the framework of separate legal regulations, institutions of higher 
education had the right to determine the makeup of both kinds of bodies, set 
the ratio of elected and appointed (invited) members; as well as the rules 
according to which these were set up and operated. The purpose of setting up 
professional bodies was to function as professional forums gathering expertise 
to support the interests of the institution and its educational activities, to foster 
productive interaction between theoretical and practical work, to organize and 
manage scientific research projects within the institutions, and to promote the 
interaction of various institutions of higher education. The professional bodies 
were not mandated to substitute representative councils, but were allowed to 
voice an opinion in professional matters, and the option was open for the 
professional bodies to be granted decision making power in relevant matters. 
The law contained provisions regarding the legal relations between host 
institution and student (at all levels), including regulations related to disciplinary 
liability; and it was an important new guarantee in the law that a rule allowed 
students to petition for the review of decisions handed down by institutions in 
disciplinary matters. 
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All things considered, the reform process that started in 1985 was a significant 
breakthrough: it lead to substantive change, as well as structural change, and 
in this sense these measures enjoyed longevity for some time to come. 
Undoubtedly, the 1985 reforms had the intention of decentralization. Twenty 
years ago this was an important achievement, if for no other reason, because it 
lead to a breakthrough in what had been an over-centralized education system. 
Nevertheless, it did not resolve certain fundamental issues. For example, there 
was no rule on how an institution of higher education can be chartered, so this— 
in practice-could only be done by maneuvering around the legal regulations, 
admission of new students (enrollment) was left open for central interference, 
therefore the inevitable subsequent growth of the student population was not 
backed by provisions for the necessary prerequisites of the enlargement. 
Political Changes and Continuity 
The 1990 change of political systems made the revision of all legal regulation 
providing the foundation for the operation of the education system necessary. 
It was in 1993 that the first post-change law was enacted, which dealt with 
higher education separately. This was a reasonable development not only 
based on the premier role higher education had been playing in the general 
development of the country, but also due to the growing signs within higher 
education of a need for increased autonomy coupled with louder voices against 
state intervention. Additionally, there was great need shown for the freeing of 
the system from the measures limiting the size of the student population, which 
had long been a practice of the central administration. Even though parts of the 
reform concept-which also took into account international trends-were ready 
as early as 1988, and by 1991 a detailed concept1 had been developed, but the 
debate over the concept (which was held in the widest possible sphere, and 
included all members of the teaching staff at institutions of higher education) 
slowed the process of drafting a bill a lot. 
There was significant resistance to the change, which restructured the system 
so that all institutions of higher education would belong under a single central 
managing organization (the government ministry in charge of education). This did 
affect the institutions financially, and as it would later turn out, they were affected 
negatively. The student population also became an active participant in the 
1
 Concept for Higher Education Development in Hungary. Budapest, 1991. Szamel. K. 
(ed.): A felsőoktatás és az állam |Higher Education and the Government], Budapest, 
1990. 
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preliminary debate of the bill, and their representatives lobbied hard to get the 
right to participate in the making of executive decisions in higher education. It 
turned out to be difficult to create a concept of a new financing protocol; 
specifically, the issue was: how to accurately calculate the true cost of higher 
education. Another objective was to find a way to cause the government to 
start treating higher education as a true priority (as opposed to the prior neglect), 
and at the same time result in higher education not being so dependent of 
central will. 
The preparatory work of this bill coincided with the constitutional and 
administrative reconfiguration of the Hungarian state, which was not a smooth 
process, nor was it particularly well planned in advance at the conceptual level. 
The time around the political changes was charged with an energy driving 
public administration in general towards a more decentralized model, which-at 
least at the beginning-affected legal regulation as well. This was primarily true 
at the level of local governments, but was also signaled by the fact that tasks 
previously accomplished by central administration were gradually transferred 
to other, autonomous organizations-NGO's such as public bodies, chambers of 
commerce, professional organizations, public foundations, etc. (A later reaction 
to what would prove to be an undesirable overachievement in decentralization 
was administrative recentralization, i.e. the reduction of the level of self-gov-
ernance.) 
Autonomy became a sort of mantra all across Hungarian public adminis-
tration, including the education sector, which was a natural reaction to the 
previously centralized system. In other words, this means the ridding of the 
education system of state influence, at least in theory, i.e. allowing the schools 
to be independent of central public administrative decision making in substantive 
and organizational matters alike, and it also means the strengthening of the 
internal leadership, as well as the role of teachers, academics in the internal 
governance of the institutions. 
So the 1993 regulation was focused on autonomy. The autonomy model 
adopted by the law was the "traditional" one based on the principal of freedom 
of research, to which the freedom of teaching was attached, (this is the so-
called Humboldt university model). This model of higher education is based on 
the understanding that the autonomy (self-governance and independent manage-
ment) of institutions of higher education as a rule is based on the constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing the freedom of learning, teaching, and scientific research, 
in addition to the constitutional principal of unity of teaching and research. 
This is so because these freedoms granted by the constitution have the best 
chance to be applied in practice within the framework of a system, where 
decision-making powers largely rest with those entitled with the specific 
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constitutional rights. A contrary system that has an opposite nature (such as 
public administrative-type management) can easily become desensitized and 
inpatient when it comes to violations a freedoms, and easily turns to unreason-
able restrictive measures when attempting to achieve its goals, (not unlike 
several cases from the historical past, including especially the decades of the 
state socialist regime). 
Institutions of higher education pressed hard for a right to participate in 
high-level science training as well as the power to issue science degrees (e.g. 
PhD, habilitation), a right that they-at the time probably somewhat overreaching-
tried to secure for themselves as an exclusive title granting them sole power 
over these matters. In essence the institutions laid a claim on the reinstatement 
of rights they enjoyed prior to the state-socialist regime, rights which starting 
in the 1950's (based in fact on the Soviet model) were given exclusively to the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, although not barring the participation of 
university professors either. 
The law provided the necessary framework for the practical application of 
yet another constitutional principle, when it prescribed for the state (as one of 
its duties) that it make higher education available to all citizens according to 
their abilities. In addition, it made the state responsible for providing financial 
support for this endeavor, and it made the government's duty to constantly 
develop education and guarantee the appropriate conditions for its operation. It 
was a particularly important mandate that the quota of admitted students be 
raised in relation to the entire young adult population, because the approximately 
10% participation ratio characteristic of the Hungarian system of that time was 
considered to be low not only compared to Western and Northern European 
averages, but in the country's own regional comparison as well. The proposed 
increase in the number of people admitted into the system of higher education 
was not just a whimsical notion, rather it was based on the rather sure bet that 
the infusion of more highly qualified professionals into the workplaces would 
bring about the growth of the economy, more precisely growth is a hardly 
manageable target without more experts with up-to-date knowledge. The 
education system also had to be tuned to the developments of European norms-a 
moving target itself. In order to make that work, the Hungarian higher education 
system had to be restructured with the addition of new, more specialized fields 
of study and corresponding narrow curricula, taking over from the domination 
of fewer choices of majors that had been providing a more general blend of 
knowledge. 
The law maintained the two basic types of intuitions of higher education, 
i.e. the university and the college, which basically differ in the nature of the 
programs and their relative length. (Universities provide a primarily scientifically-
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oriented education that normally runs five or six years, while colleges orient 
their programs towards practical training and issue degrees after three or four 
years of full time study.) Even at that time the proposal to get rid of the college 
category was on the table, but the 'college lobby' found support in foreign 
countries and managed to influence decision making inside the Hungarian 
Government. 
An institution of higher education could either be a state school, or school 
sanctioned by the state (a non-state school is generally run by a foundation or 
by a faith-based organization). Nevertheless, the difference in ownership status 
did not automatically attach the duty for non-state schools to finance their 
operation, as all institutions presented a need for the state to finance their 
activities. (In connection with the constitution's guarantees of religious freedom 
and freedom of personal conviction, the law gave separate rules for those non-
state universities and colleges that provide theological training. Faith-based 
educational institutions, however, started other types of programs as well, 
based on the somewhat weak argument, that they are in fact performing the 
duty of the state by doing so, because education is in high demand, and state 
schools do not admit sufficient numbers of students.) 
It was also at this time that in response to the demands made by the 
institutions of higher education all of them were listed by name in an appendix 
of the law. The institutions hoped that this high level of state sanction would 
automatically be a guarantee of financing for them. However, since there was 
no set rule on the procedure of founding new institutions of higher education-
true in the case of even the state schools - , an unusual trend developed. The 
state would add to the appendix (listing institutions of higher education) those 
institutions that already had come into existence and were already functioning, 
(and each time this required the legislative act of amending the law). It was 
therefore no surprise that a virtual rush started to charter new schools as a 
result of the new law, and it should have been no less surprising that the central 
budget of the state could not keep pace with the exponentially ballooning 
financial burden the fast paced quantitative development brought. 
The law made it the competence of the Government to set the rules for 
degree-requirements, and the right to approve the starting of new programs and 
the cancellation of existing ones in so-called 'basic training' (undergraduate 
core curriculum). The rationale behind this decision was that this was supposed 
to guarantee a desired level of uniformity of the requirements among various 
institutions of higher education offering the same kind of degree program. 
Additionally, this was to be a proof and state guarantee of the value of diplomas 
for citizens, and was to contribute towards the future goal of international 
recognition of the diplomas issued by Hungarian schools (equivalence). In 
212 KATALIN SZAMEL 
practice, this measure, which was meant to offer guarantees, lead to a flood of 
new regulation, which it turn ended up making the entire system too rigid. This 
would prove to be a hindrance in the effort to update the substance of the 
education programs. Furthermore, the attempt at making degree requirements 
uniform across schools offering similar programs slowed the work, as it was 
difficult to find a consensus, and harmonize the various needs of different 
institutions in a single government decree. The launching of new departments 
was also a complicated matter, yet the logic of the system was such that it 
encouraged institutions to establish increasing numbers of new departments, 
because doing so could be used as yet another way of making the case for 
getting access to state financial resources. (Logical sequence: new program 
need, authorization of new department, new additional enrollment capacity 
added, additional normative financing from state budget issued based on the 
number of students admitted.) 
The 1993 law called into life the common bodies of central administrative 
organizations on the one hand and the autonomous institutions of higher 
education on the other, and an intermediate body called the Higher Education 
(Scientific) Council, as well as the (Hungarian) Accreditation Committee. 
The Higher Education (Scientific) Council had-and still has-a very important 
right to define priorities of development programs affecting the whole of the 
higher education system, and has influence over scientific research activity done 
in the framework of higher education, and over the higher education institution 
system's organizational structure, as well as student population quotas, and last 
hut not least advises the state on the budget of higher education. The Higher 
Education (Scientific) Council is well balanced between universities and colleges, 
and this body also includes all government ministers involved in education, 
outside professional experts, representatives of cultural institutions, economic 
players, and society at large; parties that were supposed to represent the needs 
of higher education, and those financing and taking on the output of the system. 
In this period of higher education reaching a mass scale it was particularly 
important that quality be upheld with regard to all aspects of the various tasks 
of institutions of higher education, so that the value of the service provided by 
a particular school be measured by the comparison of the set requirements 
obliging the school to perform well and the actual results related to their 
performance. The premier guarantee of the high quality of higher education is 
(coded into) the system itself, therefore procedures had to be devised, a system 
had to be created that made it possible (and in fact mandatory) for particular 
institutions of higher education and the community of institutions of higher 
education to routinely use the tool of self-evaluation; and additionally, procedures 
that would allow the latter to make a contribution to the preparatory process of 
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governmental decision making. Based in part on foreign models, the law called 
into life the Accreditation Committee, which is made up of domestic and 
international experts, local and foreign members of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, and additional expert bodies' representatives. They jointly evaluate 
the system's functioning and also set the key values that translate into priorities 
for its development. Once the Accreditation Committee was established, a 
comprehensive evaluation process, a sort of general fact finding audit of all 
institutions of higher education followed, which resulted in the issuing of 
accreditation certificates representing proof of quality (institutional accreditation). 
It was probably due to the attitude inherited from the previous political 
system characterized by decades of dictatorial rule that the properly devised 
accreditation system was in practice quickly corrupted into a lobbyist club, a 
sort of mechanism serving interests of those better-connected institutions in the 
battle over support. Actual quality was replaced by just the proof of quality, 
and those institutions with lesser political capital and weak networking activity 
were left behind in the competition for financial resources allocated to 
development. 
In practice, neither the accreditation procedure, nor the operation of the 
Higher Education Council had fully developed operational rules providing proper 
guarantees, therefore only the government minister's right (tied to the obligation 
of an explanation) to change the decisions made remained as a possible recourse 
or protection for those institutions that were negatively affected by a given 
decision. However, since even this ministerial overrule procedure was not 
fortified with unambiguous legal regulation, this institution only increased the 
level of unpredictability of the decision making process, instead of providing 
true guarantees. 
The law was meant to have another type of guarantee for the protection of 
institutional autonomy. The Constitutional Court was given jurisdiction over 
matters where the state was suspected to have infringed the rights of institu-
tions, yet in practice this institution proved to be just a threat of sanction with 
some chilling-effect on would-be violators of autonomy, because although 
most decisions handed down by the Constitutional Court would rule in favor of 
the party seeking an injunction, nevertheless it had no real power to remedy 
the unconstitutional situation. 
The law also gave specific rules on the internal structure of the institutions, 
including the legal framework of the management configuration. The university 
had a single person in charge, the 'president '-so in this case the system 
remained unchanged-, and the college was led by a 'head director'. Even 
though financial matters were assigned to a financial officer, nevertheless the 
head director remained the person liable for financial matters as well. While 
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this made the finance department subject to interference, it did not on the other 
hand mean that the president could in fact be held liable in case of financial 
misconduct. 
In the defense of autonomy, a much more robust protection would have 
been to have subjected those decisions made in a state administrative capacity 
to the rules of state administrative procedure. However, the law left this question 
open, therefore these decisions not clearly defined as being issued by an 
authority could not be voided in a state administrative legal action. (Even the 
2005 law only managed to remedy this problem in part.) 
The various representative bodies-primarily the (university, college) 
Councils-got a significant role in the management of institutions of higher 
education. Students' representatives also had a presence in the Councils, and 
their participation was not merely symbolic, as they held one third of the seats. 
Even at the time of this rule going into force it was understood, that the 
presence of student representation was desirable only in those cases when the 
presented issue was related to students' rights. However, pressure from society 
was strong enough (in favor of giving more rights to students at the time) to 
make the stance that would have curtailed these rights politically unacceptable; 
because that was the norm at this early stage of the process of building a 
democracy, when all actual (or predicted) faults could still be attributed to a 
'general lack of democracy' in the system. 
It was another important feature strengthening independence that the insti-
tutions were allowed to write their own rulebooks. The government minister in 
charge was given the authority to act as watchdog over these rulebooks, making 
sure they were in accordance with all legal regulation, and it was also the 
minister who had the power to annul any rule that was in conflict with the law. 
This power was not, however, tied to any time limit; therefore the minister 
could expunge any institutional rule at any time. In case of the rulebooks, the 
rationale behind not including a statute of limitations was that it was expected that 
after the law was enacted all institutions would write their own rulebook more 
or less simultaneously, making the only viable oversight body-the government 
ministry-scramble in an effort to try meeting a deadline in its effort to fulfill 
its controlling duty. It was not particularly the case of the rulebooks that made 
the lack of a deadline problematic, rather it was in the case of other decisions 
that this posed a question of harmony with rule-of-law-state requirements, 
because this led to uncertainty. (For a short period between 1998 and 2000, an 
amendment of the Higher Education Act did contain a statute of limitations 
connected to this area, but this too was later taken out of the text. The decision 
making process surrounding this issue also had a background in politics. How-
ever, since the background story of this process is tied to particular individuals 
LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE REFORM PROCESS. 215 
rather than theoretical considerations, a description of this matter would be 
immaterial to the present discussion.) 
It was due to the 1993 law that the institution of the tuition fee was intro-
duced into the system of higher education-even though this was only a short-
lived measure. It is somewhat difficult to understand why the administration 
unexpectedly cancelled the merely symbolic amount charged as tuition just at a 
time when following the initial upheaval, the population finally accepted the 
new measure. Instead, a significantly more unfair institution was introduced, the 
so-called 'expense-compensation' system, which affected only those applicants 
who did not get one of the limited number of state financed enrollment places," 
but were willing and able to pay a fee in the compensation-based system. (This 
fee is approximately fifty times the amount of what the original tuition fee 
used to be, and even at the time of its introduction it was twenty times higher 
than the universal contribution all students had to pay previously.) In practice, 
the expense-compensation money is just a supplemental income for institutions 
of higher education. As a legal institution, its validity is highly debatable, as it 
is not at all obvious that it is not discriminative, that it does not violate the 
standard of equality, although the truth is that it works.) 
The law-by granting the right of association-created a conducive environ-
ment for the fruitful interaction between institutions of higher education and 
their social environment (especially other scientific institutions, various 
institutions of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in particular), and in theory 
opened the way for institutions of higher education to join one another. (In 
this context, the word join refers to a completely open legal institution, and 
from the perspective of legal dogmatics it could probably use a degree of 
clarification, but since it is also included in the 'local government law', it is 
clearly understood to be one type of a public law contract, and is definitely not 
a type of civil law enterprise. Today it is known in the law as the 'cooperation 
agreement'.) Voluntary cooperation started among institutions based on the 
law, but without fusion. This would probably have continued, had it not been 
for the so-called 'integration' started in the meantime by yet another new 
initiative of the state, leading to several fusions of institutions. 
Institutions of higher education administer an entrance examination and those 
applicants scoring high enough to rank them in the top percentile-a number determined 
by various factors each year-get admission with an automatic full tuition scholarship 
attaché. 
2 1 6 KATALIN SZAMEL 
Yet Another Attempt at Reform, which Forces Development, by Decree, 
Instead of Supporting It 
Between 1993 and 1996 there were several attempts at writing a White Book 
of Hungarian higher education. Several groups laid their proposals on the table, 
but they could not in the end come to an agreement. The 1995 Parliament 
Resolution on the priorities of the development of higher education ( 107/1995) 
was a significant step forward in the right direction, which did in fact serve as 
an action plan for a few years to follow. During this short successive period 
Hungarian higher education had some well-defined general objectives that 
unified the development process across the sector. 
A comprehensive set of modifications was applied to the Higher Education 
Act in 1997, which caused some irreversible changes to occur.1 It was during 
this period that the so-called integration of Hungarian higher education passed 
the point of no return, i.e. the fusion of various independent institutions 
(comprised of several departments that were located physically close to one 
another) into a single organizational unit. In 1996 the government ministry in 
charge of higher education was assigned to the liberal party, and it attempted 
to conduct this process with the financial support of the World Bank and 
intended to closely tie it to the general development of higher education, but 
unfortunately the reform had to be done in the absence of this outside capital 
infusion. Integration-although without being based on the necessary infra-
structural investment-did go through in the end. During the summer of 1999 
Parliament reconfigured the Hungarian higher education institutional system, 
which caused the overall number of existing institutions to be halved as of 
January 2000. (In May of 2003 there were 18 state-run universities, 12 state-
run colleges; non-state run institutions of higher education were represented 
by 5 universities run by faith-based organizations, and 21 colleges run by 
faith-based organizations; and additionally, there was I public foundation-run 
university, and 9 foundation-run colleges.) 
The introduction of a requirement making the preparation of so-called 'institu-
tional development plans' mandatory for individual institutions was an important 
development, as it forced higher education in general to do complex and detailed 
strategic planning. Mandatory strategic planning made it possible for the newly 
integrated institutions to list their development objectives comprehensively, to 
1
 These changes are compiled in a textbook prepared for a particular public administra-
tion specialty exam Szamel, K. (ed.): A felsőoktatás igazgatása és tudományirányítás a 
felsőoktatásban [Management of Higher Education and Science Management in Higher 
Education], Budapest, 1998. 
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define the strategy they propose to fulfill their goals, in essence laying the ground-
work for the process of securing the necessary financial resources. A negative 
side effect was that not all decisions were made independently, i.e. in line with 
organic development; therefore its truly positive advantages could hardly be 
sensed. Furthermore, it caused a psychological backlash rather than a positive 
attitude to emerge, nevertheless from the perspective of the state it brought the 
advantage of having to keep track of and contact with fewer institutions. 
Another lasting legacy of the 1997 amendment of the law was the intro-
duction of the credit-system, and not just any system, but one conforming to 
the principals of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS)-a measure that 
undoubtedly had distinct advantages from the perspective of future development. 
This was also the period when the transitioning to the so-called normative 
financing protocol occurred, which was based on a combination of the specific 
number of enrolled students and the cost of providing higher education in the 
given specialty field. The openly declared rationale behind this move was that 
this system intended to secure the appropriate level of financing for the institu-
tions from the central budget, based on separately defined numbers for each 
specialty field. This was done despite the fact that this system was already 
known to be outdated even at the time of its inception. The system was so 
poorly designed, that it caused the amount of per capita financing within the 
student population (corrected for inflation) to be halved by the end of the 
following ten-year period. 
The student loan system was also introduced after 1998, as the size of the 
student population enrolled in higher education was steadily increasing. One of 
the most important characteristics of the Hungarian higher education system in 
the period before 2002 was the exponential increase in the number of people 
wanting to participate. (There was a marked increase between 1998 and 2002, 
as overall enrollment numbers rose by more than 30%. The total number of 
students enrolled in higher education almost quadrupled between 1990 and 2002, 
although it has to be added that almost half of the currently enrolled students 
participate in the expense-compensation system, i.e. they tmesleves are res-
ponsible for the cost of their education, and the state does not cover them.) 
Between 1990 and 2002 the total size of the academic staff grew from 
16,319 to 23,151, i.e. the increase was only 42%. When this figure is related to 
the size of the student population, it shows that the instructor/student ratio grew 
from 6.2 to 16.5-a number that is similar to the ratio found in the European 
Union. 
The dual nature of Hungarian higher education remained unchanged, i.e. 
college and university education continued to coexist in parallel universes, 
because they did not line up in a sequential system (as undergraduate colleges, 
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and graduate programs at universities do in some foreign systems), and their 
share of the student population remained stable at an approximate even split. 
There were several additional components of the reform that could be 
mentioned, which had only a short-lived positive effect immediately following 
their inception. These were either not very chiseled legal solutions even in the 
original form they were passed in, or they became dysfunctional after some 
time, and thus they contributed to lessening the overall affect of the original 
intentions. The system's response to these anomalies was a never-ending stream 
of additional measures, which in part led to positive reform steps, but in part 
had only a temporary-patch nature. 
The state administered, top-heavy reforms that occurred in Hungary, and the 
increased autonomy, but lack of strict state supervision led to the undesirable 
survival of trends that should long have disappeared had a bona fide market 
economic model been successfully implemented in higher education. 
- Instead of making their programs more up-to-date and their operations 
financially more viable, the institutions concentrated on increasing enroll-
ment numbers, because they understood the somewhat inflated student 
body to be the key of their economic survival. This was logical thinking 
on their part, since the system of financing encouraged them to do so. 
- The "hunger" in society for diplomas masked the alarming trend that 
'diploma factories' could continue to operate with sate financial backing, 
despite the fact that they did not follow the logic of the market, instead 
were based on a statist model of a pseudo-market; a market deformed by 
the state. 
- These circumstances caused the state to end up having to do the work 
of patching up the system's faults; therefore dependence on the state 
remained a fact of life in higher education, while referring to autonomy 
could defeat reform proposals. 
- It is no overstatement that the functioning model evolved into a routine of 
micro-management, where the system was governed via direct contact 
between the Ministry and the institutions, the integrity of which the 
Ministry tried to maintain by trying to remedy problems that were the 
results of errors at the core of the system itself. 
Has Hungary Really Joined the European Higher Education Area? 
All successive administrations were aware that development of higher education 
would require additional financing, but none were able to make this go 
through during annual bargaining over the numbers of the central budget. The 
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overstretched central budget could not allocate resources to the continuous 
development of the infrastructure of higher education, since it was already 
carrying the increased burden of financing the operational spending of the 
bloated system, filled with a growing number of students. Solutions had to 
be found that would release the system of higher education from the pressure 
of being a plaything of the annual fight over the budget, and thus manage to 
relatively stabilize the position of the institutions of higher education. 
Undoubtedly, this was one of the motivations behind the new wave of reforms 
that started in 2002. So the reality was that solely the Bologna Declaration or 
the Bologna Process did not initiate this reform, but the system itself needed 
comprehensive change regardless. 
When the Ministry of Education launched the Accession to the European 
Higher Education Area project (CSEFT) in September of 2002, the Minister's 
intention was to comprehensively audit the system in order to identify its 
deficiencies and create an action plan based on this investigation, which lists 
the new targets. The review process involved dozens of renowned experts, 
each with decades of experience in conducting research into the workings of 
higher education systems. The several thousand pages of findings included the 
review of all problems of higher education, and the group made the case for 
starting a comprehensive and truly radical reform process. In the end, after 
running its course for about two years, its scope went beyond a certain level 
and became more particular in nature than what could be regulated at the level 
of law. The program grew to be a set of programs affecting higher education as 
a whole.4 
Several inventive solutions were found in the studies submitted as part of 
the process of formulating the final concept, but the time was not deemed right 
by the Ministry of Education for these to be put into practice. Consequently, 
these tasks were left for the new education cabinet to be formed after the 2006 
4
 Magyar Felsőoktatás [Hungarian Higher Education], 2002. 7., 8., 9. contain a 
series of submissions on the topic of the Bologna Process. Available online at 
http://www.ph.hu/ph/mf/index.html 
Barakonyi K.: Sorbonne-tól Prágáig: A „Bolonyai folyamat" I. [From the Sorbonne to 
Prague: the Bologna Process I.], Magyar Felsőoktatás, 2002. 7. 19-21: Dinya L.: A 
„Bolonyai folyamat" a duális képzési rendszer szemszögéből I. [The Bologna Process from 
the Perspective of the two-cycle education system I.], Magyar Felsőoktatás, 2002. 7. 24-25; 
Dinya L.: A „Bolonyai folyamat" a duális képzési rendszer szemszögéből II. [The 
Bologna Process f rom the Perspective of the two-cycle education system II )., Magyar 
Felsőoktatás, 2002. 8. 22-25. CSEFT: http://www.univpress.hu/data/cseft.pdf; The Bologna 
Process: http://www.aic.lv/ace/bologna/Prg_berl/join_mas.pdf; Components of the Hungarian 
Universitas Program: http://www.aic.lv/ace/bologna/Prg_berl/join_mas.pdf 
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parliamentary elections to tackle. The new Minister did not reject all these 
proposals, and therefore some of these leftover ideas were implemented. 
The formulation of the concept started in 2002 with a critically-minded and 
unabashed evaluation of the contemporaneous situation, and at the same time 
the question had to be answered: to what degree does the Hungarian system 
harmonize with European trends?5 During the work such an arsenal of 
solutions was laid on the table for various problems that their abundance was 
surprising even for those involved in formulating the concept. The preliminary 
work was being distilled into a uniform concept during what was a somewhat 
difficult process, as many equally important components were vying for a final 
place in the text of the draft law. On the one hand, experience showed that 
reforms changing too many elements of the system at the same time ended up 
failing, on the other hand some other changes would inevitably require several 
additional changes to be made in sequence. Changes are best carried out not 
simultaneously, rather following a predetermined timeline, i.e. according to a 
pacing that is relatively slow, but one that can potentially prevent the trend of 
faulty measures making their way into and remaining in the system from 
continuing, as had often been the case with previous reform attempts. 
Making this a priority, the draft went through several revisions and 
compacting, and-as expected-several elements lost some degree of their 
"radicalism". 
The forecasted cuts of the education budget to be the expected trend in 
coming years certainly do not infuse the higher education sector with a large 
degree of optimism, because even the most narrow program that can be seen 
as being of reform-quality would require spending that is not at all secured in 
the current economic environment in Hungary. Consequently, event though the 
reform would likely produce savings in the long run (as it did in several other 
countries), directors running the various institutions of higher education in 
Hungary only sense at this time that the state is gradually withdrawing from 
financing higher education instead of increasing investment, and in this sense 
abandons the institutions. 
Hrubos, L: A felsőoktatás intézményrendszerének átalakulása a fejlett országok-
ban [Development of Higher education Systems in Developed Countries). Európa Eórum, 
1998. 1. 21-34; Structural Problems of Higher Education Systems in the Age of Mass 
Education. In: Temesi J. (ed.): 50 éves a Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem. 
Jubileumi ülésszak [50 Years of the Budapest University of Economic Sciences, Jubilee 
Session], Budapest, 1998. 1522-1530; Hrubos, I.: Transformation of the Hungarian 
Higher Education System in the 1990's. Civic Education Project. Discussion Series 
1999. 2. 13. 
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The actual goal of formulating a 'development concept' is-even if it is to 
serve as the foundation for the future bill to be passed by legislators-is not to 
produce a polished text with legal instruments formulated with exacting detail. 
Instead, the goal is to produce material that can then be converted into a legal 
form of the reform. Even though the program that was formulated did in fact take 
into account the legal framework, and its makers were aware of the limitations 
the system itself would pose from the perspective of implementation, never-
theless they focused their attention not on identifying these potential sources of 
conflict, instead these experts worked hardest on substantive matters, which 
were related to actual developmental questions from the perspective of 
education. 
The bill (new Higher Education Act) based on the concept was eventually 
passed in 2005, which caused paradigm shifts to occur in the following areas, 
discussed below: 
1. Most important is the transitioning to the multi-level system (cycles). The 
greatest challenge with this was that traditionally in Hungary, the dual-system 
was not organized according to vertically integrated tiers, rather the two 
systems (the college, and the university) were issuing parallel diplomas at the 
same level of certification. This was the base system that had to be reformed 
so that even the three-year (college) programs could qualify as acceptable 
prerequisites (foundations) for graduate-level programs issuing master's degrees. 
There were also the added objectives (due to financial considerations) that 
theoretically all students ought to be able to potentially go onto studying at a 
master's level, but in practice only the more talented students should actually 
get into a master's program, which was financed at a higher per capita rate. It 
is difficult to define specific numbers in relation to this objective, but the law, 
nevertheless, managed to fix the number of students going onto the second tier 
of training at approximately one third of the number of students graduating 
at the lower prerequisite level. This was at least the criterion for centrally 
financed enrollment places. 
Even though there was intense objections to accepting the changes in the 
beginning, it seems that by now most institutions have accepted the Bologna 
education method, and have either registered to participate in the system, or 
have a registration process of their so-called Bologna Departments underway. 
In addition to the two basic tiers (or with the post-graduate training the three 
training cycles) there are several supplementary forms of training providing 
further specialized knowledge or additional expertise in a shorter period time. 
According to the law, even colleges are certified to conduct training and to 
issue diplomas at all levels, but in the long run it is predicated that the dual-
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system (of parallel institutions) will cease to exist (because it will lose all 
rationality), or alternatively the nature of colleges will change: (instead of 
being specialized-science-oriented institutions they will likely become training 
centers offering a more practical-training-oriented education.) 
The set of reform measures necessitates the updating of the credit system. 
At the present time, the Hungarian education system does not fully take 
advantage of the true value, or the full potential of the credit system. This is 
yet another proof that if a certain new measure-even if it is a very rational and 
progressive one at its core-is introduced into the system without the affected 
people who work in the system truly sensing the necessity of it. then the state 
mandated changes only produce hollow results that are more for show than 
bona-fide change, therefore the desired results leading to increased rationality 
are usually lacking in the end. One could identify important socio-psycho-
logical characteristics here, if this were a relevant subject matter in the present 
discussion, but it is more important in this context to state the fact that in the 
end it was not a fruitless and completely irrational measure on the part of the 
state to force the introduction of the credit system, because its 1997 launching 
has by now led to positive results. Already, it has demonstrable advantages 
from the perspective of the students: in the event a student does not meet the 
prescribed requirements in a particular academic year, it does not automatically 
result in having to repeat the entire academic year, rather the system is able 
to accommodate individual differences by taking into account personal 
disadvantages as well as evaluating progress on a student by student basis. In 
order for this to work properly the system must be developed further, but at 
least the foundation of a properly operating system is now in place. 
2. Reform concepts formulated in advance of the 2005 Law were guided by 
intentions to fundamentally change the system of financing in such a way that 
it would secure the long-term continuous functioning of higher education, and 
somehow cover gaps in financing where the state does not provide the 
necessary funds. The original reform concept was that admitted students would 
receive their share of state financial aid via a "virtual student-voucher", which 
also functions as a sort of state financed loan, and is to be paid back to the 
central state budget over the course of a graduate's professional career. This 
would have secured the necessary additional financial resource that the system 
had always been lacking. The long term repayment scheme-as things stand 
today-has been neglected in favor of introducing a short term institutional 
financing scheme, which is essentially based on the premise that students are 
to contribute to the cost of their education, which can be financed optionally 
by taking out student loans. Nevertheless, free higher education is tied to 
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performance (a set GPA), and even in its current form covers only ten percent 
of the student population. 
There were other inventive solutions proposed as well, starting with the 
premise that the state's inability to finance the system would be overcome by a 
sort of delayed privatization, but this solution was deemed unacceptable in the 
end not only by representatives of higher education but by politicians as well. 
This proposed solution had only a very slight representation in the final text of 
the law as it was passed, and this was in the form of the right to acquire real 
property being expanded to include state financed institutions of higher 
education as well, although with the limitation that their purchases can only be 
financed with revenue derived from their own entrepreneurial activity. (Some 
believe even this limited right to be an extremity, as they hold that privati-
zation should have no place in higher education even at a conceptual level.) 
The 2005 law, however, allows the transfer of the right of a maintainer to 
finance a particular institution. 
The idea has been repeatedly proposed that the legislature ought to pass a 
separate higher education financing law, since an increasing portion of the 
current Higher Education Act is taken up by the regulations related to financing, 
which are all executed via government decrees, whereby the rules, in practice, 
change with annual regularity, to make it possible to break down the annual 
budget according to current needs. This creates an uncertain situation for the 
institution, which encourages them to spend without prudence, because they 
cannot rely on a long-term predictable cash flow guaranteeing that develop-
ment projects they start would have finishing funds provided by necessary 
budget appropriations. Perhaps the time is still not yet ripe for this new system 
of financing to be implemented, but there are attempts at formulating a new 
'credit-financing' system based on funds allocated according to credit units.6 
The poor balance sheets of the institutions made it unavoidable that rules 
be formulated providing additional economic freedom for intuitions of higher 
education, allowing more financial leeway for them than what was the norm 
for other budgetary organizations. As of 2003, the State Finance Act includes 
a rule that allows individual institutions of higher education to internally 
reallocate financial resources they are apportioned in the central budget; 
furthermore, they are allowed to keep and accumulate moneys not spent in a 
given year, to maintain a separate account for revenues they themselves generate, 
6
 Temesi J. (ed.): Finanszírozás és gazdálkodás a felsőoktatásban [Financing and 
Financial Management in Higher Education]. Budapest, 2004. 443; Polonyi, I.: Ok-
tatásgazdaságtan és oktatáspolitika [Education Economics and Education Policy], 
http://www2.zskf.hu/media/oktpolea05.ppt 
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to conduct entrepreneurial activity free of taxation, to sell real estate for the 
financing of development projects, to set up a venture fund, and to take out 
loans. The law regulates the setting up of a provision of cover fund, which is a 
legal form created for the combined participation of multiple institutions of 
higher education wanting to conduct infrastructural development projects. 
(Since this was already regulated in 2003, the new Higher Education Act of 
2005 incorporated rules that already existed.) 
3. Another important issue that needed resolution was the organizational 
reform of the state management and oversight structure and its ways and means. 
The concept the law was based on included radical reform proposals in this 
area as well, which not only affected the competency of Parliament, the 
Government, and the Minister, but also proposed that the legal framework of 
intermediate bodies be more exactingly and narrowly defined. Above all, it 
attempted to more unambiguously define the scope of competency of each 
such body, giving special attention to ridding the system of redundant 
parallelisms, ending the trend of the decisions of the Hungarian Accreditation 
Committee (MAB) having administrative authority function, and the restricting 
of the advisory function of the Higher Education Council to just economic issues. 
Since administrative authority functions were not native to the original 
tasks of the accreditation committee (as an accreditation committee is charged 
with certifying quality and not with authorizing operation), it was logical that 
these functions would have to be charged to another organization, even if this 
had the unpleasant consequence of having to set up an additional new body, 
in order to avoid the situation, where the organization that would hand down 
decisions related to operational matters would be of a kind, which was producing 
decisions that could not be overruled. Therefore, some of the administrative 
functions of the education sector were assigned to the competence of the new 
registration center. These matters fell under the rules of state administrative 
procedure, and had a judgment of first instance power. 
A new characteristic of the law is that procedures related to the operational 
matters of institutions of higher education-from the chartering of a new insti-
tution to giving tenure to a university professor-are regulated in detail, including 
exact definition of the tasks and competence-limits of those participating in 
the process, as well as the similarly detailed regulation of legal redress. Some 
of the administrative functions of the education sector were assigned to the 
competence of the new registration center. These matters fell under the rules of 
state administrative procedure, and had a judgment of first instance power. 
The following were entirely new organizational tasks: quality management, 
higher education information system, operation of the career-tracking system; 
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and the institution of the Office of the Commissioner for Educational Rights, 
and the Mediation Service for Education (OKSZ). The legal oversight of the 
operation of the maintainers of the institutions is allocated to sector manage-
ment (Government Ministry), while the legal oversight of the institutions 
themselves is a right of its maintainer. 
There were conceptual conflicts surrounding the management function of 
the maintainers and other management rights residing with state management 
agencies. The new law had to resolve these conflicts by sharply demarcating 
the various competences and clearly assigning rights to just one sphere or 
the other without overlapping. The maintenance and management tasks of 
institutions of higher education include the chartering, the closing, and the 
reorganization of institutions; the right to regulate budgetary issues, to set 
operational rules, the right to perform the duties of an employer, the right 
to make appointments, as well as the guaranteeing of lawful operation, and 
institutional autonomy. These tasks of the maintainers are uniformly described 
in reference to all institutions, whether they are state-run or not. 
4. The concept that was the foundation of the 2005 Law prescribed a manage-
ment model that-reflecting some other European examples-would essentially 
separate the academic and economic management of the institutions into two 
independent units that cooperate with each other. In this scenario, the Institu-
tional Council in charge of economic management would have been the body 
accountable for prudent institutional financial management and in charge of 
strategic targets-all the while cooperating with academic management. In this 
system, the president's supreme power within the institution would have been 
curtailed, as he/she would have become the mere executor of the decisions of 
the Institutional Council, a radical shift in competences. 
Not surprisingly, this was the one measure that ran into the strongest 
opposition from the institutions and even led to an uproar, so much so that in 
the end they managed to block this structural change. While this proposal of 
the Education Cabinet did reach the legislature, and in fact the bill was passed 
by Parliament with the new structure included, nevertheless the Constitutional 
Court7 struck this passage from the law based on an argument that institutional 
autonomy needed to be protected. The case was brought by the President of 
Hungary based on an argument founded on the fact, which was later upheld by 
the court in its decision, that Section 70/A of the Hungarian Constitution 
prescribes the freedom of sciences. The decision also included references to 
previous practices of the Court, and to the opinion that this freedom cannot be 
7
 Constitutional Court Decision No. 41/2005. (X. 27.). 
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exercised without the right to have a say in the operational matters of the 
institution. 
The consequence of the Constitutional Court Decision was that (he law had 
to be amended in order to fill the gap left by the struck passages. Since the 
governing bodies proposed by the concept, which would have been the executive 
bodies that would have exercised the right of economic management (derived 
from the rights assigned to the maintainers) could not be set up, these rights are 
exercised on the one hand by the Senate, as the highest level executive body of 
an institution of higher education, and on the other hand by the maintainer. 
Additionally, the so-called economic council was created, which is charged 
with the task of preparing materials in advance of decision making, and the 
right to formulate an opinion on economic decisions made in the institution. 
It was also based on the Constitutional Court decision that the rights of the 
maintainer were revised: the maintainer is charged with the oversight of the 
lawful operation of the institution, but has no direct ability to intervene in 
operational matters, rather if the maintainer's repeated requests to correct some 
perceived operational malfunction is not fulfilled and the problem is not 
remedied, then the maintainer can initiate court proceedings in order for the 
court to declare the violation of the law. According to the new regulation, the 
maintainer sets the figure allocated to the institution as its financing, but the 
maintainer's approval of the specific budget (line items) is no longer required. 
This series of measures running their course over a five-year period 
eventually led to an outcome where institutions of higher education have 
increased financial independence and economic autonomy. This economic 
autonomy is the true basis for professional autonomy, because realistically no 
professional decision-making power can be properly exercised without the 
appropriate economic decision-making rights. 
There were several additional issues regulated by the law, such as: 
- The diplomas and other certificates issued within the education system 
had to have a system of comparing them. 
- A new aspect of the law is that it gives specific guarantees in relation to 
the legal relationship between the student and the institution, including 
the way they enter into this relationship, maintain it, suspend it, or 
dissolve it. 
- It is in connection with the legal relationship between student and 
institution that the law regulates the differentiated higher education 
admission system, with the declared goal that those students performing 
at the highest level nationally within the secondary school system (built 
around a uniform requirement set) get those enrollment positions in 
higher education that are state financed. (This is true with all cycles of the 
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system: basic level, masters level, doctoral training, as well as speciali-
zation training, and accredited higher vocational training. 
- The equal opportunity requirement is introduced as a new requirement 
adopted from European practice, including the representation of women 
in appropriate numbers, support of disadvantaged students, and the legal 
regulation mandating the creation of environments friendly to physically 
disadvantaged people. 
- The law creates a uniform institutional practice by way of a consistent 
attitude toward all relevant regulation of those services that guarantee 
student's living and working conditions being appropriate in terms of 
studies, career, sporting, extracurricular activities, healthy lifestyles. 
- Naturally, all this8 is done in the law in accordance with the relevant 
directives of the European Union. 
As of 2006, the education cabinet is finally in a state where it can essentially 
focus on the execution of the law. The Government has also issued a set of 
8
 Just to name only the more important ones: 
- The law prescribes the ban of negative discrimination in order to execute the 
directives contained in 2000/43/EC, which defines the standard of equal treatment of all 
persons regardless of their race or ethnicity. 
- The European Communities Council Directive No. 93/96/ECC sets the rules of 
students residency rights, which is the basis for the law's regulation related to entering 
into the legal relationship between student and host institution 
- The European Communities Council Directive No. 1612/68/ECC sets the rules for 
the free movement of workers within the Community, which is the basis for the law 's 
regulation related to employment issues. 
- The European Communities Council Directive No. 1999/70/EC based on a f rame-
work-agreement by ETUC, UNIC, UNICE and CEEP related to definite-term employment is 
the basis in the law for regulation related to employment status, and entering into a public 
employee status. 
- The Council has a proposal dated September 24, 1998. on pan-European coopera-
tion on the quality-assurance of European higher education, which is the basis for the 
law's regulation related to the functioning of Hungarian Accreditation Committee (MAB), 
and the accreditation procedure. 
- The European Parliament and the Council's Directive No. 2001/19/EC on the general 
system for the recognition of professional qualifications amends Council Directives 
89/48/EC and 92/51/EC, in addition to directives on general nurses, dentists, veterinarians, 
midwives, architects, pharmacists, and medical doctors 77/452/ECC, 77/453/ ECC, 78/686/ 
EEC, 78/687/ EEC, 78/1026/ EEC, 78/1027/ EEC, 80/154/ EEC, 80/155/ EEC, 85/384/ 
EEC, 85/432/ EEC, 85/433/ EEC and 93/16/ EEC. 
The execution of the directives listed above is guaranteed by the law via its regulation of 
the structure of the education, and the regulation of the requirements of attaining various 
degrees and special certificates, and those of entering higher education. 
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decrees necessary for the proper execution of the law. The novelty (from a 
legal perspective) here was that several solutions that were necessary for the 
execution of the new Higher Education Act were combined in a single directive. 
Government Decree No. 79/2006 (IV.5) gives rules on the execution of 
new legal institutions created by the Higher Education Act. One of these was 
the setting of minimum requirements that are to be met when a new institution 
of higher education is chartered, as well as setting procedural rules for 
chartering a school. This primarily fills the role of providing a guarantee that 
the appropriate staff and infrastructure is available for the school to properly 
work even if the prescribed maximum permissible enrollment capacity is fully 
utilized. As far as faculty is concerned, the Decree creates an environment that 
allows professors not to have multiple public servant employment relations at 
several different institutions of higher education. The way to keep track of this 
is via a so-called 'instructor code', which-according to the Decree-had to be 
created for all faculty members by the end of December 2006, and it had to 
also be issued to them by this date. The reason behind this measure was that in 
the past decade accreditation trends caused leading professors to have several 
employment contracts. The multiple employment situation actually benefited 
no one involved: students could only establish a rather more limited personal 
relationship with their 'wandering-teachers'; it was a burden for the institu-
tions as well, because they were essentially issuing paychecks to „Dead Souls" 
(as in the title of Nikolai Gogol's epic poem), who could not take their fair 
share of the load of teaching and (other faculty) work; and in fact this was 
cumbersome and unpleasant for the professors as well, who could not make 
close ties with any given institution while at the same time being overloaded 
with work. 
The Decree also gives detailed regulation of the so-called 'higher level 
specialty training'. This institution, which is not very good in its naming or 
otherwise, took root in the Hungarian legal system in 1997 (when it was named 
'accredited schooling system higher level specialty training course'), which 
could be conducted both by secondary schools and institutions of higher 
education. Students are not issued any diploma at completion time, but it 
provides students with specialty certification, and knowledge acquired during 
the course(s) are convertible to transferable credit in case the student goes 
on to study in another higher education program. In fact, the true practical 
advantage was that at the time the credit system was launched it was important 
to demonstrate the utility of credit transferred from outside, and also this gave 
an additional chance for getting a diploma for those young adults who would 
have previously be destined to merely getting professional specialty certifi-
cation. In practice, this level of training is overwhelmingly conducted by 
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secondary schools based on agreements they enter into with institutions of 
higher education. (In its current function, it has become a hidden form of inflating 
enrollment figures at colleges and universities.) 
Rules on the higher education information system prescribe that the 
institution in charge is the Higher Education Information Center, which keeps 
record of data on higher education development (and financing) received from 
the institutions. Since in Hungary the Privacy Act (Law on the Protection of 
Private Information and the Freedom of Information of a Public Nature) says 
that legitimate data transfer can only occur based on specific mandate given by 
law, therefore the scope of the data to be provided by the institutions is defined 
in an appendix of the Higher Education Act, but the method of data transfer is 
described in the Government Decree. (The student and faculty identification 
numbers are also tracking aids created for the express purpose of making 
people identifiable by the data management system.) 
This decree also contains the rights of students with learning difficulties or 
physically disadvantaged persons, and special regulations connected to modified 
examination methods for them, or possible waivers related to exempting them 
from meeting requirements otherwise prescribed by law (e.g. exemption from 
under the relevant part of a foreign language test for students suffering from 
dyslexia, or hearing or vision impairment.) 
Rules on implementing the credit-based system are also found in this decree 
(such as the principal rules of the institutional credit system, rules of related 
record keeping, etc.). Additionally, the body called Credit Council and Bureau 
established in 1997 was carried over into the revised system, an institution 
identified as the premier organization charged with the continuous develop-
ment of the credit system, and is also identified as the information center in 
international credit matters. 
There were some additional new rules created that intend to improve the 
overall situation of students. One of the most important measures was the 
raising of the student loan ceiling (larger sum), as well as the widening of the 
scope of eligible individuals (expense-compensation based students, doctoral 
students, students opting to attend an institution of higher education in another 
European Union member state). While this is not a perfect solution, as it does 
not-especialiy in the case of those studying abroad-cover living expenses, 
nevertheless, it undoubtedly eases the financial burden of students' families, 
therefore they can participate in higher education independently of their 
financial background. 
Based on all of the above, the transitioning process has a fair chance of 
succeeding. 
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Today, we expect to see a trend take shape in the forthcoming years, where 
the implementation of the reform will lead to more instances of state partici-
pation in order to weed out overpopulated but dysfunctional programs that 
produce graduates that join unemployment lines in droves on the day of 
their graduation. It has become clear by now, that neglecting needed develop-
ment projects was harmful, and this problem is not effectively offset by the 
otherwise positive development that grants the right for institutions to generate 
income of their own, a right previously barred. While the state is no longer 
paternalistic in its attitude toward higher education, it still maintains tight 
controls. 
The question remains unanswered whether central budget cuts have caused 
the system to operate more efficiently, and rationally. It is unclear also if 
increased enrollment, more courses, quantitatively more expectations of students 
and academics alike can be understood as higher achievement on the part of 
the system. At the moment the answer is probably no, or at least the issue is 
ambiguous. The one positive aspect is that students graduating from now on 
will face an achievement oriented workplace environment, and they become 
aware of that in time, and they understand that they themselves are responsible 
for being prepared to face this unforgiving professional environment. They 
understand that they need to make sacrifices, and are willing to invest (in their 
own "human resource capital"), and then they will be able to succeed, although 
perhaps differently from how it was once imagined. In some sense this is also 
true for the institutions of higher education as well: they are not spoiled brats, 
therefore they are forced to find a way to survive. 
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T A M Á S N Ó T Á R I 
The Spear as the Symbol of Property and 
Power in Ancient Rome 
Abstract. In his well-known description of legis actio sacramento in rem. Gaius remarks 
that the rod was used in the procedure instead of the spear as the sign of lawful property 
since what the Romans considered truly their own was the goods taken from the enemy: 
"Festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco, signo quodam iusti dominii; quod maxime sua 
esse credebant quae ex hostibus cepissent. " In harmony with Gaius's view Verrius Festus 
states that the spear is the symbol, incarnation of supreme power: "Hasta summa armorum 
et imperii est. " Setting out from these two testimonia, in the present study we intend to 
examine the content of the hasta and the festuca as symbols of power to support the 
interpretation of the ritual of legis actio sacramento in rem as duellum sacrum. First, we 
shall give a brief account of the occurrences of the spear as the symbol of impérium, of 
subhastatio related thereto and the function of the supreme commander's spear; also, we 
shall touch on the stick of augures and certain Greek préfigurations and parallels of the 
symbolic nature of the spear and the rod. (I.) After that, we shall make some statements 
concerning the spear of the god Mars and the Mars cult, and the relation of Quirinus and 
Quirites to the symbolism of the spear. (II.) The fasces carried by lictores proceeding in front 
of the magistratus, the flamen Dialis and the virgo Vestalis are also insignia of power and, as 
we try to highlight this point, incarnate the highly sacralised, numinous nature of power. 
(III.) Finally, from the ceremony of declaring war and from the special character and use of 
the spear in the ceremony we intend to show certain parallels between ius fetiale and legis 
actio sacramento in rem. (IV.) 
Keywords: legal symbols, spear, hasta. festuca, legis actio in rem 
I. It can be rightly assumed that in the beginning-and probably later on as 
well-the spear as weapon was nothing else than a long, sharp rod made of hard 
wood, and hardened in fire.1 If the hasta was the weapon with which in the 
course of the fights they could win loot, recognition, and hence power, it is no 
Associate Professor , R e f o r m e d Universi ty "Káro l i Gáspár" , Facul ty of Legal a n d 
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 Cicero: In Verrem 4, 125; Pl in ius maior, Naturalis história 16, 65; Herodotus 7, 7 1 ; 
Taci tus: Annales 2, 14; Proper t ius 4, 1, 28; A m m i a n u s Marcel l inus 31, 7, 12. 
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wonder that shortly it became the symbol of power.2 This is also shown by 
Verrius Festus's definition: "hasta summa armorum et imperii est",} and the 
reference to impérium, especially in connection with the spear, reminds one of 
its magico-religious character, belonging to the sacred sphere.4 Imperium denotes 
the actual power of the commander in the first place; however, it is also related 
to the sphere of religion; in auspicium the sacred element predominates; at 
the same time, it implies the entitlement to implement it.5 Wagenvoort 
observes that in Roman thinking certain persons possessed exceptional maria 
of their own; so, for example, the imperátor, when we examine the origin of 
the word, had creating, fertilising force,6 and when as a commander he gave 
his soldiers an order to occupy the enemy's camp, then with his magic word he 
conjured up in them the force necessary for executing the order; this implies 
that impérium is nothing else but a form of transmitting mystical force.7 The 
military and religious leader (initially both duties were fulfilled by the rex 
among the Romans)8 possessed maria, that is what made him able, e.g., to 
increase the fertility of the earth as ethnological examples show. Accordingly, 
in Wagenvoort's interpretation imperare originally meant nothing else but to 
conjure up, to fertilize since the commander, who gave order to his soldiers 
to attack a foreign camp (imperabat), with his magical word created, conjured 
up the force necessary for executing the order; that is, the author draws the 
conclusion, impérium is actually the ability to transmit, create mystical 
force.4 Köves-Zulauf points out as a specificity of this that: "the particular 
1
 Waele, F. J. M. de: The Magic Staff or Rod in Graeco-Italian Antiquity. Gent, 1927. 
172. 
1
 Festus 55, 3. 
4
 See Pötscher, W.: 'Numen' und 'numen Augusti ' . In: Pötscher, W.: Hellas und Rom. 
Hildesheim, 1988. 462; Wagenvoort, H.: Wesenszüge altrömischer Religion. In: Aufstieg 
und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Berlin-New York, 1972. I. 2. 371 sq.; Nótári, T.: On 
Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of Authority. Acta Juridica Hungarica 46. 2005. 95 
sqq._ 
Pötscher, W.: 'Numen' und 'numen Augusti'. In: Hellas und Rom. Hildesheim, 1988. 
462. 
r
 Walde, A.-Hofmann, J. В.: Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch / - / / . Heidel-
berg, 1938. I. 683. 
Wagenvoort: Wesenszüge... op. cit. 371. 
s
 Hamza G.-Földi A.: A római jog története és institúciói (History and Institutes of 
Roman Law). Budapest, 2006" . 18. 
' Wagenvoort: Wesenszüge... op. cit. 371 sq. Sehen wir richtig, so bedeutete das 
Zeitwort imperare ('befehlen', 'herrschen') ursprünglich 'zum Leben erwecken', 'befruchten '; 
der Feldherr, der seinen Soldaten befahl ( imperabat), ein feindliches Lager zu benennen. 
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interest of the issue ... is that parere (to give birth) is a typically feminine 
word, whereas impérium was exclusively possessed by men".10 
It is not by chance that the loot taken from the enemy, as Gaius, not at all 
accidentally, also refers to it ," especially selling prisoners of war,12 and later 
auctions in general" are denoted by the term subhastatiof4 The Romans them-
selves were aware of the origin of this custom;15 it often appears within the 
context of the terms praedaib and spolia; the hasta became the symbol of 
selling,17 the compound ins hastae developed from it,18 and in state sales 
sometimes the phrase hastam ponere was used,19 on several occasions the 
hasta as a symbol substituted the entire legal transaction."0 In this function the 
spear is called hasta publica by Cornelius Nepos,21 domina hasta by Iuvenalis,22 
the place of the hasta is called hastarium by Tertullianus,23 and the custom of 
displaying the hasta survived2 ' during the entire period of the Roman empire.25 
When presenting the institution of decemvri stlitibus iudicandis, Pomponius 
uses the term hastae praeesse26 which could not mean anything else but the 
leading of indicium centumvirale. However, indicium centumvirale came into 
erzeugte in ihnen durch sein magisches Wort die Kraft zur Erfüllung seines Auftrages. 
Imperium ist also eine Form der Übertragung geheimnisvoller Kraft. 
'" Köves-Zulauf, Th.: Bevezetés a római vcdlás és monda történetébe (Introduction into 
the History of Roman Religion and Myth). Budapest, 1995. 31. 
11
 Gaius, Institutiones 4, 16. quod maxime sua esse credebant quae ex hostibus 
cepissent. 
12
 Festus 55, 9; 90, 19. 
" Codex Iustinianus 10, 3, 1 sqq. 
14
 Livius 2, 14, 1-4; Dionysius Halicarnassensis 5, 34, 4; Valerius Maximus 3, 2, 2; 
Cicero: De officiis 2, 27. 83; Philippicae 2, 64. 103; Varró, De re rustica 2, 10, 4; Codex 
Iustinianus 4, 44, 16. Cf. Alföldi, A.: Hasta - Summa Imperii, The Spear as Embodiment 
of Sovereignty in Rome. American Journal of Archeology 63. 1959. 3. 8; Kovács P.: 
Adatok a hasta mint hatalmi jelvény használatához. Antik Tanulmányok 47. 2003. 261 sqq.; 
268; de Waele: op. cit. 172. 
18
 Livius 2, 14, I sqq.; Dionysius Halicarnassensis 5, 34, 4. 
16
 Cicero: De officiis 2, 27, 8; Livius 4, 29, 4; Suetonius, Divus Iulius 50, 2. 
17
 Cicero: Philippicae 2, 103. 
18
 Tacitus: Annales 13, 28; Codex Iustinianus 10, 3. 
14
 Cicero: De officiis 2, 29. 83; Philippicae 2, 64; De lege agraria 2, 53. 
""Codex Iustinianus 10, 3, 1. Cf. Kovács: op. cit. 269. 
21
 Cornelius Nepos, Atticus 6, 3. 
22
 Iuvenalis 3, 33. 
23
 Tertullianus: Apologeticum 13\ Ad nationes 1, 10. 
24
 Codex Theodosianus 10, 17; Codex Iustinianus 10, 3. 
25
 Kovács: op. cit. 269. 
26
 Pomponius, Digesta 1, 2, 2, 29. 
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being only one hundred years after the date assumed by Pomponius (242-227 
ВС.),27 thus the historical credibility of Pomponius's report becomes doubtful, 
it can be safely stated that only a magistratus cum imperio was entitled to decide 
the question of legitimwn dominium?* The insignia of indicium centumvirale,24 
founded in the 2nd century ВС. was the so-called hasta centumviralis. By the 
end of the republic the presidency of this court of law was fulfilled by a praetor 
as supervisor at the head of the indicium centumvirale,30 Novellius Torquatus 
Atticus was the first praetor hastarius or praetor ad hastam known by name. 
With this disposition, Augustus probably did not introduce a new proquestor, 
due to the engagement of praetors,31 Augustus appointed again a rule hut 
revived an older one. " If the court was sitting in different parts, the man, chosen 
by the praetor hastarius from among the decemvirii to preside the court ad 
hoc, was using his own spear in the indicium,33 which fact is corroborated by 
Quintilian's report of duae hastae in the case when the indicium centumvirale 
was functioning divided into two parts.34 The indicium centumvirale, judging 
cases of inheritance under the supervision of the praetor hastarius was usually 
sitting in four sections in the basilica Iulia?5 
The hasta pura, pura because it was made of metal, and donatica (dory 
katharon) were regarded as military decorations 6 as Servius's comments on 
the Aeneis reveals,37 and the spear awarded for military courage must have 
been an imperátor's spear or a copy thereof to express that the person the 
decoration was awarded to would deserve to fulfil a military leader's office.38 
In addition to the eagle and some other sacred animals, the most widespread 
badge in the Roman army was the spear itself, whose tip was in many cases 
decorated with various dona militaria, which can be seen in works of fine art.3" 
The hasta indicated commander's power, and its practical significance cannot 
be undervalued either since it was used to give the army the necessary signals 
27
 Mommsen, Th. Römisches Staatsrecht l-111. Berlin. 1887-1888. I. 275. 
28
 Alföldi: op. cit. 9. 
24
 Cf. Mommsen: Römisches Staatsrecht, op. cit. II. 225. 
311
 Mommsen: Römisches Staatsrecht, op. cit. 11. 225; Alföldi: op. cit. 9. 
11
 Suetonius, Augustus 36, 1; Statius 4. 4, 41. 
32
 Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, 6, 1365, 13; 8, 22721, 5; ILS 950; Mon. Ancyr. 8, 5. 
33
 Alföldi: op. cit. 10. 
34
 Quintilianus, Institutio oratorio 5, 2, 1; 11, 1, 78. 
35
 Plinius minor, epistulae 5, 9. 1-2. 5; 6, 33, 2 -5 ; Quintilianus. Institutio oratorio 12, 5, 6. 
36
 Kovács: op. cit. 268 sqq.; 273 sqq. 
37
 Servius in Verg. Aen. 6, 760. 
38
 de Waele: op. cit. 173. 
39
 Alföldi: op. cit. 12. 
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for moving troops; and the vexillum was actually a piece of textile fixed under 
the tip of the spear.1" Also vexillum was carried by his Guards directly in front of 
the imperátor as it can be seen on the column of Traianus and Marcus Aurelius,41 
it was used to call the soldiers to get ready for fight,42 to give signal to begin a 
clash45 both in land and sea battles.44 (The commander-in-chief's vexillum was 
purple, and the act of Augustus awarding caeruleum vexillum to Agrippa45  
seems to be the first step in development of the hierarchy of colours that 
reached the stage of completeness later in Byzantium.46) Furthermore, the spear 
was the badge of the manipulus, which expression is explained by Ovidius as 
a bundle of hay attached to a long pole;47 later its use can be justified with sacred 
reasons rather than practical ones, and these bunches of grass must have been 
related to the sagmenta of the Capitolium.48 This argumentation seems to be 
supported by the fact that apart from the eagle (or the horse, the human-headed 
bull, the wild boar and the wolf before the times of Marius),44 other badges 
were honoured with cultic ceremony,50 and quite often the oath was taken on 
them.51 
In representations a stick with a slightly bent tip on the top, the lituus can 
be seen in the hand of the augur}2 the origin of the word lituus is somewhat 
dubious. Walde-Hofmann connects it to the curved shape of the stick,53 Latte 
believes Etruscan origin cannot be excluded since it was brought to Rome 
through the disciplina Etrusca,54 With the lituus the augur designated the 
sacred space selected by the gods, cut out from the profane space, i.e., the 
templum55 as well as the cardinal point, or the part of the firmament from where 
411
 Cf. Domaszewski. A. v.: Die Fahnen im römischen Heere. Wien, 1885. 
41
 Alföldi: op. cit. 13. 
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44
 Dio Cassius 49, 9, 1. 
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 Suetonius, Augustus 25, 3; Dio Cassius 51 ,21 ,3 . 
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 Alföldi: op. cit. 13. 
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 Ovidius, Fasti 3, 117; Plutarchus, Romulus 8, 7; Servius, in Verg. Aen. 11, 463. 
48
 Vö. Livius 1, 24, 4 sqq.; Rcnel, L.: Cultes militaires de Rome: les enseignes. Paris, 
1903. 238, 248 sqq. 
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he expected to receive the divine signs to be interpreted by him.56 (Tradition 
has it that Romulus and Remus, who attached the right of establishing a town 
to the result of augury, had already fulfilled augur s duties;"7 another tradition 
maintains that the establishment of the collegium of the augures is linked to 
Numa Pompilius;58 the Regia was believed to be built around the lituus Romuli.59) 
However, we should take into consideration that initially the augur's function 
was determined primarily not by the task of interpreting divine signs, quite the 
contrary, as the origin of the word deducible f rom the verbum augere shows,60 
he was given this function just because of the ability of magical augmen-
tation, exceptional mana surplus.61 Again this seems to support the point that the 
lituus must have been the tool of numinous force, the transmission of mana.62 
(The term numen, especially when investigating earlier sources of Roman 
literature, is referred to in connection with the gods, the senatus, the people of 
Rome, and in a figurative, philosophical sense with the human mind as a force 
albeit superhuman in itself yet mostly related to a person; it is entirely in line 
with these meanings how Rose formulates the definition of this concept: "Numen 
signifies a superhuman force, impersonal in itself but regulary belonging to a 
person (a god of some kind) or occasionally to an exceptionally important 
body of human beings, as the Roman senate or people."65 So numen, especially 
according to the dynamistic trend hallmarked by the name of Wagenvoort, 
denoted a kind of, to use this Polynesian expression, mana, mystical force 
hidden in a thing, or a person.64) 
Tragus Pompeius reveals, as it is communicated by Iustinus, that in early 
Roman times kings did not wear a head-dress but carried a spear, this spear 
corresponded to the Greek skëptron,65 the relevant loci of De magistratibus by 
Ioannes Lydus is in harmony with this source.66 Giving a brief survey of Greek 
56
 de Waele: op. cit. 169. 
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 Cicero: De divinatione 1, 48. 107; De re publica 2, 16; Dionysius Halicarnassensis 2, 
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 Wagenvoort: Wesenszüge... op. cit. 367. 
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 de Waele: op. cit. 171. 
63
 Rose. H. J.: Numen and mana. Harvard Theological Review 44 ( 195 1 ) 109. 
64
 Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés, op. cit. 29. 
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 Iustinus 43, 3. Per ea adhuc tempóra reges hastas pro diademate habebant, quas 
Graeci sceptra dixere: nam ab origine rerum pro diis immortalibus veteres hastas ... 
coluere ob cuius religionis memóriám adhuc deorum simulacris hastae adduntur. 
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préfigurations, Homer speaks about Agamemnon's skëptron first, which was 
originally made by Hephaistos for Zeus, then it was presented by Zeus to Hermes, 
by Hermes to Pelops, and by Pelops to Atreus, finally it was bequeathed by 
Atreus to Thyestes, and by him to Agamemnon.67 Although several authors 
have been inclined to see the skëptron of the Cretan-Mycenaean age as a kind 
of remnant of the Egyptian ruler's sceptre, due to the fact that we have no 
direct evidence of direct impact it cannot be ruled out that in the Greek and pre-
Hellenistic culture the sceptre and the rod as symbols of power evolved without 
any borrowings.68 The king is the owner of the skëptron, he is a skëptoukhos 
par excellence, the skëptron is the key symbol of his power,64 when the king 
does not use the skëptron, he passes it over to his messenger to safeguard it. 
However, the king can commission the messenger to act in some important 
matter instead of him, and in this case the messenger may carry the royal 
skëptron to indicate that he proceeds in the king's matter on his behalf; it is 
only because of the skëptron brought along with them that the furious 
Achilles greets Agamemnon's delegates respectfully,70 and the messengers of 
the Trojans and the Achaeans holding their kings' skëptron in their hands as 
the representatives of the ruler's power follow the encounter between Hector 
and Achilles with attention.7 ' (The skëptron carried by messengers sent on an 
errand by their king should not be mixed up with the rhabdos, the messengers' 
customary rod, whose archetype can be seen in Hermes's hands in several 
descriptions72 and representations.73) As the hasta appears as the symbol of 
supreme power in procedures implemented sub hasta for the Romans, likewise 
the term hypo skëptrô one can read in the Iliad denotes the reign 74 of Zeus 75 and 
of the king.76 
The question arises how the skëptron, which in its initial form was probably 
just a stick, could have become a ruler's symbol, what is more the symbol of 
the ruler's power. The stick was used by elderly people, who were initially the 
leaders of the tribe by nature, as a common accessory of their everyday life, 
and we can assume that this article for personal use of the exercisers of power 
67
 llia s 2, 100 sqq. 
68
 de Waele: op. cit. 109. 
69
 Ilias 1, 267; 2, 86; Odysseia 2, 231 ; 3, 411 ; 4, 64; 5, 9; 8, 41 sqq. 
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71
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 II. 24, 343 sqq.; 24. 445; Odysseia 5, 47. sqq; 5, 87. 
73
 Alföldi: op. cit. 16. 
74
 Ilias 6, 159. 
75
 Ilias 9, 154 sqq. 
76
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slowly became the symbol, incarnation of the exercise of power.77 In the judge-
ment scene represented on Achilles's shield the old (the judges pronouncing 
dikai) pass the skëptron from hand to hand while making the decision;78 
adjudicating rulers often appear in various descriptions, for example, in the 
Iliad,79 with skëptron in their hands; and the motif of the judge's cane can be 
found in several classical texts, and in terms of the further development of the 
symbol it is worth considering that the Byzantine rulers' sceptre was called 
dikanikë.m Furthermore, it is expedient to cast a glance at the representation of 
the three judges of the underworld:81 Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aiakos. In 
Homer we have already read about Minos and Rhadamanthys, however, they 
are not described as the judges of the dead. For Homer the duty of Minos,82 
is simply to calm and stop discord between the shadows; being a just king 
Minos holds skëptron khryseon, a golden sceptre in his hand,82 the other two 
judges, and the underworld supervisor have only a rod, rhabdos in their hands 
according to the Athenian tradition conveyed by Plato.84 Achilles takes an oath 
on his skëptron in the Iliad, and then having finished the oath throws it to the 
ground with all his might.85 However, we do not know that this latter gesture is 
merely the result of the fairly heated situation, or a part of taking the oath; the 
second alternative is supported by Vergilius's adaptation of the scene.86 in which 
the motion of striking to the ground is meant to symbolise fate afflicting the 
oath-breaker,87 and by the scene of entering into an alliance described by Livy 
where the juror asks for Iuppiter's punishment in the form of self malediction 
to be imposed on the person breaking the oath, if it applies, on himself.88 
II. In Servius's commentary on Vergil's Aeneid the description of the following 
ceremony can be found: "Is qui belli susceperat curam, sacrarium Mortis 
ingressus primo ancilia commovebat, post hastam simulacri ipsius, dicens: 
77
 de Waele: op. cit. I 18. 
781 lias 18, 497 sqq. 
79
 llias 9, 99, 156. 
80
 de Waele: op. cit. 122. 
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 Plato, Gorgias 524a 
82
 Odysseia 11, 568. 
83
 Odysseia 11, 568 sqq.; Plato, Gorgias 526c 
84
 de Waele: op. cit. 123. 
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87
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88
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'Mars vigila!"'w The picture of the deity could not be too old, because the 
Romans did not represent the image of their gods in the beginning,90 and 
Servius's explanation goes back to Varro, just as Plutarch's similar remark:91  
"en de të Rhëgia dory kathidrymenon Area prosagoreyein. "92 Seemingly, Varro 
gets into contradiction with the tradition, which has knowledge of several 
spears in Mars 's sacrarium. These must have been the spears of the salii, 
which were kept in the sacrarium Martis, together with the shields.91 The 
plural of shields is not surprising because-as it becomes evident from the 
Aitologian myth explaining the institution of the salii-Numa Pompilius ordered 
the manufacturing of another eleven copies of the ancile descending from 
the sky, in order to prevent the stealing of the original one. During their 
processions the salii were carrying the ancile in their left and were beating it 
with a spear-like rod.94 The form of these spears was not identical with the 
form of those that were generally known and actually used for fighting in the 
Classical Age but they preserved-just like the shields of the salii-their archaic 
shape: They were so-called hastae purae, made exclusively of wood without 
any iron, and their prodigium was shown by their movement without any human 
agency in the sacrarium,95 
Nevertheless, the spears of the salii must be distinguished from Mars's 
spear, which was-as they were venerating Mars's presence in it"'-surrounded 
by a cult that was due to a deity,97 as the veneration of gods (e.g., Iuppiter, 
Terminus) in some material form was usual for the Romans, which can be 
explained by the concept of the unity of person-authority.98 (The Person-
Bereichdenken, the person-authority way of thinking was a special way of 
experiencing the world for the man of antiquity, in the course of which he 
experienced physical reality, objects, processes, or states as such, and, at the 
same time, he experienced them as divinity as well. The thing and the divinity 
89
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is often designated with the same word, and sometimes it is considerably 
difficult to decide whether in a particular case themis or Themis, fortuna or 
Fortuna, terminus or Terminus should be written. Naturally, either solution is 
chosen, the other component is tacitly part of the concept and should be taken 
into account as well.44 Designation with the same word seems to suggest 
juxtaposition but in fact it means the unity of the person and his/her function, 
the sphere of authority represented by him/her, in which alternatively one or 
the other aspect comes to the fore.",u) Iustinius in his Epitoma Historiarum 
Pompei Tragi mentions that, in the beginning, the spear was surrounded by a 
divine cult.101 Servius, based on Varro, reports that at the beginning of war, after 
the moving of the ancilia, the celebrating priest also moved the hasta, as the 
image of the deity (simulacrum ipsius) and in the course of this he awoke Mars 
with the appeal "Mars vigila!" and by this, if we conceive Mars as a unity of 
person-authority, he awoke War itself.10" There is no need of any further 
explication to see the manaistic, numinous aspect recognized by Wagenvoort 
in this religious act.1" The derivation of Quirinus's name, meaning "spear" 
from the word of Sabin origin quiris-curis can be found in several auctores,104 
and Iuno's name, Quiritis is also explained this way.105 It is not by chance that 
Thormann appositely translates the name "Quirites" of the Roman citizens 
with the expression "Speermänner".106 
The importance of the ancient triad of Iuppiter-Mars-Quirinus was 
recognised by the founder of the Indo-European school of the history of religion, 
Dumézil. While researching the Indo-European image of society, Dumézil 
realised that society is divided into three vertically structured zones which 
correspond to three functions: reign, force and fertility, and these are related 
to three social groups (kings, warriors, producers), and three relevant specific 
w
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deities'07 (e.g., in Rome to Iuppiter, Mars and Quirinus). India worked out this 
threefold pattern cosmologically, and the Romans historicised the myth as it 
can be discerned from Book One of Livy's Ab urbe condita: Romulus and Numa 
can be considered the two sides of royal power mutually supplementing each 
other, the bellicose principle is represented by Tullus Hostilius, while 
producing and trading fertility boosting every day life by Ancus Martius. (This 
threefold pattern was replaced during the rule of Etruscan kings, especially 
the Tarquiniuses by the triad of Iuppiter-hino-Minerva of the Capitolium,108 
and in this process the temple of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus was placed in the 
centre of the Capitolium.104 On the other hand, there is no doubt that initially 
not only Iuppiter Feretrius had a temple on the Capitolium but as we know it 
from Varro several other deities, including Mars too.110) 
The cult of the spear related to Mars is associated with a legend told by 
Plutarch: to try his strength Romulus threw his cornel spear down from the 
Aventinus, and the spear penetrated the ground so deep that nobody was able 
to pull it out; then, it took root and grew into a large tree; the Romans surrounded 
the tree honoured as a sacred being with a wall, which perished only when its 
roots were hurt while building the scalae Caci during the reign of Caligula."1 
This story sheds light on the fact that Romulus's spear was nothing else but 
the hasta Martis, which was venerated with cultic ceremonies because the 
welfare of the state was believed to depend on its condition and soundness."2 
Analogous with the spear thrown by Romulus is the ritual act of the pater 
patratus throwing the spear to the enemy's territory when declaring war; on the 
other hand, there is a crucial difference between the two events.111 (Latte asserts1" 
that the act of fetialis represents not only the magical commencement of war 
and attack but the act of taking the enemy's territory into possession too."5) 
107
 G. Dumézil: Jupiter, Mars Quirinus: essai sur la conception inclo-européenne de la 
société et sur les origines de Rome. Paris, 1941: La Religion romaine archaïque. Paris, 
1966. 
108
 Cf. Koch, С.: Der römische Juppiter. Frankfurt а. M., 1937. 90 sqq. 
109
 Livius 1, 55, 1 sq. 
110
 Augustinus, De civitate Dei 4, 23 sqq. 
111
 Plutarchus. Romulus 20, 5 sqq. 
112
 Scholz: op. cit. 31. 
113
 Scholz: op. cit. 31; A. Carandini: Die Geburt Roms. Düsseldorf-Zürich, 2002. 508; 
Kovács: op. cit. 265. 
114
 Latte: op. cit. 122. Der Akt scheint nicht allein eine magische Eröffnung des Angriffs, 
sondern eine Form der Besitzergreifung zu sein. 
"
5
 Cf. Servius, in Verg. Aen. 3, 46; 11, 52. 
2 4 2 TAMÁS NÓTÁRI 
The following rite constituting a part of the celebrations of marriage can be 
also associated with hasta Mártis: before the wedding night the fiancée was 
not allowed to use her own comb, she had to arrange her hair with what was 
called hasta caelibaris taken out of the body of a killed gladiator."6 The hasta 
caelibaris was meant to enhance the new wife's fertility, on the one hand; this 
meaning, however, did not look back on a long past as in Rome gladiator fights 
were held only from 264 ВС.,"7 and it symbolised the wife's subjection, on the 
other."8 The explanation concerning luno Curitis does not seem convincing 
either since luno specifically as Curitis"4 was the protector of the urbs rather 
than of the female gender."" Fertility is, however, enhanced not by being touched 
with iron but by the contact, unification with the phallic deity of the spear before 
the conclusion of the marriage; that is, the liieros gamos taking place before the 
wedding, which makes the actual marriage fertile; and the deity of the spear is 
nodody else than Mars."1 
The ceremony of using hasta caelibaris is intertwined in the tradition with 
the foundation of the town of Cures. Varro's description reveals that in Enyalios's 
temple122 a noble virgin got pregnant, and gave birth to a boy called Modius 
Fabidius, who having grown up gathered his followers around him and founded 
a town; he called his followers, either after his spear (curis), or his father 
Quirinus, Cures.122 Several elements of Roman-Italian beliefs are merged in this 
myth. The question of Modius Fabidius's double name can be solved as follows: 
Fabidius is the forefather of the gens Fabia of Sabine origin, commissioned to 
offer several sacrifices in the Quirinalis,124 Modius's name is connected with 
the Latin word muto, this is how the birth of the hero is linked through the spear 
116
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god Quirinus (cf. the Antique curis>Quirinus etimology) to phallic symbolism.1"5 
Although Quirinus was the deity of the hillock of Quirinalis, the Sabine tradition-
and of course the Fabiuses and Varro-claimed it belonged to them, and this gives 
rise to the question whether the word Cures comes from the word spear (curis) 
or from Quirinus's name. In this case what we have here is unambigously an 
interpretatio Sabina, which tried to oust the (phallic) spear god, Mars; the 
Mars cult is recalled by the spear, the hasta caelibaris here called curis, the 
connotation of Modius's name and the pattern of the myth of the foundation, 
which is identical with the Romulus cycle and the rite of the equus Octobris as 
far as its basic features are concerned.126 
Hence it becomes clear that Roman thinking connected somehow the 
concept of the force inherent in the spear, the numen both with Mars and with 
Quirinus, but the exact definition of this connection is encumbered by the fact 
that the existing sources expound on this numinous force only in the case of 
hasta Martis.127 The question arises why they were using a rod, the festuca 
instead of the spear meaning iustum dominium, in the course of the symbolic 
fight of legis actio sacramento in rem. According to Herman van der Brink 
the festuca and the hasta are parts of two completely different symbolic 
systems.125 He considers the spear to be an Indo-European symbol of power,124 
whereas he regards the rod as part of the Mediterranean culture."" At the same 
time, he disregards the point that at the time when these symbols were formed, 
the differences between the spear and the rod most probably had not occurred 
yet, as both were made of wood; the only minor differences could be the size 
or that the rod used as a weapon was hardened in fire.131 The fact that in the 
ceremony of the vindicatio the festuca stood for; i.e., represented the hasta can 
be explained by the disposition which from the beginning attempted to restrict 
the use of the spear within the pomerium and to confine it to the sphere of the 
most necessary rites.132 
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III. The relation between the magistratus and the lictores following him was 
formulated quite to the point by Gladigow, namely that the duty of the lictores 
was to manifest the magistratus, and this applies both to the external appearance 
of the magistratura and the functional cooperation between the magistratus 
and the lictoresAs far as the external manifestation is concerned this means 
that the magistratus and the lictor wear the same clothes, toga in Rome, scarlet 
paludamentum outside Rome and during the triumphus,134 and mourning toga 
in mourning.135 In accordance with the Roman representation principle in place 
between the magistratus and the lictores the person bearing the given dignity 
is stressed not by the pomp and adornment of his entourage but by increasing 
the number of the entourage wearing the same clothes as he wears.136 Yet the 
similarity of the appearance is not the only sign of this close belonging together, 
the magistratus and the lictores go together everywhere'^-accordingly, the 
magistratus must go even to the brothel with an official entourage, albeit by 
doing so he impairs his official dignity 138-and the magistratus may appear 
without his lictores solely when he wants to show his intention to resign from 
the office of the magistratura,139 (Only at his home was the magistratus not 
directly accompanied by the lictores, who waited in the vestibulum of his 
house.140) Being the carrier of impérium and by that of maria, each appearance 
of the Roman magistratus was an official, consequently, a sacred event. 
Through the lictores showing an image externally identical with him the mana 
carried by him appeared in a multiplied form.141 The lictores walked before the 
magistratus in a single file,142 between the last lictor, the I ictor proximo s143 and 
the magistratus nobody was allowed to enter except for the magistratus's 
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underage sons. These provisions cannot be explained by security reasons 
since the lictores did not constitute the guards of the magistratus, all the more 
as the lictores proceeding in front of the magistratus provided no protection 
against possible attacks threatening him from the side or from behind his back; 
the reason for the prohibition must be looked for in the sphere of the sacred 
because the existence of a person entering between the lictor proximus and the 
magistratus would have disturbed the sphere of the mana present around the 
magistratus and of the impérium carried by him.147 
It makes it much easier to understand the function of the lictores that not 
only the magistratus but also the flamines and the virgines VestalesUb were 
entitled to be followed by lictores. Directly in front of the flamen Dialis a lictor 
was walking,147 from a somewhat greater distance he was followed by the 
praeciae,u8 who warned people to stop working when the flamen Dialis was 
nearing since the flamen Dialis was not supposed to see any activity belonging 
to the world of everyday life as being Iuppiter's earthly representative144 he had 
to live each day of his life as a consecrated holiday.13" (This purpose was served 
by the commoetaculum held in the flamen's hand with which the Iuppiter priest 
pushed away things and persons considered impure from himself.131 It is rather 
disputed whether one or two lictores proceeded in front of the flamen Dialis.1*2) 
The Vestal virgin leaving the aecles Vestae was preceded by a lictor too,132 and 
the lictores of the magistratus meeting the virgo Vestalis let down the fasces 
before the lictores of the virgo Vestalis as it were to show the respect for the 
priestess she was expected to receive.174 It cannot be considered a matter of 
accident that just the two players of Roman religious life heavily surrounded 
with taboos in their conduct of life, the virgines Vestales and the flamen Dialis, 
whom the life and welfare of the people and the state of Rome depended on in 
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terms of the sacred, were granted with lie-tores' entourage; furthermore, f rom 
this fact certain conclusions regarding the sacred and legal status of the 
magistratus vested with impérium can be drawn. In the archaic age neither 
political power could do without the sacred component, nor the religious 
functions could be left untouched by political aspects; the elements of sacred 
kingdom of Etruscan origin, including the fasces, the lictores, constituting 
components organically tied to each other, cannot be separated in the event of 
the triumphus.155 
While fulfilling his duties the lictor]% was obliged to carry the fasces, he was 
not allowed to act in his official capacity without them, just as the magistratus 
was not supposed to appear without the lictores,'"7 and this unambiguously 
shows the special significance of the fasces even in themselves. In the interim 
period after the right of the auspicium and the impérium had reverted to the 
senatus, and before the interrex was elected, the fasces were safeguarded at 
Libitina's temple, f h e loss of the fasces in fights with the enemy was deemed 
rather humiliating.1"8 For the magistratus, or the cases of the magistratus 
possessing impérium not subject to the force of provocatio ad populum, the 
bundle of fasces consisting of birch-wood or elm-wood1"9 embraced a hatchet,"1" 
which was also considered a symbol with sacred meaning.161 The lictores held 
the fasces in their left hand and carried them on their left shoulder, the gesture 
of attollere was customary on the occasion of taking over the impérium, and 
the summittere indicated the act of showing respect for the magistratus, the 
flamen Dialis and the virgines Vestales; mourning was symbolised by fasces 
turned downwards.">: The fall or rise of the magistratus was indicated by the 
fasces, when he was removed from office the fasces were broken,16, and when 
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the magistratus was elected imperátor they were decorated with laurel.164 
Pursuant to ancient penal law the hatchet was used as the tool of securi 
percussio, beheading with an axe. The execution was performed in the presence 
of the magistratus by the lictores themselves.165 The details of the implemen-
tation of securi percussio are mostly identical with the rite of killing a sacrificial 
animal, and from this fact Mommsen drew the conlusion that in archaic times 
this form of execution represented an act of sacrificing the perpetrator for the 
higher powers injurred by the crime and to be appeased by the sacrifice.166 
However, in view of the fact that later on the carnifexes replacing the lictores 
in Roman executions suffered certain disadvantages arising from their very 
activity-since they were seen besmeared with blood, which was considered 
taboo; for example, they were not allowed to have a ritual burial, to live within 
the city of Rome167-the execution carried out by the lictores must have been 
adjudged basically differently because the lictores, albeit they shed blood, did 
not become taboo-breakers, outcasts of the community. So if we consider the 
death sentence performed by the lictores a sacrifice, then they had to carry it 
out on a place covered with sacred protection which defended them against 
harms arising from the blood shed according to Roman beliefs; furthermore, it 
cannot be ruled out-since the Twelve Table Law prescribed expiatio also in 
the case of involuntary homicide 168-that there might have been a kind of 
purifying sacrifice, which washed the besmearing blood off their body in a 
figurative sense.169 
In fasces the virgae were used most often as the tools of coercitio during 
verberatio, which was limited in the leges Porciae; the verberatio applied as 
coercitio must be separated from the corporeal punishment that preceded the 
implementation of the death sentence, and which was forced to an increasingly 
narrow field through provocatio.170 In the times when death sentences were 
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implemented by the lictores,n] it was also them who flogged the convict before 
the execution.172 Upon the instruction of the magistratus the lictor unfastened 
the fasces, deprived the convict of his clothes and tied his hands on his back or 
tied them to a pole. After that on the "age lege" order of the magistratus the 
verberatio was carried out, then securi percussio, beheading with an axe, was 
performed.173 
The person ravishing the virgo Vestalis was flogged to death by the pontifex 
maximus himself on the comitium. We should not ignore the fact that albeit the 
magistratus was present in common executions, he did not actively take part 
in it.174 Considering that the pontifex maximus (initially the rex sacrorum) 
exercised a kind of patria potestas over the virgo Vestalis,115 this act-and the 
fact that the pontifex maximus himself was allowed to execute the death 
sentence, being procuratio prodigii too, on the guilty Vestal priestess17(l-is 
deemed as a punishment imposed and executed within the range of indicium 
domesticum17 since the paterfamilias catching his daughter in the act of adultery 
were allowed to kill both his daughter and the man committing adultery.178 
On the other hand, verberatio in this case was not merely a punishment-
since it was not allowed to be executed by the pontifex maximus himself-but 
an expiatory sacrifice, a ritual act too, just like the execution of the Vestal 
179 
priestess. 
Thrashing, flogging, whipping became the most typical form of castigatio 
among the Romans, which unambiguously shows that the ritualistic character 
is present in this form of punishment in the sacred act of the pontifex maximus 
offering sacrifice by whipping the raper of the virgo Vestalis since castigare-
171
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or the synonyms corrigere and emendare often read in texts-comprises the 
gesture of removing filth and sin, restoring the state of castum and ritual 
conciliation,18" which is confirmed by Paulus using the verbum castigare instead 
of verberare when writing about sanctions.181 (The blood shed in verberatio 
most probably also served the purpose of expiatio per sanguinem,182) So the 
verberatio carried out by the lictores represented a second punishment, 
although not to make the punishment more severe, since it was part of every 
execution implemented by the lictores, but to constitute an unalienable ritual 
cleansing element, that is, a sacred second punishment of the death sentence, 
which was actually the act of sacrificing the offender.181 The wood of the virgae 
(birch-184 or elm-wood185) also carry a religious connotation since both the 
birch-wood and the elm-wood were used also by the Greeks (the latter with 
stronger chathonic implication) in cleansing, in the original sense of the word, 
cathartic ceremonies;186 similarly, the act of depriving the convict of his 
clothes was not only meant to make the punishment more humiliating but to 
meet the requirement of ritual nakedness often customary in the antiquity. (The 
emphatically sacred character of the lictores' office is supported by two 
sources describing that lictores wore a belt on their clothes,187 Plutarch asserts 
that it was used for tying the convict, and Gellius connects it with the limus of 
the popae,m the assistants of the sacrifice. In none of the representations is 
there any kind of belt on lictores' every day clothes, but the toga could be tied 
with the hanging lacinia. This was the so-called ductus Gabinus, which was 
applied most often in offering sacrifice.189 Looking into the background of 
this detail it is justified to assume that lictores initially acted on several 
occasions as assistants of sacrifice, and it is highly probable that in executions 
considered an act of sacrificing the pepetrator they carried out their task also in 
a toga held together with the belt like cinctus Gabinus, which allowed freer 
movement than the usual form of wearing a toga?9l>) 
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IV. Comparing ins fetiale and ius privatum several valuable parallels can be 
drawn with regard to the structure of clarigatio, rerum repetitio, and legis 
actio sacramento,'91 The norms with a powerfully religious character of ius 
fetiale show close connection with several other Roman legal institutions; all 
the more so because for the man of the age it is difficult to imagine a bond 
with more binding power than the oath, including self malediction as well.142 
(According to Dahlheim, due to its strong superstitious-religious determination 
ius fetiale lacks any kind of moral background.I4"1 However, his view can be 
contested because legal formalism and legal ethics are not mutually exclusive 
components.144) In the archaic age, the interstate relationships of Rome were 
governed by a body of twenty priests, called the fetiale s.Wl Their tasks included 
the contracting of alliances, the foedus, the establishment of the conditions of 
armistices, and the declaration of war, given the fact that the war could only 
qualify as bellum pium ac iustum if it was declared and started in accordance 
with the rules of ius fetiale.1"' (It is interesting that for the Romans the basic 
principle of the invulnerability of the envoys was indisputable. Whereas in the 
case of the Greeks the division of the institution of the këryx, enjoying sacred 
protection and the presbeis, invulnerable as a result of a political agreement 
took place very early, in Rome the fe t ia l i s and later the other envoys-even if 
they did not belong to the fetiales' " -en joyed sacred protection, even in time of 
war.198) 
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The /ocí/wí-etymologically related to the expression fides199-, the Roman 
state contract implemented by observing the required formalities,200 as opposed 
to the hospitium,201 the amicitia,202 the societasm and the pax, does not signify 
the content of the contract but its form, and its most important element is the 
ceremonial oath made by the representative of the popidus Romanus,2"4 The 
ceremony of the foedus is presented by Livy. According to him the priest, 
chosen from among the fetiales, who is consecrated pater patratus by reciting 
the texts selected for the occasion and being touched with a bunch of sacred 
grass (sagmina), takes the oath after reading out the text of the contract." In 
the oath he calls Iuppiter, the pater patratus of the people making contract 
with him, and the people themselves to witness that the contract that has been 
read does not contain any falsity, and that the Roman people will not deviate 
from the former, and if they did-and here follows the self malediction-then he 
asks Iuppiter to come down on the Roman people the way he is just knocking 
down the sacrificial pig. Moreover, he should strike even more severely, as he 
is more powerful than the priest. Then he stabbed the sacrificial animal.20'1 
Festus recounts a somewhat different formula, according to which the pater 
patratus, after knocking down the pig with a stone, asks Iuppiter to throw him 
out of his wealth as he is throwing away the stone if he proceeded falsely, but 
he entreats the god to spare his city.207 Polybios calls Rome's first contract 
with Carthago an agreement per lovem lapident,206 Cicero ranks the per Iovem 
lapidem oath formula among ius civile.209 
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When discussing lus fetiale it should be pointed out that the Romans were 
the first to interpret war as a legal fact and they created the concept of bellum 
iustum, influential up to the present day.21" Not all armed conflicts counted as 
war, bellum could only take place between peoples (populi), only the enemy 
possessing an organized state counted as bostis. In accordance with this, 
Cicero can state that only the oath given to the enemy obliges, the one given to 
robbers does not.211 We can depart from Livy's description in the case of the 
declaration of war as well. On the border of that people's land from which he 
demands satisfaction (rerum repetitio, or clarigatio)212 the pater patratus declares 
that he presents his demands as an envoy of the Roman people, observing the 
divine law, and he calls Iuppiter, the borders (fines) and the divine law (fas) to 
witness that if he demanded the delivery of the mentioned people or things 
unrightfully, then Jupiter should not allow him to return to his country. He 
recites this at the crossing of the border, and with slight alterations to the first 
person he encounters, and again, when he enters the town, and finally on the 
main square.213 If they do not deliver the things asked by him within thirty-
three days-Dionysius Halicarnassensis mentions an interval of thirty days214-, 
after calling Iuppiter, Ianus Quirinius, and all the gods witness, he declares that 
he did not receive what he demanded, and that on returning to Rome, he 
wishes to deliberate about how they could take revenge. This means that he 
declares the possibility of war (testatio, or denuntiatio belli).21* Arriving in 
Rome, the envoy presented the case to the Fathers and if the majority decided 
for purum piumque duellum, the pater patratus took an iron tipped or fire-
hardened spear (hastam ferratam aut praeustam sanguineam) to the enemy's 
border, and there, making reference to the unrightfulness of the refusal of his 
demand, he declared war and threw the spear onto the enemy's territory.216 
(Thus the direct causa of the war was the enemy people's unlawful behaviour, 
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the fact that they did not deliver the things or people demanded by the 
Romans.217) As a matter of fact, there was no need of such declaration of war if 
the enemy invaded Roman territory; in this case they could immediately and 
unconditionally begin the counter attack, so the declaration of war implemented 
by the fetiales had any significance only in the case of offensive warfare, 
initiated by the Romans. The archaic age certainly knew the institution of 
personal revenge, but the official declaration of war was only employed if the 
war was waged by the entire community, the populus, against another people, 
which was clearly distinguished from armed conflict between different groups 
of the aristocracy."18 In the course of its expansion Rome did not always have 
the opportunity to keep this ritual; therefore, the characteristically Roman 
formal conservatism chose the following fiction: The pater patratus threw the 
spear onto a plot of land declared enemy territory near Bellona's temple and 
the entire ceremony was performed with respect to that plot of land, but the 
demands towards the enemy were presented by the legati of the senatus, and 
they were the ones to declare war.214 (Sometimes they sent the spear to the 
people on whom they wanted to declare war.22") However, the fetiales 's 
ritual of the declaration of war considerably contributed to the observation of 
the requirement that the war had to possess some kind of iusta causa, and it is 
not by chance that Cicero, formulating the theory of just war under the 
influence of Stoic philosophy, connects aequitas belli with ius fetiale 
The hasta ferrata aut praeusta sanguinea, meaning iron tipped or fire 
hardened spear, mentioned by Livy,222 also deserves attention. At the same 
time, it is not known when the iron-tipped spear was substituted for, or when it 
accompanied the wooden spear hardened in fire, as The Iron Age goes back to 
the turn of the 8th and 9th century ВС. in Italy. It can be assumed though, that 
in ritual usage the iron-tipped spear could only take the place of the wooden 
one when it came to be exclusively used in everyday life.223 The expression 
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sanguinea is particularly problematic: The word itself can be translated as 
consecrated in blood or coloured with blood. However, if it is taken for the 
denomination of the wooden material, it can mean the branch of the cornel 
tree, the sanguineae virgae, which, being hard wood, constituted a perfectly 
suitable raw material for the spear.224 Ammianus Marcellinus mentions in 
connection with the fetiales's spear that besmearing it with blood played an 
important role in the course of its manufacturing.225 The spear of ins sacrum 
made of cornel wood counted as arbor felix,22b but the spear used for the 
declaration of war was hasta impura; i.e., arbor infelix, dedicated to the forces 
of the underworld. Thus, whether the fetiales' s spear was coloured with real 
blood, or made of blood coloured cornel wood, the original hasta praeusta 
sanguinea was later changed for hasta ferrata sanguine infecta}21 The fetialis 
ritually predicts the outcome of war at its very beginning because by symbolically 
taking the enemy territory into possession with the hasta impura, dedicated to the 
gods of the underworld, he delivers the enemy, the hostis impius, bereft of the 
reason for its existence, to the forces of destruction.228 (In the light of this, 
the role of evocatio, performed by the Romans before the attack, by which 
they intended to lure to Rome the gods of the enemy doomed to destruction 
becomes perfectly clear.229) 
The strongly text-centered nature of ins fetiale and legis actio sacramento 
is sufficiently well-known; we know that whoever missed even one word of 
the text, lost the case.230 Although in the case of ius fetiale we have no 
expressis verbis knowledge of such consequences, it can be rightly assumed that 
the Romans did not tolerate even the slightest deviation from the text because 
this would have destroyed the effect of carmen, hence it would have endan-
gered the result of the bellum iustum, fought with divine help.231 The oath is 
an indispensable part of ins fetiale. On the one hand, the self malediction of 
the pater patratus on the occasion that he presented unrightful demands in the 
name of the Roman people; on the other hand, the calling of the gods to 
witness the lawful procedure of the Romans and the unlawful procedure of 
Macrobius, Saturnalia 3, 20, 3; Plinius maior. Naturalis história 16, 176; 19, 180; 
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the enemy. In the case of legis actio, sacramentum corresponds to this oath."1" 
The oath-like character of sacramentum is clearly shown by the original 
meaning of the word itself.213 At the same time, it also incorporates the circum-
stance that the statement of the party taking the oath-e.g., the plaintiff-is true, 
and accordingly, the statement of his opponent is false. However, if in the 
end it were proved that the claim of the plaintiff does not stand, then it 
becomes evident that he committed perjury; i.e., he performed his own 
devotio,234 (Kaser also suspects that in the beginning the sacramentum was 
related to the divine judgement, but in his view this cannot be sufficiently 
documented for the period from which written sources exist.235 It is still a fact 
that the character of divine judgement can be traced-by analogy-also in this 
part of legis actio sacramento. References to the role played by the oath in the 
trial can be found not only in literary sources, but in traces, in later legal 
documents as well.236) It seems a further parallel that both rerum repetitio and 
legis actio sacramento are originally aimed at regaining the things unlawfully 
possessed by the opposing party in a peaceful manner, placing arbitrariness and 
fight under the control of the state, thus limiting their scope and intensity.237 At 
the same time, it is a clear difference that whereas in the case of legis actio 
sacramento the parties accept the control and decision of a judge recognized 
by both of them, in the case of ius fetiale, this institution is absent. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that in the so-called international affairs they could 
not agree on the competence of legal court-this might be the cause of the 
absence of the apuci iudicem stage of ius fetiale procedure-it can be rightly 
assumed though that the Romans found the umpire entitled to decide in the 
conflict of two nations exactly in the higher powers, who were so often called 
238 
to witness." 
Ius fetiale is a clearly religious system of norms and procedures, as this is 
shown by references made constantly to the persons and gods acting in it. 
Nevertheless, legis actio sacramento, considered to be an institution of ius 
privatum shows close connection with ius sacrum: In the beginning legis actio 
was performed in front of the rex, who was present, both in his person and his 
legitimacy, as a representative of the sphere of the sacred. Then the in iure 
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stage of the trial took place in front of the magistratus; then, in concreto, it took 
place in front of the praetor, who was in terms of his jurisdictional respon-
sibilities an inheritor of the rex.2v> The oath, strictly observing the words of the 
text, was also addressed to the gods, which substantiates the assumption that 
legis actio was closely related to ins sacrum.24" (Certain parallels can be 
detected between ius fetiale and the Twelve Table Law;241 for example the 
debtor had thirty days to satisfy the demand of the creditor if he admitted his 
indebtedness, or if the case was settled by legal decision; similarly, the pater 
patratus had to wait with the denuntiatio belli for thirty days after he had 
announced his demands, according to Dionysius Halicarnassesensis.242 The reason 
of both decrees was to help to find a peaceful solution of the conflict within 
this interval. In line with the relevant loci of the Twelve Table Law order on 
giving the person who causes damage into noxa,243 ius fetiale stipulates the 
extradition of the person who commits a deed injurious to Rome.244) The same 
intention, meant to restrict the uncontrollable arbitrary enforcement of private 
demands between the citizens of a state, or between different nations and states, 
which tried to prevent the state of bellum omnium contra omnes by placing the 
act of solving the conflict under some kind of commonly accepted higher 
instance, might have stood at the origins of both ius fetiale and legis actio 
245 
sacramento. 
From the above it can be unambiguously established that the spear and the 
rod fulfilled the function of generally used symbols of power in the Greek-Roman 
culture both in the ceremony of legis actio sacramento in rem belonging to the 
field of ius privatum and in several proceedings and institutions that can be 
ranked among the tools of ius publicum and ius sacrum. In archaic thought, 
however, a symbol was not considered an image that needs to be interpreted 
but reality embodying the concept, fact denoted; so this applied to the hasta 
and the festuca, which were on the boundary of law and the sphere of the 
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sacred and served to express iustum dominium and impérium. This overview 
might have somewhat highlighted certain important aspects inherent in the rite 
of vindicatio as a kind of ordalium deciding the battle-as it was meant to be 
demonstrated with the phrase sacrum duellum used in the introductory passage 
of this study-which can be explored and interpreted solely through applying 
the findings of law and the history of religion in synthesis. 
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for a proper understanding and construction of legal phenomena cannot be 
gained by an examination of a single legal system, since law transcends national 
boundaries, or without a comparison. Like legal history, legal sociology and 
legal philosophy, comparative law provides jurists with additional perspectives 
for a more complete understanding of law and, by enriching their intellectual 
repertory, enables them to better accomplish their tasks. It introduces concepts, 
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sty les, organizations and categorizations previously unknown, revealing 
unsuspected possibilities in the very notion of law and thus enabling jurists to 
more effectively address the legal, social and political issues that legal systems 
strive to resolve. 
Modern comparative law has progressed through different stages of evolution. 
Influenced by developments in the biological sciences, linguistics and new 
theories of social evolution during the nineteenth century, comparatists tended 
to focus, at that time, upon the historical development of legal systems with a 
view to tracing broad patterns of legal development common to all societies. 
The idea of the organic evolution of law as a social phenomenon led jurists 
to search for basic structures, or a 'morphology', of law and other social 
institutions. They sought and constructed evolutionary patterns with a view to 
uncovering the essence of the 'idea of law'.1 Of particular importance to the 
development of comparative and historical jurisprudence was Sir Henry Maine's 
work on the laws of ancient peoples. According to Maine, while comparative 
law, as opposed to the properly so-called jurisprudence, is concerned with 
the analysis of law at a certain point of time, historical-comparative juris-
prudence focuses on the idea of legal development or the dynamics of law. But 
it was F. Pollock, Maine's disciple and successor in his scientific endeavours, 
who synthesized science and comparative law by drawing attention to the 
connection or interrelationship between the 'static' point of view of comparative 
law in a narrow sense and the 'dynamic' approach of historical jurisprudence. To 
him, jurisprudence itself must be both historical and comparative; in this respect, 
comparative law plays more than a merely secondary or supporting role, it has a 
distinct place in the system of legal sciences." The position adopted at the First 
1
 According to Franz Bernhöft, '|C]omparative law wants to teach how peoples of 
common heritage elaborate the inherited legal notions for themselves, how one people 
receives institutions from another one and modifies them according to their own views, and 
finally how legal systems of different nations evolve even without any factual interconnec-
tion according to the common laws of evolution. It searches, in a nut-shell, within the 
systems of law, the idea of law'. Lieber Zweck und MitteI der vergleichenden Rechts-
wissenschaft, 1. 
2
 As Pollock remarked, "It makes no great difference whether we speak of historical 
jurisprudence or comparative jurisprudence, or. as the Germans seem inclined to do, of the 
general history of law." Pollock, F.: The History of Comparative Jurisprudence. Journal of 
the Society of Comparative Legislation 5 ( 1903) 74 at 76. The influence of t his school of 
though is reflected in more recent discussions of the nature and aims of the comparative 
study of laws. Thus, according to Rotondi. comparison is one of two methods (the other 
being the historical method) whose combination can give us a comprehensive knowledge 
of law as a universal social phenomenon. Legal science relies upon these methods in order 
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International Congress of Comparative Law, held in Paris in 1900, as to the 
nature and objectives of comparative law stressed both the independence of 
comparative law from other fields of scientific inquiry, and its long-term 
practical goal, namely the unification of the laws of peoples at similar stages of 
cultural and economic development through the elimination of the accidental 
differences between them. At that Congress, the famous French comparatist 
Raymond Saleilles asserted that the chief aim of comparative law is the discovery, 
through the study of different national laws, of concepts and principles common 
to all 'civilized' legal systems, i.e. universal concepts and principles that 
constitute a relatively ideal law-a kind of natural law with a changeable 
character.3 According to Édouard Lambert, a unity of general purpose can be 
detected in similar legislation from different states, in spite of the absence of 
such unity at the level of the rules embodied in the legislation. It is thus 
possible to discern a common basis of legal solutions and establish a 'common 
legislative law'. The unitary and universalistic mentality underpinning the 
approach to comparative law adopted in the Paris Congress reflects the 
influence of schools of thought that dominated European legal science in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of these schools was the German 
Begriffsjurisprudenz (jurisprudence of concepts). Favouring the construction of 
grand schemes of systematization, Bergriffsjurisprudenz placed strong emphasis 
on the formulation of abstract, logically interconnected, conceptual categories 
to detect and construe the (natural) laws governing the evolution of this phenomenon. In 
searching for relations between different legal systems, or families of legal systems, one 
seeks to discover, to the extent that this is possible, certain stable features in this evolutionary 
process that may allow one to foreshadow future developments concerning the character 
and orientation of legal systems and branches of law. Technique du droit dogmatique et 
droit compare. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1968) 13. And see Herzog: Les 
principes et les methods du droit pénal comparé. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 
(1957) 350. And according to Yntema, comparative law, following the tradition of the ius 
commune (droit commun), as an expression of the deep-rooted humanist vision 
concerning the universality of justice, and based on the study of historical phenomena, 
seeks to discover and construe in a rational way (en termes rationnels) the common 
elements of human experience relating to law and justice. In the world today the primary 
task of comparative law is to elucidate the conditions under which economic and 
technological development can take place within the framework of the Rule of Law. Le 
droit comparé et Г humanisme. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1958) 698. 
3
 Conception et objet de la science juridique du droit compare. In: Procès verbaux des 
séances et documents du Congrès international de droit comparé 1900, 1905-1907, I, 167 
at 173. 
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as a means of constructing highly systematic bodies of positive law.4 By 
comparing conceptual forms the members of this school hoped to find concrete 
evidence of general, universally valid, legal systematics, and to reveal the 
common core or essence of basic juridical concepts, even if it was admitted 
that every legal order has a system of its own. 
The works of nineteenth century scholars, which endeavoured to concep-
tualize legal phenomena on a historical-comparative plane, paved the way for 
the recognition of comparative law as a science and an academic discipline. 
During the twentieth century, however, many comparative law scholars, most 
notably Gutteridge and David, adopted the view that comparative law was no 
more than a method to be employed for diverse purposes in the study of law. 
According to this view, comparative law is no more than a means to an end and 
therefore the purposes for which the comparative method would be utilized 
should provide the basis for any definition of comparative law as a subject. This 
approach entailed a shift in emphasis from comparative law as a science to the 
uses of the comparative method in the study of law. By focusing on the uses, 
aims or purposes of comparative study, comparatists divided their activities 
into categories such as 'descriptive comparative law' or 'comparative nomos-
copy', signifying the mere description of foreign law; 'applied comparative law' 
or 'comparative legislation', referring to the use of foreign law for the purpose 
of reforming one's own legal system; 'comparative nomothetics', concerned 
with the evaluation of foreign law; 'comparative nomogenetics' or 'comparative 
history of law', focusing on the evolution of legal norms and institutions; and 
'abstract or speculative comparative law' or 'comparative jurisprudence', with 
respect to which the comparative method was designed to assist sociologists 
and legal philosophers.7 However, the above divisions do not militate against 
the basic unity of comparative law as a scientific method. As Gutteridge points 
out, comparative law is not made up of a variety of independent inquiries 
related to each other only by virtue of the fact that they all involve the study of 
different legal systems. The basic feature of comparative law, as a method, is 
that it can be applied to all types and fields of legal inquiry.6 
In general, a distinction may be drawn between three types of comparative 
legal inquiry: idealistic, realistic and particularistic. From the idealistic view-
point, legal order is seen as a normative matter that is present in the factual legal 
4
 See e.g., Puchta, G. F.: Cursus der Institutionen. I, 1841. esp. 95-108; Windscheid: 
Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts. 1891. 1. 59-60. 
See in general, Gutteridge, H. C.: Le droit compare. Paris, 1953. 20. 
6
 Ibid. at 28. And see Langrod, G.: Quelques réflexions méthodologiques sur la 
comparaison en science juridique. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1957) 363. 
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order although it cannot be identified with it. The realistic perspective, on the 
other hand, is based upon an empirical view of legal order. Both the idealistic 
and realistic approaches are concerned with the problem of generalization. The 
study of legal orders brings to light innumerable differences and similarities. 
Idealistic universalism seeks to discover the ideal of law, which is present in 
all legal orders; realistic universalism seeks to reveal the sociological laws 
governing legal phenomena. In spite of their theoretical juxtaposition, both 
approaches have universalism in common: they are not content with a mere 
description as they want to systematize, to find out general means of explanation 
to account for legal phenomena irrespective of time and place. Those who 
follow a particularistic approach to comparative law, by contrast, claim that 
general schemes are too abstract to serve as goals of study. This approach, 
quite common in the contemporary practice of comparative law, tends to 
reduce comparative law to a detailed description of different legal orders. 
From this point of view, comparison is only a translation of valid legal orders 
into one language. In most cases, however, some kind of intermediate position 
between universalism and particularism is sought, as far as it is recognized that 
there are both general and particular features in every legal order.7 It might be 
said that the universal and individual features of legal phenomena are different 
aspects of a uniform whole, although both aspects are in order to grasp reality. 
The more general a description is, the more phenomena of concrete life it covers, 
and the better it is as a scientific description, but the less does it represent a 
particular form of life. The exact course of historical events is always individual 
and can be explained only by reference to its particular elements; but the broad 
outline of the events is subject to general socio-historical laws. Even though 
legal sociology might strive towards a universalist knowledge of law, as does 
legal philosophy in a different sense, comparative law is by its own nature 
forever bound to vacillate between the general and the particular. The 
comparative process may be described as dialectical, since it focuses upon the 
inter-connection between general principles and concrete observations made 
when these principles are applied in practice. Thus, the general explanatory 
background is concretized in particular cases; at the same time, a general 
historical outlook enables one to make certain generalizations from particular 
events within the framework of a general model of explanation. 
The role of comparative analyses in the field of legal history deserves 
special attention. The history of law explores the sources of legal phenomena, 
and the evolution of legal systems and individual legal institutions in different 
7
 This reflects the Aristotelian view of legal order as a result partly of natural 
regularities and laws, and partly of human will. 
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historical contexts. It is concerned both with the history of a single legal order 
and the legal history of many societies, the universal history of law. By 
comparing different legal systems at different stages of development, legal 
historians attempt to trace the evolution of legal institutions and the historical 
ties that may exist between legal systems. Historical analyses of law utilizing 
the comparative method are essential for understanding the development of 
legal systems. Without the knowledge derived f rom historical-comparative 
legal studies it is impossible to investigate contemporary legal institutions, as 
these are to a great extent the products of historical conditions, borrowings and 
mutual influences of legal systems in the past. 
Legal historians have observed that many legal norms have remained in 
force for a long time; yet the great degree of social change would prima facie 
also entail legal innovations. But there have been fewer than expected. How 
can the relative longevity of law be explained? One might say that there are 
social structures that have remained largely unchanged and that, accordingly, 
should be used to explain the longevity of some legal norms or institutions. But 
an obscure reference to some structure carries little weight as an explanation. The 
question is: can on e construct a general theoretical framework for assessing 
explanations concerning legal change and legal stability? Further, can such a 
framework be constructed from the perspective of comparative law? It may 
perhaps be argued that comparative law is not sufficient for constructing 
such a theory; a general analysis of society is needed. But even if concrete 
conditions, and cause and effect relations cannot be entirely explained by an 
abstract scheme, such a scheme may clarify some of the basic concepts at work 
and enhance insights into the nature and progress of law. 
The following paragraphs consider the questions of legal change and legal 
stability from the viewpoint of comparative law. The discussion will focus on 
aspects of the legal change theory developed by Professor Alan Watson, one of 
the most productive post-War comparatists and legal historians. 
A comparative theory of legal change? 
Since the publication of the first edition of his seminal book, Legal Trans-
plants: An Approach to Comparative Law in 1974, Watson has produced many 
works on the relationship between law and society, and the factors accounting 
for legal change.8 In these works he iterates his belief that changes in a legal 
8
 See, e.g., Watson, A.: Aspects of Reception of Law. American Journal of 
Comparative Law 44 (1996) 335; Comparative Law and Legal Change. Cambridge Law 
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system are due to legal transplants: the transfer of legal rules and institutions 
from one legal system to another. 'Legal transplanting' involves a legal system 
incorporating a legal rule, institution or doctrine adopted from another legal 
system. It may also pertain to the reception of an entire legal system, which may 
occur in a centralist way, as displayed by the introduction of the Napoleonic 
Code in many European countries. However, in most cases foreign rules or 
doctrines are 'borrowed' in the context of legal practice itself, because they fill 
a gap or meet a particular need in the importing country. Until the nineteenth 
century legal transplanting mainly occurred within Europe. In the course of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries European laws were transplanted in 
many countries around the world either directly or through the adoption of 
European codes. During the same period, English Common law spread through 
the colonies of the British Empire in North America, Australia, New Zealand 
and parts of Asia and Africa. In the past few decades, many institutions of 
Anglo-American law have been adopted by countries of Continental Europe.4 
Legal transplanting is also associated with the so-called 'hybrid' legal systems, 
i.e. systems whose development was influenced by two or more legal traditions."1 
To understand the reception of foreign law phenomenon one must examine the 
reasons behind the introduction of foreign law in a particular case (e.g. whether 
it is the result of conquest, colonial expansion or the political influence of the 
state whose law is adopted," or it pertains to the perceived quality and prestige 
Journal (1978) 313; Legal Transplants and Law Reform. Law Quarterly Review (1976) 92; 
Society and Legal Change, Philadelphia, 1977; Sources of Law, Legal Change, and 
Ambiguity. Philadelphia, 1984; Legal Origins and Legal Change. London, 1991; The 
Evolution of Western Private Law. Baltimore, 2001. And see R. Sacco: Legal Formants: A 
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law. American Journal of Comparative Law (1991). 
9
 An example is the concept of ' trust ' , originally an Anglo-American legal concept, 
which has been adopted by many Continental European legal systems. 
10
 Such as, for example, South Africa (Roman-Dutch and English influence), Québec 
(French and English influence) and Louisiana (French and American influence). 
" Territorial expansion through military conquest (such as the Roman expansion in the 
Mediterranean world; the settlement of Germanic peoples in Europe; the expansion of 
Islam in Africa and Asia; and the Spanish conquests in Central and South America) did not 
always entail the imposition of the conquering peoples' laws on the subjugated populations 
(for example, in lands under Germanic and Islamic rule subject populations continued to be 
governed by their own systems of law under the so-called 'principle of the personality of 
law'). In some cases a direct imposition did in fact occur (consider, for example, the 
introduction of Spanish law in South America), while in others the law of the conquering 
nation was introduced in part or in an indirect fashion (for example, during the British and 
French colonial expansion there was a tendency to introduce into the colonies elements of 
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of the adopted law).12 This analysis must also address the roles that legal 
science, legal education and the legal profession play in the reception process; 
the form of the imported law (whether it is a written, customary or judge-made 
law); and whether (or to what extent) the importing and exporting countries are 
compatible with respect to culture, socio-economic structure and level of 
development, as well as the outcomes of legal transplanting. 
The destinies of legal transplants in different cultural, socio-economic and 
political contexts are important to examine for determining the desirability and 
applicability of such transplants for legislative and judicial practice. It may be 
true that ethno-cultural, political and socio-economic differences between the 
exporting and the importing countries do not preclude the successful trans-
plantation of legal rules and institutions. Legal rules can be taken out of context 
and can serve as a model for legal development in a very different society. 
However, one should keep in mind that an imported legal norm is occasionally 
ascribed a different, local meaning, when it is rapidly indigenized on account 
of the host culture's inherent integrative capacity. It is not surprising that, very 
often, European legal concepts, institutions and rules imported by non-Western 
countries are understood in a way that is different from that in the donor 
countries. The absence of substantial differences in the wording of a statute 
law from the donor and the host countries does not imply that legal reality, or 
everyday legal and social practice in the two countries, should be identical or 
similar. The legal reality in the host country may be very different with respect 
to the way people (including judges and state officials) read, interpret and 
justify the relevant law and the court decisions based on it. Moreover, the role 
of statute law in the recipient country may be much weaker than it is in the 
exporting country and custom may be a predominant factor. Thus, in practice, 
social rules might effectively prevent people from initiating a legal claim or 
even using a court decision supporting such a claim. As this suggests, it is not 
good sense to use the perspective and framework of one's own legal culture 
when examining a law or legal concept in a legal system operating within the 
context of another culture. Such an approach carries the risk of implying the 
the legal systems of the colonial powers or to develop systems of law adapted to local 
circumstances but largely reflecting the character of the metropolitan systems). 
12
 Consider, for example, the reception of Roman law in Continental Europe. Many 
centuries after the demise of the Roman state, the jurists of Western Europe came to regard 
Roman law as intellectually superior to other systems of law. Seen as constituting an 
expression of natural reason, Roman law was received in Europe not by virtue of any 
theory concerning its continued validity as part of the positive law, but in consequence of 
its own inherent worth. In other words, its validity was accepted not ratione auctoritatis, 
but auctoritate rationis. 
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existence of many more similarities than there actually are.'2 It would be 
impossible to understand the very idea of Western legal tradition without 
recognizing the enormous variety of legal norms and styles that are common 
within it, not only within the Civil law and the Common law domains, but also 
across the borders of these legal families. 
According to Watson, the nomadic character or rules proves that the idea of 
a close relationship between law and society is a fallacy.14 Law is largely 
autonomous and develops by transplantation, not because some rule was the 
inevitable consequence of the social structure, but because those who control 
law-making were aware of the foreign rule and recognised the apparent 
benefits that could derive from it.15 Watson does not contemplate that rules are 
borrowed without alteration or modification; rather, he indicates that voluntary 
transplants would nearly always-always in the case of a major transplant-
involve a change in the law largely unconnected with particular factors operating 
within society.1(1 Neither does Watson expect that a rule, once transplanted, will 
operate in exactly the same way it did in the country of its origin. Against this 
13
 As Watson has remarked, "except where the systems are closely related, the differences 
in legal values may be so extreme as to render virtually meaningless the discovery that 
systems have the same or a different rule". Legal Transplants, 5. For example, consider the 
difficulties surrounding the interpretation of the concept of individual freedom, as found in 
international treaties on human rights. Individual freedom has a rather different meaning in 
China and other Asian countries, as compared to the Western view, not just because of a 
political ideology currently or formerly imposed by the rulers of those countries, but 
because of a more basic, culturally embedded ideology that originates from a very different, 
collect!vist world view. For an elaboration of the theory of legal transplants see Ewald, W.: 
Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants. American Journal of 
Comparative Law 43 (1995) 489. 
14
 Legal Transplants, 2nd ed. 1993. 108. On the view that law is the result of the social 
needs of a given society see in general Friedmann. W.: Law in Changing Society. 1959; 
Damaska, M.: The Faces of Justice and State Authority 1986; Friedman, L. M.: A History 
of American Law 18 (1973) 595. 
15
 Watson, A.: Comparative Law and Legal Change. Cambridge Law Journal 37 (1978) 
313, 313-315 and 32. 
16
 Watson has identified a number of factors that determine which rules will be borrowed, 
including: (a) accessibility (this pertains to the question of whether the rule is in writing, in 
a form that is easily found and understood, and readily available); (b) habit (once a system 
is used as a quarry, it will be borrowed from again, and the more it is borrowed from, the 
more the right thing to do is to borrow from that system, even when the rule that is taken is 
not necessarily appropriate; (c) chance (e.g., a particular written source may be present in a 
particular library at a particular time, or lawyers f rom one country may train in, and 
become familiar with the law of another country); and (d) the authority and the prestige of 
the legal system from which rules are borrowed. 
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background, Watson argues that comparative law, construed as a distinct 
intellectual discipline, should be concerned with the study of the historical 
relationships between legal orders and the destinies of legal transplants in 
different countries.17 On this basis one may identify the factors explaining the 
change or immutability of law." Watson asserts that comparative law (which 
he distinguishes from knowledge of foreign law) can enable those engaged in 
law reform to better understand their historical role and tasks. It can provide 
them with a clearer perspective as to whether and to what extent it is 
reasonable to appropriate from other systems and which systems to select; and 
whether it is possible to accept foreign legal rules and institutions with or 
without modifications.14 
Watson attempts to construct a comprehensive theory of legal change from 
ancient times to the modern era. He has the requisite qualifications: he is a 
distinguished Romanist. An important part of his work is concerned with the 
worldwide reception of Roman law and its admirable longevity as a system 
under different socio-economic conditions. The Roman law, as shaped by the 
compilers of the Justinianic codification in the sixth century AD, has been one 
of the strongest forces in the development of Western law. Although Justinian 
sought to produce, on the basis of the legal inheritance of the past, an authori-
tative statement of contemporary law, his system was adopted and applied by 
most European countries during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance; in wide 
17
 Legal Transplants, 6. 
18
 Legal Transplants, 21. To illustrate this, Watson mentions a set of rules concerned 
with matrimonial property, which traveled "f rom the Visigoths to become the law of the 
Iberian Peninsula in general, migrating then from Spain to California, [and] f rom California 
to other states in the western United States". Ibid, at 108. He adds, that if one considers a 
range of legal systems over a long term "the picture that emerge[s] is of continual massive 
borrowing ... of rules". Ibid, at 107. On this basis he concludes that the moving of a rule or a 
system of law from one country to another has now been shown to be the most fertile 
source of legal development, since "most changes in most systems are the result of 
borrowing". Ibid, at 94. Watson's theory of legal transplants has been challenged by some 
scholars. See e.g. Legrand, P.: The Impossibility of "Legal Transplants". Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 4 (1997) 111; What 'Legal Transplant '? In: 
Nelken, D.-Feest, J. (eds): Adapting Legal Cultures. Oxford, 2001. 55; Wise, E. M.: The 
Transplant of Legal Patterns. American Journal of Comparative Law, 1990. 1; Murdock, G. P.: 
How Culture Changes. In: Shapiro, H. (ed.): Man Culture and Society. Oxford, 1990. 256. 
Consider also Cotterrell, R.: Is there a Logic of Legal Transplants? in: Nelken-Feest (eds): 
op. cit. 71. 
'Despite the rather far-reaching nature of some of his statements, it is important to 
observe that Watson has generally confined his studies, and the deriving theory of legal 
change, to the development of private law in Western countries. 
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areas of Germany and other European regions it remained an immediate source 
of law until the end of the nineteenth century. Roman private law was used in 
Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran countries; it operated in countries where 
agriculture dominated economic life and it also applied in mercantile centres 
and later in countries undergoing the industrialization process. This law, first 
adopted in Europe, was directly or indirectly (through a European law code) 
transplanted in South America, Quebec, Louisiana and many countries in 
Asia and Africa. But why was Roman law adopted? The medieval reception 
of Roman law was partly due to the lack of centralized governments and 
developed formal legal systems that could compete with the comprehensive 
inheritance of Rome; and partly due to the fact that the lands formerly governed 
by the Romans were accustomed to this style of thought, and accorded it 
wisdom and authority. A third feature, deriving almost completely from the 
model of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, was the desire of most countries to codify 
their law and the aspirations of later jurists to conform their studies to this 
model. But Roman law was not adopted merely because it was admired, nor 
because its norms were particularly suitable for the social conditions in the 
early European nation-states. In fact, many norms of Roman law were entirely 
antiquated. Foremost, it was the perceived superiority of Roman law as a system 
that led to the adoption of its norms, even if this adoption was supported by a 
learned tradition that endured for centuries. Juridical norms and their systematic 
organization are more perennial than most rules of current law. This is, of 
course, partly due to the existence of common problems, but also partly due to 
historical tradition, the fact that Roman law has been an important common 
denominator of most Western legal experience. Thus the conceptual system of 
Roman law may be said to be an apt tertium comparationis, as it constitutes a 
common basis of the legally organized relationships of life in the West.20 
The experience of the legal historian underlies Watson's scepticism towards 
the view that law is directly derived from social conditions. According to him, 
history shows that legal change in European private law has occurred mainly 
by transplantation of legal rules and is not necessarily due to the impact of 
social structures. He sees legal change as an essentially 'internal' process,"1 in 
the sense that sociological influences on legal development are considered 
20
 Legal relationships are to a large extent organized by forms derived from Roman 
law. One might say that these forms constitute a kind of pre-knowledge for Western legal 
systems. 
21
 He speaks of an 'internal legal logic' or of 'the internal logic of the legal tradition' 
governing legal development. See Watson. A.: The Evolution of Law. Philadelphia, 1985, 
21-22. 
270 GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS 
generally unimportant. The evidence to support this position is derived from 
history, which Watson claims to show: that the transplanting of legal rules 
between systems is socially easy even when there are great material and 
cultural differences between the donor and recipient societies; that no area of 
private law is very resistance to change through foreign influence-contrary to 
the sociologically oriented argument that culturally rooted law is more difficult 
to change than merely instrumental law;22 and that the recipient legal systems 
require no knowledge of the context of origin and development of the laws 
received by transplantation from another system.2. Social, economic, and 
political factors affect the shape of the generated law only to the extent 
they are present in the consciousness of lawmakers, i.e. the group of lawyers 
and jurists who control the mechanisms of legal change. The lawmakers' 
awareness of these factors may be heightened by pressure from other parts of 
society, but even then, the lawmakers' response will be conditioned by the 
legal tradition: by their learning, expertise and knowledge of law, domestic and 
foreign. Societal pressure may engender a change in the law, but the resulting 
legal rule will usually be adopted from a system known to the lawmaker and 
often modified without always a full consideration of the local conditions. 
Watson stresses that law is, to a considerable extent, a phenomenon operating 
at the level of ideology; it is an autonomous discipline largely resistant to 
influences beyond the law itself. From this point of view, he argues that the 
law itself provides the impetus for change. At the same time, he recognizes 
that there is a necessary relationship between law and society, notwithstanding 
that a considerable disharmony tends to exist between the best rule that the 
society envisages for itself and the rule that it actually has. The task of legal 
theory with comparative law as the starting-point is to shed light on this 
relationship and, in particular, to elucidate the inconsistencies between the law 
actually in force and the ideal law, i.e. the law that would correspond to the 
demands of society or its dominant strata. As this suggests, Watson's theory is 
basically idealistic.24 
22
 See on this Levy, E.: The Reception of Highly Developed Legal Systems by Peoples 
of Different Cultures. Washington Law Review 25 (1950) 233. 
23
 A. Watson: Legal Transplants and Law Reform. Law Quarterly Review 92 (1976) 
79, 80-81. 
24
 According to Watson, "It should be obvious that law exists and flourishes at the 
level of idea, and is part of culture. As culture it operates in at least three spheres of 
differing size, one within another. ... The spheres are: the population at large, lawyers and 
lawmakers. By 'lawmakers' I mean the members of that elite group who in a particular 
society have their hands on the levers of legal change, whether as legislators, judges, or 
jurists. ... For a rule to become law it must be institutionalized. It must go through the stages 
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In an article published a few years after Legal Transplants, Watson 
delineated the factors that control the relationship between legal rules and the 
society in which they operate.2" Consideration of these factors is crucial to 
understanding the phenomenon of legal change. Whilst Watson admits that it is 
extremely difficult to determine the relative weight or impact of each factor, he 
specifies that their interaction should a priori be assessed as more important 
than the relative evaluation of the individual factors. In this respect, his model 
may be described as holistic. The factors are the following: 
- Source of law 
- Pressure force 
- Opposition force 
- Transplant bias 
- Law-shaping lawyers 
- Discretion factor 
- Generality factor 
- Inertia 
- Felt needs 
Watson recognizes that there may be some common elements in these 
factors. Indeed, it could even be maintained that some factors are only different 
aspects of the same problem, at least when applied to concrete contexts of 
legal change. This again is due to the inevitable interconnections between 
the matters considered. Even though on e might question whether Watson's 
scheme is the optimal method for presenting a comparative theory of legal 
change, one cannot deny the relevance of the observations he presents under 
the heading of 'factors'. Therefore, I shall proffer a short account of the factors 
and the way they operate. 
According to Watson, the development of a legal system is influenced by 
the nature of the predominant source or sources of law, whether this is custom, 
statute, code, judicial precedent or juristic doctrine. Precedent-based law 
develops more slowly than statutory law because such law "must always wait 
upon events, and, at that, on litigated events"; "there is no way of defining 
precisely the ratio decidendi of a particular case", for "only when there is a 
line of cases does it become possible to discover the principle underlying even 
required for achieving the status of law. ... Because lawyers and lawmakers are involved in 
all those processes a rule cannot become law without being subject to legal culture." Legal 
Chance: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1983) 
1121, 1152-1153. 
25
 Comparative Law and Legal Change. Cambridge Law Journal 37 (1978) 313-336. 
Although these factors pertain primarily to the Western legal tradition, Watson believes that 
they are valid also outside this sphere of legal culture. 
272 GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS 
the first case"."1 Thus, precedent-based law is always retrospective, whereas 
statutory law looks forward. While law based on precedent is slow to change, 
statutory law, which is more systematic and broader in scope, can be relied 
upon to introduce drastic and swift reforms. Moreover, development by statute 
with its more adequate theoretical basis can point the way to further reform. 
Watson also draws attention to the historical roots of the sources-of-law doctrine 
in different legal orders. It should be noted, however, that in many cases it is 
only legal change that determines the character of the sources-of-law doctrine 
and not vice versa. If social, economic, political or ideological change generates 
a need for revision of the law, the bonds with the sources of law (whether 
precedents or statutes) are loosened. Further, one should not over-emphasize 
the capacity of a statute-law system to foresee problems. If there is a 'gap' in 
written law, a court will often find it difficult to engage in the same sort of 
creative activity as its counterpart can in a seemingly 'retrospective' stare 
decisis system. 
The term pressure force refers to the organized group or groups of persons 
who believe that they would derive a benefit from a practicable change in the 
law. Watson says that the power wielded by a group to effect legal change 
varies in accordance with the social and economic position of its members and 
its capacity to act on a particular source of law. Pressure forces of different 
constitutions have varying effects upon individual sources of law, and different 
sources respond to pressure in different ways. In general, development by 
legislation is more affected by pressure forces than development by precedent. 
Watson stresses the independence of judges in precedent-based systems. As 
judges are not elected and their role is not seen as primarily political, they 
cannot be subject to direct pressure by organized groups, nor can they easily be 
swayed by general policy issues. He adds that juristic doctrine, as a source of 
law, is also mainly immune from pressure forces, except where a pressure 
force has great power and authority (e.g., not only an established Church, or 
the ruling party in a totalitarian state can directly and indirectly influence juristic 
doctrine but the doctrine itself can gain strength because of its connection with 
the dominant ideology). I think that Watson over-emphasizes the immunity of 
judges and jurists from external pressure. He says, for example, that a jurist's 
opinions would lose authority if a pressure force directly influenced him. But 
this pertains only to the pressure forces motivated by a newly-invented idea 
or need. Usually there is a system of permanent pressure forces in society, and 
most lawyers belong to that system. It is important to consider whether or to 
26
 Ibid, at 323. 
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what extent judges and jurists are susceptible to political arguments, and the 
degree of participation in politics they are permitted in different systems. 
Opposition force is the converse of a pressure force and embodies the 
organized group or groups of persons who believe that harm will result from a 
proposed change in the law. For an opposition force to exist, it is required that 
the group that would be adversely affected by the change is adequately organized. 
Watson remarks that although the persons who will be adversely affected by a 
proposed change in the law may be more numerous than those who will 
benefit, the change will most likely be executed if the anticipated gains of each 
member within the latter group is extensive, whereas the perceived harm to 
each member of the former group is small. The absence of an organized 
opposition force in such a case explains why legislation that is overall harmful 
and generally considered unpopular is occasionally passed without much 
resistance. 
Transplant bias harrsid is an essential element of Watson's theory that 
legal change primarily occurs through the appropriation or imitation of norms. 
It refers to a system's receptivity to a particular foreign law as a matter distinct 
from acceptance based on a thorough assessment of all possible alternatives."7 
This receptivity varies from system to system and its extent depends on factors 
such as the linguistic tradition shared with a potential donor system; the 
general prestige of the possible donor system; and the educational background 
and experience of the legal professionals in the recipient system. Watson also 
draws attention to the interaction of the factors determining legal development, 
pointing out that transplant bias interacts particularly with the sources of law. 
The adoption of an entire foreign legal code is probably the clearest manifes-
tation of transplant bias. Juristic doctrine is also very susceptible to foreign 
influence. This is evidenced by the fact that the reception of Roman law in 
Continental Europe first occurred in the field of legal science. Precedent, on 
the other hand, seems to be least affected by transplant bias. When judges 
borrow from foreign legal systems, the value of the foreign rule for the judge 's 
own system is often carefully considered and evaluated. In analyzing transplant 
bias one must bear in mind that, according to Watson, law develops principally 
through the adoption of rules and structures from elsewhere. The nature of this 
factor has an authoritative argument form such as; norm N is a Roman law 
norm-Roman law is superior-therefore, norm N should be accepted. Behind 
the minor premise of this inference there is no general appraisal of all norms of 
Roman law, but rather an opinion based upon the systematical coherence of 
27
 Transplant bias may be used to denote, for example, a system's readiness to accept a 
Roman law norm because the norm is derived from Roman law. 
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the relevant norm. The assertion, 'Roman law is superior', is neither deductive 
(i.e. based upon an axiom concerning the superiority of Roman law) nor inductive 
(where one should present reasons for considering the particular norm N good); 
rather it is quasi-inductive and systematical. 
Law-shaping lawyers are the legal elite that shape the law and whose 
knowledge, imagination, training and experience of the world and legal ideas 
strongly influence the end product of any change in the law. Watson notes that 
lawyers are well-placed to act as pressure or opposition forces. Their knowledge 
of how the legal system actually works means that they are fully aware of 
how the current law or its change affects their well-being. Besides this, legal 
professionals mould the law, in developed legal systems at least, in many ways: 
as members of parliamentary or governmental committees they are directly 
involved in the drafting of legislation; as judges they determine the shape and 
form of judicial precedents; and as jurists they contribute to the development 
of juristic doctrine and its recognition as a source of law. Watson observes 
that law-shaping lawyers are a factor one could remove as their functions are 
adequately covered by the notions of source of law and transplant bias, but they 
contribute such a particular flavour that their role deserves specific attention. 
In his more recent work, however, Watson places greater emphasis on the role 
of legal culture in shaping law's internal development.28 According to him, 
legal culture pertains to the general outlook, practices, knowledge, values and 
traditions of the legal elite of a legal system.29 
As Watson points out, "Ll]egal change comes about through the culture of the legal 
elite, the lawmakers, and it is above all determined by that culture". Watson, A.: The 
Evolution of Western Private Law. Baltimore, 2001. 264. 
24
 From the viewpoint of the autopoiesis theory, G. Teubner criticizes Watson for placing 
too much emphasis on the lawyers' professional practices as such. Teubner argues that these 
practices are not, in themselves, the motor of legal change but rather the necessary outcome 
of law's character as a distinctive discourse concerned chiefly with producing decisions that 
define what is legal. Because what is legal is law's essential focus as an independent 
discourse, law cannot be governed by social developments of the kind sociologists are 
concerned with. It may react to these developments but it always does so in its own 
normative terms. Thus, what Watson sees as the autonomous law development by legal elites, 
proponents of autopoiesis theory regard as the working out of law's independent evolution as 
a highly specialized and functionally distinctive communication system. For a closer look 
see in general Luhmann, N.: Social Systems, 1995; Teubner, G.: Law as an Autopoietic System. 
Cambridge, 1993; Priban, J.-Nelken, D. (eds): Law's New Boundaries: The Consequences 
of Legal Autopoiesis. London, 2001. On the implications of the autopoiesis theory for 
comparative law see Teubner, G.: Legal Irritants: Good Fath in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends U p in New Divergences. Modern Law Reriew 61 (1998) 11. 
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The discretion factor refers to the implicit or explicit discretion that exists 
either to enforce or not enforce the law, or to press or not press one 's legal 
rights. In Watson's words, the discretion factor is concerned with "the extent 
to which the rules permit variations, or can be evaded ... or need not or will 
not be invoked". He observes that some degree of discretion is an inevitable 
element in any developed legal system. This discretion may be possessed by 
individual parties, judges, the executive or actually be built into the legal rules 
themselves. By providing choice the discretion factor tends to mitigate the 
apparent undesirable requirements or consequences of legal norms, thus 
prompting an easier acceptance of these norms. However, Watson does not fail 
to note that an abuse of discretion will entail an adverse reaction. It is true that 
discretion creates choice, but the use of choice depends on certain other factors. 
It might be the case, for example, that a controversial parliamentary bill is 
passed as law after the most questionable paragraphs have been recast in such 
a way as to enable the judiciary or the executive to exercise discretion (e.g. 
open wording, general clause s or flexible criteria are used). However, this 
transfers the problem to another level of decision-making. At that level of 
micro decision-making, the principle pertaining to the equal treatment of the 
subjects of law plays a more important part than at the level of law-making, 
where the criteria of formal justice are introduced. From a comparative point 
of view, it should be stressed that a mere statement of discretion is rarely 
sufficient, as discretion is exercised according to some criteria and not at 
random. To understand how the discretion factor influences the state and develop-
ment of the law, one should identify both the factual and the evaluative criteria 
of discretion. 
The generality factor denotes the extent to which legal rules regulate more 
than one recognizable group of people, or more than one transaction or factual 
situation. Watson points out that the greater the generality of law, the more 
difficult it is to find a rule that precisely fits the situation of each group, or 
transaction or factual situation being regulated. He adds that the greater the 
generality of a proposed change in the law, the greater the difficulty of securing 
agreement on the appropriate rule or rules, and hence the greater the difficulty 
of bringing about legal change. The generality factor interacts to a considerable 
extent with the pressure or opposition forces. If the scope of the proposed 
change in the law is too narrow, the pressure force supporting it may have little 
influence. If, on the other hand, the scope of the proposed change is too broad, 
it is likely to produce an opposition force as such a change is unlikely to satisfy 
all the groups concerned. A connection also exists between the generality factor 
" Comparative Law and Legal Change. 330. 
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and the sources of law: to carry out a legislative change a degree of generality 
is needed. In comparative studies it is useful to draw a distinction between 
abstract generality and actual generality." There may be norms addressed 'to 
whom it may concern', i.e. to anyone. For example, drug trafficking may be a 
criminal offence and prohibited to everyone. Despite the abstract character of 
the relevant norm, the prohibition it produces, in reality, concerns a relatively 
small number of people. On the other hand, there may be norms addressed to a 
particular group of people that is so large in number that the norms are practically 
general. 
Inertia is defined by Watson as the general absence of a sustained interest 
of society and its ruling elite to struggle for the most 'satisfactory' rule. For 
law to be changed there must exist a sufficiently strong impulse directed through 
a pressure force operating on a source of law. This impulse must be strong 
enough to overcome the inertia. But how can inertia be explained? Watson 
notes that society's essential stake in law is order, and to maintain order there 
cannot be a consuming interest in the precise nature of the particular rules and 
their reform. There is a normal desire for stability and society, particularly the 
dominant elite, have a generalized interest in maintaining the status quo. This 
reflects an abstract interest in stability, which is linked to the fact that many 
legal norms have no direct impact on the lives of most citizens. According to 
Watson, besides the mystique surrounding law, practical considerations may 
obstruct legal change. Legal professionals may oppose legal reforms because 
they would have to learn new rules and juristic techniques. Moreover, as every 
legal reform entails a considerable cost, priorities must be assessed with regard 
to limited resources. Perhaps the case is that anticipated long-term benefits are 
not sufficient to justify a reform if the costs are not outweighed by the short-
term benefits. Watson argues that inertia as a factor in the relationship between 
law and society is not accorded the attention it deserves. He remarks that, as a 
matter of fact, societies often tolerate much law that has no correspondence 
with what is 'needed' or regarded as efficient. To understand the rationale one 
must consider the phenomenon of legal inertia and the various elements of its 
composition. Legal inertia has, I think, two aspects. First, it renders a 'static' 
justification of law sufficient: law is justified by past behaviour and behaviour 
by norms. This kind of inertia is inherent in all legal decision-making that 
strives to maintain regularity and predictability in the practice of law. Besides 
this aspect of inertia, inertia also relates to the structure and function of law in 
" Abstract generality is a typical feature of legislation. As stated by the classical 
Roman jurist Ulpian: "iura non in singiilas personas, sed generaliter constituuntur". 
Digest 1, 3, 8. 
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society. There are two kinds of structural matters for consideration: (a) law is 
to a certain extent resistant to certain social change, and society to certain legal 
change, and (b) there is a 'relative resistance' to change pertaining to the time-
lag between different functionally interdependent changes. 
Felt needs are the purposes known to, and regarded as appropriate by, a 
pressure force (not the ruling elite or society as a whole) that operates on a 
source of law. Watson recognizes that elucidating the nature of felt needs is not 
always easy. He declares that these are discoverable through an examination of 
words, deeds and effects: what the pressure force says is needed; how its 
constituent elements act both before and after the legal change is effected; and 
how the change actually impacts upon the interests of the pressure force. There 
are also needs that may be general, well-recognized and enduring in time. But 
unless these are supported by an active pressure force they are not 'felt needs' 
as understood by Watson, even though consideration of these 'other needs' is 
important for anyone interested in understanding the relationship between law 
and society. 
The question posited is how should Watson's nine 'factors' be used? He 
declares that, by relying upon these factors, one may devise models for legal 
development and the relationship between law and society. At the same time, 
by considering the interaction of these factors one can find answers to many 
perplexing questions concerning legal development. There are balances between 
the factors supporting change and the factors opposing change. According to 
Watson, the relationship between a society and its legal rules could be generally 
expressed as a mathematical equation: a legal rule will be stable when felt needs, 
weakened by the discretion factor, activating a pressure force as affected by the 
generality factor, to work on the relevant source of law, are less potent than 
inertia and opposition force combined; on the other hand, some legal change 
will occur when the force of felt needs, weakened by the discretion factor, 
activating a pressure force as affected by the generality factor, to work on a 
source of law, all as modified by the transplant bias and law-shaping lawyers, 
is greater than the force of inertia plus the opposition force. In other words, the 
precise relationship between legal norms and the society in which they operate 
can be expressed as the balance between two opposing sets of factors; the first 
inhibits change and the second supports change. A legal change occurs when 
the force of the second set of factors is greater than the force of the first set of 
factors, although the nature of the change is determined by the balance and 
relative weight of the various factors. In Watson's model one cannot locate a 
direct reference to concepts and elements that are commonplace in modern 
analyses of society. Neither society at large nor its dominant strata are regarded 
as factors. Legal change is triggered by pressure forces, not by society as a 
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whole, or its ruling elite. As he says, the pressure force and the society, or the 
pressure force and the ruling elite, are often co-extensive. Further, in a non-
democratic political system the ruling elite operates directly on the principal 
sources of law, enjoying a kind of monopoly with respect to legal change. In 
any country, the extent to which the pressure force and the society or its ruling 
elite are the same must be determined by a specific inquiry, although one must 
recall that, even if society at large or its ruling elite operate as the pressure 
force, legal rules are not necessarily the most efficient means of using social 
power to initiate reforms. 
Watson claims that his model is useful for elucidating certain difficult 
issues pertaining to legal development.32 But the model is not deterministic. He 
elaborates that, although existing elements in a society may determine the options 
that are known or knowable, and hence available, they do not predetermine the 
necessary outcome. In my view, this suggests that Watson's factors can only 
furnish the basis for a method of presenting relevant aspects of legal change in a 
generally valid manner. No objections of principle could be raised against such a 
method. The objections are, rather, of a practical nature. One might argue, for 
example, that Watson's felt needs and pressure forces do not direct enough 
attention to the fact that there are not only supporters and opponents of a 
proposed legal change. Often there is at least a degree of unanimity concerning 
the necessity for legal reform, but there are differing opinions as to the content 
of the planned legislation. In this case, the pressure forces and relevant interests 
cannot be seen as diametrically opposite. Interests can be construed as vectors 
which in concrete situations have a certain direction and strength (when compared 
to other social vectors). It is difficult to state that the law in question is a result 
of the goals of one interest group if this law is more allied to its interests 
than those of another group. This vie w excludes the immediate authority of 
conflicting background interests and statements of goals. But this does not mean 
that it is incorrect to refer to the social impact of different decision-alternatives; 
" For example, it is often said that there is a close connection between commerce and 
law, especially the law of contract, and that economic growth engenders legal change. But 
the Scots law of contract developed rapidly between the years 1633 and 1665 (it was 
during this period that the main forms of contract and the general principles of contract law 
were recognized), even though, as is well known, this period was characterized by economic 
stagnation. By contrast, in England, which was much more developed economically and 
commercially, there could scarcely be said that a general law of contract or general 
principles of contract existed before the nineteenth century. To understand this one must 
consider the interaction of the factors relevant to legal change in the relevant historical 
context. 
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and one is compelled to evaluate these alternatives, taking some axiological 
system as the starting point, even if no one can say that there exists one and only 
one consequent value-system of the legal order. Furthermore, the intentions of 
groups should not be defined in such a manner that one only considers those 
goals embodied in the historical sources. Constructed, hypothetical models are 
also needed, otherwise one may lose sight of probable motives of action which 
are not explicitly alluded to in the sources. 
Let us now return to our earlier question: is it possible to construct a 
general theory of legal change? Watson declares that, even if an examination 
of the various factors reveals such a diversity of possibilities that a general 
theory could not be developed regarding the growth of law in the West (except 
perhaps on such an obvious, banal level), a theory should be admissible so far 
as it is accepted that it is possible to trace a pattern of development. Consider, 
for example, the phenomenon of codification. Since the eighteenth century 
codification has emerged as almost an inevitability in Civil law countries, but 
it has been a relative rarity in the Common law world. According to Watson, 
this pattern cannot be explained on the basis of unrelated facts existing in the 
different countries. Elucidating codification (why it occurred at all and in a 
particular country at a specific time and not earlier; why the code was either a 
new creation or adopted from elsewhere; and, if the latter, why the particular 
model was chosen), or its absence in certain systems, would presuppose 
consideration of the general factors at work when legal change occurs. It is 
important to note that a general theory of legal change would be inductive: if 
all situations of legal change are considered, then some general conclusions 
may be drawn. But such a theory would only be nominally general: in reality, 
it would include several different relations of events. However, there are some 
generally valid interconnections between different matters. The expression of 
these interconnections may be facilitated by 'historical laws', but these laws 
are not obligatory. They are only 'topical norms' in the form of: 'if N exists 
then F will happen, unless.. . ' . One should distinguish between questions of 
form and questions of content. It is possible to construct a set of forms with the 
purpose of explaining a matter. If the validity of the theory is defined in such a 
manner that it depends on the relevance of the forms, it is possible to construct 
a theory of legal change. But this is primarily a conceptual exercise: it has 
nothing or very little to say about the contents of the concepts. The bulk of the 
theory would then consist of statements concerning possible interactions between 
the conceptually arranged matters and statements concerning working hypo-
theses on these relationships of interaction. 
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Conclusion 
The uses of comparative law may be manifold, but its connection with legal 
theory is also important. Propositions of legal theory can be tested on the 
grounds of comparative material, for there exists a dialectical relationship 
between theory and practice that extends beyond the narrow limits of a single 
legal order-indeed, most legal theorists seem to assume a deductive universality 
of analysis. This process involves consideration of juristic forms that are not 
incidental or particular to the relevant case: they stem from the history of legal 
doctrines and ideas. We may assert that whether we proceed from forms or 
from contents, the choices of subjects are not purely empiric al; axiological 
and teleological choices must be considered and examined together with the 
doctrinal history of legal concepts and their systematical treatment. We can 
thus declare that comparative law proceeds from the following two assumptions: 
(a) law is not only a manifestation of free will but is also socially established; 
one cannot compare legal regulations on a purely formal basis; (b) law stems 
from social relations, but it cannot be entirely reduced to them; otherwise, one 
should not compare law at all but only the basic factors the law expresses. The 
existence of certain similar social relationships does not constitute a sufficient 
condition for comparison-comparative law is not merely comparative sociology. 
A conceptual framework is also needed. If the reductionistic standpoint is 
rejected, one is justified in seeking the development of general idealistic 
theories of legal change. It is at least reasonable to hope that such theories will 
enhance insights into the nature and development of law-insights that cannot 
be acquired in any other way. 
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The Legal Position of Framework Decisions 
Abstract. The framework decisions, as the central legal act under the "third pillar" are some of 
the most significant non-typical documents from a dogmatic point of view within the EU law. 
The differences and specialities of this legislative act, correlated with the EC Treaty are 
available not only in the lawmaking process, but in juridical supervision as well. The main goal 
of this paper is to show the dogmatic and practical aspects of these two perspectives. First of 
all it is necessary to predict, why the framework decisions are not products of classic public 
international law (according to the position of the German Federal Constitutional Court), rather 
than special documents, and do they consequently belong to a supranational system. The 
missing infringement procedure within the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
makes the judicial control of the Member State's effective enlargement extremely difficult. 
Secondly it is important to demonstrate the alternative methods of the ECJ, which is based on 
case law from the Court of Luxembourg, in the field of the directives. In this context the study 
will analyze the consequences of the important "Pupino" Judgment. 
Keywords: third pillar. EC Treaty, framework decision. ECJ 
Introduction 
The free movement of persons, and the fall of the physical borders within the 
EU caused a harmonization needs in the field of the judicial cooperation.1 In 
the matter of these the position of the criminal matter has been converted, from 
a field as a part of the Member State 's sovereignty to a flexible cooperation 
based on a common interest.2 
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1
 Huseman, R. C.: Die Beeinflussung des deutschen Wirtschaftsrechts durch Rahmenbe-
schlüsse der Europäischen Union. Zeitschriftfiir Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht (2004) 454. 
von Bubnoff, E.: Legislative Gestaltung des europäischen Rechtsraums und deren 
Umsetzung in den Mitgliedstaaten. In; Pache, E. (ed.): Die Europäische Union - Ein Raum 
der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts? Baden-Baden, 2005. 105. 
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The political heart of this idea was based on the institutional revision 
involving the Maastricht Treaty. The variations were leading to leave the single 
economic perspective of the integration, and to expand it with other policies. 
This expansion resulted the establishing of the so called "third pillar", nowa-
days with the official term police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
The main goal of this area of EU law is to create a team work within criminal 
policy, which is able to guarantee the highest level of safety for peoples within 
the EU. The rules concerning the third pillar were created not within the usual 
contractual frameworks of the EC, but in the in 1992 newly launched EU 
Treaty. But the Member States separated with the Treaty-revision of Amsterdam 
the identity of the regulation and it was putting every judicial cooperation 
concerning the visa, the asylum, the immigration and the public matters in the 
deeply integrated EC Treaty. 
The reasonable proof according this paper that the framework decisions left 
the category of the rule made by the classic international public law, but arose 
to the level of a supranational system, and it made the ultimate valuation of the 
framework decisions very difficult and controversial. ' The obvious contrasts 
and specialities of this legislative act, correlated with the EC Treaty are available 
not only in the lawmaking process, but in the juridical supervision as well. The 
main goal of this paper is to remarkably present the dogmatic and functional 
aspects of these two attitudes, and to prove an enthusiastic proper place for the 
framework decisions within the EU law. 
Legislation Mechanism 
The procedure 
The EU Treaty doesn't create a new institutional framework for the new policies 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. The EU Treaty "shall be founded on the 
European Communities", which has been "supplemented" by the Member States.4 
For this purpose there wasn't any need for establishing a new institutional 
body. The EU Treaty tried to strive towards an uniform legal system.5 That's 
why the well known institutions are the key players in the Provisions on Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, as well. 
3
 Kraus-Vonjar, M.: Der Aufbau eines Raums der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des 
Rechts in Europa. Frankfurt a. M., 2002. 7. 
4
 Article 1 sec 3 TEU. 
5
 Article 3 sec 1 TEU. 
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The legislation procedure contains previously in its first step an attribute, 
which is rather an additional attribute for the public international law. The 
Commission's initiative monopoly, well known from the first pillar,6 is impaired. 
Beside the Commission the member states won the right to purpose a subject 
for a framework decision.7 Before the reconciliation within the European Council 
a discussion is taking place in the supporting bodies under the Council, which 
consisted of officials delegated by the Member States.8 After it a coordination 
panel9 deals with the draft to clear legal questions elaborated by the supporting 
bodies under the Council. 
It is a legitimate question, how the role of the European Parliament looks 
like. The maximum contribution of the European Parliament is limited under 
the legislation procedure to the consultation.10 It is statutory for the Member 
States to carry out the consultation procedure, otherwise the ECJ void the 
framework decision due to a formal injury. 11 However to follow the relevant 
opinion of the European Parliament is absolutely not binding for the Council. 
This weak role of the European Parliament shows the problem of the democracy 
deficit within the third pillar. 
The Council makes the final decision about the framework decision with 
acting unanimously.12 The sensitive character of the regulation field and the 
criminal sovereignty of states purposely avoided establishing a qualified majority 
decision within the third pillar. To acting unanimously needs a higher level 
of cooperation from the part of the Member States. The Members of the 
Commission are entitled only to be present at the debate.11 This clearly reflects 
that the main decision power is in the hand of the Member States.14 
6
 Article 251 TEC. 
7
 Article 34 sec 2 TEU. 
s
 Huseman: op. cit. 448. 
9
 Article 41 sec 1 TEU. 
10
 Article 39 sec 1 TEU. 
11
 Case 138/79 Roquette Frères [1980] European Court Reports 3333, para. 33. 
12
 Article 34 sec 2 TEU. 
13
 Article 36 sec 2 TEU. 
14
 Mtiller-Graf, P.-C.: Europäische Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Justiz und 
Inneres. In: Müller-Graf, P.-C. (ed.): Europäische Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Justiz 
und Inneres. Baden-Baden. 1996. 32. 
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The distinguishing nature of the Member State's obligation generated by the 
framework decision 
The result of the legislation procedure is the framework decision, which causes 
a real obligation for the Member States. According the Treaty "the framework 
decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved 
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of fo rm and method". It 
means, Member States can choose free the tools from the constitutional 
instruments, which are suitable for an effective implementation, but the imple-
mentation itself is obligatory. To achieve an effective implementation, the 
Member States should concentrate to the central task set up by the framework 
decision. Therefore the f reedom of the Member States is limited to the "ef fe t 
utile" of the judicial rule. This result focused mentality of the ECJ means not 
only a positive legislative action from the part of the Member States, but a 
negative as well. A negative action basically causes in this context on the one 
hand the avoidance of recent legislation actions being not coherent with the 
main task of the framework decisions, and on the other hand annulment of former 
inconsistent law. 
Juridical Control 
After representing the specialities of the legislative procedure the study deals 
with the modified juridical control within the third pillar. With the Treaty of 
Amsterdam won the ECJ a stronger competence within the third pillar, but in a 
comparison with the Community law it is still poor. The competence of the 
ECJ is defined by Article 46 EU. However this Article doesn' t create the real 
competence, just points out Article 35 EU. Thereby the ECJ 's jurisdiction in 
the third pillar is limited to processes described Article 35 EU. 
Preliminary rulings 
The rules about the preliminary decision contain specialities compared with 
the procedures described in 234 EC. The formal divergence is recognizable 
in the double competence ruling. Firstly, the Member States can declare the 
competence of the ECJ concerning this particular procedure at all.15 If the 
competence is given, secondly the Member States can decide which Courts can 
take part in the procedure. There are two alternatives. The Member States can 
15
 Article 35 sec 2 TEU. 
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actively enable to any courts or tribunals, or just for those, whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law, to request the Court of Justice 
to give a preliminary ruling on a question rose in a case pending before it."' To 
make any restriction involving the subject of questions is not possible.17 It is 
also not possible to recall the declaration made by the Member States.18 
The interpretation of the Articles describing this special juridical procedure 
by the ECJ is an interesting academic question. The Treaty allowed just the 
interpretation of legal documents based on these articles of the Treaty, but 
there isn't any relevant information about the interpretation of this section of 
the Treaty itself.14 The Court answered this question positively.20 
The legality procedure 
The legality procedure has also specific items. The number of the applicants is 
limited to the Commission and to the Member States. In this context it is missing, 
by contrast to the Community law, the right to apply for individuals and for the 
European Parliament. According to the language of the Treaty the framework 
decisions have no direct effect to individuals, so that 's why they have also 
no right to complain directly against it. The underprivileged position of the 
European Parliament was already mentioned. The missing right to apply for 
individuals and for the Member States is a political symbol, which is characteristic 
for the inter-governmental cooperation, and not for a supranational system. 
If during the legislation procedure the Parliament is not been consulted, 
cause a typical formal procedure failure.21 An example for an important 
substance item is the correct legal basis. If the judicial review shows the 
Community act has an incorrect legal basis the ECJ will repeal the measure.22 
In this context it is relevant, to which pillar a legal act belongs passed by the 
EU, to the first or to the third?23 
16
 Article 36 sec 3 TEU. 
17
 Röben, V.: in Grabitz/Hilf Article 35 Rn. 10. 
18
 Brechmann, W.: in Calliess/Ruffert Article 35 EUV Rn. 4. 
19
 Borchardt, K-D.: in Lenz/Borchardt Article 36 Rn. 4. 
20
 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] European Court Reports 5285, para. 37. 
21
 Case 138/79 Roquette Frères [1980] European Court Reports 3333, para. 33. 
22
 Case 45/86 APS I [1987] European Court Reports 1493 para. 12. 
23
 Case C-170/96 11998] European Court Reports 2763, para. 16. 
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An example: Case С-176/03 Commission vs. Council 
Because of the continuous marine pollution the EU decided, to create a legal 
document against this special criminal offence. The Council adopted a frame-
work decision under the third pillar. The main task of the framework decision 
was to control the so called "forum shopping effect", and to realize a same 
level of punishment for the entire offender. It is also possible to enact legal 
documents with criminal competence for policies under the first pillar too, if 
the effective implementation of this policy is just in this way realizable.24 The 
ECJ created two key presuppositions for documents with criminal regulation 
within the first pillar. For that purpose, whilst the choice of penalties remains 
within their discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of 
Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substantive, 
which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a 
similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.25 
In contrast there is not to find any regulation concerning the environmental 
protection in the title IV of the TEU. On account of this, and because of the 
possibility to create legal acts concerning in criminal matter, the ECJ repealed 
the measure.26 It is also not to forget, according to Article 47 TEU "nothing in 
this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or 
the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them". 
The missing infringement procedure 
The essential difference to the juridical procedure for directives is the missing 
infringement procedure within the third pillar. There is no possibility to exert a 
direct pressure on the Member States for the sake of the complete implemen-
tation. Because of the special regulation about the legitimacy of the Court 
according to Article 35 TEU in combination with Article 46 TEU, the ECJ has 
not the right for this special procedure. 
Nevertheless the infringement procedure is not the only way to protect 
immediately the rights of the individuals. Therefore the ECJ devised the doctrine 
of the direct effect of EC directives, because of the false implantation into the 
24
 Case C-2/88 Zwartweld [1990J European Court Reports 4405. para. 17. 
25
 Case 68/88 [1989] European Court Reports 2965, para. 24. 
26
 Case C-176/03 [2005] European Court Reports 7879, para. 51. 
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legal system of the Member States. However the TEU excluded obviously this 
option by the framework decisions.27 
Furthermore the rule about the framework decisions has a lex imperfecta 
character. Because this weak control the alternative methods remained for the 
ECJ to protect the rights of the individuals. This ambitious approach was the 
EU framework decision conformity interpretation of the applicable national law. 
The EC Directive-conformity interpretation of the applicable national law, 
as a dogmatically prototype 
The EC-Directive conformity interpretation of the law made by the Member 
States as an alternative protection mechanism for the rights of the individuals 
was made by the ECJ and belongs since 1984 to its permanent jurisdiction.25 
According to Article 249 sec 3 there is freedom for the Member States to 
choose the method of the implementation of directives into the particular legal 
system. Pursuant to the Court this independence means just a freedom 
concerning the formal implementation. In the matter of that the ECJ has the 
right to supervise the implementation from the substantially point of view. In 
this context the Member States required to do any general and concrete steps 
for the effective implementation. The grade of the juridical supervision is the 
result of the implementation compared with the central task ruled by the 
framework decision. If the implementation by the Member States was not 
effective enough, the ECJ obliged the Member States to interpret directive 
conformity the applicable domestic law.24 This obligation is based on the 
loyalty of the Member States according to Article 10 ECJ. 
The imperative for the conform interpretation is definitely provided, as a 
special protection mechanism in favor of the individuals, if the implementation 
made by the Member States is unable to realize the rights regulated by the EC 
directive. On the other hands there is a fundamental need for the possibility of 
the interpretation. In this context it has to be a general possibility of inter-
pretation within the Member State's legal order. Otherwise there is a need for 
the possible interpretation in the special context created by the Member State's 
law as well.2" 
27
 Article 34 sec 2 TEU. 
28
 Case 14/83 Colson L1984) European Court Reports 1891 para. 15, Case 79/83 [1984] 
European Court Reports 1921, para 15. 
29
 Case 14/83 Colson [1984] European Court Reports 1891 para. 26. 
30
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Furthermore the interpretation by the Member State's Court has its own limits. 
The obligation on the national courts refer to the substance of the directive, 
when interpreting the applicable rules of its national law and is limited by 
the general principles of the community law, such as the principles of legal 
certainty and non-retroactivity of law.31 
The obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation of the 
applicable domestic law 
The form of the obligation on the directive conformity interpretation of the 
national law was transported to the third pillar by the ECJ.'2 This figure based 
on the EC-loyalty according to Article 10 TEC. However such a regulation is 
missing from the TEU. Nevertheless the ECJ argued that with the Maastricht 
Treaty was presented a new level of integration. In this context the EU developed 
not only concerning the number of policies, but the deepness of the integration 
as well. In the matter of that, it is possible to bring the juridical mechanism made 
by the ECJ from the area of the first pillar to the equivalent fields of the third 
one. Otherwise the TEU is not "a new stage in the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe" according Article 1 sec 2 TEU.33 
The qualification of the framework decisions as a document of the classic 
public international law does not make any different in this context. As Advocate 
General Kokott mentioned, the Member States are obligated on the directive-
conformity interpretation too, if this is an instrument of the classic public 
international law.34 In the matter of that, the qualification of the framework 
decisions as a document of the public international law is not suitable to isolate 
absolutely the Member State's legal order.35 
The constitutional limitations of the obligation on the framework decisions 
conformity interpretation of the domestic law 
It is important to point out that; the Court transported not only the figure of 
the obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation of the 
applicable national law, but the limits of this obligation as well. 
31
 Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmengen [1987] European Court Reports 3969 para. 13. 
32
 C-105/03 Pupino, [2005] European Court Reports 5285. 
33
 Case C-105/03 Pupino, [2005] European Court Reports 5285. para. 42. 
34
 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] European Court 
Reports, 5285 para. 37. 
35
 Adam M.: Die Wirkung von EU-Rahmenbeschlüssen im mitgliedstaatlichen Recht. 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2005), 560. 
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Firstly, it is initially prohibited to exceed the border between the so called 
contra legem judge made law and acceptable juridical interpretation. There is 
three main form of the juridical interpretation.36 The first named prater legem 
basically suggests the legal text immanent interpretation, which is limited to 
the minor corrections or completions of the written law by judges. During the 
second art of interpretation named extra legem-intra ius the judge leaves the 
field of the written law, because it doesn't give a proper answer in a special 
question. But the judge's interpretation is staying within the law. The third 
category named contra legem means a legal interpretation against the written 
law, which is only allowed in a legal emergency situation. 
In the matter of that, it is forbidden to realize so the interpretation of the 
applicable national law by the domestic court that the interpretation will be 
equivalent with the directive effect of the framework decisions. In other way 
such an interpretation a typical form of the contra legem interpretation.37 because 
according the TEU it is absolutely prohibited the direct effect of framework 
decisions.38 
Secondly, the obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation 
of the domestic law is a tool created by the ECJ to protect effectively the rights 
of individuals. It is also forbidden to use this protection mechanism against the 
individuals. Because of the special character of the framework decisions, as a 
rule in the field of the criminal matters, such a constitutional restriction is very 
important. So any interpretation is forbidden in the third pillar too, which 
creates a criminal responsibility or makes the adjudication the position of the 
individuals more difficult.34 
Thirdly, the ECJ pointed out that, the domestic courts must follow the 
fundamental rights of the EU, consisted of the constitutional tradition of the 
Member States on the one hand, and the Convention of Fundamental Rights 
signed in Rome 1950 on the other hand. The direct addressees of the EU's 
fundamental rights are the organs of the EU.4u However the Member States are 
indirectly obliged to follow the EU's fundamental right as far as they apply EU 
law. So during the interpretation the national judge must follow not only to the 
36
 Ukrow, J.: Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung durch den EuGH. Baden-Baden, 1995. 70. 
37
 Wasmeier, M.: Der Europäische Haftbefehl vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
Zeitschrift für Europäische Stiulien (2006) 5. 
38
 Article 34 sec 2 b. 
39
 Case С-105/03 Pupino [2005] European Court Reports 5285, para. 45. 
40
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290 ÁKOS DOMAHIDI 
conformity with the framework decisions, but must follow at the same time the 
fundamental rights of the EU.41 
The protection of the individual rights: alternative methods 
The direct effect of the framework decisions as an alternative mechanism 
protecting the individual rights is missing under the third pillar. Furthermore 
the infringement procedure is also missing, as an indirect possibility to protect 
the rights of the individuals. So the one possibility to put pressure on the 
Member States due to the effective implementation of the framework decisions 
is the obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation of the 
national law created by the ECJ. However there is another protection mechanism 
according the case law, the liability of the State for loss and damage resulting 
from breach of its obligations under EU law.42 
The liability of the State for loss and damage resulting from breach of its 
obligations under EU law was created by the ECJ because of the following 
reasons. Firstly, the direct effect of directives was ineligible due to exist of the 
legal relationship between individuals. The directives create a legal obligation 
just for the Member States, so a horizontal direct effect of directives is 
prohibited.4, Secondly, the infringement procedure was also not able to protect 
the right of the individuals, because the directive was not implemented, how-
ever the deadline for the implementation ended more years ago. 
It has been consistently held that the national courts, whose task is to apply the 
provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction must ensure 
that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer 
on individuals.44 The obligation of Member States to make good such loss and 
damage is based on Article 10 of the EC Treaty, under which the Member States 
are required to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfillment of their obligations under Community law.47 
So if the infringement procedure is missing, the direct effect is forbidden 
according the Treaty, it is allowed any other mechanisms to secure the protection 
41
 Egger A.: Die Bindung der Mitgliedstaaten an die Grundrechte in der III. Säule. 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2005), 665. 
42
 Case 6/90 Francovich [ 1991] European Court Reports 5357. 
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of individual's rights. In this context the ECJ transported on the "bridge", set 
up between EC directives and EU framework decisions with the Pupino Case, 
the obligation of the framework decision conformity interpretation of the 
domestic law. Nevertheless it seems well possible to transport the liability of 
the State for loss and damage resulting from breach of its obligations under EU 
law as well. However the state loyalty according to Article 10 EC is missing 
under the third pillar,46 in a hypothetical case where the protection of individuals 
and the realization of the EU law's effectiveness with other ways not possible, 
the ECJ will introduce the state responsibility in the field of the criminal 
matters as well. 
The state liability has also additional criteria, which must be fulfilled. 
Firstly, the result prescribed by the directive should entail the grant of rights 
to individuals. Secondlym, it should be possible to identify the content of 
those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive. Finally, the third 
condition is the existence of a causal link between the breach of the State's 
obligation and the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.47 
The Legal Position of the Framework Decisions 
After presenting the special regulation in the area of the legislation and 
juridical supervision of the framework decisions by contrast to the directives, 
as a typical legal act within the first pillar, the study will focus to the legal 
position of it. The main question in this area is to find the right position of the 
framework decisions between a legal act made by the classic international law, 
and a supranational legal act. 
Cyber crime Convention of the Council of Europe vs. Framework decision 
To point out the differences between documents that belonged to the classic 
public international law, and a framework decision, there is a need to compare 
it f rom the analytical point of view. In the matter of that the research tries to 
compare two documents made in the same subject, but one is a Convention under 
the classic public international law, and the other is a framework decision. 
4,1
 In the case Pupino was the missing of Article 10 EC not enough to avoid the European 
Court of Justice to introduce the obligation on the framework decisions conformity 
interpretation of the national law. 
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The Convention was purposely created sooner, so several Member States 
regarded an own ruling within the EU as unnecessary.48 However the Council 
stayed by the original idea to make an own EU ruling.4'1 
There is not to find a difference in the terminology of the two documents.50 
The differences are available on the one hand in the perspectives, on the other 
hand the above mentioned nature of the international liability of the States 
caused by the documents. 
Due to the global dimension of the cyber crimes the Council of Europe 
decided to make a comprehensive regulation, to stop the expansion of cyber crime 
without border. In this context the Convention regulated not only substance, and 
procedure law, but divers form of international cooperation as well.51 In the 
matter of that the Convention obviously presented a real wide horizontal 
perspective. However in the field of the vertical perspective the Convention is 
limited to a general level. By contrast the framework decision is concentrated 
to three essential matter of fact in the horizontal level, but in the vertical 
perspective tries to create a precise regulation. 
To understand this difference it is important to consider the other main 
difference, the substantive nature of the liability created by the documents. The 
Convention made by the Council of Europe is legally binding for states, which 
state ratified it. In the reason of that it was possible a really wide horizontal 
perspective. Currently Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary, Estonia, France, Lithuania, 
Romania, Netherlands and Slovenia ratified the Convention, the other 18 EU 
Member-States not.52 For these 18 EU Member States the Convention is not 
legally bound. In contrast the legal binding by the framework decision started 
immediately after coming into force. 
Arguments of the national constitutional courts about the legal position 
In 2005 two national constitutional courts decided about national legal act, 
implemented the arrest warrant framework decision, and declared it incompatible 
with the constitution. However this study did not focus on the material aspects 
48
 Sanchez-Hermonsilla F.: Neues Strafrecht für den Kampf gegen Computerkriminalität. 
Computer und Recht (2003), 778. 
44
 Gercke M.: Der Rahmenbeschluss über Angriffe auf Informationssysteme. Computer 
und Recht (2005), 468. 
50
 Sanchez-Hermonsilla: op. cit. 778. 
51
 Gercke: op. cit. 472. 
52
 Simplified Chart of signatures and ratifications is available under (Date of download-
ing: 13/03/2007). http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp 
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of the arrest warrant framework decision, the decisions of the national constitu-
tional courts include key aspects concerning the legal position of the framework 
decisions. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) surprisingly pointed out 
that, the legal characteristic of the third pillar is a simply intergovernmental 
cooperation,51 and the area belongs despite of the development to the public 
international law.54 Firstly, the decision procedure based according to the BVerfG 
on consensus, as representing a typical character for decision making within 
the intergovernmental cooperation. Secondly, the active participation of the 
European Parliament within the legislation procedure is limited to the consul-
tation. However these two involved characteristics are available in the decision 
making within the supranational first pillar as well."" Meanwhile last the 
persuasive argument supported by the BVerfG is applicable, which pointed out 
the missing juridical supervision the implementation actions of the framework 
decisions made by the Member States. Nevertheless this single argument makes 
the arrangement of framework decisions to act of the classic international law 
not clear.56 The Polish Constitutional Tribunal's decision has the same opinion 
concerning the legal position of the framework decisions. According to the 
Tribunal this measure has the nature of a regular international agreement, as a 
result of cooperation between the Member States.57 
However the conclusion of these two decisions made by national consti-
tutional courts was the same, the reaction of the national legal orders was 
absolutely different. In Germany the legislator designed a new national legal 
act to implement the arrest warrant framework decision considering the criteria 
of the compatibility with the German Constitution pointed out by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court. However this criterion does not strictly fulfill the 
anti-discriminating regulation of the EU.58 By contrast the President of the 
Republic of Poland introduced a bill to the Marshal of the Sejm proposing to 
change the constitution."" As a result of this change of the Polish Constitution 
now it fulfills now the criteria of the compatibility with the arrest warrant 
framework decision. With other words expressed, Germany purposely made a 
83
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38
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new regulation which is now compatible with the German Constitution, and 
not consistent with the EU law, nevertheless Poland has changed the own 
Constitution to make it compatible with the arrest warrant framework decision. 
Conclusion 
The framework decisions, as the central legal act under the "third pillar" are 
some of the most significant non-typical documents from a dogmatic point of 
view, within the EU law. The obvious contrasts and specialties of this legislative 
act, correlated with the EC Treaty are available not only in the lawmaking 
process, but in juridical supervision as well. 
The legislation procedure is different from conventional form of the law-
making under the supranational law. However there are examples within the 
first pillar, where the main decisions form is to acting unanimously and the 
participation of the European Parliament is limited to the consultation.60 
Framework decisions are not document of classic public international law 
(according to the position of the German Federal Constitutional Court), and 
they consequently do belong to a supranational system. 
The main argument, beside the qualification of these legal acts in the 
Constitutional Treaty, the existing legal "bridge" set up between EC directives 
and EU framework decisions made by the ECJ. On this connection was so far 
transported the obligation of the framework decision conform interpretation 
of the national law. However the establishment of state liability by the ECJ 
within the criminal matters is not to be prohibited. This method is not only a 
possibility to protect the rights of the individuals, but also a method to exert a 
pressure on the Member States due to an effective implementation. 
60
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The Moral of the Hungarian Status Law Saga 
Abstract. The present paper deals with the debate about the fiercely disputed Hungarian Status 
Law and its amendments. The Law was destined to grant a special status to ethnic Hungarians 
living the beyond the borders of Hungary. The paper contains a brief comparison of the mainly 
Central and Eastern European laws, through which states grant special rights to their kin-
minorities. The international debate about the Hungarian Status Law is also covered by the 
paper. Even though several states grant special status to the members of their kin-minorities the 
enactment of the Hungarian Status Law triggered a surprisingly fierce debate. It is submitted 
that although in some details the law might have run counter certain public international law 
principles, the reaction to the law was mainly backed by emotional arguments and hence the 
whole controversy could not go beyond the level of symbols. The paper also deals with the 
2003 amendment of the Law, which was enacted according to the objections raised by the 
neighbouring countries. The paper is an attempt to show the futility of the whole Status Law 
debate: it is submitted that although the 2003 amendment did not go into the very substance of 
the provisions of the Law at large, it did satisfy these claims by simply changing the 
phraseology of the Law. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the fiercest foreign policy debates within the Carpathian Basin was the 
controversy related to the so-called Hungarian Status Law.1 Namely, the 
Hungarian government enacted a legislation granting special entitlements to 
ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries. The Law was blamed, 
inter alia, for having extraterritorial effect and being discriminatory. Following 
numerous negotiations and mediations held by international institutions, the 
Status Law was amended and brought in conformity with these political claims.2 
LLM S J D student, Central European Univers i ty , Budapes t /New York . 
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The significance of the above is twofold. First, after the foreign policy 
dispute clamed down and the application of the Status Law has earned some 
experience it is worth to draw some conclusions and to find the moral of the 
whole controversy. Second, although the foreign policy dispute is over, the 
issue is far from losing its significance. On December 5, 2004 a referendum 
was held in Hungary on whether non-citizen ethnic Hungarians should be granted 
Hungarian citizenship, i.e. should ethnic Hungarians of foreign citizenship 
acquire Hungarian citizenship automatically but upon request without requiring 
some years of permanent residence in Hungary. Although the referendum-due 
to the low level of participation-failed, a slight majority of the citizens who 
expressed their wills opted for granting citizenship to the kin-minorities. Even 
though the Hungarian society is divided regarding the above issue, it must be 
observed that there is political support for a strong policy towards Hungarian 
minorities living abroad. 
In this paper I try to show the futility of the debate about the Status Law, 
which could not touch on any relevant points of the issue. Some neighbouring 
countries felt that the Status Law is the legislative annexation to Hungary of 
their citizens of Hungarian origin what is unintelligible given the fact that the 
Law did not create a previously unknown legal regime and some of the 
neighbouring countries have roughly similar laws.3 This might be explicable 
with the fact that Hungarians represent a considerable proportion of the 
population in these countries.4 Hence, in the first part of this paper I deal with 
the general features of the status laws and the issues they normally cover. Such a 
comparative perspective is of utmost importance as the Status Law saga was 
not the first legislation of this kind. Several states preceded Hungary in enacting 
laws on their kin-minorities. Second, I analyze the Hungarian Status Law, 
especially those parts of it that triggered fierce objection. Finally, I examine 
the international instruments dealing with the status laws. 
3
 Stewart, M.: The Hungarian Status Law. A new European form of Transnational 
politics? WPTC-02-09. London, 2002. 15-16. 
4
 Note that approximately every fourth Hungarian is living beyond the borders of 
Hungary. Approximately 1.5 million ethnic Hungarians are living in Romania (census 
of 2002), 522 thousand in Slovakia (census of 2001), 150 thousand in Ukraine (census 
of 2001), 300 thousand in Serbia-Montenegro (estimations of the Yugoslav Federal 
Office of Statistics for the year 2001). See Halász, I . -Majtényi , B.-Vizi, В.: A New 
Regime of Minority Protect ion? Preferential Treatment of Kin-minorities under 
National and International Law. In: Kántor, Z . -Maj tényi , B . - Ieda , О.-Vizi , B . -Halász , 
I. (ed.): The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection. 21st 
Century С О Е Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, 2004. 349. 
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2. Status Laws in Europe 
Several states have a certain permanent policy towards their kin-minorities. A 
lot of them, however, have not adopted any legislation in this regard and their 
actions consist mainly of administrative programs or practice, e.g. Germany.5 
A considerable part of those that have a special law for this purpose provided 
this law with vague phrases defining only some program settings and priorities. 
There are, however, several laws that grant a special status for their kin-
minorities which encompasses the enjoyment of particular entitlements. The 
most important issues in this respect are the following: who can gain such a 
status, how and what kind of certificates are issued for that end and what 
entitlements does the special status embrace? 
The most important condition of such a special status is the requirement of 
belonging to a particular kin-minority group, i.e. being of certain ethnic origin. 
For instance, the Bulgarian act requires Bulgarian ancestors and national 
conscience.'1 The Slovak act speaks only about Slovak ethnic origin and 
linguistic-cultural conscience.7 The Austrian act requires that the person 
demanding the special status be born in South Tyrol and have declared himself 
as a member of the German language minority. If he/she was not born in South 
Tyrol, it is required that at least one of his/her parents be a native German 
speaker.5 The Greek law also covers the relatives of ethnic Greeks.9 
Almost all laws require a constitutive act of the kin-state in order to gain 
the special status. However, the Austrian act covers Germans in South Tyrol ex 
legefi The Bulgarian act provides for a hybrid solution. It prescribes that 
Bulgarian origin may be proven through documents issued by Bulgarian or 
Gyertyánfy, A.: A határon túli németek jogállása a magyar Schengen-probléma 
tükrében (The legal status of the Germans beyond the borders in the light of the Hungarian 
Schengen-problem), Regio 11 (2000) 140. See Halász-Maj tényi -Viz i : op. cit. 335. 
6
 See Article 2 of the Law on the Bulgarians living outside the Republic of Bulgaria 
State Gazette (2000) 30. 
7
 See Article 2 (2)-(3) and (6) of Act No 70 of February 14, 1997 on Expatriate 
Slovaks and changing and complementing some laws. (1997) http://www.gszs.sk/ 
zakon70en.php January 23, 2005. 
8
 See Article 1 of the Federal Law of 25 January 1979 on the equation of South Tyroleans 
with Austrian citizens in certain administrative areas. Bundesgesetzblatt (1979) 57. 
9
 See Article 1 (2) of the Joint Ministerial Decision no. 4000/3/10/e of the Ministers of 
the Interior, of Defence, of Foreign Affairs, of Labor and of Public Order of 15-29 April 
1998 on the Conditions, Duration and Procedure for the delivery of a Special Identity Card 
to Albanian citizens of Greek origin. 
10
 Ibid. Article 1. 
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foreign state institutions, accredited organizations and the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church.11 
The certificate issued for this purpose varies from country to country. Most 
of them are issued only for the purpose of the enjoyment of the entitlements 
and they do not replace the identity card or the passport of the state of 
citizenship.12 An exception is the Greek law that prescribes that the certificate 
is a special identity card.1 ' Generally, the certificates are issued by the 
administrative organs of the kin-states including diplomatic and consular 
missions. The involvement of civil institutions in this process is not generally 
accepted but there are some exceptions. Regarding Bulgaria, the certificate 
may be actually issued by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The existence of 
Greek origin was previously investigated by the Greek Association of North 
Epiros. Now this function is fulfilled by Greek consulates.' ' The Slovak law 
prescribes that Slovak origin and national conscience are to be proven through 
public deeds, however, if that is not possible, the applicant is allowed to 
submit the certification of the kin-organization of his place of residence or the 
certification of two Slovaks living in the same country as the applicant.15 
The gist of the special status granted to the members of kin-minorities 
relies in the bundle of rights it contains. These rights or entitlements are to be 
divided into three groups: migration rights or visa, cultural and economic 
rights. Almost all laws deal with the issue of visa and residence permit. Some 
of them facilitate the acquisition of these permissions (Bulgaria16); some other 
laws provide that the certificate is itself a visa (Austria," Slovakia ) or a 
residence permit (Greece14). 
The spectrum of cultural and educational rights embraces the right to 
access the scientific and cultural life of the kin-state, the right to be admitted 
to the state education system, the right to be an ordinary member of the 
respective national academy of science etc.2" Virtually all laws provide that 
11
 See Bulgarian law, op. cit. Article 3. 
12
 See Article 3 ( l ) - (2 ) of the Federal Law on the State policy of the Russian 
Federation in respect of the compatriots abroad (1999). 
13
 See Greek Regulation, op. cit. Article 1. 
14
 Ibid. Article 2. 
15
 See Slovak law, op. cit. Article 2(4)-(5) and (7). 
16
 See Bulgarian law, op. cit. Article 7 and 15. 
17
 See Austrian law, op. cit. Article 5. 
18
 See Slovak law, op. cit. Article 5. 
14
 See Greek Regulation, op. cit. Article 3. 
20
 See Russian law, op. cit. Article 17; Bulgarian law, op. cit. Article 9-10; Slovak 
law, op. cit. Article 6. 
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members of kin-minorities shall be entitled to access the education system of 
the kin-state, differences lie, though, in the level of education they provide 
access to. The Bulgarian act provides that ethnic Bulgarians shall have unrestricted 
access to primary and secondary schools, while regarding universities according 
to the quotas specified by the government, annually."1 In Russia, Slovakia and 
Austria the members of kin-minorities are admitted unrestrictedly to all levels 
of education.22 The Bulgarian and Romanian laws prescribe the provision of 
scholarships to persons studying in their kin-state.21 
Some laws provide certain economic and financial rights, as well. The most 
important of these is the acquisition of a work permit. The Greek and Slovak 
certificates substitute the work permit, thus their holders are entitled to work 
in Greece and Slovakia, respectively, without any further formality.24 The 
Bulgarian law provides for an expeditious procedure.26 Other entitlements 
encompass, inter alia, discounts for public transportation for retired persons,26 
acquisition of real estates according to special provisions27 etc. 
3. The Hungarian Status Law 
The Hungarian Status Law applies to persons declaring themselves to be of 
Hungarian ethnic origin.28 According to the original version of the Law, the 
Hungarian certificates were issued by Hungarian state institutions, however, 
the law provided that these authorities shall issue the certificate "if the 
applicant is in possession of a recommendation which has been issued by a 
recommending organization representing the Hungarian national community in 
the neighbouring country concerned, and being recognized by the Government 
of the Republic of Hungary as a recommending organization."24 
21
 See Bulgarian law. op. cit. Article 9-10. 
22
 See Russian law, op. cit. Article 17 (6); Slovak law, op. cit. Article 6 (l)(a); Austrian 
law, op. cit. Article 4 (3). 
23
 See Bulgarian law, op. cit. Article 10 (3); Article 7 and 9 of the Law regarding the 
support granted to the Romanian communities from all over the world (1998) Monitorul 
Oficial al României, 124. 
24
 See Greek Regulation, op. cit. Article 3; Slovak law, op. cit. Article 6 (l)(b). 
23
 See Bulgarian law, op. cit. Article 7. 
26
 See Slovak law, op. cit. Article 6 (3). 
27
 See ibid. Article 6 (2). 
28
 See Hungarian Status Law, op. cit. Article 1(1). 
24
 See Hungarian Status Law, op. cit. Article 20 ( 1). 
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The Hungarian Status Law lacks several of the rights ordinarily provided 
by the laws of the same kind. It does not substitute for a visa or a residence 
permit, nor does it facilitate the issuance of them. However, it provides for 
entitlements beyond the above. For example, an ethnic Hungarian bringing up 
at least two children of minor age in his/her own household is entitled to 
educational assistance for each of his/her children if the child attended an 
education institution according to his/her age and received training or edu-
cation in Hungarian. Finally, the original version of the Hungarian Law 
provided that "work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on 
the authorization of employment of foreign nationals in Hungary, with the 
exception that the work permit can be issued for a maximum of three months 
per calendar year without the prior assessment of the situation in the labour 
market".1" Namely, the Hungarian authority was required to assess the situation 
in the labour market prior to issuing a work permit to a foreign citizen. The 
Law eliminated this requirement; however, all other conditions were to be 
fulfilled by Hungarian applicants. 
In 2003, the Law was profoundly amended due to the vehement opposition 
of some of the neighbouring countries.31 The amending act mainly followed 
the legal position of the relevant international institutions. 
4. Public International Law Evaluation and the Amendments to the 
Hungarian Status Law 
The rules of public international law regarding status laws were interpreted by 
several international institutions. However, most of these declarations were 
rather foreign policy documents worrying about the stability of the region 
than real legal analyses, advising further deliberations and supporting any 
solution that may be agreed by all the interested parties.32 There were, none-
theless, some documents of legal interest. The most important of these is the 
30
 See Hungarian Status Law, op. cit. Article 15. 
31
 The 2003 Amendment of the Hungarian Status Law, op. cit. 
3
" See Warner, E.: Unilateral preferences granted to foreign national minorities by a 
kin-state; a case-study of Hungary's "status law", Georgetown Journal of International 
Law 35 (2004) 379, 430. 
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Report of the Venice Commission.33 Less significant, but still important, is the 
resolution of the Council of Europe and its travaux préparatoire,34 
These legal opinions did not question the legal basis of the status laws; 
nonetheless, they criticized some points of the Hungarian Law, which were 
later on amended according to these remarks. The respective resolution of the 
Council of Europe even welcomed, in principle, the "assistance given by kin-
states to their kin-minorities in other states in order to help these kin-minorities 
to (sic!) preserve their cultural, linguistic and ethnic identity".35 The main 
objection against the Law was its allegedly unilateral approach, which was 
criticized by the neighbouring countries.36 However, the resolution objected 
to the phraseology of the Law in one regard: it found that "there is a feeling 
that in [thej neighbouring countries the definition of the concept of 'nation' in 
the preamble to the law could under certain circumstances be interpreted-
though this interpretation is not correct-as non-acceptance of the state borders 
which divide the members of the 'nation', notwithstanding the fact that 
Hungary has ratified several multi- and bilateral instruments containing the 
principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states, in particular the basic 
treaties which have entered into force between Hungary and Romania and 
Slovakia." As a consequence, Hungary banished this expression from the 
Law.37 Notwithstanding the disputed linguistic meaning of the word "nation", 
i.e. whether it is the natural equivalent of territorial demands or not, this 
objection seems to be much more artificial than real. By the same token, this 
phrase had no practical effects and it was only a legerdemain with words. The 
Hungarian government did not insist on this expression and amended the law, 
33
 http://www.Venice.сое.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(2001)019-e.asp 
34
 See Resolution 1335 (2003). Preferential treatment of national minorities by the 
kin-state: the case of the Hungarian Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries 
("Magyars") of 19 June 2001 http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA03/ 
ERES1335.htm January 23, 2005; Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights. Rapporteur: Mr Erik Jürgens, Netherlands, Socialist Group. Doc. 9744 rev. May 
13, 2003. See http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/EDOC9744.htm 
(February 20, 2005); Opinion of the Political Affairs Committee. Rapporteur: Mr Latchezar 
Toshev, Bulgaria, Group of the European People's Party. Doc. 9813. May 22, 2003. See 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/EDOC9813.htm (February 20, 2005). 
35
 See art 1 of Resolution 1335 (2003). Preferential treatment of national minorities 
by the kin-state: the case of the Hungarian Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring 
Countries („Magyars") of 19 June 2001. See http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/Adopted 
Text/TA03/ERES 1335.htm January 23, 2005. 
36
 Ibid. Article 9. 
37
 Ha lász-Maj tény i -Viz i : op. cit. at 338. 
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accordingly. However, the question still emerges: how can an expression 
with no normative meaning included into a Hungarian law-stating that ethnic 
Hungarians are part of the Hungarian nation-violate the sovereignty of other 
states?38 
Another objection of similar nature and psychology was that Hungarian 
certificates founded a public law or political relationship between their holders 
and Hungary. The Venice Commission, reacting to this criticism, held that "an 
administrative document issued by the kin-State may only certify the entitle-
ment of its bearer to the benefits provided for under the applicable laws and 
regulations". It is not a surprise that in its conclusions the Commission used a 
positive definition in this regard, i.e. "may only certify", instead of a negative 
one, i.e. "shall not", since the concept of a unilateral act creating a political or 
public law relationship with foreign citizens has no sense at all. The relation-
ship between the state and the foreign citizen consists in the rights and 
entitlements secured by the law; so the certificate can be objected only if the 
rights embodied into it can be criticized. The objections seem to originate better 
from the chronic fear of secession than from any actual legally meaningful 
rule. The consequence of this fierce protest was that a phrase was inserted into 
the Law declaring expressly that the certificates served only for administrative 
purposes and nothing more. This makes no actual difference, since the certificates 
were not susceptible of proving anything more than the entitlements to the 
benefits and they were not susceptible of identifying their holders, either. 4  
That was the wisest reaction, though it is worth emphasizing that the Greek 
certificate is manifestly an identity card and the Slovak one is confusingly 
similar to the Slovak ID.411 
One of the main objections against the Hungarian Status Law, especially the 
issuance of the certificates concerned, was that they were to be provided upon 
the recommendation of an accredited organization of the kin-minority in the 
country concerned. The Venice Commission found that this is a quasi-official 
function and "no quasi-official function may be assigned by a State to non-
governmental associations registered in another State. Any form of certification 
in situ should be obtained through the consular authorities within the limits of 
38
 See Stewart: op. cit. at 25-26. 
39
 See Warner: op. cit. at 422. 
411
 Memorandum: Legal Analysis of the Slovak Rebublic 's Comments to the 
Amendments to the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. Center for 
Legal Analyses-Kalligram Foundation. 2002. (http://kbdesign.sk/cla/projects/project. 
php?melyik=comparative_statuslaw&nyelv=en&direkturl=comparative_statuslaw/cla_anal 
ysis/cla_memorandum_on_status_law.htm) 
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their commonly accepted attributions". Even though the involvement of local 
minority organizations is not new in this field, the Venice Commission held 
that contrary to the Bulgarian and Slovak laws, the Hungarian law does not 
define the criteria of Hungarian origin, thus the civil organization empowered 
to issue the recommendation has actually unlimited discretion in this respect. 
The Commission held that "the laws or regulations in question should preferably 
list the exact criteria for falling within their scope of application. Associations 
could provide information concerning these criteria in the absence of formal 
supporting documents." This reasoning, or rather this comparison, is far from 
convincing. 
First, "the recommending organizations would not have had any authority 
to take any action that would be binding on the Hungarian government, nor would 
they have acted on instructions from the Hungarian government. Recommending 
organizations would not have had the authority to award Certificates, confer 
benefits under the Status Law, or interpret its provisions".41 Second, the terms 
of the laws used by the Venice Commission as reference define their addressees 
using vague terms that cannot be considered to have any palpable meaning. 
E.g. a person has Slovak ethnic origin if he/she is an ethnic Slovak or he/she 
has a Slovak ancestor up to the third generation,42 the Bulgarian law covers 
persons having at least one Bulgarian ancestor and Bulgarian national 
conscience.42 Even if accepting that these laws establish clear-cut rules, e.g. 
ancestors of certain origin, they do not define the content of the notions they 
refer to. How do we conclude that somebody, i.e. the relevant ancestor, had 
certain ethnic origin? At the end of the day, these definitions give a carte 
blanche to civil institutions, too. Both definitions, similarly to the Hungarian 
one, contain open, indefinable terms. Furthermore, one should not forget, the 
Bulgarian civil organizations do, de facto, issue the certificates in question, which 
is much more an official function than the issuance of recommendations. Of 
course, the right of the civil organizations to issue recommendations can be 
criticized from a legal protection point of view, since applicants have no legal 
remedy if the issuance of the recommendation is refused.44 This is, however, 
another issue. All in all, there seems to be no striking difference between the 
Hungarian legislation, on the one hand, and the Bulgarian and Slovak laws, on 
the other. 
41
 Warner: op. cit. at 415. 
4
" See Slovak law, op. cit. Article 2 (2)-(3) and (6). 
43
 See Bulgarian law. op. cit. Article 2. 
44
 Küpper, H.: Hungary's Controversial Status Law. In: Kántor-Majtényi-Ieda-Vizi-
Halász (ed.): The Hungarian Status Law... op. cit. 319. 
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Regarding the specific entitlements, two of them raised special opposition 
in the neighbouring countries. First, the positive discrimination with regard to 
the issuance of work permits in Hungary, which became irrelevant in the direction 
of those countries that became members of the European Union on May 1, 
2004. Second, the assistance or support paid to parents in case their children 
studied in Hungarian. 
The first issue was criticized on the basis of discrimination. The Venice 
Commission held that discrimination is not per se illegal, though it has to have 
reasonable grounds. Concerning cultural and educational rights, the discrimination 
on the basis of ethnic origin is justified through the targeted legitimate 
purpose, whilst economic rights cannot be justified with the same end, i.e. 
positive discrimination may be acceptable, if it is employed to achieve the end 
of preservation of national and cultural identity. "Preferential treatment can not 
be granted in fields other than education and culture, save in exceptional cases 
and if it is shown to pursue a legitimate aim and to be proportionate to that 
aim." However, a state may have several reasons to prefer persons of certain 
ethnic origin when issuing a work permit. If these people speak the official 
language, it is easier for them to contact the labour administration, they do not 
only have better perspectives of social integration, they even do not have to be 
integrated. The population of Hungary is diminishing year by year and there 
are considerable job vacancies in particular professions; hence. Hungary has a 
real interest in importing labour force and it is reasonable that it prefers ethnic 
Hungarians (for the language and social reasons mentioned above). It should 
not make a difference concerning the legal fate of the regulation whether it is 
included into a status law or in the labour law. What is more, preferential 
treatment in this regard is far from unknown. Bulgaria provides it; in Slovakia 
and Greece the addressees of the laws do not need a work permit and do not 
have to comply with any formalities.45 
In relation to the second issue, the main objection against parental support 
was that it was to be paid directly to the parents, which made it extraterritorial. 
Now the parental support, in accordance with the respective bilateral agreements, 
is mostly paid through the civil organizations of the kin-minority.46 The reaction 
of the states concerned suggests that they consider this practice of indirect 
45
 Bulgarian law, op. cit. Article 7; Slovak law, op. cit. Article 6 (l)(b); Greek 
Regulation, op. cit. Article 3. See Halász-Maj tényi -Viz i : op. cit. at 341. 
45
 See The 2003 Amendment of the Hungarian Status Law, op. cit. Article 21; 
Gyertyánfy: op. cit. at 347. 
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payment acceptable from a public international law point of view. At the end, 
does it make a difference?47 
As regards the objections to the parental support it cannot be disregarded 
that "the principle of extraterritoriality is clearly limited to the situation of a 
state exercising its laws and powers on the territory of another state. Awarding 
a prize, a scholarship or financial assistance for the study of a country's 
language or culture does not involve any application of a law or power on 
the territory of another state".48 "The Status Law does not assert any right to 
regulate or proscribe the conduct or behaviour of kin-minorities; the benefits 
under the Status Law are entirely optional. A more appropriate way of looking 
at the relationships established by the Status Law would be to view them as 
essentially contractual in nature, the result of acceptance by a qualified 
beneficiary of a conditional offer made by the government of Hungary, rather 
than as an exercise of governmental authority."44 
5. Conclusions 
The moral of the whole saga is nothing less than the complete failure of minority 
protection in national as well as in international law, which is the result of 
the obsolete concepts of national state and the political actors' incapability 
of dealing with the merits of the problem instead of struggling on the level of 
symbols. "Many of the arguments made against the Status Law were more 
political and emotional rather than legal in nature, and also somewhat 
disingenuous, coming from states that have adopted similar laws with respect 
to their own kin-minorities."50 It is not welcomed that states feel forced to have 
recourse to such unilateral instruments in order to protect their kin-minorities. 
If there were a workable minority protection regime, there would be no domestic 
political support for such status laws. States are not ethnically neutral and this 
raises serious problems in countries where the population is not ethnically 
47
 See Kiipper: op. cit. at 324. 
48
 De Varennes, F.: An Analysis of the 'Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring 
Countries' and the Validity of Measures Protecting and Promoting the Culture and Identity 
of Minorities Outside Hungary. In: Kántor-Majtényi-Ieda-Vizi-Halász (ed.): The 
Hungarian Status Law... op. cit. 414; See Varga, A.: Legislative Aspects and Political 
Excuses: Hungarian-Romanian Disagreements on the 'Act on Hungarians Living in 
Neighbouring Countries'. In: Kántor-Majtényi-Ieda-Vizi-Halász (ed.): The Hungarian 
Status Law... op. cit. 469. 
44
 See Warner: op. cit. at 416. 
50
 Ibid, at 431. 
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homogeneous. For instance, the number and proportion of Hungarians in the 
neighbouring countries is constantly declining,51 the playing of the Hungarian 
card always holds out success in the neighbouring countries etc. 
Furthermore, the reflexes the neighbouring countries had to the enactment 
of the Hungarian Status Law are alarming, which, by the way, were absent in 
case of other laws. Especially the pedantry with regard to the terminology of 
the law was surprising and tragicomic, e.g. nation in cultural or ethnic sense, 
or even as a tool of hidden irredentism; certificates that create political and 
public law relationship with Hungary and that, hence, facilitate secession. 
These battles and deliberate misinterpretations at the level of symbols do not 
lead us closer to the solution of the problem since there is certainly a problem. 
That was all that fed the adoption as well the opposition of the Status Law and 
until now there is no workable international law regime for minority protection 
that could handle the issue on multilateral level. Thus states are coerced to 
unilateralism. 
Finally, in international relations the endeavour to stability and to a situation 
without interstate conflicts is very welcome but this end can be achieved only 
in the short run if international institutions do not assist the reconcilement of 
ethnic conflicts-i.e. to reach a solution that is satisfactory for both parties-but 
they just freeze the problem. 
51
 Gál, К.: The Hungarian Legislation on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. 
In: Kántor-Majtényi-Ieda-Vizi-Halász (ed.): The Hungarian Status Law... op. cit. 400. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Hamza Gábor-Nótári Tamás: Mit hoz a Múlt? Jog és kultúrtörténeti 
tanulmányok I. [What Brings the Past? Studies on Legal and Cultural History 
I.]. Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 503 pp. 
The joint volume of studies of Gábor Hamza, Academician Professor of ELTE 
and Tamás Nótári, Associate Professor of KRE was published in the autumn 
of 2006. The selection gathers twenty works published earlier, so it allows to 
study these papers together written in 10 years and not easily available 
individually, and to become familiar with the works of the two authors in a 
subtler form. The volume presents the studies in chronological order; most of 
them, as a mater of fact, cover subjects of Roman law; the reader will find a 
total of 8 writings on this subject. The other thematic unit of the volume 
comprises 6 studies on medieval subjects. The last 4 papers leading to the 
modern age and our present day are closed-in style and as a framework-by 
Gábor Hamza's study entitled Comments on the role of Roman law in training 
lawyers.' The last work in the volume, a study that raises a monument to the 
memory of the internationally renowned classical scholar and Byzantinist 
Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss' is a worthy memorial by the former student Tamás 
Nótári to his master not only with this obituary but perhaps with the whole 
volume. Below you will find a detailed analysis of two studies on Antique 
subjects of each of the authors; the rest of the studies will be commented upon 
only briefly within the framework of general remarks made on the entire 
volume. 
1
 Cf. Hamza G.: A hazai jogászképzés történetéhez (The History of the Teaching of 
Lawyers in Hungary). Magyar Jog (1986) 21 sqq.; Megjegyzések a római jog szerepéről a 
jogászképzésben (The Role of Roman Law in Legal Education). In: Márta О.-Szabó В. 
(eds.): Festgabe für János Zlinszky. Miskolc, 1998. 569 sqq. 
2
 Emlékezés Szádeczky-Kardoss Samu professzora (In Memóriám Prof. Samu Szádeczky-
Kardoss). Jogtörténeti Szemle 1 (2005) 44 sqq.; In memóriám Samuelis Szádeczky-
Kardoss piissimam. Vox Latina (2005) 142 sq.; Szádeczky-Kardoss Samu (1918-2004). 
Aetas 4 (2005) 182 sqq. 
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I. Gábor Hamza: Cicero's De re publica and Antique philosophy of the 
state 
"Rome-contrary to the Greeks-created only one specific work on the theory of 
the state: Cicero's dialogue entitled 'On the State '", writes László Havas.3 Yet, 
this work was published in Hungarian only in 19954 owing to Gábor Hamza, 
although the great orator worked more on it than on any other of his works. In 
addition to the hard labour of translating this work into Hungarian, in view of 
the composite nature of the text, the translator had to carry out the far from 
easy task of interpreting and processing the work too. "Quite often it was usual 
to misinterpret and underestimate Cicero's life work and qualify it partly 
lacking independent thought, eclectic and partly conservative or retrograde", 
writes László Havas.5 Also thoughts provoking is what Gábor Hamza writes 
in his study: "The analysis of Cicero 's works, primarily dialogues outstanding 
in terms of the philosophy of the state have been analysed mostly from 
philosophical aspect. Unfortunately, historical and legal approach is often 
forced into background." 
Right at the beginning of his study, the author points out this contradiction 
in the assessment calling the attention to the necessity of treating the works in 
terms of legal history. The first part of the study describes the historical 
environment of the creation of De re publica, recognising that the age of 
Cicero is of great significance in the history of thinking and was a turning 
point in historical aspects. Concerning Roman philosophy of state, the 1st 
century B.C. can be considered a period of paramount importance owing to the 
connection made between Greek and Roman philosophy of state by Polybius. 
Contrary to Plato's and Aristotle's concept setting the city state in the centre 
and idealising it, Polybius now presents states that have grown beyond the 
condition of a polis, and are becoming empires-Sparta, Carthage and Rome-as 
examples to be followed, seeing the latter an existing, not Utopian ideal state. 
The merit of the so-called Scipio circle that followed Polybius is immense in 
laying the theoretical foundations of the need to make changes that Rome, 
politically still operated under city state conditions, faced. Beside theory and 
thinking, however, just as important are the efforts to make changes in praxis, 
3
 Havas L.: A politikai közgondolkodás főbb vonásai Rómában (Mainstream of 
Political Thinking in Rome). In: Havas L.-Obis H.-Szűcs G.-Ujlaky I. (eds.): Róma - Egy 
világbirodalom politikai, erkölcsi és történelmi eszméi I. (Roma - Political, Mora! and 
Historcial Conceptions of an Empire I). Debrecen. 1998. 5-57. 
4
 Hamza G.: Cicero. Az állam (Cicero. The State). Budapest, 20073. 
Havas: op. cit. 18. 
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on the level of historical events. Sulla's title dictator) (dictator rei publicae 
constituendae causa) adopted and exercised in a new form of pubic law, the 
power alliance called the two "triumvirates", Caesar's eternal dictatorship all 
reflect the inefficiency of institutional frameworks as well as the need and 
efforts to change them. 
In the second and third parts that present Cicero's philosophy of state, 
Gábor Hamza sums up the author's philosophical work and its significance in 
the history of philosophy with excellently selected excerpts. The call for 
creating relation between, synthesis of the Greek and Roman philosophy of 
state, the old city state organisation and the new empire state, and populäres 
and optimates attaining balance of strength in the field of politics and society 
is one of the most important elements of Cicero's philosophical oeuvre. The 
notion of rotation, appearance in a blooming and declining stage of the three 
forms of constitution (kingdom, aristocracy, democracy) had been present 
since the beginning of Greek thinking. However, the excerpt quoted in the 
study properly underlines the characteristic Roman approach asserting that 
forms of state are filled with content by statesmen, suitable persons. Therefore, 
in the operation of states it is the personalities, magistrati fulfilling leader's 
offices, continuously replacing each other that the success, life of the state 
depends on. Here we cannot give a detailed description of the outstanding 
significance Romans attributed to magistrati, specific persons and ancient 
morals (mores maiorum). 
The fourth part of the study (The bases of the ideal state in Cicero's 
thinking) points out: Cicero follows Roman approach to the extent that he does 
not present the ideal state as a Utopia but finds it in Rome. The notion of the 
"mixed constitution" (mikté politeia) considered by him fundamental has been 
present since the greatest figures of Greek thinking; however, contrary to the 
Greeks Cicero works it out not on a theoretical basis. Cicero comprehends the 
organisational and moral (not power!) crisis of the Roman state, and makes an 
attempt to solve it relying on traditional Roman values: (auctoritas, traditio, 
mores) but integrates into them philosophical approaches of Greek origin just 
as the requirements of new social layers and power factors. The recognition 
and the elaboration of the theory of concordia and consensus, which can be 
interpreted in several ways, is Cicero's great achievement, it stays on a 
theoretical level though. Along with the thinkers of his age, neither does he 
recognise the rapid growth of the social role and weight of power of the army. 
The army of the age of the Republic was distributed among the three powers 
populus, nobilitas and magistrati equalising each other both in terms of the 
state and authority. By the 1st century, however, it had become a permanent 
institution that basically determined the power relations of the future owing to 
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both of its physical force and level of organisation more uniform than that of 
any other social group. Neither is-the often misinterpreted-best citizen, 
princeps civitatis or moderator rei publicae characterised by Cicero a monarch 
under the framework of the republic, or a supreme commander exercising his 
power in a disguised form but the restorer of the values, institutions of the res 
publica, a practical and political creator of concordia and synthesis that saves 
the order of the state in crisis. The replies of history to the crisis of the Roman 
Republic are known. After Cicero, who created synthesis on the level of theory, 
it was Octavianus Augustus who implemented the renewal of the state organi-
sation in practice that brought further development for the empire through 
preserving old institutions where possible and taking political reality into account. 
At the end of his study, Gábor Hamza describes the philosophical influence 
Cicero produced on the thinking of later ages, well representing the basic 
principle of the volume of studies formulated several times which asserts that 
intellectual values of past epochs are worth examining as much in their 
influence as in themselves. It is a special asset that the carefully selected notes 
attached to the paper serves not only literature on Cicero's oeuvre and works 
on the philosophy of state but calls the attention to works that analyse the most 
important political and historical issues of the age of the author. 
II. Gábor Hamza: Institutions of Direct Democracy in the Antiquity 
and Civics 
Gábor Hamza's other study discussed below contains not so much a detailed 
analysis of its subject but the related problems raised, and provides highly 
valuable guiding on the relevant literature and scientific standpoints.6 The study 
discusses the Greek/Roman offices, institutions responsible for representing 
direct democracy, more specifically, controlling power, which were considered 
exemplary by thinkers of later ages, who tried to revive them in their own 
systems. Below, two of these institutions will be discussed in detail: the 
institution of the Roman tribunatus, and the institution of defensor civitatis of 
the late period of the Empire. 
6
 Cf. Hamza G.: A közvetlen demokrácia ókori intézményei és a politikatudomány 
(Institutes of Antique Immediate Democracy and the Political Sciences). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny (2005) 76 sqq.; A közvetlen demokrácia antik intézményeinek továbbélése a poli-
tikaelméletben (Reminiscences of Antique Immediate Democracy in Political Sciences). 
Parlamenti levelek 1999. fasc. 6. 35 sqq. 
BOOK REVIEW 3 1 1 
The institution of the popular tribune of the Roman Republic established in 
494 built a new determining element into a political structure that had existed 
for centuries. In the state organisation of the Republic based on the separation 
of the power of the magistrati, the senatus and the popular assembly, the office 
of the tribunus plebis sharing the licences of all the three institutions was a 
quite new component. It is beyond doubt that tribunatus is an element of 
accord (foedus) between the patricii and the plebeian; consequently, it is an 
office created primarily for political rather than state organisation related 
reasons; its key feature was that only the plebeian were allowed to apply for it. 
However, through the continuous opening up of promotion to traditional 
magistratures its such role decreased, and the function of limiting, controlling 
the power of magistratus could come to the foreground. In this respect, it is 
indeed a question of paramount importance-as the author points out-whether 
the tribuni were entitled to intervene against measures taken by magistrati and 
prevent them, i.e., whether they had the option of exercising intercessio that 
the magistratus-collegae were permitted to do. It is another important question 
if the tribunicia potestas enjoyed by them can be considered of equal value 
with impérium exercised by high magistrati (consules, praetores). It may refer 
to the outstanding importance of tribunicia potestas that Octavianus Augustus 
also exercised it in spite of not being (because of his patrícius origin he was 
not allowed to be) a popular tribune. 
These two questions-the problematic issues of tribunus''s intercessio and 
potestas-would deserve detailed analysis because without them the licences of 
the powers of the tribunus limiting the power of the popular assembly and the 
senatus (ins agenndi cum plebe-cum patribus, ius intercedendi) are more 
emphatically highlighted and the rights limiting the power of the magistratus 
are thrust into the background. Without them stressing the role of tribunatus 
limiting and controlling power might be exaggerated. 
Considering the defensor civitatis of the late period of the Empire a 
préfiguration of the modern ombudsman might bring similar dangers. The 
collection of annona, the key tax constituting the most important part of 
financial administration was assigned in this period to the powers of praefectus 
praetoriones, the supreme administration holding civil governments together. 
Simultaneously, cities carrying out the actual duty of collecting tax lost their 
independence from the governments of provinces. It was through tax collection, 
a duty of city council members, atriales, that the central power tried to shift a 
part of the local administration tasks it was to fulfil on social layers that could 
still be burdened in terms of their financial performance. In the determination 
of their organisation and operation the leadership of the empire also had a say 
to an increasing extent. 
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The municipal offices having become increasingly unpopular due to growing 
duties were maintained by the central power through a series of coercive 
measures. Membership in the governing body of the city was made obligatory 
for the sons of council members and those who had a certain amount of 
property. It was not allowed to leave the city without the governor's permit; if 
somebody stayed outside the city for more than five years his property devolved 
to the city. Compliance with rules and enforcement of possible coercive measures 
were assigned to governors; that is, the key players of local administration 
were opposed to each other. The bodies of cities tried to collect the taxes 
levied on them primarily from the population of the countryside. Large estates 
enjoying immunity, increasingly growing provincial areas taken out of the 
scope of tax collection reduced the circle of taxpayers to a great extent. Yet the 
greatest part of tax burden was to be carried by the population of cities and 
curiales who were personally responsible for collecting taxes. Consequently, 
coercive measure taken by the State against curiales became stricter. 
To avoid the new method of tax collection and increasing burdens put on 
the population and municipal leaders, the population of cities and municipal 
officials themselves tried to flee to the countryside. By strictly binding social 
groups to their abode, the Sate could obviously do no more than slow down this 
process. Along with the gradual decline of cities, the former fortunate distribution 
of duties and community of interest ensuring growth between the central 
administration and local self-governments terminated. The fate of the layers of 
municipal leaders was subordinated by the government of the empire to the 
interests of the army, the bureaucracy and big landowners in the provinces 
intertwined with them. Officials of the empire began to appear in the governing 
bodies of cities formerly having extensive autonomy. The curator was the 
municipal official sent by the provincial centre who coordinated tax collection 
carried out by the city. By that the State lost both the most important group 
linking the population and layers of leaders, and the basic units of regional 
administration. 
It was this unfortunate process the leaders of the empire wanted to mitigate 
by organising the office of the defender (defensores civitatis) in 364, who would 
have had to defend the population in the provinces against the practice of 
shifting tax burden applied by municipal officials. However, once curiales had 
got into a difficult situation, they also had to be defended against the governors 
of provinces by the defender. Nevertheless, defenders were personnel of the 
central power-since they were appointed by the praefectus praetorio for five 
years-that is, they fulfilled duties similar to the curator rather than enforced 
municipal interests. The system of selection of defenders was later modified: 
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they were no longer appointed by the praefectus praetorio but were elected 
by curiales and bishops. Yet the office could not fulfil the role assigned to it. 
Anastasius replaced defenders with a new official, vinclex subordinated to 
the praefectus praetorio, who also fulfilled the duty of assessment and tax 
collection, so he was responsible for the financial administration duties that 
until then had belonged to curiales. However, the persons fulfilling the office 
soon became corruptible, bribable. For this reason, Iustinianus terminated the 
institution of vindex, and assigned the duty of tax collection again to curiales. 
Besides, his measure to make the defender the head of the city aimed at 
restoring a part of municipal autonomy. Now the defender was independent of 
the praefectus praetorio. He was elected for two years from curiales, the 
competent bishop in the region acted as his controlling body. The defender as 
the head (arkhón) of the city supervised each field of municipal administration. 
He chaired the meetings of the curia, acted as judge, and assisted curiales in 
collecting taxes. Nevertheless, cities becoming freer in terms of their self-
government continued to be subordinated to the governors of provinces and the 
praefectus praetorio. The latter defined the amount of the tax to be collected, 
officials had to turn to him for guiding on taxation issues.7 
Thus, in the history of defensores it is absolutely necessary to distinguish 
regulation before Anastasius from the regulation of Iustinianus. Dispensing 
with detailed analysis, it might be established that it is at most the latter that 
can be considered an "antique legal protection body". 
These two off ices- the tribunatus and the defensores-clearly shows that 
the institutions which can be considered the antique préfiguration of direct 
democracy should be approached with great care and in a subtle form. Never-
theless, Gábor Hamza 's study provides an excellent starting point for this 
investigation. It makes the analyser's work extremely easy that it describes key 
points of approach and principles of evaluation in a concise form yet reflecting 
extensive knowledge. 
III. Tamás Nótári: Religious aspects of the Roman concept of authority 
Tamás Nótári's study analyses the religious, political and public law aspects of 
the Roman concept of authority with exemplary thoroughness, magnificently 
separating the concepts fundamental regarding the subject but often causing 
According to N1. 128.1. (545.) it was the praefectus praetorio who considered the 
exchange rate between the tax in kind and its value in money, and one had to ask the 
praefectus praetorio to certify the amounts of the taxes imposed on the territories, cities. 
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difficulties in interpretation: auctoritas, numen, genius and impérium. In the 
investigation of Roman public law it is indispensable to present a clear view 
of, understand the connecting points of holding offices, undertaking political 
roles and religion. This rather difficult task is made easier for us by the author 
through providing a superb treatment of the subject.8 The detailed analysis of 
the concept of numen standing in the centre of the study examines the aspects 
of the concept significant in terms of public law one by one setting out from 
the etymology of the word. Of these, in our analysis we shall make comments 
on the role of the concept of numen played in exercising supremacy focusing 
on the institution of triumplius and the concept of numen Augusti integrated in 
the early emperor cult. 
This dual character of the term numen as a human feature expressing super-
human skills yet related to earthly persons clearly exemplifies the ambivalent 
view of deifying humans in the Roman mind. In Roman thinking holding 
offices, assuming dignities, what is more, the operation of state institutions is a 
superhuman activity based on superior skills that stand beyond the human 
world, which is, however, separated by several confines from raising those who 
perform it to the level of gods, from their epiphany. The skills of leadership, 
governance had been superhuman features since the beginning of Roman history, 
and were interwoven with religious images, symbols. The Roman magistrati 
inherited the sacred character of kings preceding them as much as Augustus 
took over these sacred elements to represent his power. It is associating office-
holding with superhuman skills from which the striking character of the 
Roman mind-contrary to the Greek-can be deduced, which asserts that the 
success, prevailing of the Republic depends on the persons holding the offices 
rather than the institutions. Namely, they possess numen, more specifically 
numinous force that is able to fill official power, impérium or potestas, with 
content. In the Greek world we find no traces of this distinguished respect and 
sacredness that surrounds magistrati. 
Among the traditions of the Republic this superhuman character was 
expressed perhaps the most spectacularly by triumphus due to triumphant 
commanders and by the symbols related thereto. The development of the 
triumphus ceremony can be connected to the introduction of the Jupiter cult on 
the Capitolium in 509 B.C.. Triumphal marches adhering to original religious 
traditions were held until the end of the 3rd century. The triumphi held later 
8
 Nótári T.: Numen és numinozitás - a római tekintély fogalom vallási gyökerei (Numen 
and Numinosity - Origin of Roman Concept of Authority). Aetas (2003) 33 sqq.; Nótári, 
T.: On Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of Authority. Acta Juridica Hungarica (2005) 
95 sqq. 
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cannot be considered a continuation of sacred tradition. During the time of the 
triumphus the triumphant commander was given exceptional, almost divine 
respect. For this one day he was allowed to put on toga palmata, the clothes of 
the Jupiter statue on the Capitolium, and toga picta decorated with golden stars 
that was worn over it. The triumphator was driving a two-wheeled, quadriga 
pulled by four horses, the same as the one that decorated the tip of the temple 
on the Capitolium. Yet the act of putting on the divine vestments did not mean 
being transformed into a god since the triumphator offered a sacrifice in 
Jupiter's temple and during this act he took off his symbols of power. In the 
triumphus it is not Jupiter but his statue that the commander personifies. The 
aforesaid commander's capes are taken off the statue of the chief god on the 
Capitolium, the triumphator s face is painted vermilion to make him look 
similar to Jupiter's statue made of clay. The commander's stiff posture on the 
triumphal carriage looking straight ahead is highly statue-like. The fact that he 
only appears to be a god is emphasised by one of the most characteristic 
accessories of the triumphal march, the slave standing behind the triumphator 
on his quadriga, who continuously reminds him of his mortality (hominem te 
memento! Hoti anthrópoi eisin!). 
The cult of rulers of the early period of the Empire was expressed by the 
assembly of symbols surrounding the officials and commanders of the Republic, 
manifesting respect gathered around the person of princeps. The symbols of 
the Republic were only secondarily, gradually accompanied by a set of sacred 
tools of eastern origin. The author properly emphasises that the cult of rulers 
rooted in the traditions of the Roman Republic and religion must be sharply 
separated from eastern type notions. Augustus also used sacred elements 
expressing numinosity to support his own power with transcendence. While 
doing so he created a new quality through expropriating and monopolising the set 
of sacred tools magistrati were entitled to rather than by inventing new symbols. 
Therefore, the influence of eastern elements produced on the Roman concept 
of the ruler-often overemphasised in literature-should be evaluated only in 
accordance with their significance. 
Even in the case of Augustus the tradition of triumphus, the highest respect 
due to living humans stands out of sacred elements. The primary princeps 
was first given the right to wear a commander's wreath in all of his public 
appearances; then, he obtained the privilege to put on triumphator'% clothes on 
the first day of each year. By that he wanted to make the narrow, single day 
content of the respect due to the commander permanent and to concentrate it 
around his person. 
The transcendental quality of the princeps of the early period of the Empire 
also properly reflects the caution of the Romans observable in their handling 
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the divine respect due to humans. In his life Augustus did not become divine, 
divus but received the title Divi filius after Caesar who had become Divus 
Iulius. In the adoption of the name Augustus in 27 B.C. certain sacred images 
also played a part. Following the reign of Caesar and Augustus, it became a 
tradition to make the rulers of the early period of the Empire divine divus after 
their death through a resolution of the senate, in the form of consecratio. The 
cult of rulers who had become divine was conducted by a six-member 
committee of priests (seviri augustales) set up for this purpose in each city. 
Rulers who had ancestors made divine supported the cult of the cult of their 
ancestors since by that they could legitimise their own divinity (as sons of god, 
divi filius). The cult of Caesar, then of Augustus had their own priests, cubic 
places. 
The transitional nature of the essence of the "Augustan Caesar" between 
the two worlds is superbly grasped by the author through opposing and 
comparing the pair of concepts numen Augusti and genius Augusti. In this 
comparison he expounds that the princeps has both genius and numen but does 
not become in his life either numen or genius. Thus, the Roman mind 
"authorises" earthly persons to have only divine traits but not divine essence. 
By the ceremony of making them divine, dead Emperors obtain divine essence 
and do not become divine. 
The author closes his highly ripened study supplemented with rich notes 
with a quite stylistic and thoughts provoking final part, in which he calls the 
attention to the neurotic relation of Roman thinking to numinosity and the 
sense of tremendum maiestatis. 
IV. Tamás Nótári: Campaign strategy in ancient Rome 
The Commentariolum petitionis, i.e., the Handbook for applicants for offices 
written in 64 B.C. is the oldest campaign strategy document that has been 
preserved for us. In this handbook Quintus Tullius Cicero, younger brother of 
the orator/politician Marcus Tullius Cicero gives advice to his elder brother on 
how Marcus can win consul's dignity. The up-to-date translation of the work 
into Hungarian was published owing to Tamás Nótári in 2006. In the first part 
of the subsequent study on the translation, analysed below, he examines the genre 
related and historical issues of the text.4 Originally, the text is a private letter, 
9
 Hogyan nyerjük meg a választásokat? Quintus Tullius Cicero: A hivatalra pályázók 
kézikönyve (How to Win an Election? Quintus Tullius Cicero: Commentariolum petitionis). 
Translation, notes, preface by Nótári, T. Edited and study by Németh, Gy. Szeged, 2006. 
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and not a work called commentary (commentarius) in Latin literary terminology. 
The author, Quintus Tullius Cicero calls it also only commemtariolum and at 
the end of his letter he asks his brother Marcus to share his comments with him 
so that the work could be published later as a real commentarius. In the second 
part of his study Tamás Nótári describes the opposing views on the issue of 
authorship; nevertheless, he points out that-if for nothing else than for lack of 
evidence-Cicero junior should be considered the author of the work. 
In the parts that consist of the analysis of the content of the work Tamás 
Nótári highlights the institutions of the elections of the Republic of Rome 
having special significance: collegia, clientela and ambitus. While describing 
them he outlines the political careers of the two Ciceros. By that the method of 
the treatment of the subject becomes quite new since the author does not 
provide a description of election rules, traditional institutions, does not answer 
to the questions "How to apply?" or "How to become magistratiT but gives an 
insight into the reality of Roman elections, analyses the factors that actually 
influenced events and decisions, replying indeed to the question "How to 
win?". Namely, winning the elections required in addition to-in many cases 
instead of-advantageous skills (oratory expertise, aptness) and virtues required 
on the level of traditions, primarily financial and "human" support, which was 
attained in many cases with morally and legally dubious tools. The collegia 
established by private persons were originally communities of defence of 
persons who lived at a given settlement or belonged to one religious cult; later 
on they undertook to take part in political fights too. They campaigned for the 
benefit of patroni who paid them, quite often they represented the interest of 
their patrons and weakened their opponents with actions on the verge of legality. 
The patronus-cliens relation used also for election purposes had already 
lost its original character in the period under review. Instead of winning the 
service of the cliens who owed gratitude and respect to the patrónus for his 
pecuniary support, it was more advantageous for the applicants for offices to 
win the leaders of collegia. "Convincing" the saluters (salutatores) who acted 
as opinion leaders in the campaign and contacted candidates one by one was 
also of greater significance than using clientela. Anyway, once the patronus-
cliens relation had become loose, the behaviour, party affiliation of clientes 
became unstable, dependant on financial services. 
33 sqq. See Nótári, T.: Quaestio de ambitu. Collega (2001) 43 skk.; Cicero. Négy védő-
beszéd (Cicero. Four Speaches). Translated, preface and notes by Nótári, T. Szeged, 2004; 
Jogtudomány és retorika - Cicero pro Murena. Jogtudományi Közlöny 26 (2001) 470 sqq.; 
Nótári T.-Németh Gy.: Választási kampánystratégia az ókori Rómában (Electional Strategy 
in Ancient Rome). Jogtudományi Közlöny (2006) 268 sqq. 
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Nótári's study clearly points out that winning magistrati required consider-
able financial performance and political compromises even from such a person 
with features of moral highness as Marcus Tullius Cicero. An example for the 
latter is the compromise Cicero entered into with his former opponent, his later 
fellow consul, Antonius. To restrain election related frauds, bribery, attempts 
were made also in Rome, but due to the very nature of the system these 
attempts could be only contradictory half-measures. 
A good example for this contradictory nature is that legally sanctioned 
election fraud, ambitus was distinguished from morally despised but not punished 
unethical campaigning, ambitio. Relations based on financial services: clientela 
and salutatio were not considered ambitus; that is, under their cover election 
bribery, pay offs could be implemented. Consequently, relevant laws and 
resolutions of the senatus could sanction only the phenomena that were 
outside the allowed scope of support (recruiting party adherents for money; 
distributing free tickets to gladiators' games; excessive hospitality; etc), but 
they were not able to take action on the merits against hidden corrupt practices. 
At the very end of the study, the author describes the development and operation 
of the court of justice adjudging election fraud cases (,quaestio ambitus). Tamás 
Nótári's paper provides a magnificent insight into the political conditions of the 
late period of the Republic, making our vision developed about the age more 
subtle-realistically and seeing the essence. 
Among the other papers on antique subjects in the volume Tamás Nótári's 
study entitled Weighing of souls and fates in Homer and Vergil puts one of the 
most ancient and most known symbols of administration of justice, the scales, 
in the centre of its analysis.10 In various representations we can often see 
Iustitia with scales in her hand; scales as the means of administration of 
justice, the symbol of justice can be found in many places in Greek literature. 
Nótári analyses loci in the Iliad to examine the concept of law and justice(ness) 
as it is presented in Homer. By extensive analysis of the symbols of scales he 
provides additional information on the subject. Tamás Nótári's paper entitled 
Hesiod and the beginning of the philosophy of law highlights a few concepts 
instructive for legal history and philosophical analysis from excerpts of the main 
works of Hesiod, who lived at the turn of the 8th and 7th B.C., Theogonia (Birth 
10
 Cf. Nótári T.: A mérleg mint az igazságszolgáltatás jelképe Homérosnál (The Scale 
as the Symbol of Jurisdiction in Homer's Iliad). Collega (2002) 43 sqq.; Vallástörténeti 
megjegyzések az Aeneis XII. 725-727. sorához (Comments on the Religious Aspect of 
Aeneis XII. 725-727.). Belvedere Méridionale (1999) 4 sqq.; The Scales as the Symbol of 
Justice in the Iliad. Acta Juridica Hungarica (2006) 249 sqq. 
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of the Gods) and Erga kai hémerai ( Works and Days).11 Perhaps the most 
valuable part of the study is the examination of the occurrence and role of diké, 
one of the most diverse concepts of antique legal history in Homeric epics and 
Hesiod's Erga. In his paper entitled The spear as the symbol of power and 
property in ancient Rome Tamás Nótári provides the analysis of another 
important symbol of legal history, the spear (hasta) in terms of the history of 
symbols.12 Setting out from Gaius's description of legis actio sacramento in 
rem the author examines the symbolism of the spear and the rod, illustrating it 
with parallels from the history of law and religion and analogies. Gábor 
Hamza's paper entitled Alien influences in Roman law from the Twelve Table 
Law to the classical age of Roman law surveys one of the most significant periods 
of the development of law embedded in the connections of the entirety of the 
history of antique law.'5 By highlighting institutions taken over from other 
ancient laws less underlined in the literature he provides new points of approach 
for the treatment of the period of Roman law analysed to the greatest extent. 
Among the studies on medieval legal history, first we can read Tamás 
Nótári's paper entitled Virgil - bishop and author of parodies.14 Virgil, 
11
 Cf. Nótári T.: Hésiodos jogkoncepciója (Hesiod's Concept of law). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny (2005) 328 sqq.; Bürgergemeinschaft und Rechtsgedanke bei Hesiod. In: Németh 
Gy.-Forisek, P. (ed.): Politai et Cives. Epigraphica III. Hungarian Polis Studies 13. 
Debrecen, 2006. 7 sqq. 
12
 Nótári T.: Festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco. Acta Facultatis Politico-
Iuridicae Universitatis Budapestiensis de Rolando Eotvos nominatae (2004) 133 sqq. 
13
 Cf. Hamza G.: Idegen hatások a római jogban a Xll táblás törvénytől a római jog 
klasszikus koráig (Forign Influences in Roman Law from the Twelwe Tabels to the 
Classical Age). Jogtudományi Közlöny (1996) 319 sqq.; Észrevételek az antik római had-
történet jogi és gazdasági vonatkozásairól (Comments on Legal and Economic Aspects of 
Antique Roman Military History). Jogtudományi Közlöny (1996) 83 sqq. 
14
 Cf. Nótári T.: A salzburgi historiográfia kezdetei (The Beginnings of Historiography 
of Salzburg). Szeged, 2007; Források Salzburg kora középkori történetéből (The Sources 
of Early Medieval History of Salzburg). Szeged, 2005; Adalékok Virgil apát és püspök 
bajorországi működéséhez (Remarks on Bishop Virgils Activity in Bavaria). In: Marton, 
Sz.-Teiszler, É. (eds.): Medievisztikai tanulmányok. Szeged, 2005. 99 sqq.; On bishop 
Virgil's litigations in Bavaria. Acta Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007) 49-70. Két forrás a 
kora középkori Salzburgból, Notifia Arnonis - Epistola Theotmari (Two Sources from 
Early medieval Salzburg). Aetas (2004) 72 sqq.; Salzburg neve a kora középkori for-
rásokban (The Name of Salzburg in Early Medieval Sources). Collega (2005) 48; Az 
univerzum képe Aethicus Ister Cosmographiájában (The Idea of Universe in the 
Cosmographia of Aethicus Ister). Belvedere Méridionale (2005) 38 sqq.; Gesta Hrodberti. 
In: Havas, L.-Tegyey, E.: Classica - Mediaevalia - Neolatina. Debrecen, 2006. 131 sqq.; 
Virgil és Bonifác - egy konfliktus jogi és irodalmi síkjai a kora középkorban (Virgil and 
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bishop of Salzburg of Irish origin (749-784) is noted for creating the earliest 
works of the historiography of Salzburg: Gesta sancti Hrodberti confessons; 
Libellas Virgilii and Liber confraternitatum. First, the author analyses the 
Bavarian home and foreign affairs conditions of the period; then, he follows up 
the confrontation between Virgil and Bonifacius. In his study he discusses 
primarily Virgil's activity in Bavaria in detail. Tamás Nótári's study entitled An 
early medieval show trial—the dethronement of Tasilo III analyses the show trial 
of the Bavarian duke Tasilo III, more specifically its legal background.15 Tasilo 
III, the last duke of the Agilolfing dynasty, which ruled in Bavaria for two 
centuries, was deprived of his throne by Charlemagne not in a military clash 
but in a show trial arranged in 788. The Frankish ruler first isolated Tasilo both 
in home and foreign affairs; then, in 787 made him his vassal. The main charges 
brought against Tasilo were unfaithfulness to the liege lord, and leaving the 
royal army without permission. The study gives a detailed analysis of Tasilo's 
oath of allegiance, so the reader having provided information on the lawsuit 
gets an insight into the most important elements of medieval feudal law too. 
The title of the eleventh study of the volume is The trial of Metod in the 
Council of Regensburg,16 Tamás Nótári's paper first describes the concept of 
Bonifacius-Legal and Literary Aspects of a Conflict in Early Middle Ages). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny (2007) 100 sqq.; Virgil püspök bajorországi jogvitáinak margójára (Remarks on 
the Litigations of Bishop Virgil in Bavaria). In: Mezey, B.-Révész T. M. (eds.): 
Tanulmányok Máthé Gábor 65. születésnapja tiszteletére. Budapest, 2006. 369 sqq. 
15
 Cf. Nótári T.: 111. Tasziló trónfosztása - adalék egy koraközépkori koncepciós per-
hez (Tassilo Il l 's Dethronement - Contributions to an Early Middle Ages Show Trial). 
Jogtudományi Közlöny (2005) 503 sqq.; Tassilo Ill 's dethronement - contributions to an 
early-middle-age show trial. Publicationes Universitatis Miskoiciensis. Sectio luridica et 
Politico (2005) 65 sqq.; Személyállapot és társadalomszerkezet a kora középkori Bajor-
országban (State of Persons and Social Structure in the Early Medieval Bavaria). Acta 
Facultatis Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Budapestinensis 42 (2005) 163 sqq.; III. Leó pere 
és az Salzburgi Érsekség megalapítása (The Trial of III. Leo and the Establishment of the 
Salzburg Archbishopric). Collega (2005) 55 sqq.; A kora középkori salzburgi birtokjegy-
zékek margójára (Remarks on the Early Medieval Notitiae of Salzburg). Jogelméleti Szemle 
(2006) www.jesz.ajk.elte.hu 
16
 Cf. Nótári T.: Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum. Aetas, 2000. 93 sqq.; Avarok 
a Kárpát-medencében - Szádeczky-Kardoss Samu: Az avar történelem forrásai (Avars in the 
Carpathian Basin - Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss: Scources of the Avarian History). Belvedere 
Méridionale 12 (2000) 110 sqq.; On the Avar Related Chapters of the Conversio 
Bagoariorum et Carantanorum. Chronica (2005) 26-39. Megjegyzések a Conversio 
Bagoariorum et Carantanorum avar vonatkozású fejezeteihez (Comments on the Avar 
Related Chapters of the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum). In: Balogh, L.-Szakra, 
D. (eds.): Tanulmányok a középkorról Szeged, 2001. 67 sqq.; De Consultis Bulgarorum. 
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Christianisation of Carantania and Pannónia, and presents the missionary efforts 
made by the Pope, the Byzantine Emperor and the Eastern Frankish ruler in 
Bulgaria. Here the legal history element is the description of the circumstances 
of Metod's trial in Regensburg. The author focuses on the charges formulated 
in Conversio and their background, and the further stages of Metod's teachings 
f rom the viewpoint of the legal historian. Tamás Nótári 's fourth writing on 
medieval subjects is entitled The fight between Christianity and the Islam 
in the world view ofEnea Silvio Piccolomini (Pope Pius II)?1 T h e study d e s c r i b e s 
the thinking and practical activity of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomineus, the later 
Pope Pius II (1458-1464), the excellent Humanist and significant ecclesiastical 
politician. Both of the two sources analysed by the author are permeated with fear 
from the expansion of the Turks and ecclesiastical policy urging to take action 
against it. One of them is a speech addressed to an assembly held in Frankfurt 
in 1454 on the destruction of Constantinople and the war to be started against 
the Turks; the other source is his letter written already as the Pope to Mohamed 
Sultan, in which he expounds his views on the Islam quite lengthily. 
In his study entitled St Stephen's laws and Europe18 Gábor Hamza writes 
an appreciation of the first Hungarian k ing ' s role in legal history. He under-
lines that his significance lies in his consistent actions to create the bases of 
Collega (2002) 47 sqq.; Róma és Bizánc missziós kísérletei a IX. századi Bulgáriában. 
(Missionary Work of Rome and Byzantium in the 9lh Century in Bulgaria). Belvedere 
Méridionale (2005) 22 sqq.; A Salzburgi Érsekség és Metód konfliktusa a Conversio 
Bagoariorum et Carantanorum tükrében (The Conflict Between the Archbishopric of Salzburg 
and Metod in the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum). Belvedere Méridionale (2005) 
37 sqq.; On the Avar-related chapters of the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum. 
Chronica (2005) 26. sqq. 
17
 Cf. Nótári T.: Szemelvények Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini „Európa" с. müvéből 
(Fragments of "Europe" by Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini - introduction and translation). 
Documenta Historica, 42. Szeged, 1999; Timur Lenk és I. Bajazid Aeneas Sylvius 
Piccolomini „Európa" című művében (Timur Lenk and I. Bajazid in "Europe" by Aeneas 
Sylvius Piccolomini). Belvedere Méridionale (1999) 89 sqq.; A török terjeszkedés állo-
másai Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini „Európa" című müvében (Stages of Turkish Expansion 
in "Europe" by Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini). Aetas (1999) 149 sqq.; Aeneas Sylvius 
Piccolomini szónoki művészete (Rethorics of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini). In: Weisz E. 
(ed.): Középkortörténeti tanulmányok. Szeged, 2003. 103 sqq.: Die Geschichte des Grafen 
Ingo bei Enea Silvio Piccolomini. In: Varietas Gentium-Communis Latinitas. XIII Inter-
national Congress for Neo-Latin Studies. Budapest, 2006. 96. 
18
 Cf. Hamza G.: Sanctus Stepluinus et Europa - Szent István és Europa - Saint 
Étienne et l'Europe. Budapest, 1991; Szent István dekrétumai és a jusztiniánuszi törvény-
hozás (Decrates of I. Stephan and the Legislation of Justinian). Jogtudományi Közlöny 
(1996) 418 sqq.; Szent István törvényei és Európa. In: Hamza, G. (szerk.): Sanctus 
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uniform Hungarian legal system. A new aspect of the method of approach applied 
and the consequences drawn by Gábor Hamza is that relying on an extensive 
material of sources he convincingly proves that St Stephen's laws represented 
not only the creation of Hungarian legal unity but the universality of ins, which 
included the elements of Roman (Byzantine) law, and Europeanness that could 
organically unite new elements with the traditions of consuetudo. All this 
advanced the integration of our country into Europe to a decisive extent. Gábor 
Hamza's paper entitled Accursius and the beginnings of European jurisprudence 
analyses the life work of the great medieval jurist.14 When creating Glossa 
ordinaria Accursius obviously relied on the compilation of glossaries of his 
predecessors, so especially on the works of his master, Azon teaching at the 
University of Bologna, yet his work can be considered original. The study 
provides excellent additional information on the significance of Accursius, the 
first epoch-making figure of medieval jurisprudence hard to overestimate. 
Each of the four studies leading to our present age is the work of Hamza Gábor. 
In chronological order the first of them is The appearance of the Macedonian 
issue in European politics26 In accordance with the Preamble of the Constitu-
tion adopted on 17 November 1991 of Macedonia, which declared its 
independence on 25 January 1991, Macedonia is the national state of the 
Macedonian people, which ensures equal rights and permanent coexistence for 
each ethnic minority. All this includes the right of ethnic minorities to cultivate 
their special cultural and national assets. This regulation makes this young 
state with a small territory exemplary among European and especially Balkan 
peoples. This is one of the reasons why the author describes the little known 
development of Macedonian history and law. In his study entitled The develop-
Stephanus et Europa. Budapest, 1991. 24 sqq.: Die Gesetze (Décréta) Stephans des Heiligen 
und Europa. In: Szent István és Európa - Saint Etienne et l'Europe. Budapest, 2001. 33 
sqq.; Die Gesetzgebung Stephans des Heiligen und Europa. In: Ungarn-Jahrbucli (1995-
1996) 27 sqq. 
19
 Cf. Hamza G.: Accursius és az európai jogtudomány kezdetei (Accursius and the 
Beginnings of European Jurisprudence). Jogtudományi Közlöny (1999) 171-175. 
20
 Cf. Hamza G.: A macedón kérdés az európai politikában I. (Question of Macedonia 
in European politics I). Magyar Szemle (2001) 202 sqq.; A macedón kérdés az európai 
politikában II. (Question of Macedonia in European politics II). Magyar Szemle (2001) 192 
sqq.: Macedónia és a föderáció lehetősége a Balkánon (Macedonia and the Possibility of 
Federation on the Balkan). In: „Nem akarunk csonka Európát...". Budapest, 2002. 143 
sqq.; A macedón kérdés megjelenése az európai politikában (The Appearance of the 
Macedonian Question in the European Politics). In: „Nem akarunk csonka Európát... " op. 
cit. 149 sqq. 
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ment of the constitution of the United States of America and Europe Gábor H a m z a 
describes the development of the constitution of the U.S., and simultaneously 
analyses the codes made in Europe.21 The subject is approached from a special 
aspect to the extent that not only does it analyse the development of the 
constitution of the North-American state but demonstrates the influence 
produced by political thinkers and philosophers of state of ancient and modern 
Europe (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Sallustius, Sir Edward Coke, John Milton, 
John Locke, Hugo Grotius, William Blackstone, Montesquieu) on the creation 
of the fundamental law in force for the longest period in the history of law. 
In his s tudy ent i t led Sir Henry Maine and comparative jurisprudence 
Gábor Hamza provides additional information on Sir Henry James Sumner 
Maine's epoch-making work published in 1861 "Ancient Law, its Connection 
with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas".22 The 
creation of the discipline of comparing law and the conditions of its education 
is perhaps more important that the work itself. The starting point of the latter 
was provided by the chair set up for Maine in 1869 in Oxford. Gábor Hamza 's 
last study on the m o d e r n a g e is The idea of the "Third Empire" in German 
philosophical, literary and political thinking in the 20th century".23 It is a g r ea t 
21
 Cf. Hamza G.: Az Egyesült Államok alkotmányfejlődése és a modern alkotmá-
nyosság (Constitutional Development of the USA and Modern Constitutional Law). In: 
Mitchell, R.: A; Egyesült Államok alkotmánya (The Constitution of the United States). 
Budapest, 1995. VII sqq.; Az Egyesült Államok alkotmányának és alkotmányfejlődésének 
sajátosságai (Specialities of the Constitution of the United States and it's development). 
Jogállam (1996) 125 sqq.; A római jog hatása az Amerikai Egyesült Államok jogfejlődé-
sére (Impacts of Roman Law on Constitutional Developement of the USA). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny (2003) 234 sqq. 
22 
Cf. Hamza G.: Maine és az összehasonlító jogtudomány (Maine and the Comparative 
Jurisprudence). Acta Facultatis Politico-Iuridicae UniVersitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis 
de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae ( 1987) 7 sqq.; Sir Henry Maine et le droit comparé. Annales 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, Sectio Iuridica 
(1991) 59 sqq.; Sil Henry Maine és az összehasonlító jog (Sir Henry Maine and the 
Comparative Law). Jogállam (1998-1999) 326 skk.; Sir Henry Maine et le droit comparé. 
Orbis Iuris Romani (2005) 7 sqq. 
Cf. Hamza G.: A „Harmadik Birodalom" eszméje a német filozófiai és politikai 
gondolkodásban (The Idea of the "Third Reich" in the German Legal, Philosophical and 
Political Thinking). Magyar Tudomány (1999) 779 sqq.; Die Idee des "Dritten Reichs" 
im deutschen philosophischen und politischen Denken im 20. Jahrhundert. Annales 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, Sectio Iuridica 
(1997) 11 sqq.; Die Idee des "Dritten Reichs" im deutschen philosophischen und politischen 
Denken des 20. Jahrhunderts. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung (2001) 321 sqq.; The Idea 
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merit of the work that it corrects, presents a subtle interpretation of the images, 
notions incorrectly or imprecisely formed in public knowledge regarding the 
National Socialist Germany. The name "The Third Empire", for example, was 
not the name of Germany; what is more, it was just the Propaganda Ministry 
of the German Empire that prohibited the official use of the term in 1939. 
From then on Germany's official name was "Empire of Greater Germany". That 
is, the new kind of use of the word Empire-contrary to historical predecessors-
did not emphasise continuation with earlier empires but the existence of a state 
with new quality, which was in this quality the first and only such state. 
When evaluating the volume of studies critical comments should be made only 
with regard to the typographical implementation. The exterior of the book is 
aesthetic; the cover representing Cicero's speech against Catilina is a witty 
choice. However, the type-size and space between lines used in editing the texts 
of the studies are inappropriate; the placements of notes at the end of the 
writings is not expedient either in the event of papers so richly supplied with 
notes. The selection, clear arrangement of headings (in this case, more precisely, 
footings) very important in compiling volumes of studies is not proper either. 
The joint volume of studies of Gábor Hamza and Tamás Nótári not only 
makes our legal history knowledge richer by providing new information but 
also offers numerous new viewpoints in the scope of examination and research 
highly extensive in terms of subjects. It is a special feature of Gábor Hamza's 
studies that in them one of the most acknowledged Hungarian scientist of 
Roman private law enriches our knowledge in the field of ius publicum. In 
Tamás Nótári's papers we can witness and use the benefits of the fortunate and 
for the legal literature fertile meeting of the erudition of the legal historian and 
classical scholar. 
Miklós Kelemen 
of the "Third Reich" in the German Legal, Philosophical and Political Thinking in the 20,h 
Century. Diritto e cultura (2001) 127 sqq. 
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I M R E V Ö R Ö S * 
The Likely Effects of the Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe (TCE) on the Hungarian 
Legal Order 
Abstract . The study analyses the potential effects of the Treaty on the Hungarian Constitution 
and its application by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and the more general-and at the 
European Law's present stage of the development unavoidable-problem of the theoretical 
analysis of European Law as a branch of law. 
The study points out that the Hungarian Constitution's Accession Clause (Article 2/A) 
has not solved the problem of the primacy of Community Law. as far as the relationship be-
tween EU Law and the Hungarian Constitution is concerned, therefore the Constitutional Court 
encounters a problem liiat is increasingly difficult to resolve, when facing issues relating to the 
incompatibility of Hungarian statutes with EU Law. The study criticises some solutions 
proposed by the Constitutional Treaty (e.g. the institution of "recommendations"-(the present 
practice of "guidelines" etc.) which is definitely unconstitutional according to the Hungarian 
Constitution and ils application practice by the Constitutional Court. Finally the study 
complements the problems thus outlined with the fact that the concept of EU Law and its 
various parts have not been clarified f rom a dogmatic perspective-the time has come to 
systematize this enormous material of law, especially when a Constitutional Treaty makes 
the attempt to summarize the legal fundaments of the unprecedented effort to develop an 
economic and political integration in Europe. 
Keywords : TCE, EU law, Hungarian Consti tutional Court, lawmaking 
I. The current problems facing the Constitutional Court with respect 
to the application of European law** 
The application of European law confronts the regular courts the Constitutional 
Court, as well as the Hungarian lawmakers with new challenges. One year after 
EU accession some focal points are beginning to emerge which will or may 
become placed in a new context with the adoption of the TCE. We conceive of 
S e n i o r Adv i se r , I n s t i t u t e for Lega l S t u d i e s of the H u n g a r i a n A c a d e m y o f Sc iences , 
H - 1 0 1 4 B u d a p e s t , O r s z á g h á z u. 30. 
E - m a i l : v o r o s @ j o g . m t a . h u 
T h e s tudy c o n t i n u e s t he analysis o f t h e cons t i t u t i ona l d e v e l o p m e n t in E u r o p e deal t 
wi th in a p r e v i o u s s t u d y : s e e Acta Juridica Hungarica 4 8 ( 2 0 0 7 ) 5 - 2 3 . 
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the application of European law in two ways: for one application by lawmakers 
and then by law enforcement and the judiciary. In the former case we refer to a 
very particular instance of legal application, specifically the domestic trans-
position of current directives or of future European framework law. This, though 
it completely differs in nature from traditional legal application in this particular 
European legal context, is undoubtedly (also) legal application in the context 
of the sui generis European legal order. The lawmaker creates domestic law by 
simultaneously applying European law. 
1. The application of European law has reached the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court already. Decisions have been handed down in two cases already, 
though in both cases the court specifically investigated the compatibility of 
Hungarian legal acts with the Hungarian constitution, and emphatically did not 
look at the issue of compatibility with European law-either through reviewing 
the validity of a directive or the adequacy of implementation 17/2004 (V. 25.) 
Constitutional Court decision (ABH 2004, 296-297); 744/B/2004 Decision of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai, 2005, No. 
2, 81]. The connection with European law stemmed from the fact that in the 
first case the issue revolved around the implementation of an EU regulation, 
while in the second case a European directive served as the basis for drafting 
the Hungarian legal act in question. 
Moreover, as a result of two motions the Constitutional Court was recently 
faced with the task of adjudging the constitutionality of a Hungarian legal act 
on the basis of European law, to determine the compatibility of the former with 
the latter (no decision has been rendered as of Spring 2006). 
2. In one case the issue is the faulty transposition of a directive-a directive 
on company law. The directive seeks to achieve that member states liberalise 
the rules and conditions for increasing the capital of public limited-liability 
companies. The lawmaker-obviously as a result of a translation error-amended 
Act CXLIV (Companies Act) of 1997 on commercial companies, but due to 
the presumable misunderstanding of the directive the regulation not only failed 
to become laxer, but in fact become extremely prohibitive, so that in effect it is 
more or less impossible to increase capital. The result is thus a transposition 
that is not compatible with the directive, is in fact contradictory to it. The 
Hungarian lawmaker therefore not only failed to fulfil its legislative duty, but 
in fact further restricted the regulation-effectively moving it away from its 
stated objective. 
According to European law a faulty implementation can be corrected if a 
court requests a preliminary judgment from the ECJ in the context of a legal 
suit, noting the incompatibility of Hungarian and European law. On the basis 
of the ECJ's verdict the court may then render the given statute ineffective. 
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Parties whose interests are violated can of course also turn to the Commission, 
asking it to take measures to remedy the situation. 
In the case at hand the first possibility did not even arise, since due to specifics 
of the case the commercial parties involved had intensive and good co-operation 
and therefore a legal dispute did not arise. More importantly, the ECJ's practice 
does not recognise the direct horizontal effect of a directive. The second venue 
is more of a theoretical possibility that will yield results only very slowly, if 
the Commission decides to intervene at all. 
Thus the corporation turned to the Constitutional Court with the motion to 
declare the statute unconstitutional and to thus render it void, on the basis that 
the Hungarian legal regulation is not compatible with European law (the 
directive). 
Nevertheless, the Accession Clause contained in Article 2/A of the Consti-
tution does not touch upon compatibility with European law, but rather creates 
the constitutional possibility of transferring the exercise of certain competencies. 
It does not refer to the issue of supremacy of European law over Hungarian 
legal order, and most definitely not to the formers' relation to the Constitution 
and its respective supremacy. 
Given that the Companies Act will be repealed by the entering into force of 
the new company law, the proceedings are likely to be halted. 
3. In another case members of parliament turned to the Constitutional 
Court regarding the amendment of Act LVIII of 2001 on the central bank. The 
amendment changed the rules concerning the nomination of members of the 
monetary board, dividing the right to nominate between the president of the 
National Bank and the prime minister. The petitioners do not claim that the 
amendment conflicts with the Hungarian Constitution's provisions on the central 
bank in Article 32/D, but they claim that the change is in direct conflict with 
the TEC's Article 108, which in their interpretation mandates the absolute 
independence of central banks in member states. Petitioners further request 
that the Constitutional Court, before rendering a verdict turn, to the ECJ with a 
preliminary question concerning the issue of compatibility. 
Here the Hungarian Constitutional Court must again decide on the compati-
bility of Hungarian law with European law, even though the Constitution does 
not proscribe anything concerning the primacy of European law. As unlike the 
regular courts the Hungarian Constitutional Court only and exclusively decides 
on the basis of the Constitution, and does not consider the whole of Hungarian 
law nor the European law that has become part of Hungarian legal order as a 
consequence of the Accession Treaty 's-Act XXX of 2004-Article 2 or the 
acquis, its verdict must be based on the Constitution alone. Unconstitutionality 
can therefore only be determined if a Hungarian legal act is in conflict with the 
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Hungarian Constitution. In the case of conflict regular courts naturally have 
no qualms about applying European law based on the primacy of Community 
law. But for the Constitutional Court the situation is different. 
4. Though in the professional literature there have been proponents of the 
view that based on the ECJ's practice European law is even above the member 
states' constitutions'-and this is reinforced by the TCE's Article I-6-the signifi-
cance of the issues is too great to be decided merely by an interpretation of the 
TCE Article 1-6. In our opinion such a fundamental issue of principle can only 
be decided by the member states' constitutions themselves, they are the only 
ones who can decide to raise European law above themselves. It is only the 
Constitution itself which can constitute a public power above itself.' This 
presumes, however, that the public power and its legal order stand even above the 
Hungarian constitutions, above the member states' constitutions, since European 
law cannot be measured by the constitutional standards of the member states. 
Especially not since they were not created for this policy objective, thus 
the comparison with them is a conceptual non-sequitur. It is also practically 
impossible to expect that European law be compatible with national constitu-
tions since-assuming a subordinate position-this would enable Constitutional 
Courts to "tear apart" European law as they see fit (by declaring it incompatible 
with their respective constitutions). Though the idea of European law being 
above the constitutions (its priority over them), is clearly deducible from the 
ECJ's practice, and the TCE's Article 1-6 also contains this point unequivocally 
now, based on the presentation of the previously analysed Constitutional Court 
practices and the member states' constitutional courts' reservations about this, 
a clear situation in this regard could only emerge if the Hungarian Constitution 
were to be amended in a way that unequivocally states that European law is 
above the Constitution. Due to the TCE's explicit declaration on the issue settling 
this matter up cannot be delayed any longer. 
5. Given the lack of an explicit regulation in the Constitution the situation is 
by no means simple. 
1
 Horváth. Z.-Ódor, В.: Az Európai Unió Alkotmánya [The Constitution of the 
European Union], Budapest, 2005. 80; based on the Convention 's text the problem was 
previously brought up by: Czuczai, J.: Utószó. In: Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás hazánk 
EU-csatlakozása küszöbén [Legislation, application of law before the EU-Accession|. 
Budapest. 2003. 150. 
2
 See Vörös, I.: Az EU-csatlakozás alkotmányjogi: jogdogmatikai és jogpolitikai aspek-
tusai [Constitutional law: legal dogmatic and legal policy aspects of the EU-Accession[. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny 57 (2002) 397. 
THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF THE TCE ON THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL ORDER 3 2 9 
5.1. One probable scenario in the first of the two cases outlined above is 
that the Constitutional Court will conclude that the directive's faulty trans-
position is an unconstitutional failure to act and will thus-in addition to declaring 
the respective statute unconstitutional and repealed-obligate the lawmaker to 
fulfil its legislative duties and by a specific deadline create a new regulation 
that is compatible with European law. 
According to the Constitution currently in force, declaring unconstitutionality 
cannot be based on Article 2/A, but only on the Constitution's Article 7(1), which 
prescribes the compatibility of Hungarian law with international law. Referring 
to this paragraph would be in order in as far as the Accession Treaty in itself is 
an international legal treaty, and should therefore in principle be compatible 
with the law that is subject to constitutional review. European law itself, 
however, which through Article 2 of the Accession Treaty continuously keeps 
seeping into Hungarian law (for instance through the adoption of directives/-
framework law by European lawmakers), does not qualify as international law.3 
The possibility of direct conflict with the Hungarian Constitution does not 
even arise, as the given Hungarian statute is not in direct conflict with the 
Accession Treaty (international law), but only indirectly through the European 
law that flows in as a result of the treaty. Given the lack of a rule concerning 
primacy, the first example of case law introduced above poses a poses a real 
theoretical-dogmatic challenge to the Hungarian Constitutional Court. 
5.2. But the second case is by no means an easy bit to chew for the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, either. For the reasons cited above one cannot 
refer to an infringement of the Constitution when one has (or should have) to 
decide on the compatibility with TEC Article 108. In addition, since this is not 
the misimplementation of a directive, the question of a constitutional infringe-
ment caused by a failure to act does not even arise. The legal instruments 
mentioned in the first case (requesting a preliminary ruling from the ECJ in a 
regular court procedure or notifying the Commission to request an intervention 
at the ECJ) are useless in this instance. 
5.3. The cornerstone of the Constitutional Court ' s expected decision will 
be an interpretation of the Constitution's Article 2/A, which according to the 
unanimous opinion of academic literature on the subject is equivocal, badly 
designed and offers a confusing regulation concerning the transfer of 
competencies.4 The two cases could have the consequence of almost provoking 
the creation of rules concerning the issue of primacy between the Constitution 
' See the analysis of European law as a sui generis law distinct f rom international 
law in: Vörös: op. cit. 
4
 See for example Czuczai: Utószó, op. cit. 135. 
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and European law. Such a rule could provide the basis for future decisions of the 
Constitutional Court in similar cases that are likely to arise. As long as there is 
no such rule in the Constitution, in my opinion it is impossible for a law to give 
a mandate to the Constitutional Court to request a preliminary ruling from the 
European Court of Justice (currently such an authorisation does not exist). 
6. Very probably serious difficulties can be expected with respect to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the TCE's Part II. Though the Charter of it is 
compatible with the member states' own constitutional traditions, its significance 
is so massive that it will impact member states' constitutional court practices. 
The problem is that the Hungarian Constitution is well-drafted in the area 
of formulating the basic constitutional right to social security, for instance, It 
contains a sufficiently, but not overly detailed regulation (Constitution Article 
70/E). In its practice the Constitutional Court applies a rather limited inter-
pretation of this regulation and does not consent to the indeterminate, boundless 
expansion of this right (for instance the right to housing). According to the 
Constitutional Court there is no constitutional right for anyone to receive a 
certain type or amount of social provision, either. The right to a social security 
consists on the one hand of the state's obligation to secure the citizens' physical 
existence through social benefits, and on the other hand of organising and 
operating the social insurance/social security system and associated institutions 
42/2000 [(XI. 8.) Decision of the Constitutional Court, ABH 2000. 3291. The 
lawmaker has significant freedoms in determining the concrete content of these 
constitutional obligations and in drafting the corresponding laws, a specific 
vision of these contents is not part of the fundamental right to social security. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights could be likened to a "colourful 
bouquet" consisting of everything, the contents of which have been collected 
by its makers on the great "field" of European fundamental rights. It contains 
all of the imaginable fundamental rights-such as for example the right to 
"good" (?) administrative processing (Article II-101), or the right to "found a 
family" (Article 11-69), which allows for numerous interpretations. The social 
(Article 11-94) and other rights secured by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
go well beyond the member states' constitutions' own conception and funda-
mental rights content. 
This is not a problem in itself since the Charter-as pointed out above-can 
only be applied in the context of implementing Union law and in harmony with 
the member states' common constitutional traditions. This limitation only 
applies, however, if the Charter recognises a fundamental right derived from 
common traditions [Article 11-112 (4)]. In any case, some of the Charter of 
Fundamental Right's formulations approximate political declarations and-no 
matter how noble they may be-they are often oblivious of the social and 
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economic policy realities. Therefore, as a consequence of the increasing presence 
and appearance of the European context in the fundamental rights issue, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights could have an undesired compulsory effect on 
the member states' constitutional court practice as well. 
It is a requirement according to the principles of rule of law and due process 
that the TCE's text be useful for real application: a formulation that is 
reminiscent of a political declaration is very difficult to predict in terms of the 
consequences it engenders. 
II. The problems of lawmaking 
1. For legislators in the member states future problems may not only stem from 
the faulty transposition of a directive or a future framework law, but they may 
even arise from a faultless transposition. 
1.1. The European law's sui generis nature manifests itself in the sources of 
law as well, since the directive-in terms of its content-cannot be considered a 
"true" source of law from the vantage point of continental European conception 
of the law, or from the perspective of lawmaking. The European state formation 
resulting from integration is an institution that is conceptually closely tied to the 
law-it mirrors the novelty of the "Staatenverbund", its incomprehensibility and 
unfathomable nature in terms of traditional constitutional law and sources of law 
categories. 
1.2. If we talk of a "Staatenverbund" and boldly stop ourselves from 
demanding traditional criteria of statehood, then of course it will be under-
standable and easily acceptable that there are institutions among the sources of 
law that (while prescribing legislative obligations to the member states) are in 
themselves in legal technical terms nothing more than-severed from the 
constitutional context above-a guiding working paper or a draft. 
But the directive/framework law cannot be separated from the process of 
creating a historically unique state formation. This is exactly what it corresponds 
to, what it reflects. More specifically its sui generis peculiarity, namely that is 
mixed: in part and fundamentally it develops on an intergovernmental basis, 
but the supranational elements are growing. In other words their proportion 
changes in the course of permanent, continuous evolution. 
One of the basic areas of development is continuous legal harmonisation: 
it is no surprise therefore that in the areas characterised by intergovernmental 
co-operation-if these areas can at all be separated, probably only on a theoretical 
level, of course-the indirect European lawmaking, legal harmonisation through 
directives/framework laws, plays a fundamentally important role. 
332 IMRE VÖRÖS 
The contradiction therefore, between the working paper as a source of 
law, its legal character, is only apparent: substantively it is a working paper, 
but legally it is a binding instrument requiring legislation. This is exactly the 
peculiarity that adequately portrays, mirrors this particular European integration 
attempt; it is a good expression of the legal taxonomy and source of law 
manifestation of this odd mix of intergovernmental and supranational elements. 
1.3. The directive's/framework law's source of law character remains 
unchanged in the TCE [Article 1-33 (1)] as compared to TEC Article 249. The 
framework law is itself a legislative act that sets binding objectives for all member 
states but leaves the choice of tools and forms of fulfilment up to them. 
1.4. The ECJ very rarely requires the verbatim transposition of directives 
(Case C-339/87. Commission v. Netherlands [1990] ECR 1-851. Points 26-28). 
In practice directives are published with such content that the lawmakers in 
the member states hardly have any wiggle room in freely choosing the tools 
and forms of complying with them. Legislators are in effect often compelled to 
just take the text of the directive and use it without the slightest modification, 
which can have rather adverse effects for the member states' law in terms of 
taxonomy. But of course it is also true that the bureaucracies in the member 
states' ministries tend towards investing the least amount of work possible in 
fulfilling the task of drafting legislation. 
1.5. The constant modifications resulting from transposition distort the given 
member state's original legal policy and dogmatic approach because elements 
that are alien to the system disrupt the thought process underlying the. The 
transposition lead to such a confused mass of legal regulations that are to some 
degree determined by member states', and in some part by European legal 
policy considerations. 
As these are not even remotely identical-in fact the directives become 
necessary to ensure that the European legal policy ideas are enforced in the 
member states' legal orders-the law originally based on a coherent, uniform 
legislative concept falls apart into several, often clearly distinct parts. This 
increasing internal inconsistency growing over time makes it harder for the 
law to be applied by member state courts and other authorities, not to mention 
the fact that it becomes harder for those addressed by the law-natural and legal 
persons-to voluntarily shape their behaviour to comply voluntarily with the 
requirements of the law. 
Before our very eyes the insurance act or our act on international private 
law fall apart, for instance, as a consequence of the Hungarian legislators' 
compulsory activities. 
2. But the European lawmaker can also cause numerous problems: I refer 
to the guidelines and notices issued by European authorities and agencies. These 
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notices, etc., naturally lack a legally binding force, they "merely" inform the 
"subjects" in the name of the agency how the agency will proceed in applying 
the statute. 
2.1. The Directorate-General for Competition is especially active in 
implementing competition law, which affects the "heart" of European economic 
law and its most important issues. It did not only issue a statement on minor 
cartels, but also provided guidelines concerning block exemptions, which is 
of fundamental importance with respect to cartel prohibition; the guidelines 
pertained to EC Regulation 2790/1999 on block exemptions in respect of 
vertical restrictions of market competition, as well as to EC regulation 1/2003, 
which is the backbone of community competition law." The bureaucracies' 
astounding practice then multiplies, the various documents feed on each other: 
they issue notices on modifying previous notices.... 
2.2. Two officials argued for instance in the professional literature that the 
"guideline" issued in connection with EC Regulation 1/2003 is necessary as it 
takes up certain questions concerning which there had been no consensus at 
the time the regulation was drafted, and thus they could not be integrated into 
the legal text6 . . .-but the office will nevertheless (!) proceed on the basis of the 
guideline and apply Community law correspondingly! The extensive guidelines 
and notices often do not adhere to the requirements applied to the statute, but 
rather correspond in terms of content to the administrative/public administra-
tion law and administrative instructions issued to subordinated bodies.7 
2.3. The TCE Article 1-33 (1), last phrase integrates this practice into the 
European constitution and thus endows it with the rank of a constitutional 
institution. It states that legislative acts termed "recommendations" and "opinions" 
by the TCE do not have binding force. This naturally fails to resolve the problem 
what it is that they exactly "have". But making these papers part of the TCE 
also makes it impossible to attack the practices in the ECJ on the grounds of 
"European unconstitutionality". Theoretically such a complaint would be 
possible with reference to the rule of law so often and emphatically referred to 
in the TCE, if the subject of "unconstitutionality" were not enshrined in the 
European constitution itself. 
5
 As a cautionary example we point to a list that includes only a minor part: 
Versenyjog [Competition Law], Budapest, 2004. 291-292. 
6
 Hossenfelder. S.-Lutz, M.: Die neue Durchführungsverordnung zu den Artikeln 
81 und 82 EG-Vertrag [The new implementation decree for Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty], Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb. 53 (2003) 125. 
Rittner, F.: Die neuen Guidelines für Vertikalvereinbarungen [The new guidelines 
for vertical agreement]. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 50 (2000) 831. 
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2.4. The publication of such sources of law is in sharp contradiction with 
the Hungarian constitutional approach. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, 
in its 60/1992 (XI. 17.) Constitutional Court decision (ABH, 1992, 275) did not 
even investigate the constitutionality of the circulars, guidelines, and notices 
that had become prevalent in Hungarian legal practice-as tools of anti-demo-
cratic control-under the party dictatorship between 1947-1989, as those do not 
qualify as statutes in the Hungarian legal system according to Act XI of 1987 
on lawmaking. And the Constitutional Court only reviews the constitutionality of 
laws. They are simply not suitable for review by the Constitutional Court. In 
this verdict the Constitutional Court condemned in sharp terms this inherently 
unconstitutional practice embraced by the authorities-but the practice has no 
legal effect at all. From this often-cited landmark decision that is considered a 
key precedent it could be concluded that the authorities have no right to inform 
the addressees about the practices they plan to follow in the future and about 
the factors that inform their decision-making, since they have to apply the law and 
not their own notices. By publishing the decision-making criteria the authorities-
the executive power-really usurps the competencies of the legislative power-
without adequate legal authorisation to do so, of course. 
2.5. The situation is the same in European law: issuing notices and guidelines-
recommendations and opinions according to the TCE's Article 1-33 (1) last 
phrase and Article 1-35 (3)-brings the danger that the Union authorities will 
replace the European legal acts and legal order with their own interpretation-
which extends far beyond legal application-and thus with this mere publication 
influence the behaviour of addresses as if they had issued quasi-legal acts. 
Thus lawmaking and the application of the law become mixed up and the 
separation between two distinct branches of power become blurred. This is a 
serious violation of the democratic principle of separation of powers. (This is 
exactly how Rittner assesses the practices concerning community competition 
law.8) 
This European constitutional law phenomenon seriously undermines the 
basic principle and concept of rule of law (the rule of law as an "area of 
freedom, security and justice") as it is currently laid down in TEU Article 6, 
enshrined as a basic value in the TCE preamble and in Article 1-2, and formulated 
as a key Union objective in Article 1-3 ( 1) of the TCE. This phenomenon violates 
the constitutional principle of rule of law because it seriously endangers and 
violates due process in the Union. The reverse side of the coin only serves to 
8
 Rittner, F.: Das neue europäische Kartellrecht: bürokratische Netze statt Herrschaft des 
Gesetzes? [The New European Cartel Law: Bureaucratic Webs instead of Rule of Law?] 
Orientierungen zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik. 2004. 
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underline our concerns. It was precisely the ECJ which quite resolutely espoused 
the position that the member states' authorities' "circulars"-which in the given 
case were compatible with the directive, by the way-could not be placed on 
the same level as the implementation of a directive and that the implementation 
could not be replaced by or "redeemable" with such a document.9 In this 
decision the ECJ pointed out that an authority's practice that was compatible 
with the directive could be easily modified, while-moreover-such a "circular" 
lacked the transparency and publicity required by the rule of law. 
From the above one could arrive at the conclusion that the "recommen-
dations" and "opinions" raised to constitutional level by the TCE are neither 
compatible with the rule of law, which is considered one of the core values 
and basic objectives of the EU and the European legal order, nor with the 
constitutional requirement of due process, as derived from the rule of law. The 
TCE's inconsistent, internally contradictory regulation in this regard can exert 
a negative effect on the Hungarian Constitution and constitutional thinking. The 
Hungarian authorities' aforementioned practice is gravely unconstitutional in 
itself; but if they themselves were to issue recommendations in reference to 
community competition law based on EC Regulation 1/2003, for instance, then 
according to TCE Article 1-33 (1) they would proceed lawfully and constitu-
tionally, but at the same time they would violate the TCE's Preamble, its 
Articles 1-2 and 1-3, as well as the Hungarian Constitution. Given the TCE's 
adopted text we cannot offer any solutions to this problem, but we thought it 
was important to draw attention to it. 
III. The legal dogmatic and taxonomic problems of European law 
as a branch of law 
1. A significant portion of the problems outlined above undoubtedly have their 
origins in broader contexts. The introduction in part I of this study of the need, 
in fact burning necessity, of creating the TCE-and of the related developments-
in some sense "advanced" the notion that the European constitutional legislators 
not only wanted to quantitatively amass the "Treaties" constituting primary 
European law into a unitary framework, but that they wanted to created 
something qualitatively novel. One key goal was to achieve clarity, to get rid 
of the confusions and overlaps. At the same time the TCE seeks to further 
develop integration, the Union undoubtedly makes a leap forward towards 
9
 Case C-315/98. Commission v. Italian Republic [19991 ECR 1-8001. 
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developing the political union (for example limiting the veto right, dual majority 
and strengthening the role of the European Parliament). 
The need for a quality summation is not formulated with regards to European 
legal order, though it appears that there would be great need for it. On the 
remaining pages we will attempt to address the question of what European 
law is, as the basic law of which the European constitutional legislators have 
drafted, adopted and recommended to the member states for adoption the TCE? 
What is European law in terms of taxonomy and the branch of law it belongs to? 
What are we talking about when we refer to European or Union law? 
2. It is true that the subdivision and classification of this field of law and 
legislation can still be regarded as an open issue. The problems already begins 
with the concepts in EU law/EC law, the lack of a basis for distinguishing 
Union law and Community law. 
The professional literature seeks to bridge the problem by assuming that 
Community law is the sum of first pillar laws, while Union law consists of 
the laws in the second and third pillars."1 Correspondingly, one could talk of 
Union law narrowly understood (as law enshrined in the second and third 
pillars), or Union law more broadly, which would comprise both Union law 
narrowly understood and Community law (in this interpretation Union law 
broadly understood would obviously be a cover concept devoid of real content). 
The confusion is increased rather than mitigated by the fact that the TCE 
itself uses the terminus technicus "Union's law" [e.g. Article 1-9 (3)]. 
Considering the fact that next to the unclear terms "European law"/"EU 
law'V'EC law" other terms have began to spring up, such as for instance 
"Community/European company law", "Community/European competition 
law",11 European economic law,12 or "European private law"-which even boasts 
its own journal-we need to ask the following question. 
How can the continuously expanding, ever larger and irrepressibly growing 
legislation be systematised and interpreted as legislation, or maybe even as a 
separate branch of law? The question is evident: are the criteria and conceptual 
framework of a traditional branch of law still useful in this case; and if yes, then 
with what content? 
10
 See for example Schweitzer, M.-Hummer , W.: Europarecht [European Law], 5lh 
edition. Berlin. 1996. 
" e.g. Mestmäcker, E.-J.-Schweitzer, H.: Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht [European 
Competition Law], 2nd edition. München. 2004. 
'"Zach. R.: Grundzüge des Europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts [Fundamentals of European 
Economic Law]. 2nd edition. Zürich. 2005. 
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What does the concept of "European law" mean today and especially after 
the drafting and adoption of the TCE (regardless of the ratification process and 
the results of the referenda)? 
Let us consider some examples. 
Regulations in the European Community company law aim to secure the 
legal safeguards for the exercise of the basic freedom to settle and start business 
anywhere; thereby they protect and maintain the unity of the internal market 
from this perspective. The primary legal policy purpose of European company 
law therefore is not the codification of all company types (for example the 
form of a public limited-liability company). 
Community competition law does not move within the traditional frame-
work of competition law/competition law: the objective of its legal policy is 
not to protect the freedom of competition from attempts to curb it, but primarily 
to protect, maintain and secure the unity of the internal market. The ECJ's 
well-known verdict in Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt13 addresses this issue 
specifically. 
2.1. Initially the European integration process was geared towards creating 
a customs union, then an internal market, and then with time it moved further 
to envision achieving economic union. The continual progress, realisation and 
deepening of the economic union, especially the creation of the common 
currency, increasingly shifted the economic/commercial law character of the 
integration process into the direction of political union. This inevitably 
brought to the forefront and strengthened the public law and constitutional 
aspects of integration-which had been present in traces already at the outset. 
Though the legislation customarily referred to as EU institutional law was 
characterised by strong constitutional features from the beginning on, and the 
concept of "European constitutional law" popped up as well,14 it was hardly 
possible to identify a separate constitutional law branch in European law, in 
the sense the term is traditionally understood in nation-state/member state 
law. At least not if we see the criteria of traditional legal branches in the 
homogeneity of the subject matter of regulation and the method of regulation. 
2.2. The difficulties begin already with the fact the European law is not 
the legal order of a state, but of-for a lack of a better word-what the German 
Constitutional Court has termed "Staatenverbund". Even today this is an 
unprecedented experiment in European history whose objective is to create a 
sui generis European economic and political union. As the polity itself cannot 
be dogmatically, and from a state theory perspective, be identified with a 
13
 Case C-14/68 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1. 
' Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, op. cit. 
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traditional state in terms of legal dogma or state theory, its legal order cannot 
be understood in the traditional nation-state/member state categories either. 
The two types of legal policy approaches and objectives are too different. 
The more or less dominant theoretical approach that considers the EU an 
autonomous legal order l7-and holds that European law is neither nation-state 
nor international law but a sui generis legal order-makes such an interpre-
tation, categorisation and systématisation impossible in any case. 
3. The EU legal order and its further development was first based on the 
establishment of economic union and was then increasingly driven by the goal 
of creating political union. This determines the legislation's dual policy 
objectives and dual nature. Correspondingly-in a somewhat simplified manner-
the economic union's legal policy objectives were geared towards the achieve-
ment and preservation of a single internal market. 
The creation, maintenance and further development of political union, 
however, was (again somewhat simplified) determined by the legal policy 
objective that sought to determine at each stage the respective proportions of 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism-always with respect to the current 
social/political possibilities, needs and necessities. 
3.1. The difficulty of the problem is exemplified by the structure of the 
various monographs dealing with European law. The comprehensive treatises 
simply put the European legislation side-by-side, but quietly acknowledge that 
this legislation in reality more or less develops based on the possibilities 
offered by everyday politics, by the perspectives current political considera-
tions bring to the issue. Its formation, development, expansion and content are 
determined by political will formation, the ability to find consensus. The result 
is that it develops not with the systematic/dogmatic conceptions of a unified 
nation-state, but more as a patchwork, thus to a significant degree dependent 
on chance. 
One cannot expect European law to have an immanent system quality-with 
the taxonomic quality that is present in the national legal orders of nation-
states-a real, overarching conception of legal branches that is composed of 
different legal branches. 
Let us consider some other examples! 
The "Handbuch des EG-Wirtschaftsrechts"16 edited by Dauses and Zäch's 
previously mentioned „Grundzüge des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts"17 are 
15
 Vörös: op. cit. III. 3.3. 
' Dauses, M. (ed.): Handbuch des EG-Wirtschaftsreclits [Manual of EC Economic 
Law). München, 2002. 
17
 Zäch: op. cit. 
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just as incapable of realising their undertaking without exploring the so-called 
institutional/organisational law-that is the constitutional aspects par excellence-
as Nicolaysen's work on the same legislation18, which carries the subheading 
"European Integration Constitution" itself. The same constitutional issues (among 
others) are discussed in the standard work by Craig-de Búrca, which none-
theless bears the title "EU Law".19 
3.2. Designating the field of law as sui generis may be appropriate, but 
cannot conceal the fact that the scientists who came up with the term 'sui generis' 
had no clue themselves as to what is that they are talking about. Developing 
the contours of political union and stabilising it specifically requires that the 
concept be endowed with specific meaning. 
From the diverse studies, monographs and analyses on the subject it 
becomes increasingly apparent that a tripartite division is becoming generally 
accepted. 
a) First: the history of integration; the legal dogmatic and legal policy founda-
tions of European law and its characteristic features, as well the concept of 
European law as unified Union law. 
b) Second: the two major part of European law today: the institutional/orga-
nisational law (institutions, structure, operation, lawmaking, legislation) and 
the so-called "substantive" law (e.g. competition law, company law, public 
procurement law, penal law). 
c) Third: the Union policies. 
Such a tripartite division illustrates at least that today a monograph on 
European law can no longer be just a mass of ten chapter on positive laws lined 
up next to each other. The reasons are threefold. 
For one, European law has to reflect the dual legal policy objectives of 
preserving and further developing economic and political union, which one 
cannot expect from the legal order of a nation-state, especially since that is not 
even its legal policy function. This consideration suggests that we ought to 
use the greatest caution possible when using traditional categories of legal 
branches, such as for instance European "private law", "competition law", 
"company law", "penal law" or even "constitutional law". The sui generis content 
of European law and its characteristic features-including its structure and 
categories-are determined by integration and its specific legal policy objectives. 
These legal policy objectives-let us reiterate this-cannot be described (without 
lx
 Nicolaysen, G.: Europarecht. Die Europäische Integrationsverfassimg [The European 
Integration Constitution]. 2ml edition, Baden-Baden, 2002. 
19
 Craig, P.-de Burca, G. (eds.): EU Law. Oxford, 2003. 
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the danger of causing confusion) with reference to the content of the nation-
states'/member states' legal systems. 
The distinction drawn between Community law and Union law also in-
creasingly appears artificial, and with the conclusion of the TCE's ratification-
that is if it is successfully concluded in every member states-it will become 
outmoded. Regardless of the TCE's actual fate European law must be presented 
and systematised in dogmatic unity. The excessive overlaps between TEU and 
TEC also serve to underline this requirement. 
Secondly, the well-known distinction between "institutional" and "substantive" 
law is also becoming increasingly questionable. 
The institutions constitute the EU's constitutional, more precisely its 
administrative law foundations and structure, naturally including the lawmaking 
and legislative system. 
But the "substantive" law can no longer be simply reduced to the law on 
the internal market-in other words to the legal guarantees concerning the 
four fundamental freedoms-either. Obviously the four fundamental freedoms 
constitute the absolute core of the EC, whose legal regulation and safeguarding-
from common trade policy to rights to subsidies-far extends beyond merely 
maintaining the internal market narrowly understood and the prevention of 
market distortions. The legislation created in this context-the "law" of the internal 
market-is not "substantive" law, but a more or less coherent sui generis field 
of law, codified around the four fundamental freedoms and following its own 
particular legal policy objectives. 
"European" competition law, public procurement law, company law or 
the law concerning state subsidies all give legal form to different aspects of 
maintaining, safeguarding and protecting a single internal market; they formulate 
the categorical imperative and legal guarantee of the free movement of goods, 
services and capital, as well as the freedom to settle, countering potential state 
or corporate efforts to distort or inhibit said freedoms. In terms of their legal 
policy context and their objectives, the regulations concerning European company 
law (European Economic Interest Groupings, European Public Limited-Liability 
Company), can be much better understood as implementing executive regulations 
of TEC Article 43-that is the free movement of persons and settlement, as well 
as the safeguarding of the freedom of services-rather than as a form of some 
"real" nation-state commercial law's codification of company law. 
From the above it appears to follow that the use of a "European" private 
law, economic law or trade law category would be rather problematic. 
Finally, an open question still remains: what should happen to the various 
policies in terms of legal dogmatic-where should one put the common first 
pillar trade policy, for example? The strong market protection/administrative 
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aspects of this policy are obvious. But what about the second and third pillars? 
A common trade policy, with its legal policy orientation towards protecting 
the market, its legal/administrative set of tools, as well as its economic diplo-
macy competencies (WTO, etc.) undoubtedly belong to internal market "law". 
The other two pillars belong to traditionally understood public law issues. 
But in light of the above the division of European law into "private law" and 
"public law" seems like a rather dubious experiment that I would caution 
anyone from engaging in. Such a division would be extremely unlikely to have 
a convincing legal dogmatic basis, as it would say or express nothing regarding 
the EU's previously often emphasised own and specific legal policy objectives. 
4. In my opinion European law could be divided into a general part and a 
special part. These categories obviously do not correspond to a nation-state's 
legal system's traditional conceptual criteria concerning general and special 
parts. 
The general part would deal with the historical development of integration, 
as well as the foundations and objectives of the EU's social, economic and 
legal policies. 
The special part can be further broken down into two parts: First into the 
constitutional foundations (institutions and their operation, lawmaking and 
legislation, the legal nature of European law, the second and third pillar policies) 
realising the political union. Secondly, it would incorporate the subpart on the 
legal safeguards for preserving the single internal market and the realisation of 
the economic union which, in a systematic perspective, would summarise these 
safeguards' various aspects and legal institutions embedded in a mutually 
referential context. 
* * * 
In our opinion the presentation of the TCE and the analysis of its effects makes 
it inevitable to take a look at the fate of European law as well. A dogmatic 
rethinking of the European legal system is a task, however, that the Hungarian 
and European legal scholarship and legal practice-including the legislators-
will have to face up to as soon as possible, regardless of the TCE's political 
fate and its substitution with the planned Reform Treaty. 
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The concept became one of the defining notions of international relations when 
in 1987 the Environment and Development World Committee of the UN 
General Assembly published its "Our common future" report outlining the 
chance of a new era of economic growth. An era where economic expansion 
comes together with the preservation of natural resources and at the same time 
brings a solution to the eradication of poverty. Sustainable development is a 
form of development that satisfies the needs of today without endangering the 
chance of future generations to satisfy theirs. 
Sustainable development rests on three basic pillars: social, economic and 
environmental aspects. These must be taken into consideration together, along 
with their interactions when different development programs are constructed, 
uch holistic approach is generally found in human rights discussions and the 
provision of human rights is part of sustainable development as well. One aim of 
sustainable development is to put an end to poverty, to secure social welfare 
for the generations of the present and the future, thus sustainable economic 
development is inconceivable without ensuring social rights. 
The trend of globalization has adverse effects as the competitive liberal 
state, the so-called free market model grants priority to individual achieve-
ments, selfcare and harsh market competition while state involvement is 
minimized and government regulations avoided. This model evolved historically 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, today mostly dominating in the United States. The 
main characteristic of globalization is the unlimited flow of capital, therefore 
globalization favors the spreading of the free market model that grants priority 
to the interests of capital investments. State regulations, administrative 
institutions devoted to the strengthening of social cohesion limit the interests 
of capital. Investors counter such limitations by pulling out capital and moving 
it towards free markets that promise faster returns and greater profit. This is a 
trend that threatens European social states.1 
Among present social structures it would be unimaginable as well as un-
acceptable to pull down the social state while rebuilding the total reign of free 
market competition. This move would not only bring social tensions on a severe, 
unmanageable scale, but would also lead to controversial results within the 
economy. Obviously enough if the state cuts its spending for reasons of 
competitiveness on education for example, then in the long run it can easily 
1
 See Szamuely, L.: A globalizáció és a kapitalizmus két alapmodellje I. és II. 
I Globalization and the Two Basic Models of Capitalism I and II]. Kritika. 31 (2002) 
május és június, http://www.szochalo.hu/index.php?p=news&news_id=2602 and http://www. 
szochalo.hu/index.php?p=news&news_id=2603. 2005. október 5. 
THE CHALLANGES OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION. . . 345 
bring about adverse effects due to the reduced quality of labor, thus further 
eroding overall competitiveness. 
As the above example clearly shows, free market economies do not have 
the necessary self-control mechanisms in place, production and distribution 
of certain "goods" cannot be trusted to the forces of the market. Labor is one 
example of such "goods". Its production requires a great deal of efforts by 
the state in the fields of demographic policy, education and healthcare 
draining significant public spendings. Similarly, sound state commitments are 
necessary for securing long term interests of future generations in environmental 
issues for instance. Sustainable economic development therefore demands a 
well balanced approach to social and environmental aspects, an approach that 
cannot be expected from profit oriented competition on its own, without state 
intervention. 
As a result of the realities of globalization and the requirements of 
sustainable development, convergence of two models, that of the competitive 
state and the welfare state, can be anticipated in the long run. In Europe, 
systems of national economic redistribution need some serious rethinking, but 
instead of elimination, they must be rationalized. Elements of social services 
with potential hindering effects on productivity need to be put aside, while 
means of selfcare should be encouraged including greater involvement of non-
governmental organizations. Besides social solidarity, therefore, in order to 
create good balance, awareness of individual responsibility must also be raised. 
Within economies, globalization translates to the spread of the model of 
the liberal free market state, whereas in a globalizing world resulting in 
mutual interdependence of states, peoples and individuals in the case of social 
trends. The effects of trends in one group of states do not stop at their borders, 
rather end up making the consequences felt in other countries. For the same 
reason the concept of and demand for global governance are voiced, along 
with the strengthening of the roles and rebuilding of the foundations of 
international organizations, particularly the United Nations and its Agencies 
and the international financial institutions. 
Responding to the impacts of globalization, relations between states 
intensify resulting in significant developments in international law. Although 
sovereign states remain primary subjects of international legal procedures, as 
early as the end of 19th century produced international organizations founded 
to facilitate interstate relations on an even more complex scale and playing a 
growingly greater role. One result of globalization in international law is 
"transformed sovereignty": full powers over domestic issues are "limited" by 
international commitments and stand to give way to the power to influence 
decisions made on an international level as the degree of sovereignty. Such 
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capabilities can be increased by self-limiting classic sovereignty and joining 
international organizations. 
Also in response to the challenges of globalization the scope of the rule of 
international law expands rapidly, thus making states cooperate in more and 
more issues of international relations that used to be governed exclusively by 
domestic powers such as respecting human rights and freedoms. They seek 
common solutions to problems out of their reach due to the effects of globali 
zation including the protection of the environment, trans-border crime (drugs 
trafficking), or even filling social gaps such as the struggle against poverty. 
These issues are gaining momentum in the activities of international organi-
zations. 
Globalization itself comprises of several trends with antagonistic effects. 
The penetration of free trade is usually considered its primary source and mani-
festation, thus inducing analysis mainly of its economic dimension. Subsequently 
the relationship between globalization and human rights is primarily approached 
from the aspect of the impact on human rights by international economic 
trends. At the same time the impact on globalization by human rights must also 
be mentioned, as well as those of the revolution in technology and information, 
and not only f rom the perspective of economic development, but also the 
functioning of civil society. 
Globalization and the internationalization of human rights and freedoms 
The ideology of human rights dates back to the formation of bourgeoisie and 
the civil revolutions, when citizens' demands were translated into freedom rights 
in constitutions and other documents of constitutional importance against the 
state and ruling power. Economic development including improvements in 
infrastructure and travel and also expansion of trade intensified not only state-
to-state relations, but also relations among citizens of different states. 
Intensified relations have brought along phenomena and problems driving 
states to solve them together, thus requiring international cooperation and 
international standards of regulation. In the early 20lh century, the impacts of 
economic development reached such an extent that demanded international 
regulation of labor conditions (first that of child and woman labor), leading to 
the foundation of the International Labor Organization in 1919. Premature 
attempts of international human rights regulations included first the protection 
of rights of foreign citizens, later the regulation (prohibition) of issues on an 
international scale, such as slave trade and the trafficking of women, but the 
real driving force towards international law was brought about by the horror of 
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the WWII. By this time the impacts of globalization reached a level of strength 
where it became obvious that no state is entitled to do whatever it wants with 
its own citizens, and that no state can repeatedly ignore human rights without one 
way or another affecting other countries, mostly by posing a threat to inter-
national peace. Therefore internationalization of human rights-namely creation 
and further rapid development of international human rights regulations-can be 
attributed to globalization. Fundamental rights previously set in national constitu-
tions were elevated to the level of international obligations by international 
human rights regulations and later the range of these rights has steadily been 
extended: besides first and second generation of rights, a third generation is 
being debated nowadays. In the wake of the evolution of rights, the sphere of 
those eligible has also expanded. Today, rights protecting every human beings' 
freedoms are considered universal human rights, while their requirements of 
substance include not only the protection of certain freedoms, the restraint of 
the state from intervention, but also rights that require some kind of action from 
the state (the majority-but not exclusively-falling into the cluster of economic, 
social and cultural rights). What 's more, beyond the relations between state 
and its citizen, demands to ensure human rights extend to involve relations 
between one citizen and the other. 
There is even a cluster of human rights that not only became international 
as a result of globalization, but globalization has given birth to them. This latest 
cluster of so-called third generation human rights (in other words "solidarity 
rights"") is viewed by many as "human rights responses given to counter the 
challenges of globalization".3 Today it is not clear which rights belong to this 
group and what exactly their real substance is. Examples are the right to peace 
as a counterbalance against arms race, the right to a healthy environment 
calling attention to the dangers of pollution, therefore the surge in the number 
of challenges of globalization is thickening the catalogue of third generation 
2
 See Mavi, V.: Szolidaritási jogok vagy az emberi jogok harmadik nemzedéke? 
[Solidarity Rights or the Third Generation of Human Rights?] Állam- és Jogtudomány, 
30 (1987-1988) 151-173. Viktor Mavi labels the newest generation of human rights to 
solidarity rights, signing their common background in the solidarity of the people and 
the nations. 
3
 See Kardos, G.: Emberi jogok egy új korszak határán [The New Era of Human 
Rights]. Budapest, 1995.; Chapter II. Gábor Kardos defines the third generation of human 
rights which in his opinion are neither "rights" (since these have no subjective and their 
subject matter is not clear), and these nor create a generation of rights (since there is no 
adequate coherence between them) as a human rights response to global problems. 
Common in these rights the attemption to relocate, synthetize, and adopt the global 
challenges into the system of human rights. 
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human rights. Nowadays such rights are only in their early stages emerging as 
solutions to global problems, raising talk about the right to develop and the 
right to sustainable development. 
These rights cannot be fully realized within the boundaries of one state, nor 
can they, or elements of them, be interpreted —or it is difficult to do so—as 
subjective rights of the individual against the state. On the other hand they 
must be considered when discussing individual rights: when the right to health 
is debated, the "right to a healthy environment" may also be taken into con-
sideration. 
The relationship between globalization and human rights and freedoms is 
not a one-direction route: just as globalization has had its effect on human 
rights (making some international, while bringing about others), they have 
affected globalization by making human rights universal and by human rights 
fostering globalization of civil society. 
1. Universality of human rights 
Universality of human rights and freedoms can be interpreted in several ways. 
Distinction may be made on the basis of the universality of forming norms, as 
well as the universality of their implementation.4 Creating norms of human 
rights under UN statutes is universal in the sense that all UN member states 
may take part in the debates leading to the wording of draft agreements. State 
approval of such norms, however, is a great deal less common, meaning a lot 
fewer states ratify them to be equally binding, while their universality further 
diminishes when we look at everyday practice or the implementation of those 
norms. Universality, therefore, applies to the creation of norms, but not to the 
realization and the respect of human rights. 
Taking into account its philosophical background the universality of human 
rights primarily means that every human being regardless of race, sex, color, 
religion and any other belief, origin, wealth and so on is entitled to such rights 
independently from the region, country, social system they may live in. Since 
the idea of basic human rights emerged from Western ideological concepts of 
the !700's (mainly that of enlightenment and natural law) and since regulations 
of Western and European legal systems are believed to be the most sophisticated 
representatives, other civilizations (mainly developing countries) frequently argue 
that human rights are products of the West and its cultural imperialism, thus 
aimed at nothing, but to impose Western cultural achievements and political 
4
 See Van Reenen, P.: A Culture 's Reeeptiveness for Human Rights; A Preliminary 
Sketch of a Conceptual Framework. In: SIM Special. No. 21. 591-608 . 
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and social philosophies on Third World countries. Such countries commonly 
praise cultural relativism over the universality of human rights. 
Tensions between universality and cultural relativism highlights the fact 
that besides globalization, symptoms of fragmentation are also present in inter-
national affairs. This is apparent in the relationship between universality and 
regionalism concerning human rights. 
Globalization is driven by mutual interconnections, while enhancing them 
in the meantime. The principle of human rights being mutually interdependent 
is only one aspect as it is evident that human rights and various generations of 
human rights are linked so closely to one another that disregard for one of the 
rights deprives the benefits of another. It is equally important to point out that 
human rights cannot be thoroughly enjoyed in any corner of the world with 
mass human rights violations elsewhere. As the threat it poses to world peace 
may seem obvious, human floods of refugees often induce large-scale tensions 
"exporting" legal offences from the countries of origin. Recipient or target 
countries then come under enormous public pressure as social welfare systems 
become compromised, inhuman conditions in refugee camps make it to the 
headlines and acts of racism and intolerance become more and more frequent. 
Such close links often manifest in the interaction of cultures. The western 
legal culture and human rights philosophies focus on individualism and 
historically argue in favor of rights rather than duties, whereas non-Western 
societies traditionally emphasize obligations to the community over individual 
freedoms. As a consequence of a better understanding between cultures, non-
Western approaches may eventually acknowledge a new, complex set of 
individual choices and obligations and also Western philosophy may incoiporate 
collective duties.5 The impacts of Buddhism have already appeared in Western 
thinking as reflected in environmentalists' attitudes to the rights of future 
generations. The idea of collective duties towards the greater community is 
getting more attention as recognition of economic and social rights is es-
tablished, although providing these rights remain the responsibilities of social 
solidarity (by for example means of social redistribution and NGO efforts). 
Western countries could serve as examples for successful adoption and vindi-
cation of economic and social rights alongside with civil and political principles. 
These examples prove that individual rights and freedoms-often labeled as 
creations of the West-can peacefully coexist with collective norms and accepting 
the value of individualism allows for reconciliation with the solidarity found 
among citizens. Of course, liberal views have long nodded at society's common 
See Pollis, A.: Towards a New Universalism; Reconstruction and Dialogue. Nether-
hinds Quarterly of Human Rights. 16 (1998) 5 - 2 3 . 
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boundaries of individual freedoms and acts; even the concept of social contract 
outlines rights to be valid within the community. Freedoms are not at all limitless 
in modern international law as it is clearly highlighted in human rights decla-
rations: in the case of civil and political rights the interests of society and the 
need to protect the rights of fellow citizens justify certain forms of restrictions 
with various extent. Upon imposition of such limitations the countries' unique 
social and cultural features may also be taken into consideration. 
Human rights universality does not contradict the idea of diversity among 
societies and cultures, as universality is never intended to mean uniformity.6 
Nor can it mean cultural uniformity, as human rights only draw a bottom line 
in the minimum conditions for individual and collective well-being.7 Universality 
sets certain fundamental values inalienably entitled to all members of the 
human family based on their biological and social needs and musts. Such values 
include life (free of fear and suffering), basic health and human dignity. Human 
rights represent exactly these values, although their actual manifestation and 
effect may vary from one culture to another. Human rights philosophies have 
two principal cornerstones: prohibition of discrimination and tolerance that is 
respect for the rights of others. All in all universality should be viewed in the 
light of these two fundamental principles and values, as it tolerates every culture 
unless it ignores basic human rights-values treasured by an overwhelming 
majority of civilizations. 
2. The effects of economic globalization on human rights performance 
In general, globalization is attributed to the impacts of certain economic factors, 
namely the liberalization of market interests and world trade. Economic factors 
on the other hand bave a great influence on attitudes to human rights. In the 
case of economic, social and cultural rights there is a more or less direct 
correlation as the state's capabilities to implement corresponding and necessary 
government actions are limited by its economic conditions. The concept is 
present in numerous international agreements, primarily in the Universal Decla-
See Kuitcnbrouwer, M.: Perspective on the Huntington Debate 574. In: To Baehr 
in our minds: essays on Human rights from the heart of the Netherlands. Bulterman, 
Mielle 1998. SIM Special; no. 21. 
Follows from the peculiarity of the international regulation of human rights that it does 
not aim to achieve uniformity since it is subsidiary and defines a minimum assumption 
of human rights. 
See Freeman, M.: Human Rights and Real Cultures: Towards a Dialogue on 
'Asian Values'. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights. 16 (1998) 25-39 . at 37. 
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ration of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, allowing states to allocate 
dedicated resources within their financial limits. This close relationship works 
only in one direction though; hence protecting human rights requires a certain 
level of economic development, whereas high industrial output lacking further 
political will and action does not necessarily mean effective human rights 
responses. It is generally true that providing all the economic, social and cultural 
rights puts an enormous budgetary pressure on the state, although some rights 
of this sort, for example the right to form labor unions costs significantly less 
than others, of course practically even these expenses are pushed over to the 
private sector, mainly to business units as employers. Also true, that certain 
civil and political rights claim a bigger portion of the budget cake as does the 
court system enabling fair legal protection or the voting process in democratic 
elections-the costs of democratic institutions as a whole. With regard to mutual 
interconnection of human rights, the conclusion may be drawn that since the 
two major groups of freedoms can only be provided together with one another, 
there is a minimum level of economic development and resources essential for 
providing full-scale human rights coverage. Consequently, trade liberalization 
and integration, if healthy for economic growth, can have a positive impact on 
the realization of human rights. 
Another aspect of the relationship between human rights and the economy 
is the way everyday human rights practices influence the economy. Deprivation 
of classic rights can in the long run lead to economic recession, as seen among 
the countries of the former communist block, market stability on the other hand-
on both national and international level-presumes political stability, which 
in the end relies on a basic standard of civil and political rights conditions. 
Realization and practice of these rights have proved inseparable from those of 
economic, social and cultural rights; realization of one branch of rights requires 
respect for the other on the basis that neither of the branches is superior or 
more important (theory of mutual interdependence among human rights). A 
successfully completed economic liberalization gives way to new centers of 
public administration and decision making with clearly defined functions, 
eventually leading to political liberalization8, and subsequently the new middle 
class can push for improvements in democratic standards.4 Economic growth 
therefore triggers social demands for democratic rights, flawless human rights 
8
 See Monshipouri, M.: The Muslim World Half a Century after the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Progress and Obstacles. Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights, 16 (1998) 287-314. 
' See Huntington. S. P.: A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása [The 
Clash of Civilizations], Budapest, 1998. 320. 
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conditions contribute to political stability, which as a result encourages investors 
fueling business growth after all. 
Political studies found that long-term economic uphill favors degradation 
of traditional or material values (such as work, family, prestige) and a renaissance 
of postmodern, post-material values (such as democracy, human rights and 
protection of the environment). A value shift of this kind has frequently been a 
key factor in democratic consolidation processes in Latin America and Asia. 
The shift is by no means irreversible; following sudden economic downfalls 
even Western societies show signs of revaluation among historic and mundane 
achievements at the expense of democratic values."1 The phenomenon serves 
as a bright example for inseparable and mutually interdependent human rights, 
equally important civil and political and also economic, social and cultural 
freedoms. Attention usually turns to certain abused rights as human life can only 
be complete with the full set of values represented in these human rights. 
Despite such an obvious relationship, economic and social rights are also known 
to boost tax rates and the price of labor thus holding back effectiveness and 
competitiveness, no wonder they are not so much welcome among corporate 
leaders. These issues can be alleviated by the world community's harmonized 
efforts to provide economic and social rights. 
Competitive advantages resulting from an artificially low level of economic 
and social rights, often referred to as social dumping have previously stirred up 
resistance from international organizations. The struggle has always been a 
major driving force behind the development of, among other economic 
institutions of integration, the European Community and the World Trade 
Organization, promoter of worldwide quota liberalization." For the very same 
reasons human rights aspects are starting to take hold in the activities and 
policies of international financial institutions - although in many cases confined 
to rhetorics only.12 
Besides labor conditions, globalization has a rather negative effect on various 
aspects of human rights. Globalization has increased disparities regardless of 
anti-discrimination principles of human rights. Economic and social differences 
have always been there, globalization only made things worse. Social gaps and 
poverty are on the rise and globalization exclusively fruits for very limited 
"' See Kuitenbrouwer: op. cit. 512. 
11
 WTO has already made some undertakings in this direction. See Farkas, О. : AT 
Európai Unió szociális joga és szociálpolitikája [Social Law and Social Policy of the 
European Union], Szeged. 1998. 174. 
12
 See Szentessy, K.: A Világbank és az emberi jogok [The World Bank and Human 
Rights], Acta Humana. 16 (2005) 69-81, 
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fractions of the population, distinctions made on the basis of geographical 
location, income and language used in telecommunication. Urban and rural 
ways of life have come oceans apart and disparities in future prospects divide 
continents not only by the historic trenches between North and South, but 
within the developed world bringing more and more racial discrimination 
along. Particularly hard hit were women in the developing world: besides 
generally accepted achievements mass proportions of women's employment 
have resulted in thousands of underpaid women flooding suburban areas all 
over the developing world. Rootless, hungry and desperate, many end up as 
victims of prostitution or trafficking. Nevertheless, globalization is not always 
a direct cause of brand new human rights abuses, it has simply drawn excess 
attention to previously identified, but long ignored issues." Well in line with 
the principles of global governance, these phenomena have come in the center 
of the attention of international organizations as essential elements of the 
making of political programs. 
Globalization is not only a sum of consequences of business trends, but it is 
indeed influenced greatly by political currents. Market conditions are in the 
hands of politics and the rules of the game are constantly being shaped through 
power talks at both bi and multilateral round tables, such as at the World Trade 
Organization." To identify political dimensions in globalization one has to 
simply remind of the growing number of ideas about global government, 
supporters proposing for extended UN institutional authority to cope with 
global issues. 
Present institutions of the global governing system have in the past been 
selectively sensitive to global issues, most UN agencies have dealt with various 
aspects of development and globalization. Among others, the UN Development 
Program (UNDP) presses that strategic reforms in any economy must coincide 
with an appropriate social welfare policy able to withstand the negative effects 
of market forces. Its 1999 annual overview, the Human Development Report 
stressed out that the institutions of global governing system need to be reoriented 
in order to successfully maintain fairness during international negotiations. 
11
 See Howse, R.-Mutua, M.: Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy. 
Challenges for the World Trade Organization. International Centre for Human Rights 
and Democratic Development. http://www.iehrdd.ca/l 1 l/english/commdoc/publications/ 
globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html 
14
 See Oloka-Onyango, J.-Udagama, D.: The realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights. Preliminary 
report to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13. http://www.unhchr.ch 
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Human rights institutions founded by the United Nations Charter (the 
Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and its sub-com-
missions) often address different issues of globalization, however linked human 
rights bodies show less ambition in doing so. The majority of attention came 
from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In May, 1998 
the Committee turned to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the WTO to implement appropriate methods to probe real public 
impact on human rights brought about by their measures (social monitoring). 
The Committee declared: country reports are evaluated with respect to inter-
national economic policies, which greatly influence a state's capabilities to do 
her duties set forth by the Universal Declaration. In the general comment 
section of the right to food, the Committee addressed the issue of food safety 
affected by globalization, the responsibility of private organizations and the 
obligations of states to properly regulate private and corporate activities, and 
highlighted the stakes involved as international organizations must keep the 
right to food in mind while setting up policies and trying to enforce them.15 
An exceptionally high amount of criticism hits international economic and 
financial institutions from human rights perspectives. Both World Bank and 
the IMF has on several occasions been charged with prescribing structural 
reform projects and shock therapy measures on state budgets, that significantly 
deteriorated the conditions in the population's economic and social rights. 
The WTO has been blamed before for its praise for trade liberalization and 
competitive advantages resulting from cheap labor. As an outcome, critics say, 
Labor Code minimums and social welfare standards decline, causing after 
all, or at least threatening with, downward-harmonization of a sort. In order to 
restore balance, industrial countries and labor unions have urged a so-called 
social clause to be annexed into trade agreements. These steps are not at all 
welcome among developing countries, who see it as covert protectionism of 
the developed. Studies conducted by international economic workshops on the 
other hand show that although some corporate decisions are actually based 
on exploitation-generated low cost advantages, poor or lacking Labor Code 
standards do not attract investments exponentially as many business entities 
anticipate social discontent and unrest along, not mentioning the emerging 
danger of customer boycott. Countless multinational corporations have set 
their own business policies containing additional human rights remarks, much 
encouraged by the governments of industrial nations in case of public procure-
ment procedures for instance. Such initiations can easily confront WTO 
guidelines concerning procurement conditions and the elimination of technical 
15
 Ibid. 
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trade obstacles, thus bringing WTO sanctions. To avoid WTO getting in the way 
of human rights vindication in the process of globalization, experts suggest 
promoting the principle of human rights primacy over any other contractual 
commitments in international law. And if free trade agreements are to be 
reconciled with human rights obligations, steps in human rights development 
will hardly clash with WTO regulations again."1 
Besides certain conceptual issues, international economic and financial 
institutions receive complaints for their formal-organizational structure for 
ignoring human rights principles. Among the insufficiencies in the structure 
such as the dominance of developed countries and a marginal position of the 
developing part of the world in decision making procedures, operational defects 
are also believed to include lack of publicity and transparency and also 
unwillingness to consult with civil groups. One of the establishments that has 
gone farther than others on this way is the World Bank as it started listening to 
what civil societies have had to say and took up pioneering human rights 
conditionality (linking loan commitments to certain human rights conditions). 
The IMF is slightly behind as the Fund only made some progress in information 
availability and is yet to implement all other components of transparency and 
responsibility.17 
During the struggle against the negative effects of globalization there is a 
growing consensus that besides states, international organizations and multi-
national companies should also be held accountable by the world community 
in order for more efficient human rights protection. It is now widely believed 
that states' mandates stretch further than their own international human rights 
obligations in respecting those rights, but they also need to compel all citizens 
and organizations within their jurisdiction to follow the course. At the present 
time the world community faces the unique challenge of multinational business 
activity, which thrives on all the economic benefits of globalization, while 
neglects any pressure to compensate for the disadvantages. All this is a result 
of their overwhelming economic power, which smaller states cannot even 
dream to be a match for, and bigger countries find it just as hard to exercise 
jurisdiction over business units of such mobility. 
In order to keep transnational business activities within the boundaries 
of human rights, in 1999 the UN Secretary-General launched the Global 
Compact program intended to provide a reinforced framework for promoting 
16
 See Allmand, W.: Trading in human rights: The need for human rights sensitivity 
at the World Trade Organization. International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development, http://www.ichrdd.ca/111/english/commdoc/publications/globalAllmand.html 
17
 Oloka-Onyango-Udagama: op. cit. 
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cooperation between the international business community and the UN and to 
directly integrate the efforts of the corporate sector to comply with universal 
human rights norms. According to Global Compact, companies are to lay 
down business policies and internal ethics coherent with international human 
rights and labor law guidelines. The aim is to encourage corporations not only 
to implement respective working and employment conditions for their very 
own colleagues, but also to demand that subcontractors do likewise. They can 
incorporate policy restrictions to exclude investments targeting economic areas 
with disregard to human rights. Corporate giants have by now realized the 
need to take the lead as respect for human rights values has become crucial 
in improving production figures, too. Firstly, increasing consumer awareness 
puts the pressure on market competitors to guarantee their workers' basic human 
rights, as well as environmental and animal treatment minimums. Secondly, 
respect for underlying principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights greatly contributes to the stabilization of a constitutional state, 
creating a more effective, more placid business climate. It is also more and 
more widely believed that staff members work better if contented, thus treated 
with respect and dignity. In investment target and trade partner countries 
promotion of human rights norms serves the best interests of the business 
sector as developed countries have lately been imposing trade sanctions on 
states with contempt for basic rights - sanctions obstructing free trade. Multi-
national companies hope for borderless business opportunities and open markets, 
however these features along with human rights conditions can be improved by 
sponsoring local welfare, healthcare and educational infrastructure or by 
disseminating the concept of human rights and supporting civil groups' efforts.18 
The International Labor Organization has a particularly important role in pushing 
transnational companies to follow such responsible practices, as the ILO's 
tripartite organizational and decision-making system ensure employers' interests 
and experience to be reflected in creating international norms. This way 
"volunteer law-abiding" of transnational organizations (although these norms 
are no more than soft laws) can better be guaranteed.1" 
There is growing demand for companies to demonstrate corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), which goes further than the usual state regulations. Socially 
ls
 See Business and Human Rights: A Progress Report, http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
business.htm 
" S e e Kaponyi. E.: A multinacionális vállalatokra vonatkozó szabályozási kísér-
letek, különös tekintettel az ILO és az OECD deklarációira [Attempts of Regulation 
Relating Multinational Corporations, with a Special Regard to the Declarations of ILO 
and OECD1, Acta Humana, 16 (2005) 52-68. 
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responsible investments essentially mean that in accordance with the requirements 
of sustainable development, social, environmental and ethical aspects are also 
considered. Specialized institutions rate enterprises against non-economic 
criteria, and investors are invited to make their decisions based on these scores. 
In some cases even states support the use of this practice by requiring pension 
funds to declare their investment policies regarding social, ecological and 
ethical aspects.2" Consequently, the conscious citizen sensitive to such aspects 
has a choice to make about which pension fund to opt for and what sort of 
investments to prefer. 
3. The role of human rights in the evolution of the organizations of global 
governance 
As mentioned earlier, several international organizations have made steps in 
order to adjust their activity to comply with human rights requirements. The 
long-anticipated reform of the United Nations aims at strengthening the human 
rights aspect of the solutions to global issues. 
In March 2005 the UN Secretary-General submitted a report for the General 
Assembly on his proposals on how to tackle global issues facing the organi-
zation and the organizational reform necessary for any efficient remedies.21 
The Secretary-General offered a clustered analysis of the most urgent global 
problems and the required response from the side of the international com-
munity along the aspects of development, security and human rights, in other 
words the three freedoms: the freedom from want, the freedom from fear and 
the freedom to live in dignity. In connection with securing lives in dignity, a 
universal enforcement of the protection of human rights became the single 
most important task beside support for the rule of law and the establishment 
and strengthening of democracy. The Secretary-General acknowledged that 
despite the results of creating legal norms, implementation of such norms lacks 
real success. As a consequence, the authority of supervisory bodies monitoring 
human rights must be reinforced, as well as the roles of the human rights high 
commissioner and his or her office in preventing and solving conflicts and in 
supporting the establishment of national capacities of human rights institutions 
must be improved. During everyday practice it has become obvious that human 
rights aspects increasingly need to be taken into account in resolutions with 
20
 See Brunczel, В.: A fenntartható fejlődés egy lehetséges forgatókönyve [A Possible 
Scenario of the Sustainable Development], eVilág. 2 (2004) 13-15. 
21
 See In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. 
Report of the Secretary General. Doc. A/59/2005. 
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impact on international peace and stability even in the Security Council, as 
the integration of human rights aspects ("mainstreaming human rights") on 
all levels of decision-making gains more and more attention. Demonstrating 
the growing importance of the human rights aspects and aims, the Secretary-
General introduced a proposal to reform the Human Rights Council. 
The founders of the UN went on to establish three committees in the line of 
the main UN organs: the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council 
and the Trusteeship Council. The last of the three has lost all of its functions, 
while the Security Council receives criticism over its anachronistic composition, 
making its organizational structure ever more ripe for reforms. According to 
the Secretary-General's proposal the seats of the Security Council must be 
reshuffled and expanded with respect to the principles of representativity and 
legitimity; the coordinative role of the Economic and Social Council must be 
strengthened throughout the world's economic decision-making procedures 
and development cooperations as well as in the dialogues and consultations 
with the organizations of the civil society; to the replace the emptied Trustee-
ship Council, a new Council of Human Rights will have to be created either as 
one of the UN's principal bodies or the as a support mechanism to the General 
Assembly. In contrast to the present Human Rights Council-left with eroded 
credibility as states have tended to struggle for membership not so much to 
promote respect for human rights, but rather to prevent their own human rights 
abuses from being discussed on the agendas or to point a finger at other states-
the new Council would be a smaller and permanent organ, whose members 
could be elected for a definite period of time by a 2/3 majority of the General 
Assembly. 
All in all, the Secretary-General's proposal aims at turning the UN into an 
international organization that does not watch mass scale human rights abuses 
silently, is able and willing to act to promote development, security and human 
dignity in order to achieve global freedom. 
4. The human rights dimension of sustainable development 
The main goal of sustainable development is promoting social welfare within 
the limits of the supportive capabilities of the environment. That means the 
concept of sustainable development can undisputedly be linked to the respect for 
economic and social rights. Keeping the principle of mutual interdépendance 
in mind, these rights cannot be guaranteed without civil and political rights, 
therefore sustainable development involves the strengthening of democratic 
societies respecting civil and political rights. 
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It is a strong argument that among the criteria for sustainability and the 
basic principle of sustainable development, the requirement of subsidiarity is 
also present. As a result of globalization, the levels of decision-making are 
farther and farther from the individual, while the process of decision-making is 
becoming more and more obscure-leading to alienating people from public life 
and politics. The concept of subsidiarity, however, aims at rendering decisions 
back, closer to the levels accessible to people, self-governing systems of local 
communities must also be reinforced. When they get nearer to decision-making, 
people's perception of freedom as well as their sense of responsibility improve. 
The decision-making process relies on a cascade of negotiating interests on the 
levels of larger and larger community structures, and such negotiations ensure 
that various factors of sustainable development, different economic, environ-
mental and social interests are considered and harmonized."" 
In numerous aspects of life, globalization has impacted overall respect of 
human rights in a negative way, particularly by exaggerating inequalities. 
One of the aims of sustainable development is to eliminate such disparities. 
In the struggle against the negative effects of globalization, the role of the 
organizations of civil society and their international cooperation is increasing. 
Helping them in this struggle is the arsenal of essential tools provided by the 
development of information technology-one of the engines of globalization. 
The complete realization of human rights is therefore inseparable from sus-
tainable development. 
" See Gyulai I.: A fenntarthatóság értelmezése és megvalósításának feltételei [Inter-
preting Sustainability and the Conditions of Its Realization]. eVilág, 2 (2004) 8-12. 
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Introduction 
Although during the last thirty years a wider range of evidential tools have be-
come available, witnesses have invariably had a key role in criminal proceedings. 
Witness statements are indispensable to the success of the investigation and 
the trial. The appearance as a witness on subpoena in front of the judicial 
authorities is generally an obligation of a person. Moreover, save in some 
circumstances listed in criminal procedural norms, making a statement is also 
mandatory, and in addition the witness is burdened by the obligation of giving 
a truthful testimony. Otherwise the witness has to face the consequences of a 
breach of this duty (perjury). Being a witness in a criminal case is not at all a 
comfortable position, not only for the above mentioned reasons. 
Many factors have led to increased public attention on the role of witnesses 
in criminal proceedings. Perhaps the two most important issues have been the 
increased interest in the status of victims in criminal procedure and the signi-
Research Fellow, Inst i tute for Legal S t u d i e s of the Hunga r i an Academy of S c i e n c e s , 
H - 1 2 5 0 , Budapes t РОВ 25. 
E-mai l : r v e g v a r i @ y a h o o . c o m O T K A T 0 4 6 9 7 3 . 
3 6 2 RÉKA VÉGVÁRI 
ficant rise in terrorism and organised crime.1 Over the last decade, intimidation 
by the parties to the case, and particularly of witnesses in the criminal process 
has become more and more frequent, and this has led to an increasing amount of 
allowing exceptions under legal norms for taking witness statements, for example, 
without the presence of the accused; or refusals in rendering incriminating 
testimonies. It is clear and recognised in the public debate that witnesses need 
protection. The main question relates to the 'know-how' of this protection, i.e. to 
questions such as what are the possible and most effective forms of protection. 
Efforts in the Field of Witness Protection 
States have recently given importance to the problem of witness protection at 
national, European and international levels. In the context of this paper "European 
level" includes the endeavours within the Council of Europe (hereinafter CoE) 
and within the European Union (hereinafter EU) ; the international level covers 
the work of United Nations (hereinafter UN). 
European level 
The first step was taken within the European Union by the adoption of the 
Resolution on the protection of witnesses in the fight against international 
organised cr ime of 23 November 1995: (hereinafter Resolution 1995). The 
Resolution on individuals who co-operate with the judicial process in the fight 
against international organised crime of 20 December 1996' calls on Member 
States to adopt appropriate measures to encourage individuals who participate 
or have participated in an association of criminals or other criminal organiza-
tion of any kind, or in organized crime offences, to co-operate with the judicial 
process and to provide appropriate protection measures for any individual and, 
where necessary, for his parents, children and other persons close to him, who, 
by virtue of the individual 's willingness to cooperate with the judicial process, 
is or are likely to be exposed to serious and immediate danger; in considering 
such measures, Member States should have regard to the Resolution 1995. 
1
 Mackarel, M.-Raitt, F . -Moody, S.: Briefing paper on legal issues and witness 
protection in criminal cases. Edinburg, 2001. 
2
 OJ 1995 C327. 5. 
3
 OJ 1997 CIO. 1. 
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The Millennium Strategy4 states that a proposal shall be prepared for an instru-
ment on the position and protection of witnesses and of persons who participate 
or who have participated in criminal organisations, and who are prepared to 
co-operate with the judicial process by supplying information useful for 
investigative and evidentiary purposes or by providing information that may 
contribute to depriving criminal organisations of their resources or of the 
proceeds of crime. According to Council Framework Decision of 15 March 
2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings,5 each Member State 
shall ensure that victims have a real and appropriate role in its criminal legal 
system, and shall recognise the rights and legitimate interests of victims with 
particular reference to criminal proceedings. It is necessary to ensure that 
victims who are particularly vulnerable can benefit from specific treatment best 
suited to their circumstances. Article 8. refers the victims rights to protection.6 
The European Court of Justice adjudged in the Pupino case,7 that "The 
national court is required to take into consideration all the rules of national law 
and to interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and 
purpose of the Framework Decision". 
4
 The prevention and control of organized crime: a European Union strategy for the 
beginning of the new millennium OJ 2000 С 124.1-33. 
5
 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 82, 22. 3. 2001. 1-4. 
6
 1. Each Member State shall ensure a suitable level of protection for victims and. 
where appropriate, their families or persons in a similar position, particularly as regards 
their safety and protection of their privacy, where the competent authorities consider that 
there is a serious risk of reprisals or firm evidence of serious intent to intrude upon their 
privacy. 
2. To that end. and without prejudice to paragraph 4, each Member State shall guarantee 
that it is possible to adopt, if necessary, as part of the court proceedings, appropriate 
measures to protect the privacy and photographic image of victims and their families or 
persons in a similar position. 
3. Each Member State shall further ensure that contact between victims and offenders 
within court premises may be avoided, unless criminal proceedings require such contact. 
Where appropriate for that purpose, each Member State shall progressively provide that 
court premises have special waiting areas for victims. 
4. Each Member State shall ensure that, where there is a need to protect v ic t ims-
particularly those most vulnerable-front the effects of giving evidence in open court, 
victims may, by decision taken by the court, be entitled to testify in a manner which will 
enable this objective to be achieved, by any appropriate means compatible with its basic 
legal principles. 
7
 http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin; Judgment OJ С 193, 06. 08. 2005. 3. 
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The Institute for International Research of Criminal Policy, which is integrated 
into the University of Ghent, conducted a research on witness protection. As 
a result of the work three proposals for EU framework decisions were drafted: 
a proposal concerning anonymous witnesses,8 a proposal concerning protected 
witnesses,4 and a proposal concerning collaborators with justice.10 
The Committee of Ministers of the CoE has adopted relevant recommenda-
tions in connection with the issue. Recommendation on the position of the 
victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure" proposes that when-
ever this appears necessary, and especially when organised crime is involved, 
the victim and his family should be given effective protection against intimida-
tion and the risk of retaliation by the offender. 
Recommendation on intimidation of witnesses and the rights of the defence 
[R (97) 13]12 is based on the awareness of the need for Member States to develop 
a common crime policy in relation to witness protection. 
Recommendation on the protection of witnesses and collaborators of justice 
[R (2005) 9]13 declares inter alia as a general principle that appropriate legislative 
and practical measures should be taken to ensure that witnesses and collabo-
rators of justice may testify freely and without being subjected to any act of 
intimidation. 
International level 
Measures for witness protection are provided for within the Statutes of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and for Rwanda 
(1994) and also in the Rome Statute. It is the duty of these institutions to 
provide for appropriate protective measures. Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
both of ICTY and ICTR contain provisions on witness protection. 
8
 Vermeulen. G. (ed.): EU standards in witness protection and collaboration with 
justice. 244-250. http://www.mruni.lt/ 
9
 Ibid. 258-268. 
10
 Ibid. 251-257. 
" Ree (85) 1 1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Position of the 
victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure, https://wcd.coe.int/ 
" Ree (97) 13E 10 concerning intimidation of witnesses and the rights of the defense, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ 
" Ree (2005) 9 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the protection of 
witnesses and collaborators of justice, https://wcd.coe.int/ 
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The Notion of Witness 
European level 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not contain a 
definition of witness; however, from the case law of the European Court a 
wide notion stands out. The Court has not given any specific wording but has 
defined the concept in an autonomous manner with a broad scope allowed for 
its application. The autonomous concept is mentioned in Kostovsky, and in 
Isgro judgements.14 The R (97) 13 also uses a broad definition, namely, "witness" 
means any person, irrespective of his/her status under national criminal 
procedural law, who possesses information relevant to criminal proceedings. 
This definition also includes expert witnesses as well as interpreters. It covers 
those persons who have disappeared after making an initial statement, or who 
make statement only to the police. 
The R (2005) 9 stipulates that "witness" means any person who possesses 
information relevant to criminal proceedings about which he/she has given 
and/or is able to give testimony (irrespective of his/her status and of the direct or 
indirect, oral or written form of the testimony, in accordance with national law), 
who is not included in the definition of "collaborator of justice". The definition 
as formulated by the Recommendation is based on the autonomous concept of 
witness under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This 
definition includes any person who possesses relevant information to criminal 
proceedings about which he/she has given and/or is able to give testimony.15 
Here the function of the witness has main importance rather than the status of 
the person concerned or the form of the testimony. These factors could differ 
according to the national system. The expression 'relevant1 covers all the infor-
mation which is pertinent for the procedure, irrespective of the importance 
of the information. The element of importance should be connected to the 
evaluation of the protection needs, but not to the qualification of witness. 
European Union 
In accordance with the Resolution of the Council (1995) "witness" means "any 
person, whatever his legal status, who possesses intelligence or information 
14
 Kostovski v. Netherlands Judgment of 20 Nov. 1989, Series A, No. 166, Applic. No. 
11454/85, (1990) 12 EHRR 434; Isgro v. Italy Judgment of 19 Feb. 1991, Series A, No. 
194-A, Applic. No. 11339/8. 
15
 Explanatory Memorandum. 
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regarded by the competent authority as being material to criminal proceedings 
and liable to endanger that person if divulged". The resolution is connected to 
organised crime, and therefore it is understandable that the definition contains 
an element of threat. 
The proposed framework decision on protected witnesses does not contain 
any general definition of witness. The proposal concerning anonymous witnesses 
presents a definition under which anonymous witness means "any person, 
irrespective of his status under national criminal procedural law, who provides 
or is willing to provide information relevant to criminal proceedings and whose 
identity is concealed from the parties during the pre-trial investigation or the 
trial proceedings though the use of procedural protective measures as specified 
in (...)". 
International level 
No definition of the witness can be found in international law. According to 
treaties, the case law and guidelines, parties giving testimony during the criminal 
procedure are included. Parties include witnesses in its classical meaning in 
most national laws, mainly victims and other vulnerable categories. Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence both of the ICTY and of the ICTR contain the 
definition of a victim, who is a person against whom a crime over which the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly been c o m m i t t e d . R u l e s of Procedure 
and Evidence of the ICC also defines the notion of victim.17 
Hungarian law 
In domestic law the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a definition of 
witness. In accordance with section 79 subsection 1, any person can be 
questioned as witness, who may have information of the fact that must be 
proved. This is quite a broad definition of a witness to the crime; the members 
of the authorities giving testimony, the collaborators of justice, the eye-
witnesses etc. are covered by it. According to Hungarian law and an accused 
and a co-accused give evidence still only in a position of an accused, not as a 
witness. 
16
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence ICTY IT/32/Rev.39, Rule 2; ICTR ITR/3/Rev.l, 
Rule 2. 
17
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence ICC Official Rccordc ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 85. 
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Procedural Principles and the Witness Protection Problem 
Public hearing means that criminal cases are tried in an open court. There are 
two meanings contained in the concept of open trial. First, a trial is open when 
the public can attend the trial, and second, it can be regarded as open when the 
hearing is not open to public as such, but it is open to all of parties of the 
procedure. When a trial is conducted without public access, the principle of open 
court is infringed. However, it is important also to take into account the interests 
of the parties, and balance those interests against the public interest. In some 
cases the restrictions are necessary and fulfil the proportionality requirements, if 
the parties' interest and procedural rights are taken into consideration. The 
balance between the parties' rights and the interest of the public is secured by 
making the final court decision public. 
When a trial is open for the public, serious problems may emerge, if the court 
orders the accused to leave the court room while the witness gives evidence, 
where there is a danger that his or her presence may influence the witness. Not 
only the principle of public hearing, but also the right to fair trial can be 
jeopardised. This limitation of the presence of defendant is justified, when it is 
necessary for protection of witness, but only when other guarantees counter-
balance the absence of the accused. 
The principle of oral hearing means that the trial itself is conducted orally. 
The possibility to provide for written witness statements has an impact of this 
principle. The accused's right to a fair trial corresponds to the right of an oral 
hearing where the court is faced with an obligation to search for the material 
truth. 
Immediacy in the court trial is the leading principle of many systems of 
criminal procedure. At the court trial as a rule evidence must be produced on 
the basis of this principle. Using a statement of an anonymous witness as 
means of evidence is an important exception to the immediacy principle. In 
addition problems arise in connection with the principle of fair trial (R (97) 
13). Furthermore, the case law of the European Court has given guidelines on 
how to deal with the problem. Using anonymous witnesses is not against the 
ECHR if proper guarantees are observed. These are: 
- no convictions must be based solely or to a decisive extent on the 
anonymous statement, 
- using anonymous witnesses must be exceptional, 
- proper verification procedure is needed, where the credibility and reliability 
of the witness is examined and the examining authority shall have full 
knowledge of the witnesses' identity, 
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- the defence must have the right to challenge the alleged need for anony-
mity, of the witness, his/her credibility and the origin of his/her knowledge. 
Until the last two decades the fair trial focussed almost only on the rights 
of the defence. The witnesses' rights were less discussed. Nowadays the 
importance of defence is recognised, and the procedural rights of witnesses 
are also accepted. 
Witness Protection Measures in Hungary 
Following the political transformation, an obvious change has ensued in the 
area of the protection of the witness. According to procedural law, a witness is 
under an obligation to appear and testify before the authorities upon summons. 
Apart from the prescription of obligations and their consequences, the state did 
not give attention for the proper protection of witnesses at all for a long time. It 
was at the discretion of authorities,-in the interest of spareing the witness the 
awkwardness of the situation-to make use of the modest opportunities guaranteed 
by law, such as the temporary removal of the accused from the courtroom or 
avoiding the confrontation by the parties. It is evident that the involvement of 
witnesses in criminal process cannot be omitted altogether: however, the risk 
entailed by giving evidence must also be minimized for witnesses. Appearance 
before the authorities and making a statement implies a stress situation in itself 
for the majority of witnesses. It is the duty of the state to protect those involved 
in the situation as much as possible from detrimental consequences or stress 
deriving from the situation, even if actual threat or undue influence does not exist. 
So, as to accomplish the objectives above, the instruments of the protection 
of witnesses were gradually introduced. The protective measures that are 
available according to the Code of Criminal Procedure are as follows: 
- non-disclosure of personal data, 
- statement in a written form, 
- legal counsel on the witnesses' side, 
- exclusion of public during trial, 
- temporary exclusion of defendant during trial, 
- elimination of confrontation, 
- witnesses under special protection (anonymous witness), 
- direct personal protection, 
- provisions on witnesses to be involved in a protection programme, 
- pre-trial hearing in front of an investigating judge, 
- giving evidence by means of live television link, 
- restraining orders. 
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It was pursuant to Act 92 of 1994 that the management of the particulars of 
witnesses (with the exception of their names) was facilitated for courts acting 
ex officio or at the request on basis of classified materials.18 
Within the purview of the new ACP, the rules of the protection of witnesses 
are specified under a separate title, which originally contained rules on the 
management of personal data as classified material, on the protection of 
special classes of witnesses, and on the protection of the person of the witness. 
It is prescribed that only in exceptionally moderate cases the name of the 
witness, which usually is classified information, is also admissible, confron-
tation between the accused and the witness can be disregarde, and the 
introduction for recognition shall be accomplished so that the person introduced 
for recognition cannot recognise or see the witness, if that is necessary in re 
the protection of the witness. 
The introduction of the rules for the specially protected or anonymous 
witnesses was partly justified by the requirement for increasing the efficiency 
of intervention against organised crime. Thereby, a person exposed to danger 
will not have to appear at trial, since hearing shall take place during the 
investigation and it is conducted by the investigative judge in the absence of 
the accused and the defence counsel. The declaration of a specially protected 
witness shall be granted on the basis that the testimony concerns an essential 
circumstance of a significant case and the evidence provided by the witness 
cannot be obtained from another source. Measures taken to protect the witness 
are effective, since his identity shall not be known either by the accused or 
the defence counsel, and without such protection the witness, his relative or 
property would be exposed to a serious threat. 
The procedure of the declaration on a specially protected witness shall be 
conducted by an investigative judge. Originally the ACP did not specify the 
so-called verification phase as part of the procedure, in the course of which the 
judge is able to verify the credibility of the witness and the circumstances 
relating to the credibility of his testimony. The elimination of this default 
was particularly essential, since according to Recommendation no. R (97) 13 a 
verification procedure involving an anonymous witness should be integrated 
into the criminal procedure to properly balance the objectives of judicature and 
the rights of defence. This would facilitate the defence 's ability to challenge 
the necessity for anonymity, the credibility of the witness and the source of his 
information. A state that has not instituted the above-mentioned procedure will 
likely be regarded to infringe the rules of fair trail. In Hungary the problem 
was solved by enacting the Supplementary Law of 2002, which prescribed for 
18
 It en te red into fo rce on 15th February , 1995. 
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the examination of the credibility of the witness and of his testimony as an 
obligation of the investigative judge. 
The third form of protection is the protection of the person. Pursuant to 
amendments made in relation to the position of the accused, the defence counsel, 
the aggrieved or other party concerned, the representative of the aggrieved or 
other party concerned, or, the expert, the consultant, the interpreter, the official 
witness or any other person related to the afore-mentioned ones, are allowed 
for protection of the person. For its implementation, Government Decree no. 
34 /1999 (II. 26.) formulated the conditions and rules for an order of protection 
of the personae involved in the criminal procedure and for officials partici-
pating in the process. The sphere of the statute encompasses also the personae 
of officials, prosecutors and judges. Furthermore, on the 1st of April 2002, Act 
85 of 2001 on the Program of Protection of Parties (hereinafter APP) entered 
into force which included in the criminal procedure protection the supporters 
of the administration of justice, the objective of which is to guarantee protection 
for parties who are participating in the criminal procedure or actively support 
the administration of justice or are closely related to these persons, and, are 
threatened, and their personal security requires increased protection by the 
state. Its further objective is to promote the tight against crime, especially 
against infamous, primarily organised crime, and the effective enforcement of 
the interests of criminal prosecution and the administration of justice by the 
application of special measures adjusted to the extent of danger threatening the 
concerned party.19 
Within the purview of APP. protection shall be guaranteed for those witnesses, 
aggrieved parties and offenders who are involved in criminal procedure and 
exposed to serious danger and who co-operate with judicature and repent. 
,9
 Framing the Act was motivated partly by the obligation of legal harmonisation 
entailed by accession to the EU and by the practice related to organised crime in the 
Member States. The statement of the Council of Europe of 1995 requires that Member 
States provide efficient and appropriate protection for witnesses preceding, during and 
following the criminal procedure. The majority of Member States provide protection for 
those in need in the scope of the program. This is also a solution adopted by Hungarian 
law. In the EU, this has become an indispensable prerequisite of co-operation against 
criminality, whence co-operation among Member States is accomplished by national 
departments implementing the program. 
In December, 2000. Hungary signed the UN Convention against transnational organised 
crime. Its provisions concerning the protection of the witness promote the physical protection 
of witnesses, the removal of witnesses in danger, confidentiality of the particulars of 
witnesses, recourse to legislative and other measures that facilitate the arranging of video-
conferences. 
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Under the new ACP, separate rules are stipulated in re witnesses and the 
accused whose identity has been changed as a consequence of their involvement 
in the Protection Program. These persons participate in the procedure with 
their original particulars; however, the headquarters of the Witness Protection 
Service shall be indicated as their place of residence. 
Provisions promoting the witness protection are specified not only under 
the new ACP. The rules of hearing witnesses stipulate hearing children in 
exceptional circumstances; and they allow for the possibility of the provision 
of written testimony, the latter of which is subsequent to and following a verbal 
hearing. However, if necessary, the witness may be heard also subsequently to 
the provision of written testimony. These rules are strengthened by provision 
of a restraining order and the possibility for the application of closed-circuit 
broadcast at the session of the investigative judge or at the trial. 
Although the rules on restraining orders are placed in sections concerning 
coercive measures, they also partly fall within the means of witness protection. 
The increase in the effectiveness of intervention against violent crime 
committed within families has in recent years become a fundamentally 
important issue of criminal policy in Hungary, and this can be partly attributed 
to the impact of international trends. 
A restraining order may be instrumental as to the impediment and evidence 
of the infringement of the law within families. Several international legal 
documents motivate states to institute rules on limiting, restraining and 
safeguarding family members, designed to assure both that the accused abandons 
the lieu of crime and the composure of the aggrieved party at least for a transi-
tional period. The motioned provisions may be incorporated under administrative 
or penal rules. 
Law-makers in Hungary have opted for the latter alternative by defining the 
restraining order as a coercive measure with regard to the rules of the 
prohibition of the abandonment of residence. This, as a solution, is still disputed 
in criminologist circles. The accused is forced to abandon the residence and 
area specified by court and to avoid both returning there for a specific period 
and making any contact with the person specified by court. 
The shortest period for a restraining order is 10 days, and the longest period 
is 30 days; it is not possible to request for an extension. Nonetheless, the 
possibility of a repeated order is not precluded by law. 
The rules are applicable on condition that there is a danger that the offender 
impedes, encumbers or jeopardises testimony via influencing or intimidating 
the aggrieved party. Therefore, a restraining order indirectly also promotes the 
objective of the protection of the witness. A deficiency in the new regulation 
is that it does not admit the application of a restraining order in re other 
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witnesses apart f rom the aggrieved party, whereas, in the testimony relating to 
a crime committed within a family, a crucial role is assigned to parties living in 
the specific neighbourhood and exposed to harassment by the offender outside 
their homes. 
Summary 
Expanding and developing the measures on witness protection are the pledge 
of effective international co-operation in criminal matters. The question of 
witness protection has extreme importance within the European Union in light 
of the principle of mutual recognition. Acceptance of minimum standards in 
this field could facilitate the emergence of this corner stone of the judicial co-
operation. The concept of the witness protection should be interpreted broadly. 
It ought to cover not only the procedural and non-procedural means,20 but also 
the treatment of witnesses from the side of judicial authorities. The first stage 
of the witness protection is the improvement of the treatment of persons giving 
evidence. Similarly to the proposal for a framework decision on certain proce-
dural rights applying in proceedings in criminal matters throughout the 
European Union,"1 a letter of rights should be given for all witnesses or open it 
up for them. The trust towards the judicial authorities should be strengthened. 
The definition of witness should be clarified on EU level. Witnesses' right 
to give evidence without intimidation and threat should be declared. Propor-
tionality between the nature of the protection measure and the seriousness of 
the intimidation of the witness should be ensured. Certain minimum procedural 
protection should be given to every witness. In case of serious criminal 
offences the right of appointed legal representation should be ensured for the 
witness. With regard to witnesses in weaker position, e.g. children, special 
protective measures should apply. 
The problem of anonymous witnesses should be reconsidered in connection 
with the principle of fair trial. Legal representation of the defendant during the 
verification procedure should be ensured. 
20
 Non-procedural protection means the safeguarding of witnesses who are in danger or 
directly threatened, and where the application of the procedural tools are not effective per 
se. 
21
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The Reform of the Legal Regulation of Arbitration in 
Austria with Special Emphasis on the Appointment 
and Challenge of Arbitrators 
Abstract. This study deals with some particular features of commercial arbitration in Austria. 
The legal framework of arbitration in Austria was changed with an effect of 1st July, 2006, 
as the Austrian Parliament passed the Schiedsrechts-Änderungsgesetz 2006 in December 
2005. This act was proclaimed on the 13th January 2006 and entered into force 1st July in 
spite of the planned date of 1st January. After having described the significance of 
arbitration in Austria the author pays special attention to the topic of appointment and 
challenge of arbitrators. The author compares the rules of the valid Austrian act with the 
provisions of UNCITRAL Model Law adopted on 21st June. 1985. The author highlights 
some cases from the legal practice which are considered relevant in the present issue. Finally 
the author summarizes the provisions of the rules of procedure of International Arbitral 
Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber from the point of view of appointment 
and challenge of arbitrators, which rules have been effective also since 1st July, 2006. 
Keywords: arbitration, international arbitration. Austria, appointment and challenge of 
arbitrators. 
The settlement of legal disputes in Austria by arbitration looks back to a long 
past. It is not only the domestic arbitration, which possesses significant tradi-
tions in Austria but the place of numerous international commercial arbitration 
proceedings is also Austria, and respectively Vienna.1 Of course the role of 
Austria and its capital deserves to be accentuated in the field of international 
commercial law as well. From the aspect of our subject we have to refer before 
all to the organization of UNCITRAL, Vienna, furthermore to the International 
J u n i o r R e s e a r c h Fe l low, Ins t i tu te for Lega l S tud ies of the H u n g a r i a n A c a d e m y o f 
S c i e n c e s , H - 1 0 1 4 , Budapes t , O r s z á g h á z u. 30., H u n g a r y 
E-mai l ; a d a m b o o c @ h o t m a i l . c o m 
1
 In re la t ion to ear l ier Aus t r i an domes t ic a n d internat ional a rb i t r a t i on regula t ion see : 
F a s e h i n g . H . W . : Schiedsgericht und Schiedsverfahren im österreichischen und im 
internationalen Recht. Wien , 1973. 
I. 
374 ÁDÁM BOÓC 
Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (Das Internationale 
Schiedsgericht der Wirtschaftskammer Österreich).' 
International commercial practice esteems Vienna as a well-known seat of 
arbitration along with several other cities-e.g. Paris, Stockholm-, and this sort 
of psychological circumstance provided that contracting parties often do choose 
Vienna as the court of arbitration.3 The people's democratic states with 
socialist systems have been also stipulated Austria as the place of arbitration, 
the reason for this can be identified in the traditional political independence of 
Austria.4 According to the survey conducted in the 1980's on the arbitral practice 
of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris (ICC) with the examination 
of 90 cases it has been determined that also in the cases of the ICC companies 
from both Eastern and Western Europe had chosen the law of Austria 9% of 
the cases and Austria as the place of arbitration 7% of the cases.5 We have to 
regard these numbers as significant in the light of the fact that the ICC has its 
seat in Paris and therefore the place of proceedings of international arbitration 
is in most cases Paris. 
In the era of socialism the Austrian arbitral practice had played a significant 
role in Hungarian business life, as well." Numerous Hungarian companies had 
stipulated the jurisdiction of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in their 
foreign trade contracts.7 At this point we cannot avoid to mention the 1982 
cooperation agreement on the field of commercial arbitration concluded 
between the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and the Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (formerly known as Hungarian Chamber of Commerce). 
The first amendment to the cooperation agreement was made in 1990 and its 
text currently in force was determined 11th June 1998. This agreement allowed 
In relation with the centre of UNCITRAL in Vienna sec: www.uncitral.org. In 
relation of the Court of Arbitration attached to the Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber-which court of arbitration we will investigate in detail later on-see : 
www.wko.at/arbitration. 
3
 See also: Berger, К. P.: International Economic Arbitration in Germany: A New Era. 
Arbitration International. 8 (1992) 103. 
4
 See: Melis, W.-Strohlbach, H.: East-West Arbitration. In: Sanders, P. (ed.): Yearbook 
of Commercial Arbitration, VII (1982) 403. 
See: Third Seminar on East-West Arbitration: (Paris, December 6-8, 1983) Journal 
of International Arbitration, 1 (1984) 85-86. 
6
 On Middle and Eastern European arbitration in general sec: Horváth. É.: Választott-
bíráskodás Közép- és Kelet-Európában (Arbitration in Middle and Eastern Europe). Kül-
gazdaság Jogi Melléklete, 4 (1994) 49-59. 
7
 See: Leloczky. К.: East-West Arbitration: A Practitioner's Viewpoint from Hungary. 
Arbitration International. 4 (1988) 267. 
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arbitral proceedings between Austrian and Hungarian business organizations 
by the application of the UNCITRAL sample code of conduct. The agreement 
includes a sample arbitration clause, as well, which stipulates the appointment 
of one or three arbitrators. From the aspect of our subject the appointing body 
in the agreement has an emphasized significance, since in the statement of 
claim shall be filed to the appointing body and also this body will proceed in 
the appointing of the arbitrators as well. According to the agreement, in the 
case the dispute arises between parties with seats in Austria and Hungary, 
and the claimant-or counter-claiming defendant-has its seat in Hungary, the 
Federal Chamber in Vienna shall be the appointing body. In case the the 
claimant-or counter-claiming defendant-has its seat in Austria, the Hungarian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry shall proceed. In case parties with seats in 
Austria or Hungary have a legal dispute with a person of any kind from a third 
country, the president of the Federal Economic Chamber in Vienna shall be the 
appointing body if one of the parties' seat is in Austria, furthermore the 
president of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry shall proceed 
in the appointment if one of the parties have its seat in Hungary.8 
From the aspect of the appointment of the arbitrators Article 3 of the agree-
ment deserves special attention according to which the Court of Arbitration 
attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Arbitral 
Centre of Austrian Federal Economic Chamber owns one common list of 
arbitrators, onto which each party may designate up to 21 persons eligible for 
the arbitrator's position, of whom 7 should be neither Austrian nor Hungarian 
citizen. This list is obligatory for the appointing body, yet it is only recom-
mendatory for the parties to the dispute, however only persons who signed 
the arbitral contract attached to the agreement may act as arbitrators.9 The 
provision in connection with the arbitrator's nationality has a significance in 
order to guarantee the impartiality and independence of the proceeding persons, 
moreover it is for the same reason that the appointment is divided as written 
above between the two chambers. 
The agreement concluded in 7lh September 1984, Vienna does also provide 
support for the significant role of the Austrian arbitration during the 1980s. 
This agreement-which was created in a five year period of preparation and 
harmonizing-with the help of the recommended arbitration clause allowed 
American and Hungarian companies and enterprises to designate Vienna as the 
8
 For more on this see: Horváth, É.-Kálmán, Gy.: Nemzetközi eljárások joga - A keres-
kedelmi választottbíráskodás (Law of International proceedings-Commercial Arbitration). 
Budapest, 2003. 139-140. 
9
 For the text of the Agreement visit: http://www.mkik.hu/index.php?.id=54. 
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place of proceedings and the arbitral rules of UNCITRAL (Arbitration Rules 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Rules) as the law of procedure. From the aspect of our subject it deserves 
special stressing that in accordance with the clause, in case the parties cannot 
agree on the appointment of the arbitrators, the chairman of the arbitral centre 
of the Austrian Federal Chamber shall appoint the arbitrators, from a list 
collectively set up by the American Arbitration Association and the Hungarian 
Chamber of Commerce. On this list one can only find highly reputable judges 
and attorneys of different nationalities who were not coming from either 
the United States or Hungary. This provision served the assurance of the 
independence and impartiality of the arbitral body. The optional appliance of 
the recommended clause can be described as a significant element of the 
agreement, thus parties could agree on other kinds of arbitral arrangements.1" 
The principle rules of arbitration in Austria can be found among rules 
providing on standard civil procedures-similarly to some other European legal 
systems, like that of Germany." The Austrian law on civil procedures, the 
Code of Civil Procedure, the Zivilprozessordnung (hereinafter referred to as 
ZPO) entered into force 1st January 1898.12 The introduction of the ZPO was 
taken care of by the Einführungsgesetz zur Zivilprozessordnung (Gesetz vom 1. 
8. 1895 betreffend die Einführung des Gesetzes über das gerichtliche Verfahren 
in bürgerlichen Rechtsstreitigkeiten) adapted on the Is1 August 1895. The first 
significant reform of the rules of arbitration was carried out by the 1983 civil 
procedure novella. Before this only one editorial correction had been made 
in 1929 in relation with Paragraph 3 of Article 583.13 In the preparation of 
the reform of 1983-which carries the name Zivilverfahrens-Novelle 1983-
10
 See: American Arbitration Association, Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Federal Economic Chamber of Austria: Signature of New Agreements to assist Trade 
Between the United States and Hungary by Providing for Arbitration in Vienna, Vienna, 
September 7, 1984. Journal of International Arbitration, 1 (1984) 369-370. 
11
 It should be noted as well that respectively up to the 2006 reform of the Austrian 
arbitration law the laws on the jurisdiction and competcnce of courts of common pleas 
had had a great significance too. (Jurisdiktionsnorm - Gesetz vom I. 8. 1895 über die 
Ausübung der Gerichstbarkeit und die Zuständigkeit der ordentlichen Gerichte in bürger-
lichen Rechtssachen.) 
' "For a overview regarding the ZPO see: Fasching. H. W.: Zivilprozessrecht. 2. ed. 
Wien, 1990; Fasching, H. W.-Konecny, A.: Kommentar zu den Zivilprozessgesetzen. 2. ed. 
Vienna, 2003; Rechberger. W. H.: Kommentar zur ZPO. 2. ed. Wien. 2000. 
13
 For this see: Liebscher, Ch.-Schmid, A.: Arbitration Law in Austria. Journal of 
International Arbitration, 16 (1999) 25. 
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Prof. Iván Szász has played an important role which activity was met with 
great acknowledgement in Austria.14 
It is vital to pay attention to the year of the procedure amendment which 
has made among others even the conclusion of the arbitration contract easier,15 
since it precedes the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985. As a result of that, this 
amendment could not have taken into account the provisions of the Model 
Law, thus the development of the Austrian arbitration practice had avoided 
background regulations based on the UNCITRAL Model Law till the year of 
2006. According to the opinion of some authors, this Austrian arbitration 
regulation has adjusted itself only moderately to the demands of international 
arbitration procedures."1 Other authors think that even this Austrian amend-
ment has been created to keep pace with the significant development of the 
international arbitration after World War Two.17 
At the same time, the significant American expert, Gary B. Born has the 
standpoint that this Austrian body of regulation assures the accomplishment 
of arbitration contracts and the enforcement of the arbitral awards in the 
appropriate way, furthermore it is also important that the interference of state 
judicial bodies stays only minimal.18 
Taking into account the abovementioned the reform of the Austrian 
arbitration law presented an ever urging demand in the 1990s, the main goal of 
the reform being the accommodation to the compliance with the provisions 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law. In 2000 Prof. Walter H. Rechberger from 
Vienna proposed that the Ludwig-Boltztmann-Instituts für Rechtsvorsorge und 
Urkundenwesen Institute which was led by him shall set up a workgroup dealing 
with the reform of arbitration law. The task of this workgroup was to create a 
draft resolution for part six of the ZPO that contained the arbitration rules. 
The leader of the workgroup was Prof. Paul Oberhammer from Zurich. Experts 
from the areas of both practice and theory of arbitration took part in the work-
group. The draft on the reform of the arbitration rules was presented to justice 
minister Böhmdorfer in 2002 under the title Entwurf eines neuen Scliiedsverfahrens-
14
 See: www.ssd.com/files/tbl_sl0News/FileUpload44/12373/Szasz.pdf. 
18
 See: Niklas, M.: Schiedsverfahren via Internet. Juristische Möglichkeiten der 
Verfahrensabwicklung via Internet nach der ZPO. http://www.rechtsprobleme.at/doks/ 
internet-schiedsverfahren-niklas.pdf 2. 
" 'Regarding this see especially: Herrmann, G.: The UNCITRAL Model Law-Its 
Background, Salient Features, and Purposes. Arbitration International 1 (1985) 9. 
17
 For this see: Lionnet, K.: The UNCITRAL Model Law. A German Perspective. 
Arbitration International. 6 (1990) 344. 
18
 See: Born G. В.: International Commercial Arbitration. Commentary and Materials. 
2. ed. The Hague-Boston-London, 20012. 147. 
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rechts. According to the ministerial motion the goal of the reform was that 
Austria became an even more attractive seat of arbitration.1'' 
The adoption of the draft statute however needed more time. The third official 
version dates 18th October 2005. The Austrian Parliament passed the Schieds-
rechts-Änderungsgesetz 2006 in December 2005 and which was proclaimed on 
the 13th January 2006 and entered into force 1st July in spite of the planned date 
of 1st January.20 
The new arbitration set of rules can be found in Art. 577-618 of the ZPO 
and includes ten parts: General Rules (Allgemeine Bestimmungen), Arbitration 
contract (Schiedsvereinbarung), Setting up the arbitral tribunal (Bildung des 
Schiedsgerichts), Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal (Zuständigkeit des Schieds-
gerichts), Conduct of the Proceedings (Durchführung des schiedsrichterlichen 
Verfahrens), Arbitral Award and Termination of Proceedings (Schiedsspruch 
und Beendigung des schiedsrichterlichen Verfahrens), Legal Remedy against the 
Award (Rechtsbehelf gegen den Schiedsspruch), Recognition and Enforcement 
of the Arbitral Award (Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Schiedssprüchen), 
Special Provisions (Sonderbestimmungen) 
The unified set of rules, that is relating to international and domestic 
arbitration cannot be considered only as the amendment of the existing legal 
regulations. According to Walter H. Recliberger the new statute is a complete 
revision of the Austrian arbitration rules based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
In the opinion of Recliberger the provisions of the Model Law were not taken 
over on a full scale, the Austrian act do follow party different solutions from 
the Model Law, furthermore in the course of the preparation of the draft 
reform, numerous foreign bodies of law had been considered as well-thus for 
example the arbitration laws of Switzerland, England and France." Never-
theless Austria can be considered as a Model Law Country from the date of 1st 
14
 „...die Stellung Österreichs als Schiedsort noch attraktiver zu machen." (to make the 
status of Austria as place for arbitration more attractive). For the preparation of the reform 
of the arbitration see also: W. H. Rechberger: Einführung in das neue österreichische 
Schiedsverfahrensrecht. In: http://www.iwp.or.at/veranstaltungen/unterlagcn_2006_ 
03_21.pdf 3. 
:
"Cf.: Baier, A.-Trofaier, M. T.: Austria. In: Rowley, J. W.-Mendelsohn, Mc. B. (ed.): 
Arbitration World. Jurisdictional Comparisons. London, 2006". 18. 
21
 These special provisions re fer to arbitral proceedings between the undertaker 
(Unternehmer) and the consumer (Verbraucher) Par . (1) of Art. 617 provides on a 
theoretical level that in relation with the undertaker and the consumer an arbitral contract 
may be concluded validly only in existing legal disputes. 
22
 See: Rechberger: Einführung in das neue... op. cit. 4-5. 
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July 2006 from the point of acts on arbitration since the Austrian arbitration 
rules are based on the Model Law-similarly to many other legal systems. 
Art. 586-591 of Capital 3 of Part 6 of the ZPO (Bildung des Schiedsgerichts)23  
provides on the setting up of the arbitral tribunal, the nomination and challenge 
of arbitrators, the reasons for challenges, which provisions we analyse in detail 
further below, with the comparing to the older regulation and the stipulations 
of the Model Law.24 We will also refer to some cases arisen in the practice in 
relation of the nomination and challenge of arbitrators.23 
According to Art. 586 of the ZPO in force parties may agree upon the 
number of arbitrators freely. In case parties nominate an even number of 
arbitrators, the arbitrators shall nominate one other arbitrator who will preside 
of the tribunal. In case parties do not agree otherwise, the number of arbitrators 
shall be three. This regulation is different from earlier rules and to some extent 
from the Model Law, as well. The earlier regulation had not contained provisions 
on the odd number of arbitrators, that is there were no such provisions as a 
further arbitrator shall be nominated by the arbitrators if they were appointed 
in an even number.26 Evidently, this question has an importance from the 
viewpoint of the ability to decide of the tribunal. According to Par. 1 of Art. 
591 of the invalidated ZPO, in case a majority of votes cannot be achieved, 
moreover in case there two arbitrators no agreement can be reached, then this 
fact shall be disclosed to the parties. 
23
 It is noteworthy that the title of Capital 3 is rather deceptive since the word Bildung 
means creation yet this same capital contain the rules of challenges of arbitrators as well. 
This system does correspond with thee terminology of the UNC1TRAL Model Law, 
Capital 3 thereof deals with the setting up of the arbitral tribunal (Composition of the 
Arbitral Tribunal), as well. 
24
 For an overview of the new Austrian arbitration law see: Liebscher, Ch.: The New 
Arbitration Act 2006. Text And Notes. The Hague, 2006; Zeiler, G.-Steindl, В.: The New 
Austrian Arbitration Law. A Basic Primer. Wien-Graz, 2006. 
27
 With respect to the fact that the later arbitral rules entered into force 1st July 2006, 
the cases obviously relate to the application of the former set of regulation. 
26
 Art. 580 of the invalidated ZPO provided that in case parties did not stipulate on the 
number of arbitrators in the arbitral contract, nor appointed any arbitrators, then both 
parties were entitled to nominate one arbitrator and the thus elected arbitrators would 
appoint the chair of the tribunal. 
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In accordance with Par. 2 of Art. 591 if Parties did not stipulate any 
provisions for this case neither in the arbitration contract nor in later written 
agreements, then any of the parties are entitled to request the otherwise 
competent (due to the lack of the arbitration clause) state court of justice to 
determine the invalidity of the arbitration contract or to pronounce that it is 
invalid in the actual case. It is clear that this older rule could pose a obstacle to 
a successful arbitration procedure, since in case both parties do nominate only 
one arbitrators, and the arbitrators could not reach an unanimous decision, then 
the whole arbitration contract would be invalid and with this, the possibility of 
the settlement of the case by way of arbitration would be terminated, too. 
It should be noted that the Model Law provides only as much as that parties 
may determine the number of arbitrators freely. Although at the time of the 
creation of the Model Law there were conceptions on that in the event parties 
do not determine the number of arbitrators, with the help of a supplementary 
rule the even number of arbitrators could be avoided. However the final version 
of Par. 2 of Art. 10 of the Model Law stipulates that if parties cannot agree upon 
the number of arbitrators, three arbitrators shall proceed in the case.27 
From a comparative legal point of view we should note that while the 
Austrian law provides that if parties nominate an even number of arbitrators, 
the tribunal-for the sake of decisions-making-actually co-opts itself, the 
Québec Code of Civil Procedure in force since 1 Ith November 1986 which was 
revised 1st August 2004 and based on the Model Law, does not give such 
freedom to the parties. According to Art. 941 of the Québec Code of Civil 
Procedure three arbitrators should compose the tribunal. The text presumes two 
litigant parties, since it provides that each party shall nominate one arbitrator, 
and the thus elected arbitrators shall nominate the president of the tribunal. 
Art. 587 of the ZPO contains the rules of the nomination of arbitrators. 
Paragraph 1. includes the principal rule that parties may agree freely upon the 
arrangements of nomination of arbitrators. It is a significant difference from 
the provisions of the Model-act that the Austrian law-contrary to Par. 2 Art. I I 
of the Model-act-does not include the principle that if not otherwise provided 
by the parties none shall be excluded on the base of her nationality to proceed 
as arbitrator. 
In case the parties cannot reach an agreement on the nomination of arbitrators, 
the ZPO's supplementary rules shall apply. In case of a sole arbitrator, the 
parties cannot agree upon the person of the arbitrator, after the delivery of notice 
of the arbitral centre the centre will appoint this arbitrator if this requested by 
7
 See: Binder, P.: International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in Model 
Law Jurisdictions. London. 2005". 103. 
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either party. In case an arbitral tribunal proceeds, each party shall nominate 
one arbitrator and these appointed arbitrators shall nominate the chair of the 
tribunal. In case more than three arbitrators shall proceed, then each party is 
entitled to nominate the same number of arbitrators, and the thus elected 
arbitrators shall elect the chair of the tribunal. 
Point 4 of Par. 2 of Art. 587 of the ZPO contains a four-week-long deadline. 
In case any of the parties do not fully comply with the obligation to nominate 
the arbitrators within four weeks upon receipt of the written notice serving for 
this end, or the arbitrators cannot elect the arbitrator to be co-opted within four 
weeks, then upon request the ordinary state court of justice shall be entitled to 
appoint this arbitrator. In case the parties agreed upon special procedures on 
the nomination of the arbitrators, and any of the parties, the arbitrators, or the 
electoral body-for example an arbitral institute-breaches these rules, or the 
parties cannot reach and agreement within this special procedure, upon request 
of any of the parties the state court of justice shall be entitled to appoint the 
proceeding arbitrators. Thus the supplementary rules of the ZPO apply not 
only if parties altogether cannot agree on the nomination of arbitrators, but 
also in case parties stipulate a special procedure to this end, but for some 
reason the appointment of the arbitrators does not come to end. 
It is an important question whether there are any limits to the freedom of 
the parties in the nomination of arbitrators. The rules of the ZPO-following the 
provisions of the Model Law-expressly stipulates that parties may agree upon 
the rules of procedures freely. It can be concluded from the other provisions of 
the ZPO-and of the Model Law-and it is also supported by legal literature that 
the nomination procedure determined by the parties cannot breach the 
minimum requirements of impartiality of arbitrators, moreover they cannot 
serve as a reason to the contestation of the arbitral award upon ground of the 
constitution of the tribunal. 8 
(This can be thus recognized as a limit to the freedom of the parties in 
connection with the procedures of nomination of arbitrators.) Otherwise the 
regulation would be inconsistent, since in principle it would then allow a 
procedure which later on would allow the exclusion of arbitrators, or the 
invalidation of the arbitral award. 
In accordance with Point 5 of Par. 1 of Art. 587 of the ZPO the party shall 
be bound by the arbitrator who was nominated by her after the time the other 
party received the written notice on the nomination of this arbitrators. (The 
Model Law does not include such rule.) 
"
8
 See: Power, J.: The Austrian Arbitration Act. A Practitioner's Guide to Sections 
577-618 of the Austrian Civil Procedure. Vienna, 2006. 28. 
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The Model Law grants a 30 day period to nominate the arbitrators, while 
the earlier Austrian regulation provided only a significantly shorter, 14 days 
period in Par. 1, Art. 581 of the ZPO previously invalidated. Although the new 
arbitration law requires written nominations, the earlier act was somewhat 
stricter in accordance with formal requirements. Par. 3 of 581 of the invali-
dated ZPO provided that the notice on the nomination of arbitrators shall be 
delivered by post or by notary public to the other party. This proceeding is a 
must in the case of an oral notification on the person nominated as well since 
the regulation requires written notifications.24 This is important because the 
other party will be in a confirmative position that she is able to make her 
remarks, objections regarding the person of the nominated arbitrator only after 
the receipt of the written notice. It is a significant part of the Austrian legal 
practice that Art. 581 of the older ZPO shall not apply case the arbitration 
contract expressively determines the name of the arbitrators.2" 
Art. 582 of the earlier ZPO allowed the courts of justice to appoint arbitrators 
in an unappealable decision in case the parties do not nominate the arbitrators. 
In accordance with Par. 1 of Art. 583 of the older ZPO parties were required to 
nominate arbitrators jointly and no agreement were reached in this matter, any 
of the parties were entitled to request the state court of justice to declare the 
arbitral contract null and void. The same could be requested if the arbitral 
contract included the arbitrators by name and any of these arbitrators passed 
away, were excluded or denounced to proceed in the case, or otherwise failed 
in performance of her obligations.21 Since the former Art. 579 of the ZPO 
provided that noone is obliged to accept her nomination to the arbitrator's 
position. For an important reason one could retire from the tribunal even after 
the acceptance of the nomination. 
It should be emphasized that the Austrian legal practice stressed the private 
legal nature of the legal relationship between the arbitrator and the nominating 
party and the arbitral contract as well.22 According to a legal case arisen in 
practice, the arbitral contract enters into force between the arbitrators and the 
parties only when the arbitrators are appointed and they have accepted the 
"
4
 For this see: Fasching, H. W.: Kommentar zu clen Zivilprozessgesetzen. Wien, 1971. 
761. 
30
 See: EvBl 1959/362 (SZ 32/109). Quoted by: Stohanzl. R. (Hrsg.): Zivilprozessgesetze. 
Wien, 20 029. 563. 
31
 It should be noted that only in case the arbitrators were nominated in the arbitral 
contract would be the later group of cases, namely the death of the arbitrator, her 
denouncement, denial or delay to comply with her obligations were enough grounds to 
declare the invalidity of the arbitral contract. 
32
 See: Stohanzl: op. cit. 562. 
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nomination and from this aspect the nominator person to the arbitrators are 
irrelevant.3. 
According to Par. 3 of Art. 583 of the old ZPO in case the arbitral contract 
was concluded in connection with all and every legal disputes arising from the 
given legal relationship, and the reason because of which the arbitral contract 
shall be invalidated does not exclude that disputes in the future will be decided 
by way of arbitration, the court of justice is entitled to pronounce in its verdict 
the arbitral contract to invalid only in the given case. In the pertinent practice 
the verdict of court will invalidate the arbitral contract and not the invalidation 
of its performance-by the reasons given in detail above. At the same time, the 
arbitral agreement will be invalidated ipso iure in case the arbitral institution 
designated in the agreement will be closed down by way of a change of law.34 
It is clear that by the above mentioned old rules of the ZPO it was relatively 
easy that by difficulties of the nomination of or by problems with the arbitrators, 
the arbitral contract would be invalidated, that is the possibility of enforcement 
of one's rights by way of arbitration would be terminated. It should be noted 
that these rule-on grounds of the old Art. 585. of the ZPO-are permissive in 
their nature, which means that parties may deviate from them in the arbitral 
contract or in later written agreements by mutual consent.35 
Par. 4 of Art. 587 of the ZPO currently in force contains a somewhat special 
provision which cannot be found either in the Model Law or in the German 
civil procedural act which was taken into consideration during the preparation 
of the Austrian rules. This provision states that one has to determine what kind 
of claim and on what arbitral contract is about to be enforced in the written 
notice on the nomination of the arbitrator.36 Although in practice one can find 
in many cases even without this rule references to the content of the legal 
dispute in notices on the acceptance of the nomination, this rule can be practical 
when there are more arbitral contracts between the parties. According to the 
practice, this rule should not be interpreted over-extensively. It could be 
33
 See: OGH 28. 04. 1998 (253/97). The legal case can be found at 
www.kluwerarbitration.com/caselaw. 
34
 See: SZ 21/66, EvBl 1996/130 (SZ 69/773). Quoted by: Stohanzl: op. cit. 565. 
ъ
 It is expedient to refer to the text of Art. 591. of the old ZPO according to which if 
the arbitrators could not reach a decision, the parties had to be notified, who could request 
the court of justice to invalidate the arbitral contract. 
36
 See: ZPO 587. § (4): Die schriftliche Aufforderung zur Bestellung eines Schieds-
richters hat auch Angaben darüber zu enthalten, welcher Anspruch geltend gemacht wird 
und aufweiche Schiedsvereinbarung sich die Partei beruft.(The written application for the 
appointment of an arbitrator must also state which claim is being asserted and on which 
arbitration agreement the party is pleading.) 
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enough that the type of the claim, moreover the legal relationship on which the 
claim is based will be described, furthermore it is also satisfactory, if there are 
references to the document containing the arbitral contract. '7 In my opinion the 
designation of the type and nature of the claim can be relevant because they 
can affect the party in which arbitrator she will appoint 
Par. 6 of 587 of the ZPO contains a subsidiary rule, stating that the court of 
justice may appoint an arbitrator upon the request of either party in the case the 
nomination of the arbitrator does not come to pass within 4 weeks upon the 
receipt of the notice by any other reason not discussed above, moreover if 
within a reasonable period of time the parties fail to nominate the arbitrators 
according the nomination rules set out by themselves. This subsidiary rule 
reflects presumably the affections of the new French Code of Civil Procedures, 
Par. 2 of Art. 1493 thereof contains a similar solution. 
Although also the Model Faw contains the provision, that either party is 
entitled to turn to the court of justice or other competent authority if parties did 
not agree upon the nomination of the arbitrator, moreover if the appointment 
procedure stipulated by the parties proved to be unsuccessful, the Model Law 
does not allow the approach of courts of justice in case the procedure agreed 
upon by the parties does not end successfully in a reasonable time. 
To define the term reasonable time-angemessene Zeit-\s not an easy task, 
the appropriate interpretation of this not fully determined legal term is the task 
of tribunals. According to Jenny Power the first sentence of Art. 6 of the 
European Convention for Human Rights signed 4lh November 1950 in Rome 
may prove helpful for the interpretation of the term reasonable time.38 The first 
sentence of Art. 6 of the Convention determines the entitlement to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law as a fundamental right. 
I would like to indicate that to the interpretation of the term of reasonable 
time even the international commercial law can provide some help too. The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG)-which in fact does not deal directly with arbitration questions, yet 
nolente-volente it has been applied in numerous arbitration procedures as 
material law-also know the term of reasonable time. '4 The first paragraph of 
17
 See: Power: The Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 30. 
38
 See: Power: op. cit. 30-31 . 
" i n relation to the Vienna CISG see: Mádl. F.-Vékás. L.: Nemzetközi magánjog és 
nemzetközi kapcsolatok joga (International Private Law and Law of International 
Relationships). Budapest, 19923. 378-397; Sándor, T.-Vékás, L.: Nemzetközi adásvétel 
(International Sale of Goods). Budapest, 2005. 
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Art. 43 of the CISG stipulates that the emptor looses his right to rely on the 
warrant provisions of article 41 or article 42 if he does not give notice to the 
seller specifying the nature of the right or claim of the third party within a 
reasonable time after he has become aware or ought to have become aware 
of the right or claim. In accordance with Point b) of Par. 2 of Art. 64 of the 
Convention in cases where the buyer has paid the price, the seller loses the 
right to declare the contract avoided unless he does so in respect of any breach 
other than late performance by the buyer, within a reasonable time. According 
to Par. 7 of Art. 587 of the current ZPO in case the party does make the 
necessary nomination after the commencement of, but before the resolution 
stating the end of the procedure before the court for the appointment of the 
arbitrator, and it is proven by this party, then this very procedure will be 
terminated. This section-in my opinion-emphasizes the party's procedural 
autonomy in arbitration proceedings. (Nota bene, this provision is not included 
in the Model Law.) 
Par. 8 of Art. 587 of the ZPO provides basis for the court appointing the 
arbitrator, by stating that the court of justice-during the course of appointment 
of the arbitrator-should take into account the provisions set out by the arbitral 
contact of the parties, moreover the circumstances which are needed for the 
appointment of independent and impartial arbitrators. It is important to 
emphasize that the ZPO-contrary to the Model Law-does not provide that in 
case of a sole arbitrator or a tribunal the possibility should be taken into 
consideration that the appointed arbitrator should have a different nationality 
from that of the ones which were nominated by the parties. Par. 9 of Art. 587 
of the ZPO provides that there is no appeal against the decision of court in the 
matter of the appointment of the arbitrator. 
The ZPO does contain provisions on the exclusion of arbitrators, yet they do 
not define the terms independence nor impartiality. The rules on the exclusion 
basically follow the stipulations of the Model Law, however they are not 
altogether identical to them. Par. 1 of Art. 588 of the ZPO provides that the 
person who intends to accept the arbitrator's position shall notify every possible 
circumstances which would doubt his independence or impartiality of more-
over which is in contradiction to any agreement of the parties. The arbitrators 
are obliged to disclose without delay any such circumstances from the time of 
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acceptance of the nomination throughout the whole arbitral proceedings, with 
the exception of a previous notification to the parties of the circumstances.40 
The Austrian act does deviate significantly from the Model Law on two 
points. According to Art. 12 of the Model Law, when a person is sought out for 
a possible arbitrator nomination, he should reveal any such circumstance which 
could be sources of well-grounded, justified doubts about his independence 
and impartiality. It is clear that the obligation to notify applies only when the 
given person is intended to accept the nomination. This is in correlation with 
the old text of Art. 579 of the ZPO-to which we have referred to earlier-which 
paragraph stipulates that no one is obliged to accept the arbitrator's position. 
According to Austrian law, every other circumstance shall be revealed which 
could awake doubts about the impartiality and independence, while the Model 
Law provides such obligation only in case of a justified doubt. 
The second section of Art. 588 of the ZPO provides that arbitrator may be 
challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
his impartiality or independence, or that he does not possesses the qualifications 
required by the agreement of the parties. A party may challenge an arbitrator 
appointed by him, or in whose appointment he participated, only for reasons of 
which he becomes aware after the participation in the appointment or after the 
appointment has been made. This later provision clearly takes over the text 
found in the Model Law. According to certain scientific views, not even the 
circumstance that the party to the case did not have any knowledge of the 
ground of challenge because of his considerable negligence would prohibit this 
party to initiate a challenge.41 
Since Austrian law itself does not define the terms of independence and 
impartiality, it is the task of the practice to work out their frames. In general it 
can be noted that the arbitrator's obligation to notify the parties on the 
40
 It is advisable to refer other German text: „.<? 588. (1) Will eine Person ein 
Schiedsrichteramt übernehmen, so hat sie edle Umstände offen zu legen, die Zw eifel an 
ihrer Unparteilichkeit oder Unabhängigkeit wecken können oder der Parteiverein-
barung widersprechen. Ein Schiedsrichter hat vom Zeitpunkt seiner Bestellung an lind 
während des Schiedsverfahrens den Parteien unverzüglich solche Umstände offen zu 
legen, wenn er sie ihnen nicht schon vorher mitgeteilt hat." (When a person intends to 
assume the office of an arbitrator, he shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise 
to doubts as to his impartiality or independence or which are in conflict with the 
agreement of the parties. An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and throughout 
the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose any such circumstances to the 
parties unless they have already been informed of them by him.) 
41
 For this see also: Thomas, H.-Putzo, H.: Zivilprozessordnung. 25. ed. Munich. 
2003. 1036, 5. section. 
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partiality and lack of independence is obvious when he has a personal, 
business or financial interest in connection with the subject of the case, he has 
substantial previous knowledge in relation with the legal dispute, or has a 
personal connection to the parties or incidentally to the other arbitrators.42 
Taking into consideration that the currently normative legal regulation in 
Austria entered into force Is1 July 2006, the consideration of the previous 
regulation can be important from the aspect of the examination of this question 
too. 
The former Par. 1 of Art. 586 of the ZPO stipulated that against arbitrators 
one can file motions of challenge on the same grounds as against a state judge. 
Par. 2 of Art. 586 deviates from the regulation currently in force because it 
states that the party who participated in the nomination of the arbitrator, may 
present a motion of challenge against this arbitrator only for reasons of which 
he becomes aware after the participation in the appointment or after the 
appointment has been made. As quoted above, the current rules that are based 
on the Model Law do not include such expressions, however we have to 
implicitly imply it, since a ground for challenge arises after the appointment, 
evidently the nominating party may only learn this fact after the appointment. 
In Austria, the rules on the challenge of state judges are contained in the 
jurisdiction act of civil procedures, the Jurisdiktionsnorm (JN). The full title of 
the act is Gesetz vom 1. 8. 1895 über die Ausübung der Gerichtsbarkeit und die 
Zuständigkeit der ordentlichen Gerichte in bürgerlichen Rechtssachen. Article 
19 of the JN bears the general title of reasons for omission and challenge of 
judges (Ablehnungsgründe). According to this Article a judge may be challenged 
if (i) if the judge is excluded from proceedings in cases defined by law, 
moreover (ii) if there are satisfactory grounds that doubt the impartiality of the 
judge (Unbefangenheit). The first group can be considered as absolute exclusion 
grounds after the terminology of Hungarian law-by the Austrian legal practice 
real grounds of exclusion (Ausschliessungsgrund)-wh'i\e the later group could 
be named as relative grounds of exclusion, which is known to Austrian legal 
practice as grounds of objections (Ablehnungsgrund). (In the followings we 
will use the terms of Austrian terminology, i.e. exclusion grounds and objection 
grounds.) 
Exclusion rights are contained in Art. 20 of the JN. According to this 
exhaustive list there is a ground of exclusion against the judge if the judge is 
party to the case, co-obligor or co-creditor, or obligor of compensation, the 
spouse or defined relative (step-child, step-parent, adopted child or foster 
42
 See: Holtzmann. H. M.-Neuhaus , J. E.: A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration. Deventer, 1989. 389. 
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parent) of the judge is a party to the case, the judge is or was empowered by 
either party, the judge participated in the making of decision of a lower level 
court of justice, in connection of which the appeal was filed. 
In case of these exclusion grounds the judge, or arbitrator has to be 
excluded from the proceedings without any examination of his independence 
of impartiality. Taking into consideration that during the analysis of the 
exclusions of arbitrators the practice of challenges of state judges can show us 
important directions, it is practical to examine it too.43 According to Austrian 
practice the prejudice is an obstacle raised by psychological mechanisms to an 
impartial decision. Single procedural decisions made during the course of 
proceedings cannot establish a ground for exclusion in general, as far as they 
allow the appearance of the lack of objectivity. A special relationship to any of 
the witnesses can also lead to partiality.44 
Partiality can be determined as well in case one of the parties is a former 
judge who worked at the same court of justice where the given proceedings are 
under way. Partiality was established in another case too, where the judge had 
been a former colleague of one of the parties, and the dispute of the parties 
was known to him by way of informal meetings. The case can be viewed as 
particularly interesting where one judge was determined impartial because he 
shouted at one of the party, after which he left the room without saying goodbye 
and slamming the door behind him.43 The case is somehow more under-
standable where the judge disclosed his opinion on the case to one of the 
parties without the hearing of the other party, whereafter the judge declared 
that he would change his opinion only if the circumstances which he heard 
would have changed in a significant way-he was deemed not to be impartial.4'1 
Naturally there are more cases where the partiality of the judge was not 
established. For example the judge was not partial in the case where one of the 
party was a member to an association where there judge himself was a member 
to, since the judge was not an active member and he had no personal interest 
in the outcome of the legal dispute.47 In an interesting case the judge ' s 
impartiality was determined where his individual opinion in a given legal 
43
 This opinion is shared by: Power: The Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 34. 
44
 In relation with these cases see: Stohanzl: op. cit. 26-27. 
45
 See: LGZ (Landesgericht) Wien, 27. 07. 1993 (72.768) and LGZ Vienna, 6. 10. 
1992. (69.693). The cases quoted by: Liebscher, Ch.: The Healthy Award. Challenge in 
International Commercial Arbitration. The Hague-London-New York. 2003. 275. 
46
 See: LGZ Wien, 27. 02. 1991 (66.834). Quoted by: Liebscher: op. cit. 275. 
47
 See: OGH (Oberster Gerichtshof). 1. 11. 1991 (117). Quoted by: Liebscher: op. 
cit. 275. 
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question was known. , x This deserves special attention since in case of such a 
particular opinion on a very special legal question there is a chance that a case 
that contains that given legal question will be decided by him according to 
his particular opinion, that is it is possible that the psychological attitude required 
for an impartial and objective decision is lacking. As mentioned above, Austrian 
legal practice required a kind of psychological independence for impartiality as 
well, that is why it is questionable whether the viewpoints expressed in two 
legal cases are in full accordance with each other. 
It should be noted that in one arbitration case the arbitrator was found 
impartial in spite of his enraged behaviour. The explanation to this is that the 
reason for the behaviour of the arbitrator was the conduct of the lawsuit of one 
of the parties, yet because of the nature of this conduct the behaviour of the 
arbitrator was deemed acceptable and they saw no reason to determine his 
prejudice.44 Impartiality was found in an other arbitration case where the 
arbitrator had represented one of the parties in a former lawsuit.50 
There is a significant difference between grounds of objections and grounds 
for exclusions in the older Austrian regulation even from the aspect of 
procedural law. While grounds of exclusion (Ausschliessungsgrwul) shall be 
taken into account by the arbitral tribunal ex officio, the objection grounds 
(.Ablehnungsgrund) are to be examined only if any of the parties presents such 
motion.51 
The other significant difference can be seen clearly in one decision of 2005 
of the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice (Oberster Gerichtshof). According to 
the factual background of the case, one of the parties requested the invalidation 
of the arbitral award of the International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber brought on 19lh February 2004. His contestation 
included the argument that he learned of a ground of objection only after the 
delivery of the arbitral award. His petition was denied by the court of first 
instance, the decision of which was later upheld by the court of appeal. The 
Supreme Court of Austria has ruled that the petition was receivable, but it was 
denied on the substance. The Supreme Court expressed the viewpoint that one 
has to make a difference between grounds of objections (Ablehnungsgrund) 
and grounds of exclusion (Ausschliessungsgrund). The petition for invalidation 
of the arbitral award could only be supported by an exclusion ground which 
48
 See: OGH 18. 04. 1989 (110). Quoted by: Liebscher: op. cit. 275. 
44
 See: LGZ Wien 21. 03. 1989 (41.530). Quoted by: Liebscher: op. cit. 275. 
50
 See: OGH 15. 12. 1971 (208/71) The undisclosed verdict is quoted by: Liebscher: 
op. cit. 276. 
51
 More on this: Fasching: Zivilprozessrecht, op. cit. 116. 
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came lately to the knowledge of the party, yet a thus lately learned ground of 
objection cannot establish a claim on invalidation.52 
It should be noted that in the view of Prof. Walter H. Rechberger the 
difference between grounds of exclusion and objection is an exploded theory, 
therefore he deems it appropriate that new arbitration rules avoid such 
distinction in the future.5 ' 
We could find ample examples for the judgement of the impartiality of 
judges and arbitrators in earlier Austrian case law, which should have some 
affections on the practice developed on the basis of laws currently in force. 
With attention to both this and the texts of legal regulations currently in force 
if one is to investigate the questions of impartiality and independence, one 
obviously has to take into consideration the special circumstances and facts of 
the given case.54 
Article 589 of the ZPO in force, contains the rules of exclusion. According 
to the first paragraph parties may agree upon the rules of exclusion freely, 
however they have to be mindful of the possibility of the legal remedy of the 
third paragraph. In case parties do not stipulate the rules of exclusion, then 
rules in Par. 2 of Art. 589 shall apply. According to these rules, the party who 
presents the motion of challenge has to file the petition containing the grounds 
of exclusion to the arbitration tribunal within 4 weeks of obtaining knowledge 
of the composition of the tribunal or of the ground of exclusion. Should the 
challenged arbitrator not withdraw from his office, or the other party does not 
agree with the exclusion, the arbitral tribunal-with the affected arbitrator-shall 
decide upon the challenge. 
Par. 3 of Art. 589 provides that in case the challenge proves unsuccessful, 
the challenging party may appeal to the court of justice for a decision on the 
challenge within 4 weeks upon receipt of the decision. There is no appeal 
against the decision of court. The procedure before the court is no obstacle to 
the proceedings and decision-making of the arbitral tribunal-the arbitrator 
challenged included. With attention to the 1" Par. of Art. 589 there is no 
deviation from the provisions of the Par. 3, not even in case the parties agree 
upon special procedures of challenge. 
The above written rules of the ZPO actually take over the stipulations of 
the Model Law with the difference that according to the Model Law the motion 
for challenge shall be presented within 15 days, and the appeal for the court of 
52
 See: OGH 26. 1. 2005 OGH 70b314/04h. Can be found at http://fremuth-wolf. 
com/arbaut/newsletter/ index.php?archiv_id=22. 
53
 See: Rechberger: Einführung in das neue... op. cit. 10. 
54
 See: Power: The Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 34. 
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justice shall be filed within 30 days upon receipt of the declining decision on 
the challenge. 
Previous to the acceptance of the current provisions of the ZPO two 
professors of the Vienna University, Prof. Peter Böhm and Prof. Ena-Martis 
Bajons has presented a commentary to the draft statue in their letter of 22nd 
June 2005 addressed to the Justice Ministry. According to the letter, the rule 
of Par. 2 of Art. 589 of the ZPO-which allowed the challenged arbitrator to 
participate in the decision on the challenge-is in contradiction to an important 
principle of Rechtstaat, that is no one is to decide in one's own case. The authors 
of the letter intended to take the edge of this critical remark inasmuch that the 
legal remedy in Par. 3 of Art. 589, the revision by court of justice represents a 
possibility to correct the decision brought in this peculiar situation.55 
Although parties are granted with a relatively great freedom in regulating 
the rules of exclusion, it deserves noting that numerous arbitral institutes, like 
the Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber presents 
detailed regulations on relation to which body of the arbitral institution will be 
entitles to decide in challenge procedures. (We will discuss these rules in 
details later on.) 
We have to note, that Par. 3 of Art. 601 of the new Austrian Arbitration Act 
follows Par. 3 of Art. 1049 of the German Code of Civil Procedures. The 
Austrian law provides here that experts appointed by the arbitral tribunal are 
subject of the stipulations of Art. 588 and Par. 1 and 2 of Art. 589 of the act. 
This means that the legal institution of exclusion and the challenge procedure 
apply for experts as well, but with the important difference that Par. 3 of Art. 
589-which establishes the legal remedy by court of justice against an unsuc-
cessful motion of challenge-does not apply in the procedure of challenge against 
experts.56 This entire means that the lack of impartiality and independence of 
experts do not establish a basis for the invalidation of the arbitral award. It is 
relevant too that this procedure of challenge applies only on experts appointed 
by the tribunal. Thus private experts of the parties cannot be challenged. The 
probative value of reports of such experts are to be evaluated appropriately by 
the proceeding tribunal itself.57 
Although it is not implied in the text of Par. 2 of 589 expressively that in 
case no challenge was made before the tribunal, the appeal to a court of justice 
is excluded in this aspect, international scientific literature argues that the 
55
 For a full text see http://www.parIinkom.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/pg/ 
DE/XII/ME/ME_00280_21/ FNAMEOR1G_04. 
Ml
 Zeiler-Steindl: The New Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 64-65. 
77
 For this see: Power: The Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 75-76. 
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possible enforcement of claims before a court of justice has to be preceded a 
motion of challenge before the arbitral tribunal, since the reason for this is to 
avoid the lengthening of arbitration procedures."8 
The legal remedy of court of law in connection with the challenge has its 
goal in the revision of the decision of the arbitral tribunal. It has an increased 
importance that this petition is to be filed to the court of law within 4 weeks. 
Because if no appeal was to the court of law within 4 weeks of the receipt of 
the decision dismissing the challenge, or the court of law denies the petition, 
then there is no place for a petition which is based upon Par. 2 of Art. 611 of 
the ZPO and which is aimed at the invalidation of the arbitral award." ' 
It is clear from the above written that the deadline of the filing the remedial 
appeal in subject of the challenge may be passed only with forfeiture of right. 
It deserves noting that previous to the framing of the current arbitration 
regulation there were concepts-not supported in the course of legislation 
later on-which deemed in inadvisable to tie this deadline to loss of rights. 
This was reasoned by them-as showed by Christian Koller as well-that the 
lack of independence and impartiality could mean even the infringement of 
public order (onlre public), and thus it is iniquitous that in case the missing of 
the deadline of the appeal to the court of law one cannot contest the arbitral 
award on this basis.60 
It is important to emphasize that Par. 3 of Art. 589 of the ZPO includes a 
rule which cannot be renounced, that is, the civil remedy cannot be excluded in 
this question. This is in full conformity with Par. 579 of the ZPO, according to 
which parties may renounce the right of objection only against measures of the 
arbitral tribunal, if the rules of arbitration of the ZPO allow deviation in 
relation to this measure, that is there is no right of renouncement in connection 
with the cogent rules.61 The obvious purpose of this rules is the assurance of 
the neutrality of the arbitration proceedings. 
58
 See: Holtzmann-Neuhaus: A Guide to the UNCITRAL... op. cit. 37. 
54
 On the basis of Par. 2 of Art. 611 of the ZPO one can request the invalidation of the 
arbitral award if the setting up of or the composition of the arbitral tribunal was contrary to 
the approvable agreement of the parties or in contradiction with the provisions of Art. 611. 
' "See: Koller, Ch.: Das neue österreichische Schiedsrecht - Die wichtigsten 
Neuerungen des Schiedsrög. 2006 im Überblick. Teil I. Juristische Ausbildung und 
Praxisvorbereitung. 2005/2006/03. 186 : i p. ) 
61
 Art. 579 of the ZPO stipulates as follows: „Hat das Schiedsgericht einer 
Verfahrensbestimmimg dieses Abschnitts, von der die Parteien abweichen können, oder 
einem vereinbarten Verfahrenserfordernis des Schiedsverfahrens nicht entsprochen, so 
kann eine Partei den Mangel später nicht mehr geltend machen, wenn sie ihn nicht 
unverzüglich ab Kenntnis oder innerhalb der dafür vorgesehenen Frist gerügt hat." (Where 
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The prevention of the tactic to prolong the arbitration proceedings appears 
basically in two places in the part of Austrian arbitration law discussed here. 
The rule also supported by the practice of law according to which in the event 
the party does not present the challenge to the arbitral tribunal, but uses it 
only in the civil procedure on the invalidation of the arbitral award, then the 
challenge cannot be accepted, is obviously preventing the vindication of the 
tactic that a reason for exclusion is in fact used as a "time bomb" by the party 
and he may use it after the declaration of the arbitral award. Beside that this 
tactic has its purpose in the prolongation of the proceedings, it is in itself in 
contradiction with the legal institution of exclusion. In my opinion the legal 
institution of exclusion should be in relation with the independent and impartial 
arbitrators proceeding in arbitration procedures, and not with the exploitation 
of the motion of challenge by a party in a time deemed as favourable for him, 
when an unfavourable award has been made. Jean-Pierre Ancel-in whose 
opinion state courts of justice have key roles in impeding tactics aimed at the 
prolongation of the proceedings-refers to French legal case examples where 
the lack of independence of arbitrators only appeared in the arbitral award. In 
this case the motion for exclusion (furthermore for the determination of lack of 
independence) should be presented to the court which is entitled to decide on 
the legal redress against the arbitral award.62 
A further obstacle to tactics aimed at the prolongation of arbitration 
procedures can be found in Par. 3 of Art. 589 of the current ZPO, according to 
which the arbitral tribunal may decide the case in the merits even if there is a 
revision procedure in its course on the decision dismissing the challenge of one 
of the arbitrators. It is another question of course that the arbitral tribunal may 
decide to wait with for the decision of the civil court of law, which is 
especially meaningful if the court of law excludes the arbitrator, since this 
decision would serve as a ground for the invalidation of the arbitral award.63 
According to the older-already invalidated-Austrian arbitration rules an 
arbitral body of the arbitral institution was entitled to decide on the challenge. 
the arbitral tribunal has not complied with a procedural provision of this part from which 
the parties may derogate, or with an agreed procedural requirement of the arbitral 
proceedings, a party shed be deemed to have waived his right to object if he does not 
object without undue delay after having become aware of the failure, or within the 
provided time limit.) 
62
 Jean-Pierre Ancel refers to the verdict reached in March 1998 in the Excelsior 
Film case by the 1st Civil Department of the French Cour de Cassation. See: Ancel, J. 
P.: Measures Against Dilatory Tactics: The Cooperation Between Arbitrators and the 
Courts. In: 1CCA Congress series no. 9 (Paris/1999). 420. 
63
 See also: Power: The Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 38. 
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However there were no civil redresses before state courts against the decision 
on the challenge during the course of the arbitration proceedings. (This rather 
strict regulation differs from other Western European state's-like that of 
Germany-relevant provisions.) In the case however the challenge was dismissed 
without any grounds, the invalidation of the arbitral award could be requested 
on the basis of Point 4 of Par. 1 of Art. 595 of the old ZPO.64 Although the 
Supreme Court of Austria took the viewpoint that the grounds listed in Art. 
595 of the ZPO, on which the invalidation of the award may be requested, is an 
exhaustive list, there are such opinions in scientific literature that in case of 
other severe breaches of procedural rules not listed in Art. 595. of the ZPO the 
invalidation of the award may be requested by virtue of infringement of public 
order.65 Point 6 of Par. 1 of Art. 595 of the older ZPO included the public-
order clause, truly not by this definition, yet with the same interpretation.66 The 
prevailing Point 5 of Par. 2 of Art. 611 which deals with the invalidation of the 
arbitral award expressively contains that the invalidation of the arbitral award 
may be requested by virtue of its contradiction with the foundations of 
Austrian legal order, with public order (ordre public) in case the arbitral 
proceedings were conducted in such a way.67 
Concerning the invalidation of the arbitral award in the prevailing Austrian 
law from the aspect of our theme, we have to underline the followings. Par. 1 
of Art. 611 of the ZPO provides that by action of civil law only the invalida-
tion of the arbitral award may be requested. The petition may be filed within 3 
months upon receipt of the award. In respect of Point 4 of Par. 2 of Art. 611 of 
54
 Point 4 of Par. 1 of Art. 595 of the old ZPO contained the following provision: „§. 
595. (1) Der Schiedsspruch ist aufzuheben ...4. wenn die Ablehnung eines Schiedsrichters 
vom Schiedsgericht ungerechtfertigt zurückgewiesen worden ist." 
65
 See: OGH, 18. 11. 1982 (1983). Quoted and commented by: Liebseher: The Healthy 
Award, op. cit. 295. 
ы
' Point 6 of Par. 1 of Art. 595 of the older ZPO basically stipulates on infringement of 
the principles of Austrian legal order, furthermore that of mandatory applicable legal 
regulations in relation with the invalidation of arbitrator awards: ,.§. 595. (1) Der 
Schiedsspruch ist aufzuheben ... 6. wenn der Schiedsspruch mit den Grundwertungen der 
österreichischen Rechtsordnung unvereinbar ist oder gegen zwingende Rechtsvorschriften 
verstösst, deren Anwendung auch bei einem Sachverhalt mit Auslandsberührung nach § 35 
IPR Gesetz durch eine Rechtswahl der Parteien nicht abbendungen werden kann." 
bl
 Point 5. Par. 2 of Art. 611 of the current ZPO contains the term of infringement of 
public order as follows: „611. § (2) Ein Schiedsspruch ist aufzuheben, wenn ... 5. das 
Schiedsverfahren in einer Weise durchgeführt wurde, die Grundwertungen der österreichischen 
Rechtsordnung (ordre public) widerspricht." [An award shall be set aside i f . . . 5. the arbitral 
proceedings were conducted in a manner that conflicts with the basic principles of the 
Austrian legal system (ordre public).] 
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the ZPO the invalidation of the award may be requested in case the party had 
not received appropriate notice on the nomination of arbitrators or on the 
arbitral proceedings, or by other grounds he had been unable to present his 
case. As noted before, according to Point 4 of Par. 2 of Art. 611 of the ZPO 
one can contest the arbitral award in case the setting up (Bildung) or 
composition (.Zusammensetzung) of the tribunal was not in accordance with 
the law or the acceptable agreements of the parties.68 As referred above, in case 
the challenging party did not appealed to a civil court of justice against the 
dismissing decision of the arbitral body, or if it was denied by the court of 
justice, then on this ground on the basis of Point 4 of Par. 2 of Art. 611 of the 
ZPO he cannot request the invalidation of the arbitral award. 
It is important to note that this regulation of the ZPO differs somewhat 
from the provisions of the Model Law. That is to say Sub-point (iv) of Point a) 
of Par. 2 of Art. 34 of the Model Law does not only allow invalidation if the 
establishment or composition of the tribunal did not comply with legal 
regulations or appropriate stipulations of the parties, but in the case the arbitral 
proceedings itself were on contradiction with these rules as well. The Austrian 
ZPO contained this possibility-that is the request of invalidation on grounds of 
contra legem proceedings-in another place, namely Point 5 Par. 2 of Art. 611 
of the ZPO, which was quoted above. 
In case Point 4 of Par. 2 of Art. 611 of the ZPO applies-taking into 
consideration the abovementioned-it is enough to prove that the establishment 
or composition of the tribunal did not comply with the rules, thus it is 
unnecessary that all this would have any affection on the decision on merits.64 
Thus here Austrian law provides significant legal protection for guarantees in 
relation with the composition of the arbitral tribunal, contrary for example to 
German law. Namely, Sub-point d. of Point 1 of Par. 2 of Art. 1059 of the 
German Code of Civil Procedures (Deutsche Zivilprozessordnung) provides 
that for the request on invalidation of arbitral awards, a presumed affection on 
the final award of the irregular arbitral proceedings or of irregular composition 
of the arbitral tribunal is also needed.70 
68
 See: „611. § (2) Ein Schiedsspruch ist aufzuheben, wenn ...4. die Bildung oder 
Zusammensetzung des Schiedsgerichts einer Bestimmung dieses Abschnitts oder einer 
zulässigen Vereinbarung der Parteien widerspricht." (An award shall be set aside if:...4 
the constitution or composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with a 
provision of this part or cm admissible agreement of the parties. ) 
69
 Cf.: Power: The Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 115. 
70
 Sub-point d. of Point 1 of Par. 2 of Art. 1059 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedures provides: „§. 1059. (2) Eins Schiedsspruch kann nur aufgehoben werden, wenn 
der Antragsteller begründet geltend macht, dass ... d) die Bildung des Schiedsgerichts oder 
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The new Austrian arbitration law for the most part regulates the early 
termination of the mandate of arbitrators in the basis of the Model Law in Art. 
590 of the ZPO. The mandate of an arbitrator terminates when the arbitrator 
withdraws from office, moreover the parties mutually agree on his termination. 
In accordance with Par. 2 of Art. 590 any of the parties may appeal to a court 
of law to request the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator in case the 
arbitrator becomes incapacitated to proceed with his task or he is in unjustified 
delay with the fulfilment of his obligations and the arbitrator does not 
withdraw from office, the parties cannot agree upon the termination of the 
mandate of the arbitrator, or the arrangements stipulated by the parties for this 
case does not prove successful. It is important that in case the arbitrator 
withdraws from office according to Par. 1 of Art. 590 or after the filing of a 
motion of challenge against him, does not mean the acceptance of any of the 
exclusion grounds or grounds listed in Par. 2 of Art. 590 This in fact provides 
an opportunity for the arbitrator to leave office without any possible further 
impeachments or even any loss of prestige.71 
Art. 591 of the ZPO contains stipulations on the election of deputy 
arbitrators which are identical to the rules of the nomination and appointment 
of arbitrators. A deputy arbitrator is obviously elected in the case when the 
mandate of the previous arbitrator is terminated. Par. 2 of Art 591 of the ZPO 
includes a rule on reasonable and economical conduct of the proceedings, 
inasmuch in case unless otherwise agreed by the parties, arbitrators shall 
continue with the proceedings taking into account the insofar finished previous 
procedural stages and results, including the minutes of the hearings. Naturally 
at the consideration of previous minutes-which were created in the presence of 
the arbitrator who left the tribunal-it is advisable to regard the grounds on 
which the arbitrator left office, this could affect the later evaluation of these 
minutes as well. It should be noted that this above explained rule of Par. 2 of 
Art. 591 of the ZPO cannot be found in the Model Law. (This provision is 
missing from the Hungari an Act on Arbitration, the Act LXXI of 1994, too.) 
das schiedsrichterliche Verfahren einer Bestimmung dieses Buches oder einer zulässigen 
Vereinbarung der Parteien nicht entsprochen hat. und anzunehmen ist. dass sich dies auf 
den Schiedsspruch ausgewirkt hat...". The official translation of the German text: "1059. 
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside only if the applicant shows sufficient cause that ... 
d) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with a provision of this Book or with an admissible agreement of the parries and this 
presumably affected the award." See: Berger. К. P.: The New German Arbitration Law in 
International Perspective. Forum Internationale, 26 (2000) 36. 
71
 For this see: Power: The Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 41. 
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Summarizing the above written it can be emphasized that the new Austrian 
arbitration legal regulation differs from the earlier regulation on numerous 
points. In the matter of the nomination and exclusion of arbitrators the current 
Austrian rules contain more provisions which were not included in the older 
regulation and which we intended to sum up above. 
Austrian legislators have taken into account to a great extent the Model 
Law in the framing of this legal regulation, yet there are numerous important 
questions even from the point of our theme where a different set of rules apply. 
The new Austrian arbitration rules obviously purpose to make proceedings 
smoother and more effective. The interpretation of the law by the legal practice 
will be obviously determined by the case law developed on the basis of these 
provisions. At the same time it is essential to refer to that the practice of law in 
its judgement of independence and impartiality will definitely take into 
account the case law born under the earlier regulation too, being an other 
reason why we deemed the comparison of the earlier legal rules and judicature 
with the current provisions law important. 
As stated before, one of the most important arbitration institution in Austria is 
the International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Lederal Economic Chamber. 
Lor this end, it is justified to give a short analysis of the rule pertaining to the 
arbitration. 
The Rules of Arbitration currently in force were accepted by the expanded 
presidency of the Austrian Lederal Economic Chamber on 3rd March 2006, and 
entered into force Is' July 2006 at the same time as the ZPO novel, replacing 
the older rules of proceedings accepted by the general assembly of the 
Austrian Lederal Economic Chamber on 30,h November 2000 and entered into 
force 1st January 2001.72 
The so-called new Vienna Rules were framed in accordance with the above 
reviewed reform of arbitration law. Art. 7 deals with the appointment of 
arbitrators. According to Point 1 of Art. 7 the parties are free to agree in 
appointing the arbitrators. Any person having legal capacity-irrespective of 
nationality-may be an arbitrator, provided the parties have not agreed upon 
any special additional qualification requirements. This later provision was 
missing from the Vienna Rules in force till 30 ,h June 2006, Point 1 of Art. 5 
thereof did not contain any information on the qualification of arbitrators. At 
2
 Both rules of proceedings can be found at www.wko.at/arbitration. 
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the same time the previous rules which were in force till 1st January 2000 
provided that arbitrators shall possess legal, commercial and other, relevant 
scientific qualifications and experience.73 The current procedural rules trust 
fully on the discretion parties whether arbitrators shall possess special knowledge 
or experience, the rules of proceedings only grants the possibility that parties 
may agree upon this question as well. 
The currently in force Vienna Rules provide in relation with the nomination 
of arbitrators that they are to make a written statement as to their impartiality 
and independence, moreover that they submit themselves to the Vienna Rules 
of Arbitration. This requirement-also known to other international rules of 
arbitration-was missing form the former set of rules, it only contained the 
principle of the requirements of independence and impartiality.74 
The current Vienna Rules-contrary to the earlier rules-prescribe in Point 5 
of Art. 7 a disclosure requirement on the independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators. This rule is based on Par. 1 of Art. 588 of the ZPO and Par. 1 of 
Art. 12 of the Model-act with the following differences. 
Contrary to the provisions of the ZPO, Point 5 of Art. 7 of the Vienna Rules 
follows the Model-act in respect that the disclosure obligation of the arbitrator 
is sets in when he is approached in connection with his possible appointment, 
and not when he is about to accept the office. On the other hand Vienna Rules 
follow the ZPO inasmuch the arbitrator shall disclose any circumstances likely 
to give rise to doubts as to his impartiality or independence, while the Model 
Law-as we noted above-prescribes this obligation in case of a well-founded 
doubt. According to the Vienna Rules the arbitrator shall disclose any 
circumstances hat are in conflict with the agreement of the parties. 
Point 3 of Art. 7 of the current Vienna Rules-similar to previous regula-
tions-includes that very important rule which a member of the Presidency 
Board of the Arbitral Centre may act only as Chairman of an arbitral tribunal 
or sole arbitrator.75 
In relation to the nomination of arbitrators it should be underlined that 
pursuant to the Vienna Rules, either a sole arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal 
consisting of three arbitrators shall proceed. When no such agreement has been 
made and the parties do not agree on the number of arbitrators, the Board shall 
73
 See: Oppenheim. К.: Választottbíróság Ausztriában. (Arbitration Court in Austria.) 
Magyar Jog. 40 (1993) 733. 
4
 The Rules of Proceedings of ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) prescribe a 
similar statement requirement in Par. 2 Art. 7, furthermore Article 5.3 of the Rules of 
Proceedings of the London LCIA (London Court of International Arbitration). 
73
 in relation to this see: Baier-Trofaier: Austria, op. cit. 23. 
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determine whether the dispute is to be decided by a sole arbitrator or by an 
arbitral tribunal on the basis of Point 2 of Art. 14 of the Vienna Rules. In that 
context, the Board shall take into consideration in particular the difficulty of 
the case, the magnitude of the amount in dispute and the interest of the parties 
in a rapid and cost-effective decision. In the event that proceedings before a 
sole arbitrator are decided upon, the parties shall be requested to agree on a 
sole arbitrator within thirty days after service of the request. In the lack of such 
agreement the arbitrator shall be appointed by the Board. 
Point 4 of Art. 14 of the Vienna Rules prescribes that if the dispute is to be 
decided by an arbitral tribunal, and the party that has not yet nominated an 
arbitrator within thirty days, then the arbitrator shall be appointed by the Board. 
This point has been changed significantly since previous rules. Point 4 of Art. 9 
of the earlier Rules of Proceedings applied a distinction between the claimant 
and defendant in this question containing a serious consequence. If the 
Claimant has not appointed an arbitrator within 30 days after service of notice 
and does not expressly leave the appointment to the Board, the case must be 
deleted from the list of pending cases, and only if the Defendant fails to 
appoint an arbitrator within that time-limit, shall the arbitrator be automatically 
appointed by the Board. Thus earlier rules demonstrated more vigorously in 
this respect that fundamentally it is in the sphere of interest of the claimant that 
the arbitration proceedings are conducted. 
The challenge of arbitrators is stipulated in Art. 16 of the Vienna Rules. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 16 follows Par. 2 of Art. 588 of the ZPO and Par. 2 of 
Art. 12 of the Model-act with the difference that while these later set of rules 
the lack of qualification agreed by the parties establishes a ground of 
exclusion, pursuant to the Vienna Rules-along with the doubt arisen in relation 
with the question of independence or impartiality-circumstances that are in 
conflict with the agreement of the parties produce a ground of exclusion. 
Vienna Rules stipulate similar to the ZPO and the Model-act that under what 
conditions is a party entitled to challenge an arbitrator in whose appointment 
this party participated. 
In this relation the current Vienna Rules contain a more precise provision 
than earlier ones. Point 1 of Art. 11 of the earlier Rules of Proceedings 
included laconically that an arbitrator may be challenged if there are sufficient 
grounds for doubting his independence or impartiality.7'1 
76
 It should be noted that according to previous rules-pursuant to Point 3 of Art. 11 of 
the Rules of Proceedings-a challenge is inadmissible if the party making the challenge has 
taken part in the proceedings notwithstanding the knowledge which it already had or ought 
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Points 2, 3 and 4 of Article 16 apply on the rules of challenge. If a party 
challenges an arbitrator, it must without delay inform the Secretary General 
thereof, stating the grounds for the challenge. Should the challenged arbitrator 
not withdraw from his office, the Board shall decide upon the challenge on the 
basis of the particulars in the challenging motion and the evidence attached 
thereto. Before the Board makes its decision, the Secretary General must obtain 
the comments of the arbitrator challenged and of the other parties. The Board 
can also request comments from other persons. 
In spite of the motion of challenge the arbitral proceedings may continue. 
It is important however that an award may not be rendered until after the 
final and binding decision of the Board. Nevertheless, we should be aware 
here of Point 3 of Art. 589 of the act on arbitration, on the basis thereof an 
unsuccessful procedure of challenge can be appealed.77 
The current Vienna Rules contain in relation to the exclusion new stipulations 
which were missing from earlier set of rules. Article 21 of the prevailing 
Vienna Rules allows that rules applicable to the challenging of arbitrators shall 
apply accordingly to the challenging of experts appointed by the sole arbitrator 
or by the arbitral tribunal. The challenge of experts shall be decided on by the 
sole arbitrator or by the arbitral tribunal. 
These provisions of the Vienna Rules cannot be described as exclusive in 
the field of international commercial arbitration. It deserves special notice that 
we can find similar decisions in Swiss case law. In one case the Supreme Court 
of Switzerland has extended the requirements of impartiality and independence 
onto experts appointed by the arbitral tribunal.74 
In the light of the above written it is unmistakably clear that the new 
Vienna Rules intend to comply to a great extent with the rules of Austrian 
arbitration law in force since 1st July 2006. At the same time it is important 
that the rules of arbitration of the chamber preserved numerous particular 
features in subject matter of nomination and challenging of arbitrators. The 
new Vienna Rules and the practice of law relying on them will presumably 
contribute significantly to that the several entities of international economy in 
the future will choose Vienna as the and the International Arbitral Centre of 
the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber place of arbitration and place of the 
settlement of their legal disputes as well. 
to have had of the grounds of challenge relied upon, or if the party making the challenge 
notified the grounds of challenge with undue delay. 
For this see: Zei ler-Steindl: The New Austrian Arbitration... op. cit. 47. 
78
 See: BG (Bundesgerichtshof) 28. 04. 2000. The resolution is quoted by: Liebscher: 
The Healthy Award, op. cit. 214. 
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Differing Mentalities of Civil Law and Common Law? 
The Issue of Logic in Law 
1. Mentality and Legal Culture 
In recent-day comparative literature, the term of mentalités juridiques is being 
used as the key through which the underlying basic difference between Civil 
Law and Common Law can be best shown.1 This term is to englobe the entire 
view within which law is conceived at all, is named and also put in whatever 
intellectual context. So it affords one of those paths or aspects for an approach 
that may be instrumental for a comparative investigation of legal cultures in 
general and the dilemma of their future convergence or divergence in particular." 
2. Naming of Basic Units in a Normative Stuff 
From the wide range of linguistic expressions and other objectifications used 
in the direction of behaviour,2 the dilemma of rule and/or norm is not a 
scholarly issue in any direct sense. Neither the dilemma nor its resolution can 
Scientific Adviser, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
H-1250 Budapest, P.O. Box 25: Professor at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University of 
Hungary, Director of its Institute for Legal Philosophy, H-1428 Budapest 8, P.O. Box 6. 
E-mail: varga@jog.mta.hu 
1
 An expression by Pierre Legrand. 
2
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming into a 
Genuine Discipline. Acta Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007) 2, 95-113 and Legal Traditions? In 
Search for Families and Cultures of Law. Acta Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005) 3—4, 177-197. 
3
 To quote just one author from the rich international literature covering the topic, 
Opalek, K.: Theorie der Direktiven und der Nonnen. Wien-New York. 1986, 88 lists norms, 
rules and principles, alongside with persuasion, wish, proposal, request, supplication, advice, 
warning, as well as recommendation and encouragement, as directions of behaviour. In such 
a broad sense, see, f rom the Hungarian literature, Szotáczky, M.: A normák eredete és 
funkciója (Genese und Funktion der Normen). In: Ádám, A. (ed.): Tanulmányok Szamel 
Lajos tiszteletére. Pécs, 1989. 227-238. 
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in fact be derived either from the historical etymology of the relevant words or 
from investigations into the history of basic legal ideas, inspiring or merely 
reflecting one or another language use. Clear-cut distinctions of meanings 
regarding these two terms are not even specified either by various historical 
periods or by the historical cultures of law and legal thought developed in a 
diversity so far. Although their regular usages may be different compared to 
each other, in most attempts at a theoretical definition they are still decisively 
referred to as synonyms,4 as concepts able to substitute each other nearly 
completely.5 Therefore the issue whether one or another usage is preferred by a 
given language and underlying culture depends for the most part on mere habits 
of parlance. However, such habits may then (through the latently creative and 
socially constructive force of the consolidated and consolidating usage of 
language) get organised into certain (historically self-solidifying) blocks. And 
from then on, these blocks may in their own manners generate additional 
meanings, with specifications according to contexts, which may on their part 
also eventually lead to kinds of separation providing some basis for added 
theoretisation. 
3. Terms of 'Rule' & 'Norm' 
The term 'rule' ['règle', 'Regel', 'regola', 'regia'] originates from the Latin 
'regula', while 'norm' stems from the Latin 'norma' as used to denote a tool 
applied by masons and carpenters in ancient Rome to draw the "carpenter's 
square".'1 Or, "A regula, or rule, is used to draw straight lines.", and "A norma is 
used to make right angles." That is, "The carpenter's norms and rules (meaning 
4
 For instance, "The rule is a synonym for 'norm' or 'directive' taken as the 
declaration of a prescriptive function."-writes W[róblewski], J.: Règle. In: Arnaud. A.-J. 
(dir.): Dictionnaire encyclopédique de Théorie et de Sociologie juridique. Paris, 1988, 346. 
An even simpler solution is proposed by the basically American The Philosophy of Law An 
Encyclopedia. New York-London. 1999, with the entry 'Rule' referred to-but speaking 
about nothing but - 'Norms ' eventually. 
This is illustrated by the way how in case even of an otherwise minutely precise 
author-e.g., Pavcnik, M.: Pravno pravilo. Zbornik znanstvenih razprav [Ljubljana] (1995). 
217-240 and in his Die Rechtsnorm. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 83 (1997) 4. 
463-482- , one term is simply replaced by the other when changing between Slovenian and 
German languages. For a Hungarian and German inter-change, see also Peschka in note 30. 
6
 Online Etymology Dictionary< <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/norm>. 
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the tools) make right-norms make orthogonal and rules makes straight-that 
which they shape."7 
In its present sense, 'norm'-mostly in derivatives such as 'normal, 'normality', 
etc.-is a product of 19th-century development, differentiating and homogenising 
human conditions as well as social processes and attitudes of production, for 
adjusting them to previously set standards. To denote nothing but 'standard', 
the term 'norm' was first used in pedagogy, and then, in health care, and only later 
on, in the course of the same century, it got also extended to standardisation in 
production and technology, for that phases and successive steps of the same 
industrial processes can be isolated, defined, combined and re-organised as a 
series of distinct patterns.5 
Let us mention as an illustrative example of incidentalities in the history of 
the usage of words that, in its original meaning, 'rule' once served-instead of 
the causal succession meant by the expression of "if [...], then [...]", implying 
conditional repetition firstly describing, and then, partly prescribing those facts 
which may in their conceptual generality constitute a case, and partly also 
ascribing a sanction to them-to express some basic backgrounding wisdom 
or synthesising adage, summarising the versatility of Roman jurisprudents 
indefatigably searching for the principles of a justifiably right-and preferredly 
exclusively right-solution.4 
According to its philosophical definition, the rule is a "formula indicating or 
prescribing what is to be done in a certain situation", noting in this very context 
that its prescriptive use affords a criterion with selective force and that no such 
use shall be overshadowed by those recently spread constative uses which are-
mostly as connected with the senses of 'regular/irregular', or 'regularity', and 
so on-worded as if they were merely descriptive.1" 
On the other hand, norm is the "concrete type or abstract formula of what 
has to be done, at the same time including a value judgement in the form of 
some kind of ideal or rule, aim or model", adding to the definition above that 
Pattaro, E.: The Law and the Right A Reappraisal of the Reality that Ought to be. 
Dordrecht, 2007, 62. 
8
 See, e.g., Foucault, G.: Surveiller et punir. Paris, 1975, 186 and Canguilhem, G.: Le 
normal et le pathologique 4e éd. Paris, 1979. 175. 
4
 For more details, see Varga, Cs.: A jogi gondolkodás paradigmái. 2nd ed., Budapest, 
2004. 33-34, enlarging explanations he afforded in his Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal 
Thinking. Budapest. 1999. 
10
 Lalande, A.: Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie [ 19261, Paris, 1991, 
906-907. According to Ota Weinberger's similar (and somewhat simplifying) formulation-
in his The Role of Rules. Ratio Juris 1 (1988) 3, 224-240, especially para. 1, 225.- , "Rules 
are advice to be used in determining action." 
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norms are mostly formulated in order to express some logical thought or act of 
will, or free representation, or emotion or ideal of beauty." 
When, accordingly, norm is taken as "synonym of ' rule ' " (with the latter 
regarded as somewhat "more general"" or "more wide and generic"13), it is 
remarkable that in everyday usage the rule is still primarily an explicit or posited 
formulation-as the in-itself neutral and historically accidental outcome-of 
some 'rule-enactment' or 'regulation', while the norm is either the logical (i.e., 
logified) form of the above or the logical (and normative) prerequisite of the 
act of regulation itself. 
This explains why 'rules' may either be ones of experience" or, specifiedly, 
ones of a game, e.g., of the law (expressed as Spielregeln & Rechtsregeln). All 
this is unproblematic so far as we are only interested in them as the manifesta-
tion of (or access to) something else, taken as more basic. As to its apparent 
pair, 'norms' enter the scene when the rule's intended or probable notation 
becomes problematic and requires further investigation in a way that out of the 
rule as the presentation of something made accessible to us, we start searching 
for gaining an identifiable message by means of the former 's logical (etc.) 
analysis. 
It is surely not for mere chance that we can hardly speak of, for instance, 
'creation of norms'; and we only speak of 'provision of norms' when we intend 
to emphasise either the field as being "normed" (ordained under regulation) or 
the artificiality of the said regulation. Notwithstanding, present-day literature 
suggests the idea as if the norm separated out of the rule by its mere linguistic 
formulation as a logical proposition. Actually, however, it is not the rule but 
the norm alone that is considered and also treated in an onto-epistemological 
(and, alongside with it, also psychological and logical, etc.) perspective, in 
order to be able to interpret it both as an enunciation" and as the contents of 
denotation (inherent, among others, also in a psychologically examinable act 
of will).16 
That what has been explicated above seems to be substantiated by the fact 
that while in English language, for instance, historical dictionaries specify 
11
 T[roper], M. & L|ochak|, D.: Norme. In: Dictionnaire encyclopédique...[note 4], 691. 
E.g., Perrin, J.-F.: Règle. In: Archives de Philosophie du Droit 35: Vocabulaire 
fondamental du droit. Paris, 1990, 245-255. 
13
 Borsellino, P.: Norms. In: The Philosophy of Law An Encyclopedia [note 4], 5 9 6 -
598, especially on 596. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 See, above all. Alchourrón. С. E.-Bulygin, E.: Normative Systems. Wien-New York, 
1971. 
16
 See, primarily, Kelsen, H.: Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. Wien, 1979. 
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more than twenty entries of meaning and fields of application for the usage of 
the single word 'rule', each of these are still related exclusively to the avail-
ability or prevalence of a given measure of behaviour, either indicating or just 
carrying and/or enforcing it, without any of them claiming even incidentally 
that the rule itself will serve as the denotatum (with the objectivation itself 
or its communication embodying for us this very measure either through its 
textuality and grammatical make-up or owing to-as reconstruable f rom- the 
logical interrelationship among its elements).17 Moreover, the pervasive strength 
of the English language mentality is excellently shown by the fact that not 
even the amazingly late and rather slow spread of the word 'norm' provoked 
any change. Namely in English, quite until linguistic (later on: linguistico-
logical) analysis grew into the main trend of moral philosophising in the first 
decade of the 20lh century, the word 'norm' had exclusively been used to refer 
to some standard, pattern or measure made available, and by far not in order to 
imply that the standard, pattern or measure itself could have been embodied 
(objectified18) by it in a way that one and exclusively one single right meaning 
could be extricable from such an embodiment." 
In language use, we do not to talk about 'logic of rules' instead of 'logic of 
norms'. No way in everyday practice we do equate the two terms with each 
other. Only a 'logic of norms' can be thought of, as if accepting in advance 
17
 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary Complete Text Reproduced 
Micrographically, I—II. Oxford, 1971, 2599-2600. In incidences far away in the past, such 
examples may affirm this: "beos riwle" [Ancren Riwle a (1225) (2 (Camden Soc. 1853)}] 
or "be pope [ . . . ] forsook be rule of be olde tyme" (John de Bartholomeus (de Glanvilla) 
Trevisa: Polychronicon Randulphi Higden (tr. 1387), VII, 431 {Rolls series 1865-1867}] 
(original edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 881, column 3 and 882, column 1, 
respectively). Against the historically established use, it is exclusively the modern (and, in 
a linguistic sense, rarer) professional usage that can attribute the word such a meaning: 
"Either according to the rules of the common law, or by the operation of the Statute of 
Uses." Penny Cyclopcedia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (1842), 
XIX, 379/2, quoted by Oxford English Dictionary, 882, column 2. 
18
 Obviously, this is a case of secondary objectification, i.e., one objectified by (through/in) 
previous objectification (copying the pattern of "secondary nature", built by humans for 
their servicing, upon the genuine nature as found and made use of on Earth). Cf., in a legal 
context, Varga, Cs.: 'Thing' and Reification in Law. In: Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in 
Lukács' World Concept. Budapest, 1985,21998. 
19
 It is to be noted that from 1676 on, the word appeared in the form of 'norma/normae', 
always italicised as a borrowance from the Latin, and started to spread as 'norm' only from 
1885, albeit between 1821 and 1877 mostly in pairs of synonyms such as, e.g., 'norm or 
model', 'norm and measure' or 'norm or principle'. Ibid., 1942, respectively (as in the note 
supra) 207, column 3. 
406 CSABA VARGA 
that nothing but linguistic propositions conceived of (or prepared as to serve) 
as logical units can be subjected to either logical operation or any genuine 
linguistico-Iogical analysis. 
4. Variety of Denotations 
All this may lead us to the conclusion that in actual occurrences and according 
to a nominal definition, ' ru le ' and 'norm ' denote the same, the fo rmer 
considered from the point of view of making it accessible (communicable) as 
a message and the latter f rom the one of logic, that is, as seen from the 
perspective of internal coherence and consequentiality of relevant contents. Yet, 
regarding either their genus proximum or differentia specifica, we have to 
realise that both their conceptual volume and extension will be different. For 
no norm can be found in a rule (or rules) but the mental reconstruction of its 
(their) message may generate one. Otherwise speaking, a rule may refer to a 
norm by forecasting the good chance that a norm can be reconstru(ct)ed 
through (as mediated by) it. For in itself, the rule is but a specific linguistic 
expression, while in logic an abstract logical relation is stated by the norm. 
Following this train of thought, we can also conclude that they are common in 
that, at least, none of them can stand by itself. A rule may come into being if 
thematised (expressed, declared, posited, enacted or promulgated, and so on) as 
such. And a norm may come to being in a somewhat reversed manner, namely, 
if a logical form is given to one or some of (parts of) the above in result of 
mental operations in intellectual (re)construction. All this notwithstanding, 
they are not and cannot be related as form and contents to one another.20 More-
over, they are not co-extensive either. After all, rules differing by language, 
culture, structure and expression (etc.) may be logified as expressing the same 
norm and the same rule (in case of intentional or unintentional ambiguity, or 
with omission of punctuation or misprint, etc.) may serve for the reconstruction 
of differing norms. 
J l
 For the Hegelian-cum-Marxian use of this terminology, cf. Varga, Cs.: Autonomy 
and Instrumentality of Law in a Superstructural Perspective. Acta Juridica Hungarica 40 
(1999) 3-4, 213-235 and Heuristic Value of the Axiomatic Model in Law. In: Raimund. 
J.-Lothar, Ph.-Schweighofer, E.-Varga, Cs. (ed.): Rechtstheorieband In memóriám Ilmar 
Tammelo (25. Todestag / 90. Geburtstag). Münster, etc., 2007 [in preparation]. 
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5. The Uniqueness of Civil Law 
In terms of what has been said above, it is the norm that has become the 
cornerstone of theoretical system-construction in our continentally rooted Civil 
Law, based upon the axiomatic inclination to logification. It is no mere chance 
that the construction of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law as the form-giver of the 
continental legal arrangement"1 is founded on the Grundnorm, as it builds the 
derivation of validity throughout the entire prevailing law and order either 
on direct logical or indirect linguistic (conceptual) inference [Ableitung]. 
Accordingly, the norm is conceived as a logical unit which has been generated 
through logical reconstruction and can be subject to further logical operation. 
Therefore it is by far no chance either that both the need for and the conceptual 
performance of a doctrinal study of the law-wi th the call for a meta-system 
strictly conceptualised and rigidly logified upon the law (taken as a body of 
texts thoroughly consistent as concluding f rom the law's very components2 2)-
were formed within the sole domain of Civil Law.22 (It is to be noted too that a 
theory of norms serving as a Rechtsdogmatik can be erected with no concept of 
21
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Hans Kelsen, a kontinentális jogi gondolkodás formaadója [Kelsen as 
form-giver of the continental legal thought]. In: Cs. Kiss. L. (ed.): Hans Kelsen jogtu-
dománya. Budapest, 791-804. 
22
 For the law 's systemic property, cf. Varga, Cs.: A kódex mint rendszer (A kódex 
rendszer-jellege és rendszerkénti felfogásának lehetetlensége) [The code as a system: the 
systemic character of the law and the unfeasibility of conceiving it as a system]. Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, XVI (1973) 2, 268-299, and for the chance, as well as science-philosophical 
and science-methodological aspects of the doctrinal study of law, cf. Varga, Cs.: Jogdogma-
tika, avagy Jurisprudentia és társai - tudományelméleti nézőpontból [Legal dogmatics, or 
jurisprudentia and so on in a science-theoretical perspective]. In: Jogdogmatika és jogel-
mélet. Konferencia (2006. november 10-11.) a Miskolci Egyetem és a Miskolci Akadémiai 
Bizottság rendezésében: Programfüzet, 3-7. 
23
 The predominance of the analytical method in applied legal philosophy and the 
thoroughly constitutionalised doctrine of the law in recent decades may suggest a trend 
greatly changed by today. Hence, the preference to analysis comes from an external interest, 
and the elitist (libertine) development of such constitutionalism as achieved by the US 
Supreme Court with academic assistance (i.e., by non-elected fora) has not yet exceeded 
the impact once exerted by the German doctrine on the English legal thought during the 
second half of the 19lh century, which may have enriched Common Law in both theoretical 
interpretability and conceptualisation without, however , dissimilating it from its own 
traditions. 
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rule implied,21 whilst a theory of rules dedicated to the law's phenomenal form 
can also be built upon the exclusive basis of norm-concepts.25) 
On the other hand, the culture of Common Law-which, instead of striving 
either for an exhaustive conceptual representation and textual embodiment 
(objectification) of the law, or re-establishing it according to axiomatic ideals, 
or also instead of reducing certainty of and security in law to logical deducibility 
from previously set propositions, focuses rather on the law's social and 
professional environment and the reliability of the former 's responsible and 
responsive practice, on the rectifying medium of everyday experience and of 
feedbacks drawn from dilemmas of decision on the level of common sense as 
organically rooted in tradition, as well as on the force of social continuity able 
to framework both preservation and renewal in the law so far and in as much 
as it may be needed-does speak in terms of rules as an exemplification of the 
law, that is, as an accidental manifestation and incidental actualisation in 
situations when one has to declare what the law is actually."'' 
4
 Kelsen supplies an illustrative example by avoiding the use of 'rule' (except for the 
term 'rule of law' with 'rule' meaning just domination or control) in his final theory of 
norms [note 16|. 
"
3
 See below, note 30. 
" 'This is well illustrated by the flow of literature covering the variety of areas and 
aspects of an academic interest in law which, historically drawing from the classical heritage 
of Jewish and Roman Law to span up to the present-day Anglo—American approach, uses 
exclusively the term of 'rule' as a phenomenal designation. Cf., e.g., D. van der Merwe 
'Regulae iuris and the Axiomatisation of the Law in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth 
Centuries' Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987) 3, 286-302; Kalinowski, G.: 
L'interprétation du droit: ses règles juridiques et logiques. Archives de Philosophie du 
Droit 30: La jurisprudence, Paris, 1985, 171-180; Clanchy, M.: A Medieval Realist: 
Interpreting the Rules at Barnwell Priory, Cambridge. In: Attwooll. E. (ed.): Perspectives 
in Jurisprudence. Glasgow. 1977, 176-194; Campbell, I. D.: Are the Rules of Precedent 
Rules of Law? Victoria University College Law Review 4 (1956) 1, 7-27; Jackson, M.: 
Austin and Hart on Rules. Edinburgh Philosophy Journal (March 1985), 24-26; Rosenberg. 
I. M.-Rosenberg, Y. L.: Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How to Read Cases: Of 
Specificity. Retroactivity and New Rules. The American Journal of Comparative Law 42 
(1994), 581-598; Frierson, C. A.: 'I Must Always Answer to the Law... ' Rules and 
Responses in the Reformed Volost Court. The Slavonic and East European Review 75 
(1997) 2, 308-334. 
In contrast, even in hypothetical situations when some normative staff is expressed in a 
logifying context, one can mostly encounter a norm-concept to base explanations. Cf. . e.g.. 
Fikentscher, W.: Methoden des Rechts IV: Dogmatischer Teil. Tübingen. 1977, eh. 31, para. 
VIII: 'Die Fallnorm' and. in a particularly telling context, Hassemer, W.: Über nicht-
juristische Normen im Recht. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (1984). 
84-105. 
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Yet, in a reverse sense, if rule is unconceptualised (without ever con-
ceptually related, analysed and/or classified to the depth), that is, if neither 
logical conceptualisation nor any systemic idea stands in a determinative manner 
behind the practical act of giving it a linguistic form, that is, of denomination,27 
then it is to be doubted whether a Rechtsdogmatik can ever be erected upon 
such a scheme. For no doctrine on the internal connection and coherence and 
conclusion can be built without being based upon norms.25 
If and in so far as the norm is logical a unit, the rule is nothing else than a 
kind of proposition. As to their respective environment, norms may stand both 
on their own and in a systemic context. On the other hand, rules do presuppose 
principles, standards and policies that can, without being rules themselves, 
demarcate the sphere of the said rules' relevance and/or applicability.24 
It is for the "scientific" methodology of the doctrinal study of the law [legal 
dogmatics] to answer how and to which depth the unlimited (and in principle 
also illimitable) demand of logical correlation, consequence and coherence may 
(if at all) be complemented to with axiologically founded teleological considera-
tions. Therefore, the introduction of either broader (socially sensitive) definitions 
(confronting, e.g., free-law movement to exegesis) or brand new aspects (by, 
e.g., teleological interpretation) in an established discourse within Civil Law 
may equally induce debates shattering the normativism's basic claim. In 
contrast, the a-scientific approach to law as paradigmatic of the regime of 
Common Law may openly admit that law can only cover (reach and challenge) 
27
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Codification à l'aune de troisième millénaire. In: Mélanges pour 
l'hommage de Monsieur le Professeur Paul Amselek (ed. Patrick Waehsmann et al.). 
Bruxelles, 2004. 745-766 and Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 2, 89-117. 
3
 A conclusion like this is facilitated by the unclarified English word usage and also 
by the fact that instead of any doctrinal study, it was the attempt at an axiomatical foundation 
of sciences-e.g., Moore, G. E.: Principia Ethica (1903) [cf. Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the 
Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 120]—that became instrumental in developing 
the linguistic analysis of law in the Common Law world. This very fact has anticipated 
English legal analysis not to be based on the very law but on sample sentences either 
authorly hypostatised or-as the early criticism upon Herbert Lyonel Adolphus Hart 's The 
Concept of Law had shown-although presented in a sociologising manner, yet actually 
constructed with no factual coverage whatsoever. Cf. Varga, Cs.: The Hart-Phenomenon. 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2005) 1, 83-95. For an exemplary elaboration, 
see Samuel, G.: Epistemology and Method in Law. Aldershot, 2003. 
24
 Practically the entire oeuvre of Dworkin, R. M.-starting from his paper The Model 
of Rules. University of Chicago Law Review XXXV ( 1967)-serves just the explication 
of this. 
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the field of practical reason, within which-perhaps to our continental astonish-
ment-sober everyday considerations are used to be given preference. 
6. Ambivalence in Praxis 
In sum, the dilemma of "rule and/or norm" carries marks of ambivalence 
inherent in coupling linguistic conventionalisation with attempts at theoretical 
(logifying and analytical) system-building upon it. (As a merely practical 
outcome, it is to be noted that albeit the Hungarian professional language usually 
refers to-by naming-legal rules, yet once they are subject to conceptual operation 
in doctrine, they are also treated as legal norms.20) 
On the final analysis, both can be used as conceptually justified in their own 
place and within their own context, respectively. For words in any language are 
used instrumentally and according to established habits, while concepts are 
formed as mental representations according to homogenising requirements set 
up by the given theoretical outlook and framework. 
All in all, we have thereby justified the moment of identity, ambivalence 
and duality inherent in the terminological dilemma of "rule and/or norm". 
Despite any remaining conceptual uncertainty, we may find it fortunate that 
scholarship developed in both German and Hungarian language cultures belongs 
to the orbit of Civil Law, which makes an explicit difference in theory between 
the mere act of signalling the fact that there is a normative message made 
available and the logically processed conceptual embodiment (objectification) 
of such a message. 
311
 E.g., Peschka, V.: A jogszabályok elmélete [The theory of legal rules], Budapest, 
1979. theorises upon norms exclusively [testified by its German version strikingly entitled 
as Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen. Budapest, 1982], after an obviously similar solution was 
already resorted to by Asztalos, L.: Polgári jogi alaptan. A polgári jog elméletéhez |A 
fundamental doctrine of the theory of civil law], Budapest. 1987. 
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Case Note: Sison v. Council-Human Rights or the Fight 
Against Terrorism-Do We Really Have to Choose?! 
On 1 February of this year the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its capacity as 
an appeals forum to the Court of First Instance (CFI) passed yet another judge-
ment relating to European acts containing lists defining persons suspected of 
association with terrorist activities. The judgement touches upon the important 
questions of access to documents of the European institutions as well as the 
human rights related to a fair trial and an effective legal remedy. It sheds light 
on the fact that although certain decision-making powers have been relocated to 
the European level, a parallel accommodation of legal protection has not 
followed suit thus leading to an unsatisfactory protection of human rights. In 
cases relating to terrorism, the European courts seem uneasy in applying the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by which the Community is 
bound. This tendency creates serious discrepancies in the legal regime of an 
entity committed to the respect of freedom, human rights and the rule of law." 
1. Facts of the case 
Professor José Maria Sison is the chief political consultant of the National 
Democratic Front of the Philippines in the peace negotiations with the Govern-
ment of the Republic of the Philippines. After being released from Philippine 
prisons, he obtained refugee status in the Netherlands in 1988 and has been 
living there since. On 12 August 2002, the US Office of Foreign Asset Control 
listed Mr. Sison as a terrorist and ordered the freezing of his assets. Just one 
day later, without notice and without giving him the opportunity for a hearing 
Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law, Heidelberg 
E-mail: plancos@mpil .de, petralea@gmail.com 
1
 Case C-266/05, Judgment of the Court of 1 February 2007-José Maria Sison v. 
Council of the European Union ("judgment"), not yet reported. 
" Article 6(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU). 
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the Dutch authorities listed Mr. Sison in a "sanction regulation against terrorism" 
ordering the freezing of his assets and the termination of all social benefits due 
to him. Two months later the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 
2002/848/EC linking Mr. S ison to the so-called New People 's Army, a para-
military communist revolutionary group classified as a terrorist organization 
by numerous countries as well as the EUJ and listing him as a terrorist suspect 
in the meaning of Decision 2580/200l 5- the basic European act for the purpose 
of combating terrorism. Two further Council decisions followed'1 repealing the 
decision establishing the original list; however, both new decisions maintained 
Mr. Sison on the list of suspected terrorists. 
2. The applications 
Under Regulation 1049/2001 on the public access to documents (Regulation)7 
which ensures among others natural persons residing in a Member State the 
right of access to documents of Community institutions8 Mr. Sison requested" 
the Council to grant access to all documents that led to his inclusion and 
maintenance on the lists contained in the mentioned decisions as well as the 
1
 Council Decision of 28 October 2002 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) 
No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities 
with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2002/460/EC (OJ L 195 of 30 
October 2002). 
4
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_People's_Army (3.03.2007). 
"Natural persons committing or attempting to commit an act of terrorism, partici-
pating in or facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism" Article 2 para 3 indent i) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures against certain 
persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344). 
Council Decision of 12 December 2002 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation 
(EC) No 2580/2001 on spécifié restrictive measures directed against certain persons and 
entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2002/848/EC (Decision 
Nr. 2002/974/EC; OJ 2002 L 337) and Council Decision of 27 June 2003 implementing 
Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing 
Decision 2002/974/EC (Decision Nr. 2003/480/EC; OJ 2003 L 160). 
7
 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parilament and of the Council of 30 
May 201 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents ("Regulation", OJ 2001 L 145). 
s
 Article 2( 1 ) of the Regulation. 
" Confirmatory applications of 11 December 2002. 3 February 2003 and 5 September 
2003. 
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disclosure of the identity of States submitting documents relevant in this 
respect."1 With regard to each application the Council refused access to such 
documents, stating that these were classified as 'sensitive" documents in the 
meaning of the Regulation" and even partial access would prejudice the public 
interest regarding public security, and further, that the disclosure of the identity 
of the submitting states would undermine the public interest relating to the 
soundness of international relations of the Union. The Council pointed out that 
the Regulation provides for exceptions in such cases12 as well as in cases 
where disclosure has not been consented to by the originator." 
3. Findings of the Tribunal in the judgement under appeal (T-11Ö/03) 
Mr. Sison brought three successive actions before the CFI for the annulment of 
the Council decisions refusing access. The three cases were joined,14 whereas 
the first case was declared as inadmissible and unfounded, the second as 
unfounded and only the third was dealt with in essence by the Tribunal. In the 
judgement under appeal the CFI in general noted, that "it must be accepted that 
the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism presupposes that information held 
by the public authorities (. . .) is kept secret so that (. . .) effective action can 
be taken."13 The Tribunal further confirmed that "institutions enjoy a wide 
discretion" in just ifying the refusal of access with reference to the public 
interest in areas covered by the mandatory exceptions'6 provided for by the 
Regulation.17 It found that, consequently, judicial review of such decisions is 
10
 Item 10 of the judgment. 
11
 Article 9(1) of the regulation provides: "Sensitive documents are documents origi-
nating from the institutions or the agencies established by them, from member States, third 
countries or International Organizations, classified as 'TRÉS SECRET/TOP SECRET' 
'SECRET' or 'CONFIDENTIEL' in accordance with the rules of the institution concerned, 
which protect essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member 
States in the areas covered by Article 4 ( 1 ) (a), notably public security, defence and 
military matters." 
Article 4( 1 )(a) of the regulation. 
13
 Ibid.. Articles 4 (4)-(5). 
14
 Joined cases T-405/03. T-150/03 and T-l 10/03, Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 26 April 2005-José Maria Sison v. Council of the European Union ("judgment 
under appeal") [2005] ECR 11-1429. 
13
 Item 77 of the judgment under appeal. 
16
 Italics by me. 
17
 Ibid.. item 46. 
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"limited to verifying whether the procedural rules and the duty to state reasons 
have been complied with, the facts have been accurately stated and whether 
there has been a manifest error of assessment of facts or a misuse of powers."18 
In particular it stated that the "Council was not obliged, under the exceptions 
provided for [by the Regulation], to take into account the applicant's particular 
interest in obtaining the documents requested", namely, that these were 
necessary for him to secure his rights to a fair trial in the proceedings before 
the CFI.19 
3.1. The appeal before the ECJ 
In his appeal against the judgements of the CFI, Professor Sison claimed that 
the ECJ set aside the contested judgements and annul the Council decisions 
refusing access to the requested documents, while the Council claimed the 
dismissal of the appeal.20 As the appeals against the judgements of the CFI 
dismissing the first two cases as unfounded was dismissed by the ECJ as 
inadmissible for lack of arguments brought in the appeal against these, the 
Court solely dealt with the appeal against third case, notably T-l 10/03.21 The 
appellant put forward five grounds of appeal centred upon his rights to a fair 
trial and access to documents, as well as the infringement of the duty to state 
reasons, the presumption of innocence and the right to an effective legal remedy. 
In its judgement the ECJ found one of the grounds for appeal inadmissible and 
all of the others unfounded, and it therefore dismissed the appeal.22 In the 
following I shall restrict my analysis to the first ground for appeal related to 
the breach of the right to a fair trial and an effective legal remedy. 
3.2. Breach of fair trial rights and the right to effective legal remedy 
3.2.1. Arguments in appeal 
In his first ground of appeal the appellant referred to the principle of a fair trial 
in general and defence rights in particular, as well as the right to an effective 
legal remedy. The appellant submitted that in the light of Article 6(3)(a) of the 
18
 Ibid., item 47. 
19
 Ibid., items 53 and 71. 
2,1
 Items 21-22 of the judgment. 
21
 Ibid., items 23-24. 
Ibid., item 109. In faet. ironically the Court even ordered Mr. Sison to pay the costs 
of the proceedings although all his assets had been previously frozen and all his social 
benefits had been cut. 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the right to a fair trial the 
Council is obliged to take into account his "legitimate interest in obtaining 
access to those documents, which concern him personally"23 as "everyone (.. .) 
has the right to be informed (...) of the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him."24 Further, according to Mr. Sison, in the light of the same provision the 
CFI infringed his defence rights by dismissing his actions, limiting its scope of 
judicial review and dismissing the fair trial argument, thereby also breaching 
his right to an effective legal remedy enshrined in Article 13 ECHR.23 
3.2.2. Findings of the Court 
Concerning the appellant's particular interest regarding the access to the 
documents in question, the ECJ pointed out that the CFI correctly observed 
that the purpose of the Regulation is to provide for general access to documents 
and not to "protect the particular interest which a specific individual may have 
in gaining access to one of them."2'' The Court found that exceptions contained 
in Article 4(1 )(a) of the Regulation provide for a mandatory refusal of access 
"without the need (.. .) to balance (...) those interests against those which stem 
from other interests."27 Thus, the ECJ goes on to state "even assuming that 
the appellant has (. . .) a right to be informed in detail of the nature and cause of 
the accusation made against him, which led to his inclusion on the list at issue" 
such a right cannot be enforced by reference to the Regulation at hand. 8 Exactly 
for this reason the Court rejected both claims regarding the infringement of 
defence rights and the right to an effective legal remedy. It seems to be saying 
that these rights cannot be exercised by recourse to the Regulation for the latter 
has not been designed for this purpose, and thus decisions denying access under 
the Regulation cannot result in a breach of such rights. 
23
 Ibid., item 28. 
"Article 6(3)(a) ECHR reads: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him." 
25
 Article 13 ECHR reads: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority not-
withstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity." 
26
 Item 43 of the judgment. 
27
 Ibid., item 46. 
28
 Ibid., item 48. 
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3.2.3. Assessment 
As a preliminary question it is important to note that not only the Member 
States but also the EC as well as "Community institutions are bound by the 
ECHR",29 specifically, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights.30 As regards defence rights, arguments directly 
invoking the ECHR in cases before the European courts are admissible in so 
far as the Tribunal and the Court of Justice afford a "protection equivalent to 
that guaranteed by Article 6 of the E C H R " / ' However, it may be questionable 
whether the appellant may rely on Article 6(3)(a) ECHR in his case at all, for 
he has formally not been "charged with a criminal of fence" as required by the 
Article and indeed, he was not facing criminal charges in any EU country.32 
However, in Deweer v. Belgium33 the European Court of Human Rights pointed 
out that the word 'charge' constituted an autonomous concept of a much rather 
substantive than formal meaning, where for example the "situation of the 
suspect has been substantially affected."34 It cannot be denied that the freezing 
of assets or the revocation of benefits constitutes such a substantial change. A 
29
 Brown, L. N.-McBride, J.: Observations on the proposed accession by the 
European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights. American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 29 (1981) 695. 
30
 „Where (...) an international agreement provides for its own system of courts, 
including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the Contracting Parties to the 
agreement, and, as a result, to interpret its provisions, the decisions of that court will be 
binding on the Community institutions, including the Court of Justice", Opinion 1/91, 
[19911 ECR 1-06079; "The commitments emanating from the ECHR are already explicitly 
integrated in the EU treaties; they are an integral part of the community's legal order". 
Lerch. M.: European Identity in International Society-A Constructivist Analysis of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Constitutionalism Web-Papers-ConWEB No. 2/2003 (note 
12), at 6; see further: Lavranos, N.: Concurrence of jurisdiction between the ECJ and other 
international courts and tribunals, EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference (31. 3 -
2. 4. 2005), Texas, 17; see also the Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 52(3) and its 
commentary, Borowsky, M.: Tragweite und Auslegung der Rechte und Grundsätze, 
marginal notes 10, 29, 30, 37, in: Meyer, J. (ed.): Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen 
Union, Baden-Baden, 2006. 
31
 Case T-112/98, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 20 February 2001-
Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG. v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR 
11-729.: see also: Brown, McBride, op. cit., 695. 
12
 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/nov/sison-application-2-T-150.pdf (24. 05. 
2007), 4. 
33
 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Deweer v. Beigium-b993n 5 
[ 1980] ECHR 1 (27 February 1980). 
4
 Peukert, W.: Artikel 6 (Verfahrensgarantien), marginal note 48, in: Frowein, J. A. 
and Peukert. W.: EMRK-Kommentar. Kehl, 1996. 
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further qualification is that the reason for such a 'charge' must be a criminal 
offence, thus protection under Article 6 ECHR is guaranteed in all cases where 
the act allegedly committed by the suspect is deemed criminal in the legal 
order of the jurisdiction in question.35 It is obvious from the preamble of 
Council Regulation No. 2580/2001 on combating terrorism36 that terrorism 
constitutes a criminal act under European law. It follows, that both the Council 
and the Tribunal are fully bound by the fair trial rights enshrined in the ECHR 
which may further be invoked before the CFI and the ECJ. Thus, it seems that 
the Court 's brief hint in the judgment to the contrary ("even assuming that the 
appellant has (...) a right to be informed in detail") is undue and Article 
6(3)(a) applies in full. 
As regards the concurrence of the CFI and the ECJ in stating that the purpose 
of the Regulation is not to protect particular interests in obtaining access to 
documents, this statement holds true; however, this does not mean, that human 
rights do not figure in cases where a certain legislative act is not explicitly 
designed to consider, or does not even mention, human rights. Although it is 
correct that fair trial claims may not be based on the Regulation itself, the 
'mandatory refusal' provided for by Article 4(l)(a) of the Regulation cannot 
hold without an at least possible exception for human rights. Consequently, the 
Council cannot use a specific 'blanket' provision of the Regulation to rid itself 
of the duty to respect human rights in general, and the right to a fair trial in 
particular. It follows that the Council cannot dispense with balancing public 
interests against "other interests" such as those related to securing the defence 
rights of the appellant.37 Naturally, the Council may still arrive at the conclusion 
in the individual case that the public interest as regards for example public 
35
 Ibid., marginal note 35, see further: http://www.legislationline.org/?tid=105&jid= 
60&less=false. 
36
 See recitals 1 and 2 of Council Regulation No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism 
(OJ 2001 L 344); Peukert, op. cit., marginal note 36. 
37
 Effective legal remedy requires that "the question whether the impugned measure 
would interfere with the individual's [specific human] right (...) and, if so, whether a fair 
balance is struck between the public interest involved and the individual's rights must be 
examined." Cameron citing the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden-62332/00, not yet reported (6 June 2006), in: 
Cameron, L: The European Convention on Human Rights, due process and United Nations 
Security Council counter-terrorism sanctions, Report prepared for the Council of Europe 
(2006), http://www.coe.int/t/e/legaLaffairs/legal_co-operation/public_international_law/ 
Texts_&_Documents/2006/I.% 20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf (24.05.2007), 20; see also: 
Borowsky, op. cit., marginal note 21. 
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security justifies a proportional restriction of the individual interest in gaining 
access to documents which may prove necessary for the realization of defence 
rights. At the same time, the legal review of the decisions of the Council and 
the judgement of the CFI may lead to a different result should the Regulation not 
be interpreted by both judicial instances as excluding a balancing of interests. 
In accordance with the above, the Tribunal is also obliged to respect fair trial 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR. Defence rights guarantee, among other things, 
that the party to the proceedings is granted "sufficient, adequate and equal 
opportunity to deliver statements both factually and in a legal sense, and that 
the party is not put at a disadvantage in comparison to the other [party]."38 As 
the ECJ points out, contrary to the assertion of the appellant its defence rights 
had not been denied by the CFI in the sense that the arguments put forward by 
the appellant had been indeed considered and then dismissed.34 However, an 
other aspect of the right to a fair trial is the principle of 'equality of arms' 
which requires "that all material evidence for or against the accused must be 
disclosed to the defence"411 except in cases where measures restricting disclosure 
are strictly necessary, with the further qualification that "if a less restrictive 
measure can suffice then that measure should be employed."41 The latter requires 
that the proceeding court has the means to establish whether the refusal of 
disclosure was strictly necessary and proportionate. 
Based on the above it is questionable whether the appellant's right to an 
effective legal remedy as provided for by Article 13 ECHR has not been 
violated.4- It is important to note that the right to effective judicial protection 
under the ECHR is bound to the breach of a particular human right under the 
same Convention. The appellant claimed that he had been denied an effective 
legal remedy against the breach of his right to be informed in detail of the 
cause of his inclusion on the lists in question, which also entails disclosure of 
evidence in this respect. As noted above however the ECJ found no breach of 
the right to be informed in detail. Referring to the fact that no breach of a 
human right under the Convention has taken place, the Court seems to be 
saying that this fact excludes the possibility of an infringement of the right to 
3K
 Peukert, op. cit., marginal note 72 (my translation). 
34
 Item 50 of the judgment. 
411
 Cameron, op. cit., 13 (italics in the original). 
41
 Ibid., 14. citing the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, van Mechelen 
and Others v. Netherlands-2l363/93\ 21364/93: 21427/93 and 22056/93 11998] 25 EHRR 
647 (23 April 1997). 
4
" In general see: Biernat, E.: The locus standi of private applicants under article 230 
(4) EC and the principle of judicial protection in the European Community, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 12/03, 22-23. 
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an effective legal remedy,41 that is: the lack of breach of a specific human 
right per se excludes the infringement of Article 13 ECHR and therefore also 
dismissed this part of the appeal. However the Court unduly applied a 'shortcut' 
in reviewing whether the right to an effective legal remedy has been breached 
by the CFI. The starting point of the review should not be the determination of 
whether the right to a fair trial (here: the right to be informed) has been 
breached or not and drawing conclusions therefrom regarding the infringement 
of Article 13 ECHR. Rather, the object of the review should have been the 
proceedings of the first instance court, the examination of whether it provided 
an effective legal remedy in assessing the breach of the appellant's right to 
be informed by the Council. Even more so, as the right under Article 13 
presupposes merely an "arguable claim"44 instead of an established breach of a 
right under the Convention exactly because the right to an effective legal 
remedy is meant to facilitate the assessment whether such a breach has 
occurred at all. The right to an effective legal remedy not only secures the right 
to bring a case before a legal forum but also that the remedy provided by the 
latter is 'effective' in the sense that a "competent, independent appeals 
authority must exist which is to be informed of the reasons behind the 
decision, even if such reasons are not publicly available. The authority must be 
competent to reject the executive's assertion that there is a threat to ( . . . ) 
security where it finds it arbitrary or unreasonable". Albeit states (and mutatis 
mutandis also the EC) have a "margin of appreciation in how they apply Article 
13" especially in areas concerning public security, judicial remedy must still 
be afforded, and this "must be effective in practice as well as in law".45 Thus, 
Article 13 ECHR requires that minimally the proceeding court has access to 
documents based on which it may establish whether claims exacting secrecy 
are well founded46 for "where a national authority does not take sufficiently 
into account, or is not capable of taking into account, the substance of the 
individual's arguable claim that his or her Convention rights have been breached 
then there has been a breach of Article 13."47 Consequently, the review of 
4
" Item 52 of the judgment. 
44
 Frowein, J. A.: Artikel 13 ("Beschwerderecht"), marginal note 2, in: Frowein, J. A. 
and Peukert, W.: EMRK-Kommentar, Kehl, 1996. 
43
 Cameron, op. cit.. 20. 
46
 As Cameron points out "the (minimal) controls which operate in general on collection 
and transmission of security information could not compensate for the total absence of 
effective judicial remedies," that is the conduct of the executive must be subject to possible 
judicial review. Ibid., 12-13. 
4
 Ibid., 19, referring to the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, КI ass and 
other v. FRG-5029/71 [1978]2 EHRR 214 (6 September 1978) (italics in the original), 19. 
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whether the CFI has afforded effective judicial remedy as regards the arguable 
claim relating to the breach of Article 6(3)(a) must entail the assessment 
whether the Tribunal has accessed the necessary information and examined the 
proportionality of the contested decision. 
Conclusion 
It seems that the European courts are yet uncertain in how to apply human rights 
in cases that relate to the fight against terrorism. The Sison case is a good 
example of this tendency: both the CFI and the ECJ unduly limit their scope 
of review according the Council excessive discretion in refusing access to 
documents, which leads to unsatisfactory results as regards the protection and the 
enforcement of human rights. As Cameron points out, "there are unfortunately 
many examples of purely formal mechanisms of challenge as far as security 
matters are concerned", which give the illusion that human rights have been 
safeguarded, whereas in reality they have been mocked by faint proceedings. 
This way, there may be even more harm done than good15 for the EU in general 
and the victims of human rights infringement in particular. 
48
 Ibid., 14. 
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Lörincz Lajos: A közigazgatás alapintézményei [The Basic Insitutions of 
Public Administration], HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2005. 406 pp. 
The experiences of human history demonstrate that at times the leading forces 
of societies need to pause and retrospect, evaluate the present and outline the 
future, since the future is obviously anchored in the past, or more precisely, in 
the present. Thence, the evaluation of "the present" will necessarily result in a 
conspectus, scilicet, a conspectus of the available, or favourably, accessible 
facts, circumstances, experiences and knowledge in the specific framework. 
I may not be incorrect, if I simultaneously contend, as a university professor 
dealing with public administration for more than two decades, that in our own 
(personal) lives peculiar situations ensue or might ensue, when we must also 
pause and accomplish what no one else can objectively effect, including our 
colleagues most familiar with our achievements. Scilicet, a conspectus or 
summary of our theoretical and practical knowledge acquired and scientific 
achievements attained during the recent years or decades. That is, the commit-
ment to the writing of all the knowledge which perforce we master most. 
Initially, these were the thoughts that entered my mind, when I took "The 
Basic Institutions of Public Administration" by Lajos Lörincz into my hand 
and read the work, which was published possibly not unintentionally upon 
the 70lh anniversary of the birth of the author.' All along, it gave me the 
impression that I was holding an oeuvre, a kind of conspectus on public 
administration, and not merely Hungarian public administration, in my hand. 
A conspectus, which intends to provide a comprehensive and complex 
introduction to the basic institutions of public administration for the first time 
since the publication of the textbook of Zoltán Magyary in 1942 titled "Public 
Administration in Hungary". Complexity in this case implies that upon the 
introduction of basic institutions, the author endeavoured (with success, I might 
add) to consider the achievements of all sciences concerned with public 
administration, including those of legal and political sciences, the sciences of 
1
 The volume was published by HVG-ORAC Publishing House Ltd. in exacting 
finish. 
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administration, sociology and psychology and comparative sciences. In my 
judgement, however, complexity marks the volume not only by reason of the 
consideration of the achievements of sciences concerned with public administra-
tion from various points of view, but also in the sense that besides drawing on 
the results of Hungarian special literature, the author works through the American, 
German and French special literature concerning public administration uniquely 
from a Hungarian point of view." 
The title projects the introduction of the basic institutions of public 
administration, hence, it is regarded important, on the one hand, what the 
author defines as the concept of public administration, and on the other hand, 
what the author deems to be "the basic institutions" in the context of public 
administration. As a matter of fact, this complex question can be answered as 
follows: 
As to the first part of the question, we can establish that public administra-
tion implies a specific activity of the state carried out by a specific group of 
experts working in a specifically structured organisation. Thus, public administra-
tion can be most clearly described through the detailed introduction and analysis 
of these three elements, i.e., activity, organisation and staff, which is to be 
construed as the generic term of state and local administration in a democratic 
state founded on the rule of law. 
As to the other part of the question, the basic institutions of public 
administration are considered to be the three referred to elements of public 
administration, i.e., activity, organisation and staff, complemented by two 
further essential elements. One of these, or, if it suits your convenience, a 
starting point is that public administration is never realised or operates in a 
vacuum, but in a particular social environment, thus, the introduction of the 
real character of public administration requires the analysis of the system of 
relations with respect to that social environment. The other further element is 
the circumstance, that in modern societies public administration as to its organi-
sation and functions cannot be distinctly separated from its environment, that 
is, on the frontiers of public administration we can find several so-called para-
ln recent years, primarily in the spirit of the accession of Hungary to the EU. more 
and more studies were published, which examine various legal institutions from a 
Hungarian point of view. Let me adduce the following two works: Kecskés, L.: Tézisek az 
Európai Közösség jogáról és a jogharmonizációról - immár magyar szemmel is (Theses 
Concerning the Law of the European Community and Legal Harmonisation, by This 
Time from a Hungarian Point of View). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 52 (1997)181; Pap. L.: 
Az Európai Bíróságról - magyar szemmel (Concerning the European Court from a 
Hungarian Point of View). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 53 (1998) 107. 
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administrative organs. These para-administrative organisations-also described 
as "non-administrative organs similar to administrative organs"-carry out public 
(administrative) activities. 
According to the explication above, the basic institutions of public administra-
tion are adumbrated as follows: 
1. public administration and its social environment, 
2. the organisation of public administration, 
3. the activities of public administration (functions and duties), 
4. organs that constitute the frontiers of public administration and their 
activities (para-administration), 
5. the staff of public administration. 
This list constitutes not a random, but instead logical system. It creates a 
natural, substantive order, which the author properly constructs and forms the 
structure of the volume. Therefore, the oeuvre of more than 400 pages consists 
of five great structural parts. 
Part 1: Public Administration and Its Social Environment 
The substrate formula is given: public administration is always realised in a 
particular social environment, therefore, the provision of an insight into this 
environment as a theoretical foundation is reasonable before the detailed introduc-
tion of the three elements of public administration. In this process, the author 
deals with three main issues: 
1. Which sciences, from which viewpoint and which methods deal and have 
dealt with public administration? 
2. How does (and has) the relation of public administration to the economy 
and politics develop(ed)? 
3. Does public administration have basic principles, and if so, what are 
these and what is their significance? 
Ad. 1. Sciences concerned with public administration 
Public administration can be defined as a form of the appearance of the state 
for the majority of people, and as the author remarks, reasonably, it implies the 
state per se as the organisational and personal framework operating for several 
thousand years, which has secured the subsistence of human communities via 
its organisational work. This, according to the rules of formal logic, would 
entail that the science of public administration also dates back several millenia. 
More precisely, we could assume that the science of public administration as a 
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systematic synthesis of knowledge pertaining to public administration, which 
progressively affects its subject matter, has developed over several millenia. 
In fact, however, at least in Europe, the science of public administration as 
opposed to classical natural sciences emerged relatively late, around the end of 
the 18lh and beginning of the 19lh centuries, that is, the time of the decline of 
feudal absolutism, which was closely related to the accretion of the property 
of the monarch and to the bourgeois transformation of society. The work of 
scientists dealing with public administration for two hundred years is assessed 
by the author in the following manner: 
A) Scientists dealing with public administration: 
The respective authors study the functions, organisation and the environment 
of public administration directly, and actually assume that no significant 
difference obtains between the administration of the public and private sectors. 
The current framework of this science has evolved as a result of the long and 
organic development of the following branches: 
a) cameralistics and the science of policing (J. H. Justi, J. Sonnenfels), 
b) theory of public administration (L. Stein), 
c) theory of administration (H. Fayol), 
d) the American theory of public administration (F. Taylor, L. Urwick, L. 
Gulick, H. A. Simon). 
B) Theorists of legal science dealing with public administration: 
The respective authors have focused not on public administration and its environ-
ment, but instead on law pertaining to public administration. More precisely, 
these authors have studied public administration not directly, but via pertinent 
law, and consequently, arrived at their conclusions. Thereby, it is understandable 
that the prerequisite for the emergence of this branch was the evolution of the 
separate area of law settling basic problems of the organisation, activity of 
public administration and relation between citizens and public administration, 
i.e., the law of public administration. It was first in France at the beginning of 
the 19lh century that this branch emerged, nevertheless, a German scientist, 
Otto Mayer played the most prominent role at the turn of the 20,h century. 
C) Theorists of political science: 
Law regulating public administration only had a role on the Continent. In 
Anglo-Saxon states, by reason of the different development of the legal system, 
it was superseded by political science, which was designed to provide theoretical 
support to the practical administration of state affairs, i.e., governance. Its 
foundations were laid by W. Wilson. 
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A common feature of the sciences dealing with public administration 
mentioned so far is that their prominent field of research is public administra-
tion. The same applies to comparative public administration as the most powerful 
branch in our days.3 That does not obtain with respect to the following sciences 
(although, their fields of research undoubtedly cover public administration): 
sociology, psychology, economics geography, etc. As the author also asserts, a 
further fact is that the mutual interaction of diverse fields has increased in recent 
decades; research in law and political science intertwines with sociology, 
research in the science of administration with psychology, etc. 
Ad. 2. The relation of public administration to the economy and politics4 
In this chapter, the author starts from the fact that although, public administra-
tion has continuously changed, it has retained its essential features and relative 
autonomy throughout the ages. Its essence has changed, but not dissolved, 
since it has remained an organisational activity carried out in favour of the 
realisation of the will of the people. Regarding the changes, both the economy 
and politics have a decisive role, but undoubtedly, other circumstances, such as 
historical traditions or the geographical situation of the specific state also 
influence the formation of public administration. 
The author treats the effects of the economy and politics on public 
administration in separate chapters, while emphasising that economic and 
political factors do not equally affect the three elements of public administra-
tion: its organisation, activity and staff. 
A) The system of relations between the economy and public administration 
In the context of relations between economic factors and the organisation of 
public administration, the author indicates that the concentration of production 
verifiably led to an increase in the quantity of the duties carried out by public 
administration and the centralisation of the administration of affairs by the 
1
 When I stated above that the oeuvre subject to the eurrent review is a kind of 
conspectus, I could have adduced the former works of Lajos Lőrincz to substantiate my 
statement. 1 didn't do so, since I consider the method in which I draw the reader's attention 
to the various works and studies in relation to the specific issues more expedient. Well, the 
author published a separate study concerning the substance of comparative public 
administration, as well. See: Összehasonlítás a közigazgatásban (Comparativeness in 
Public Administration). Magyar Közigazgatás, 49 (1999) 225. 
4
 In this area, the author published a monography in 1981. See: A közigazgatás 
kapcsolata a gazdasággal és a politikával (The Relation of Public Administration to the 
Economy and Politics). Budapest, 1981. 
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state. However, the increase in quantity did not result in the transformation of 
the quality of the entire organisational system of public administration, as the 
core of the organisational system has remained unaltered since feudal absolutism. 
Namely, no substantial changes have occurred in the organisation of the 
administration of foreign affairs, finance, justice and defence. The situation is 
different in other areas of public administration, i.e., concerning economic, 
commercial and cultural affairs, where changes both in quality and quantity 
have occurred. It is necessary to emphasise changes in quality, since the so-
called duty-performing, new types of organs of public administration, can be 
clearly distinguished from the traditional formalist, inflexible organs of public 
administration threatening with sanctions and organised in a nationally unified 
hierarchy, scilicet, from the authority. As the author formulates, "the authority 
is splendidly structured to perform administration, although inadequate to 
perform duties in the areas of the economy, culture and social life", (p. 47) 
Its consequences are assessed in Part 4 of the volume discussing para-
administration. 
Changes are also palpable in the context of the relation between economic 
factors and the activity (functions) of public administration. The process of 
globalisation that ensued in economic life, has obviously and powerfully influ-
enced the functions of public administration, primarily manifesting itself in 
an increase in the function of the provision of services. An array of public 
administrative functions and duties have appeared, which had formerly been 
inconceivable, such as national planning, appraisement and rational utilisation 
of various resources, financing scientific research, subvention of crucial areas of 
production by the state, securing the balance of production and consumption, 
etc. 
With regard to the relation between economic factors and the staff of public 
administration, the author sets forth that in the second half of the 19th century, 
the respective staff was recruited from the middle class, in which the disposal 
of certain property and an educational level far above the average were a priori 
given. The decisive change ensued following the Is' World War, when parallelly 
with a change in quality, the moderate increase in the number of staff before 
the turn of the century accelerated, which was closely related to the accrual 
of public administrative duties. Civil servants were progressively recruited 
from the lower strata of the middle-class and the standard of education also 
descended. 
B) The system of relations between politics and public administration 
As it is publicly known, the political system is a complex establishment, in 
which certain elements, i.e., the parties, the state and the political ideology 
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are not equally momentous. The most significant force is represented by the 
political parties, since within a democratic framework, it is exclusively these 
organisations having the direct objective of obtaining and retaining state power. 
The parties with a modern structure emerged in the second half of the 19th 
century, after the basic principles of the establishment of the bourgeois state 
had been laid down and the institutional safeguards of the division of power 
had been established. In developed states, two types of party systems have 
developed and function currently. In the USA and Great-Britain, two-party 
systems, whereas in other Western-European states, multi-party systems were 
established, which has apparently affected public administration, as well. 
In states with two-party systems, the party that wins the elections exercises 
exclusive (state) power, as if a one-party system prevailed in the specific country. 
In principle, the legislative and executive powers (public administration) are 
separated, although in actual fact, both are the organs of the winning party, that 
is, parliament and government are propelled by the same power. 
In states with multi-party systems, the classical principles and institutions 
of the division of power markedly manifest themselves. Parliament has a 
greater scope of action in comparison with government, in addition, a kind of 
vertical structure also appears, so far as the coalition parties predetermine, which 
administrative branches they intend to control. 
As a matter of course, the relation between the party and public administra-
tion is the most compelling in countries with one-party systems, as it was 
manifest for instance in Hungary before the political transformation. 
Besides or beyond the problem of party struggles, the issue of the relation-
ship between the staff of public administration and parties is also unavoidable. 
This issue is analysed in a separate chapter, which departs from the fact that 
the relation between public administration and the parties is particularly close 
with regard to their staff. In this respect, the question arises as to what extent 
parties can influence the staff of public administration so as to attain their 
objectives. In this respect, three solutions obtain globally. According to the 
first one, the staff is entirely politicised, that is, the positions in public 
administration are occupied by members or supporters of the political party in 
power (prize system). A clear example in this respect is the USA. According to 
the second solution, the staff is politically neutralised, that is, shielded or 
protected from any political influence (career structure). As an example, we 
can mention the United Kingdom before 1945. The third solution represents an 
in-between form, which combines the two former models, a commonly cited 
example of which being the system in France. 
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Ad. 3. The basic principles of public administration 
According to the author's allusion made among his introductory thoughts, 
special literature is rather divided concerning the basic principles. Even the 
question is subject to debate, as to whether public administration has basic 
principles, and if so, what their significance and functions are. 
Nevertheless, the author's standpoint is unequivocal: public administration 
does have basic principles, and as such, they are indispensable, politically 
marked scientific constructions. Furthermore, they frame the essence of social 
expectations with regards to public administration. In this sense, the basic 
principles are norms, according to which the realisation of the conceptions of 
political leadership can be measured. The basic principles manifest the desired 
reality: their roles consist in motivation, reality formation and orientation. 
According to the standpoint of the author, which 1 do not question, two 
basic principles embody the requirements concerning contemporary public 
administravtion as reflected in the experience throughout the history of develop-
ment of public administration: namely, democratism and the effectiveness of 
public administration. 
A) The democratism of public administration 
The traditional form of democratism as the rule of the majority is discernible 
only to a limited extent (through public bodies) in the case of public 
administration construed as a peculiar system of state organisation exercising 
public authority. The democratism of public administration implies its limited 
and controlled nature. Thus, democratism doesn't consist in an internal operative 
principle of public administration, but it is the principle of the exercise of 
power vis-a-vis public administration. In the ensuing text, the author also sets 
forth that, although the instruments and manners of the enforcement of the 
democratism of public administration may be multifarious, they can be classified. 
A part of them represents the direct safeguards of democratism, while the other 
part indirectly contributes to the social control of public administration. In the 
scope of direct manners, the author mentions and analyses participation and 
the openness of a career in public administration as basic principles, whereas, 
in the scope of indirect manners, work in the public interest, subjectedness to 
law and transparency are mentioned. An exhaustive discussion of these basic 
principles and requirements exceeds the scope of the present review. 
Notwithstanding, I must assert that on the one hand. I completely agree with 
the explication of the author, and on the other hand, the majority of the 
principles treated by the author were framed as the basic principles of "good 
governance" in a document of the European Committee as a requirement to be 
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complied with by the institutions of the European Union and the public 
administration of member states. According to the European Committee, the 
basic principles of good public administration are the following: openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.5 
B) The effectiveness of public administration 
In general, effectiveness implies consideration of the relative statistic deriving 
from the comparison of the effort made to attain a specific objective with the 
reached achievement. In the area of public administration, the issue of 
effectiveness was raised quite late, after the Is ' World War, by the science of 
administration. The reasons for that include the monopoly of public administra-
tion and its subjectedness to politics.6 As to public administration, we need to 
distinguish extraneous and intrinsical effectiveness. Extraneous effectiveness 
can be measured with respect to society and its norm is satisfaction, which is 
difficult to measure. Whereas, intrinsical effectiveness is easy to measure, 
since this is encompassed in the area of the organisation of work. 
The author concludes the discussion of the two basic principles of public 
administration, i.e., democratism and effectiveness by establishing that these 
principles are closely interrelated. Public administration that is lavish, slow and 
negligent, cannot be democratic, since it fails to meet the most basic expectation 
of society. Simultaneously, public administration that lacks democratism cannot 
be effective, since it excludes the population that it is destined to serve f rom 
the administration of affairs, preparation and control. 
Part 2: The Organisation of Public Administration 
The author treats the issue of organisation, the first component of public 
administration, in two greater contexts. First, he introduces the results of the 
pertinent research of various sciences, and he then classifies and treats the 
system of organisation in a detailed manner, distinguishing the central and 
local organs of public administration. 
' See; White Paper on European Governance. The document was issued by the 
European Committee in June, 2001. 
6
 On effectiveness, see more amply the following study by the author: A hatékony 
állam (The Effective State). Magyar Közigazgatás, 55 (2005) 449. 
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A) Sciences concerning the organisation of public administration 
Formerly, I referred to the fact that sciences dealing with public administration 
from disparate points of view introduce new aspects of the actually complex 
system of organisation, activities and staff. This statement is valid not only in 
general, but also specifically with respect to organisation. What I am referring 
to is that, concerning the organisation of public administration, the author 
presents the most important assumptions of political science, legal science and 
the science of administration and sociology in an exhaustive manner. Let me 
point out the following ones: 
a) Political science and legal science describe the organisation of public 
administration by comparing it to other organs participating in the exercise of 
state power, thereby, drawing on conclusions as to its features. According to 
the author, these features are best apprehended through the examination of the 
decisions of representative organs and the opportunities for the application of 
coercive measures of the state. The society is interested in the control of this 
power, i.e., of public administration, therefore, the law must ensure, on the one 
hand, the subjection of administrative organs to representative organs, and on 
the other hand, the protection of citizens vis-a-vis the unlawful acts of public 
administration. 
b) As opposed to both political and legal science, the science of administra-
tion studies the intrinsical features of the organisation of public administration; 
that is, it lays the emphasis on the system of relations within and among 
the organs. It recognises two structures considering the development of the 
organisation of public administration: a vertical and a horizontal structure. The 
vertical structure derives from the establishment of mediating organs between 
the centre of government and settlements with dual functions; that is, the 
mediation and enforcement of central decisions and the collection and transfer 
of local information. The horizontal structure evolved during a later stage of 
historical development; that is, at the time of feudal absolutism. It entailed a 
higher degree of the division of labour, which was initially realised only at the 
central level via the establishment of the basic types of ministries, such as the 
ministries of foreign affairs, defence, finance and the interior. At a later stage 
of development, primarily as a result of detachment from the branch of internal 
affairs, a sharp increase is noticed in the number of ministries, which resulted 
in an almost unsolvably difficult coordinational task in the prevailing top 
organ of public administration. 
c) Sociology describes public administration as a bureaucratic type of organ by 
underlining its respective features: written rules, the principles of hierarchy and 
official trips, and officialism. The author also mentions that the reasonableness 
of certain tenets of the bureaucracy-model contended by Max Weber was in many 
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respects challenged by later research. As an example, he refers to the research 
carried out by Elton Mayo, who proved that, besides the structure set forth under 
formal rules, an informal structure can also be discerned in the organisation. 
B) The classification of administrative organs 
A wide range of public administrative organs work in all countries, therefore 
requiring classification of their description and apprehension. This is feasible 
in numerous manners, depending on the aspect according to which systématisa-
tion is accomplished. The author selected the area of activity of the administrative 
organ as a criterion for classification and accordingly, distinguished central 
and local organs of public administration. 
Notwithstanding, as the author correctly indicates, central organs do not 
represent a homogenous organisational system. Therefore, he firstly presents a 
typology of central organs, and then introduces ministries, national supreme 
authorities, the government and its organs in an exhaustive manner. Regarding 
the typology, we need to point out that two models obtain with respect to the 
executive function in the world: the dualist and the monist models. According 
to the dualist model, both the head of state and the prime minister are 
responsible for execution, whereas, according to the monist model, the prime 
minister and the executive organisation clustering round him exclusively bear 
the responsibility. 
The author dedicates a separate chapter to the introduction of ministries and 
national supreme authorities, which is justified by the obvious significance of 
these public administrative organs. In this scope, the author classifies ministries 
and distinguishes between stable and changing ministries, ministries directly 
related to the activity of government and ministries performing execution, and 
he then introduces various structures in ministries, such as the classical and the 
Swedish model. Furthermore, he discusses the issue of their direction, i.e., the 
organs of shaping politics and the organs of execution in ministries. Even his 
adumbrative account of these exceeds the currently available scope. Nevertheless, 
we should note the fact that the author treats these issues not only in general, 
but also devotes focus to Hungary, whilst not neglecting the historical 
approach. 
Also reasonably, the author devotes a separate chapter to the government 
and its organs, specifying various kinds of governments, structures and activities 
of governments. His methodology resembles the one applied in the case of 
ministries, and as such, he proceeds from the general towards the particular 
through the apprisingus of various governmental systems, as well as Hungarian 
solutions using a historical and legal historical approach. 
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Regarding the local organs of public administration, the author starts the 
discussion with the clarification of principles and concepts. He considers local 
administration in a kind of theoretical work on the subject, and then renders his 
interpretation of the concepts of centralisation, déconcentration (the establishment 
of local organs of central administration) and decentralisation. Finally, with 
a focus on Hungary, the author discusses the issues of both déconcentration 
(establishment of the local organs of central administration) and local govern-
ments in separate sub-chapters.7 
Part 3: The Functions and Duties of Public Administration 
Public administration is not only an organisational system structured according 
to specific principles, but it is also an organisation performing specific 
functions and duties. Functions and duties, as the author sets forth in the introduc-
tion, are terms with different implications, although, they are often treated as 
synonyms. Function is a more general and broader term; it defines the essence of 
the social designation of the organ. Duty, however, reflects comparatively more 
specific tasks, the performance of which leading to the accomplishment of 
function. According to the method applied formerly, functions and duties of 
public administration are discussed with respect to the fields of political 
science, legal science and the science of administration and sociology, with 
the author drawing on an enormous apparatus of special literature. The essence 
of his statements can be summarised as follows: 
A) Regarding the approaches of political and legal sciences 
According to the classical definition, the function of public administration consists 
in its execution. In the system operating with the division of labour among 
various types of state organs, the function of representative organs is legislation, 
the function of courts is administration of justice, whereas, the function of public 
administrative organs is the enforcement of law; that is, realisation of decisions 
made by political organs via the implementation or performance of three duties 
with specific content, i.e., law-making, application of the law and organisation. 
7
 The author examined these issues in various studies formerly. Among these, I ' l l 
highlight the following one: Magyar közigazgatás: dilemmák és perspektíva (Public 
Administration in Hungary: Dilemmas and a Perspective). Budapest, 1988. 
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B) The science of administration concerning the functions of public 
administration 
The science of administration focuses on organisation as a specific activity. As 
Fayol and Gulick demonstrated, organisation is not a homogenous human 
activity, since it has disparate elements. According to Fayol, these are planning, 
commanding, coordination and supervision, whereas, according to Gulick these 
include planning, organisation, staff matters, direction, coordination, reporting 
and budgeting. The latter viewpoint gained ground in special literature as 
POSDCORB, which equals the joined initials of the elements. Having worked 
through the achievements of recent special literature, the author analyses the 
most important elements of organisation, i.e., planning, decision-making and 
supervision, in a detailed manner. 
C) The functions of public administration according to the sociological 
approach 
The majority of authors enforcing a sociological approach, e.g., Max Weber 
and Michael Crozier, agree as to the distinction between standard and variable 
functions of public administration. Standard functions prominently include these 
of protection and meeting demands. Variable functions cannot be so distinctly 
separated, since their peculiarity is that they vary according to time and space. 
The author mentions the public administrative system of ancient Egypt as an 
instance, the decisive functions of which included planning and establishment 
of the watering system and the organisation of water management. 
Regarding the functions of public administration, sociology has also 
elaborated on a further categorisation. Accordingly, public administration has 
dual functions: integration and allocation. Via the integrative function, public 
administration attempts to channel the extremely multifarious interests manifest 
in society towards the attainment of objectives declared to be in national, local 
or social interest. Without integration, the society would be decomposed to its 
elements and social peace would become vulnerable. Alternatively, the essence 
of the allocative function is the allocation of social resources to social activities 
and institutions for the purpose of attaining the objective of integration. 
Part 4: Para-Administration 
The word "para" of Greek origin is used as the anterior constituent of compounds 
and denotes the similarity (to something) of the term connected to it; for instance, 
para-military. The study of public administration from multiple viewpoints as 
presented above has demonstrated that, as I pointed out in the introduction, 
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public administration cannot be distinctly separated from its social environment, 
since on its frontiers, as the author puts it, we can find organs that attend to 
public (administrative) duties, which are not actually public administrative 
organs, but merely similar to them. These are para-administrative organs; the 
number and significance of which having increased from the second half of the 
20lh century. 
A) The manners in which public duties are performed 
Before the discussion of these manners, the author departs from the statement 
that one of the principal duties of public administration is the organisation of 
various public services, such as water supply, education, health care, energy 
supply, construction of public roads, etc. The range of these services has 
extended throughout history with the express demand of the members of 
societies. This has led to a situation, which the author describes as follows: "we 
justifiably designate the public administration in our age as a provider of 
services or an organiser of services", (p. 242) Public administration performs 
its duty to provide services in three main manners. First ly, it attends to its 
duties itself either via its specific, bureaucratically structured organs, on which 
public authority is conferred, or via its official apparatus. This range includes 
duties which manifest that public administration is a public authority, e.g., 
keeping basic records, issuance of certificates and documents, licensing and the 
application of state sanctions. Secondly, for the purpose of performance of 
duties, it establishes institutions, so-called public institutions, on which it 
confers the duty of the provision of public services. Thirdly, it transfers the 
performance of a duty to an organ in the private sector. 
The common feature of public duties belonging to the second and third 
categories is that these are economic and material services, and therefore in 
these cases public administration undertakes a different role from the one of a 
public authority in the first category. The classical organs of public administra-
tion do not have either the power or the preparedness to provide economic 
services, although they are responsible for their accomplishment. 
B) Factors determining the manners in which public duties are performed 
It is a fact that in all countries of the world, each of the three manners in which 
services are provided is applied, although their relative proportions are quite 
variable. According to the author, the selection of each of the solutions in a 
specific state is determined by the geographical position of the country, 
prevailing political-idological differences and fashionable trends. 
So far as the geographical position of a country and the prevail ing political-
ideological differences are concerned, it is worth mentioning the USA, where 
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liberalism determines both the economy and politics. Its consequence is that, in 
the area of the provision of public services, public property is restricted to the 
narrowest scope: public services are provided by both organs founded on 
private property and private associations, while state control and supervision 
are maintained. In Europe, however, the vehemence to transfer public services 
to private undertakings has been far more contained. 
The prevailing political-ideological differences also determine the manner 
in which public duties are performed, since historical experience demonstrates 
that left-wing (socialist, social democratic) parties appreciate public property 
more so than liberal parties. 
Finally, fashionable trends have an unquestionable role in the proportions 
of the respective manners in which public duties are performed. In Europe, for 
instance, following the 2nd World War, the efficient provision of public services 
seemed to be feasible via nationalisation, whereas, currently it is carried out 
through privatisation. 
C) Para-administrative organs in Hungary 
Under effective law in Hungary, the following organs can be or are considered 
to be non-public-administrative organs that provide public services: public works, 
public institutions, public bodies and public foundations. The author treats these 
para-administrative organs separately, denoting their features and refering to 
effective pertinent legal regulations. 
D) Public services provided by private organs 
The chapter on para-administrative organs is concluded with a sub-chapter 
discussing the performance of public services by private organs. In this context, 
the author underlines that, in a broader sense, practically all human activities 
may be considered public services: bread-supply, manufacture of clothing, 
construction of roads, building of flats, etc. These duties are generally performed 
by organs of private property, according to the rules of the private sector and 
under specific control by the state (public administration). The relation of 
public administration to these private organs is special, since supervision, and 
parallelly, interference by the state, is facilitated. This is especially valid in those 
cases, whereby work in the public interest is carried out by private organs on the 
basis of agreements concluded with public administrative organs for a 
specific period. In this scope, the author lays emphasis on concession agree-
ments and agreements concerning public services. 
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Part 5: The Staff of Public Administration 
Regarding significance, the most extensive part of the work under survey 
discusses the issue of staff and let me add, not without reason. I must also admit 
that staff is the most important constitutive element of public administration. 
We can form the organisational structure of the public administration of a state 
most optimally and we can provide for the most auspicious working conditions, 
but nevertheless, if there is no availablility of adequately trained and motivated 
staff of officials adjusted to the given function and duty, public administration 
will be incapable of complying with its social designation. 
The author considers the following issues with respect to the staff of public 
administration: 1. the number and composition of staff, 2. systems of human 
resource policy, 3. selection in public administration, 4. planned and predictable 
promotion-career structure, 5. rights and duties of civil servants, 6. the system 
of responsibility of civil servants, and 7. (further) training of civil servants. 
Even a brief introduction of each of these chapters would overreach the 
narrow scope of the present review. Therefore, in the ensuing text I will rather 
abide by pointing out the statements and conclusions of the author that 1 consider 
most important: 
- The number of the staff of public administration is determined by several 
factors (such as the population size and the extension of the territory of the 
state), which are deemed equally important, as any instance can be used to 
demonstrate the "powerlessness" of a specific system. In this respect, a further 
problem is that we can merely assume the comparability of specific categories, 
which in fact may not correspond. For instance, the content of the terms "civil 
servant" and "state employee" in Hungary can be quite different in other states 
of the world. 
- The number of employees in public administration and its relative 
proportion to the number of all employees has increased since the 1880s, which 
is closely related to the progressively powerful interference by the state, 
including the sharp growth of the duties of the state (public administration). 
This tendency is reflected in Hungary as well, although, there have been 
obvious fluctuations in the recent century. 
- The number of staff in public administration per se is not decisive, since 
we must also observe the composition of the staff with respect to the relative 
educational level, age, sex and even proportion of politicians and experts. It is 
worth noting that, in Hungary, the records pertaining to civil servants kept by 
the Ministry of the Interior is quite expedient. 
- Public administration is the most enormous field of work in all countries 
considering that it employs the highest number of employees. Therefore, the 
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concept of how employees are taken on and how their situation shapes during 
work should not be treated indifferently. In this respect, two notably great 
models of human resource policy systems have evolved; on the one hand, the 
open system, which conforms to the solutions of the business world, and on the 
other hand, the closed system, which applies military conceptions in the civil 
sector; although, the open and closed systems are obviously not maintained in 
their pure forms. In fact, the experience is that open systems tend to close and 
closed systems tend to open sooner or later. 
- In view of prevalent tendencies, Hungary invariably converted to the 
closed system, which was regarded as a model (see, Act 23 of 1992 on the Legal 
Status of Civil Servants) at a time when it started to recede in the majority of 
developed states. 
- The first and most important element of human resource policy is 
selection.8 It implies a process targeting the filling of a position and consists of 
two phases: recruiting and actual selection. During selection, the so-called 
general employment criteria, such as age, citizenship, moral criteria, state of 
health and education, are applied, while the so-called social preferences, namely, 
the principle of representation, affirmative action and political preferences, are 
also enforced. 
- According to the closed system of human resource policy, life-long 
service is the most favoured solution. In that case, the major stages of the life-
course need to be planned, and the respective positions and salaries need to be 
assigned. Therefore, all those who are employed in the closed system pursue 
careers. In the modern world, three types of career-structures have evolved. 
The first projects a continuously rising career from entering into office to 
retirement. The second, occurs whereby the employee reaches the peak of 
his/her career, when the organisation can take the most advantage of his/her work 
(between the ages of 40-50). The career trajectory here reaches an accelerating, 
followed by a declining phase, and as such advancement is not continuous. 
The third career trajectory is rarely applied in the public sector, but rather in the 
private sector. According to this solution, the employee should reach the peak of 
his/her career, when he/she has the most up-to-date knowledge with some 
practical experience. This characterises the period from the age of 30 to 35. 
- The author considers each of the obligations and rights of civil servants 
and stresses that, under effective Hungarian law, we cannot find the specification 
of these under a separate chapter. With respect to the scope of obligations, he 
8
 See.- more amply the following study by the author: Kiválasztás a közigazgatásban 
I. és II. (Selection in Public Administration Parts I and 2). Magyar Közigazgatás, 50 
(2000) 321, 449. 
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discusses the following: fulfilment of duties in a public administrative organ, 
compliance with directions, retaining information and secrets, exemplary 
behaviour, lawful and honest work and loyality. The author then distinguishes 
three scopes of rights. Firstly, the rights that derive from employment, which 
are due to all employees, such as the right to payment, holidays and various 
benefits. Secondly, certain rights that are derived from the closed system of 
career in public administration, such as the right to promotion and employment 
security. Thirdly, civil servants have political rights, such as freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, and rights to trade-unionism and strikes. 
- With respect to the training of experts in public administration, the 
author poses basic questions and subsequently answers them. Just to mention 
some of these: When should the training take place? (before entering office or 
during employment?) Should the training involve generalists, who are familiar 
with all fields, or exclusively specialists, who are employable only in specific 
fields, and in this respect, what should the subject material of the training be? 
Who should be involved in teaching? (only theoretical experts or practical 
experts, as well?) 
* 
After the introduction of the oeuvre titled "The Basic Institutions of Public 
Administration", the reviewer has one task left to attend to; to consider the 
essence of the questions above and give an opinion reflected in a recommen-
dation concerning the excellently systematic and brilliant work exhibiting an 
enormous volume of knowledge. My recommendation is that it should be 
examined by all people concerned with, interested in or wishing to acquire 
knowledge concerning public administration. Since we can have access to all 
that is worth knowing about this magnificently complex organisational system, 
activity and staff, thanks to the author and his thorough grounding, knowledge 
and entertaining style, all we must "merely" do is read his book. Enjoy perusing! 
András Torma 
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